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# Foreword

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A phrase that appears in the title of the first article in this issue points to a phenomenon that is explicitly or implicitly relevant in the other articles as well: changing role. All of us know this little phrase very well, but most of us will probably say that we do not use it very often. It is so that in our daily life the situations which prompt us to consider or propagate a role change may be few and far between. It is in situations where conflict appears on the scene, subtly disguised or blatantly manifest, that we tend to practise some wishful thinking about certain people changing their roles.

The articles and book reviews in this issue provide us with case studies, discussions and conclusions that may shape our thinking about the possibilities of changed roles. As we read, we may keep a few questions in mind and be on the look-out for answers. For instance: Are we limited to wishful thinking in this regard? Or can anything be done to initiate, facilitate or encourage a role change that might lead to conflict resolution and/or reconciliation?

In the article on women changing their role from instigators of violence to builders of peace, we find three episodes of women adhering to their firmly established traditional role, and two episodes of women courageously breaking away and leading others in the direction of peace. These initiatives emerged from inner motives, but in each case there were others who responded and joined the effort.

In the article on the role of the print media we read about editors and journalists who focus more on conflict and its escalation, but also about some who publish reports related to reconciliation. This article then also gives

clear recommendations for encouraging the people of the print media to fulfil a realistic and responsible role.

The third article describes the predicament of citizens and 'non-citizens' deprived of human security and other human rights by one-track-minded politicians. In this case no optimistic examples could be given, but between the lines there is a clear call to such politicians to change their mindset and role. A similar message to politicians is embedded in the last article. As one reads this account of a 'dialogue', one realises how participants, addicted to power and slogans, were entrapped in monologues, and how a change of role was totally unthinkable to them.

Nevertheless, we know that there have been politicians who have changed their roles - with dramatic and far-reaching effects. Moreover, the books reviewed in this issue can equip and inspire us to play very significant roles as influential or even as ordinary citizens, or as 'partners' in a conflict, or as counteractors of gender-based violence.

It may be interesting and useful to remember that the expression of playing a role functions in two semantic fields. The one is that of an actor playing a part in a play. The other is that of performing a particular task in an undertaking. It is obviously this second meaning that we are talking about. The women of Darfur who changed their roles did not merely act something for the show; they committed themselves to a new responsibility. When such a 'small miracle' happens in a conflict situation, surprising effects may follow. But should we only wait passively and wishfully for such a possible change, or are there ways in which we may help to pave the way towards a turn into a new direction?

Our South African experience prompts me to add a concluding comment. We remain endlessly grateful for crucial role changes that genuinely took place within people. But we could not help noticing that some of those who were compelled to act in new roles, apparently internalised them and are now actually living these roles.

# From Instigating Violence to Building Peace: The Changing Role of Women in Darfur Region of Western Sudan

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## Abstract

The article sets out to examine the changing role of women vis-à-vis inter-communal conflicts in Darfur region of western Sudan. The region is currently riddled with violent inter-group conflicts. Women are commonly

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accused of being one of the causes of such conflicts and the instigators of violence in general. This rather unfounded perception about women confuses their actual role today with regard to peace and war, and denies women their legitimate demand for participation in public life, including peace building and conflict resolution. The article attempts to separate fact from fancy. It points out that it is true that a small number of women in the region still act as instigators of violence. These are the women who live among nomadic communities and are generally known as *Hakkamas* – which literally means arbiters of man's conduct. The majority of women, however, are found among rural sedentary communities. Many women are also found in the urban centres. Both sedentary and urbanised women are strong advocates of peaceful coexistence among the regional identity groups. The male-dominated social structure impairs their effective participation in conflict prevention, management and resolution. The article is based on information obtained from the women themselves. No attempt is made to put words in their mouths or dictate for them the way they should behave. Findings are considered important for both researchers and decision-makers. It is about time to change the misconception that analysts have about the actual role of women vis-à-vis peace and war in the region. It has been argued that changing the *Hakkama* role would only be possible by changing the entire social milieu in which the *Hakkama* finds herself. The situation calls for enormous developmental projects that lead to conflict transformation. Nomadic communities need to be settled so that women need not preserve the image of the 'warrior-man'. On the other hand, the demands made by the rural sedentary and urbanised women need to be met and women's associations need to be empowered so that women can become actual peace builders rather than violence instigators.

## Background

Darfur region in the extreme northwestern Sudan is currently riddled with violent inter-group conflicts, so much so that recently a so-called mechanism for the imposition of law and order and the supremacy of government was established in the region. This mechanism allows extra-legal measures which ensure that inter-group violence comes to an end. Traditionally, when a major violent conflict takes place between groups, a government-sponsored peace-making conference is organised to work out a formula for reconciliation. Recently, however, such conferences have become ineffective. In a press

release, the deputy-governor of Northern Darfur State made the point that around thirty such conferences have been held recently, but without success in ending inter-group conflicts.[1] The phenomenon raises several questions about the nature of such conflicts and the reasons why government-sponsored conferences have failed to put an end to them (Mohamed 2002).

The investigation of the role of women in such conflicts is timely for several reasons. Firstly, being historically a male-dominated community, the region denies women representation in peacemaking conferences. Educated and urbanised women in the region have become increasingly critical about being denied a role in peace building and representation in peacemaking conferences. Secondly, women are generally accused of being the promoters, or at least one of the causes, of inter-group violence. Thirdly, it is true that the *Hakkamas* – literally, the arbiters of man's conduct – can be instigators of violent conflicts among their men-folk. But the *Hakkamas* are only a small segment of the female population in the region. The *Hakkamas* are found only among nomadic communities, which account for less than 17 per cent of the regional population, according to the 1993 population census (Department of Statistics 1994).

The article aims at separating fact from fancy; and demonstrates women's changing role from instigating war to building peace. As the theme has not been adequately researched previously, secondary sources are not available for library data analysis. Instead, data were collected from fieldwork, using in-depth interviewing and focus group discussions as mechanisms for data collection. In most cases women's involvement in making war or peace is presented in the form of storytelling. Stories are presented as episodes. The author made several visits to Southern Darfur State during the period 1998-2002, and interviewed both men and women as individuals or groups. Consulting published materials of course formed the theoretical background. The article is presented in 5 parts: (1) Shame Culture and Gender Roles, (2) Women as Instigators of Violence, (3) Women as Promoters of Peace, (4) Women's Perception of their Role, and (5) Implications for Researchers and Decision-makers.

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1    Al-Ayyam Daily No. 7485, October 3, 2002. The deputy-governor is Shareef Mohammadain Adam Sabi.

## 1. Shame Culture and Gender Roles

Societies at traditional or transitional stages of development are said to be guided by a shame culture. According to Palmer (1980:48), 'The main characteristic of shame cultures, is the situation in which the prime element of social control is the individual's fear of being publicly humiliated or shamed. This over-concern for appearances stresses compliance with an established set of cultural norms designed to prescribe proper behavior for most if not all contingencies'.

In rural Sudan, and particularly among the Bedouin populations, it is extremely shameful for a man not to be courageous, brave and enduring. For instance, it is shameful behaviour to run away from dangerous situations, to not stand by the side of relatives or kin at moments of danger and to fail to demonstrate endurance when undergoing pain. Likewise, it is considered shameful for a man to be stingy and to fail to reciprocate friendly gestures made by other people.

Until quite recently, there has been no central authority to protect people's lives and property; so Sudanese rural communities assigned men the role of protectors for their communities.[2] Thus the image of the 'warrior-man' evolved among Sudanese rural communities. While men were assigned this role, women were assigned the role of being the arbiters of man's conduct. They see to it that their men-folk demonstrate bravery, courage, endurance and generosity, among other socially desired behaviour patterns. They perform this role by singing songs or displaying deeds that either commend or disapprove of men's conduct.

The nomadic communities are particularly concerned about the need for the courageous man. Until the beginning of the colonial era, they lived in a dangerous country, 'with lions, leopards and hyenas attacking their herds. Men still carry spears wherever they go not only as defense against wild animals but also because of the ever present possibility of vengeance being committed upon their persons' (Cunnison 1963). Among the cattle nomads,

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2    Until the colonial government reconquered Sudan (1898), rural Sudan was predomi-nated by inter-group raids and counter-raids. Paul (1954:121) has this to say about the Beja tribesmen over whom he was serving as District Commissioner: 'law and order were in the main observed, and there were growing apprehensions that murder, blood feuds and internal raiding were social crimes, which the government would not tolerate'. Also see Howell (1974) for the control of rural communities in the Sudan.

locally known as Baggara, the personality of the '*Hakkama*' woman emerged. Men fear the *Hakkamas* because they can make or break their reputations. Lampen (1933), who was a District Commissioner for cattle nomads of southern Darfur, wrote:

> The women's tongues are greatly feared, for if they sing against a man's courage, he will probably leave the country to be quit of this intolerable nuisance. I have seen a boy almost in despair because the women, quite unjustly, accused him of having run away from robbers and left his brothers to be plundered. I have seen three Nazirs [tribal leaders] give extravagant bribes to one of these *Hakkamas*, who threatened to sing against their meanness.

## 2. Women as Instigators of Violence

The nomadic communities and their animals are no longer threatened by wild animals, but they are now mostly engaged in inter-group conflicts, either among themselves or between them and the settled farmers (Mohamed 2002, Mohamed & Wadi 1998). In other words, the need for the warrior-man is still felt, which gives importance to the *Hakkama* role. The ensuing discussion depicts some episodes that demonstrate how women in general, and the *Hakkamas* in particular, might be the instigators of violent conflicts among men.

### Episode One[3]
In a field visit (1998) to Daein town, the headquarters for the Rezaigat cattle herders, many stories were told about how women may incite their men-folk to engage into violence. A short time before my arrival to Daein, a *Hakkama* was said to have mocked three young men of her own tribe who, reportedly, allowed robbers to plunder them. The *Hakkama* appeared in the market place, putting a piece of cloth around her head, a cigarette between her lips and a pen at her ear. People gathered around her, inquiring about her unusual

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3    The Daein Province Commissioner related these episodes. He was interviewed in his house, December 13, 1998.

behaviour. She told them it was very simple: the piece of cloth around her head was that of Mr. A's turban [and she named him], which he left for the robbers to take away. The cigarette was that of Mr. B [and she also mentioned his name], which he also left for the bandits to take away. And the pen was that of Mr. C, [who was a government official, using the pen in office work]. I was told that the three young men had to leave Daein area, going to unknown destinations. They would probably not dare to come back to Daein until each of them is reputed to have done an exemplary deed of courage.

## Episode Two

Not only the *Hakkamas* but all women may assume the role of provoking their men-folk to go to war. They can do this by words or deeds. My arrival in Daein was less than a year after the late Cherubino Kwanyin Bol[4] attempted to take the town of Wau in Bahr el-Ghazal region of southern Sudan. Having been driven out of the town by government forces, the Cherubino militia attacked Rezaigat herders, who happened to be in the area around Wau, killing some of them and rustling a large number of their cattle. The Rezaigat women got extremely angry that their men-folk did not avenge Cherubino's deeds, and decided to incite them to seek revenge. The Rezaigat young women who sold tea in the town decided not to add milk to their tea if buyers were Rezaigat youths. If a young Rezaigi buyer asked for the reason, the answer came to him readily: 'We have no milk any more. Cherubino's people took away all the milk cows!'

The Daein commissioner told another story. The Rezaigat housewives also decided to mock their husbands for failure to retaliate against Cherubino. When a husband came home, and asked his wife to open the door for him, she would not open the door. On asking her 'Why'? she would answer, 'You can't come in. A Cherubino militiaman is already inside!'

Such acts of mockery on the part of Rezaigat women worked like fire in the Rezaigat men to create feelings of shame. They gathered in thousands – the commissioner added – on horseback or on foot and pursued Cherubino's

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4    Cherubino was a leading figure in the Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M). In 1991 he defected from SPLA/M mainstream and in 1997 he signed a peace agreement with the Khartoum government, but he later turned on the government and attempted an unsuccessful taking of Wau town in southern Sudan. Cherubino was eventually killed in the bush amidst conflicting reports about his killer.

militia. Many of them got killed, but many of Cherubino's militia were also killed, and some cattle were recovered. The *Hakkamas* then sang songs, praising the bravery of their tribesmen and calling Cherubino and his militia insulting names.

## Episode Three

Another example of cattle nomads' women inciting men to engage in fighting comes from the extreme western part of Southern Darfur State. Two Arab tribes, the Taaisha and the Salamat, inhabit the area. Tension had existed between the two tribes for quite a long time over local autonomy demanded by the Salamat, who are regarded as newcomers to the area. In 1980 two Taaisha youths killed a Salami man, and then went to the police station, admitting their deed and placing themselves in the custody of the police. The Salamat tribesmen were surely offended but were not quick enough in retaliating. Their young women were alienated and decided to invoke vengeance on the Taaisha by mocking the Salamat youths.

The women took the opportunity of a big festival in which young men and women of different tribes would dance together in couples. It is the woman who selects a partner to dance with. The Salamat women decided not to select Salami men for dancing. Instead, they would select partners from other tribes. The message was clear enough for the Salamat tribesmen. Their women disapproved of their failure to avenge the Taaisha deed. Consequently, the Salamat tribesmen gathered in large numbers, assaulted Taaisha villages, killing, burning and looting. The Taaisha retaliated in kind. Raids and counter raids by the two parties left hundreds dead and caused considerable loss of property. The Taaisha-Salamat warfare is generally regarded as one of the most deadly wars in the region.[5]

## 3. Women as Promoters of Peace

Palmer (1980:23) is correct in making the point that 'human behaviour tends to be profoundly shaped by the individual's structural and cultural milieu'.

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5    An interview with Yusuf Suleiman Takana, in my office in Khartoum, December 1998. Takana was Minister of Agriculture in the region (1980-81). He acted as chairperson for the conference on peacemaking between the Taaisha and Salamat.

The *Hakkamas* and other nomadic women tend to be violence instigators because they live in social surroundings where the 'warrior-man' image is dictated by the need for communal protection. As society moves from this traditional or semi-traditional level of societal development, individuals' attitudes and behaviour patterns undergo changes (see Palmer 1980, Chap. II). Not all women in Darfur region are still nomadic. Most of them have become sedentary, engaging in agricultural production. Others have become urbanised.[6] Both the rural sedentary and the urbanised women have been exposed to change-producing agents that made them more modern in attitude and behaviour patterns. The following episodes suggest that rural sedentary and urbanised women are increasingly becoming advocates of peace rather than war.

## Episode Four

Fatima Seif ed-Deen ed-Dikhairi is an elementary school teacher, who was brought up in Um Kaddada, a small town in Northern Darfur State. In 1989, with the beginning of the National Salvation government, Mrs. Dikhairi and four other women were appointed members of a grand committee that was man-dominated. The so-called committee was a political organisation, representing almost all major regional identity groups. It was founded by the central government with the aim of building power bases for itself in the region. The committee was on a field trip to inspect the newly installed pipeline that provided el-Fasher, the then capital of the entire region, with fresh water. All of a sudden Mrs. Dikhairi burst upon her men-folk, scolding them for paying attention to less burning issues, such as inspecting water pipelines, when dear blood was being shed in other parts of the region. At that time the bloodiest conflict between Fur, a non-Arab tribe, and a group of Arab tribes was at its climax. She addressed Fur and Arab representatives in the committee, protesting how they had allowed a few deviant individuals among their communities to raise the racist banner of Arab/non-Arab that had torn the regional fabric into pieces! Then she addressed the entire committee again, asking them how they ever regarded themselves as men when they failed to preserve what their ancestors had left for them. They left for them, she added, a region whose people had lived in harmony for generations; but

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6    The 1993 population census estimated urban population in the region to be 17%, the nomadic population 13% and sedentary farmers 70% (Department of Statistics 1994).

now individuals won't dare to travel from one place to another because of inter-group violence. She added the question: how would they ever call themselves men when they allow precious blood to be shed between Fur and Arabs in the Jebel Merra massifs! How could they accept to see women being widowed, children being killed or losing their parents, and elderly people being gunned down, killed and left unburied! She repeated the question: 'How dare you consider yourselves men?'

Mrs. Dihairi's words were said to have made everybody burst into tears, and caused the entire committee to decide promptly to end their pipeline inspection and make their way to the areas where Fur and Arabs were fighting. They stayed there until they had brought the fighting to a halt and prepared the ground for a peacemaking conference. As a gesture of honour Mrs. Dikhairi and the four other women were appointed as chairpersons for sub-committees to handle the crisis. The long-lasting, exceptionally devastating ethnic conflict was thus brought to a halt. Mrs. Dikhairi knew very well how to arouse the pangs of shame culture in her men-folk and make them want to be peace builders rather than war mongers.[7]

## Episode Five[8]

A government-sponsored peacemaking conference was held in 1989 to resolve the conflict between Fur tribe on the one hand and the group of Arab tribes on the other. In 1990, however, some educated tribal elites in Nyala town felt that the agreement reached in the conference was a 'postponement' rather than a resolution for the conflict. Grassroots reconciliation was needed, if a lasting peace could prevail among the warring factions. The government authorities were notified and their consent was secured, after agreeing to appoint three people to represent the government in the largely non-governmental body. From the start women were represented in the initial steering committee, and then in committees inside Nyala neighbourhoods. The message was clear: grassroots people must leave war traumas behind them and go back to their normal brotherly relations. They must learn to forgive and forget. After having

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7    The late Abulgasim Ibrahim Mohamed, the governor of the region (1989-1990), told Mrs. Dihkairi's story. He was interviewed in Khartoum, October 18, 1999.

8    Information comes from Abdalla Ali Massar (interviewed December 9, 1989), Fatima M. El-Hassan (December 9, 1989) and Zakaria Seif ed-Deen (July 23, 2002). The three interviewees were active organisers in the citizen-based reconciliation campaign.

succeeded beyond expectations at the level of Nyala town, the organisers decided to expand their activities to their tribal entities at the village and camp levels. Women were instrumental in disseminating the idea at all levels, particularly within Nyala neighbourhoods.

The initiative was not carried through to its maximum fruition, however, as a change of government brought a new governor to the region, who did not see eye to eye with the organisers of the citizen-based reconciliation. Their invaluable effort was thus brought to a halt, but not before the message was well received by the grassroots populace.[9] When the so-called 'Comprehensive Peace Conference' (CPC) was held (in 1997) for the entire region, Southern Darfur State delegates included a sizable number of women, most of whom were active members of the citizen-based reconciliation initiative.[10]

## 4. Women's Perception of their Role

The studies of women in connection with war or peace, few as they are, have been done by outsiders, who are mostly men (e.g. Lampen 1933, Cunnison 1963, Hassan 1975). Such studies express the opinions of researchers rather than those of the women themselves. The current study – still carried out by a male researcher – tries to let the women speak for themselves. Women's opinions were obtained by means of focus group discussions and in-depth interviewing. The author made two field trips to Southern Darfur State (December 1998 and July 2002),[11] and carried out the discussions and interviews with women in the state. Southern Darfur State represents, to a large extent, the entire region in that it has representation of the three segments of society that are found in the region today: the urbanised women, the *Hakkamas* and the rural sedentary women.

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9   The new governor reportedly viewed organisers as serving the political ends of the opposition.

10  According to Massar (see note 8), the Comprehensive Peace Conference (1997) was itself a citizen-based endeavour, starting as a 'people's security conference', before it was dominated by the government and renamed as CPC.

11  Darfur region is now divided into the three states of Northern Darfur State, Southern Darfur State and Western Darfur State, their headquarters being the towns of el-Fasher, Nyala and el-Gineina, respectively.

The *Hakkamas* and rural sedentary women were met during the first field trip (December 1998). The meeting with the *Hakkamas* took place in Daein town, while meeting with rural sedentary women took place in Um Matariq, a village to the south of Daein. The *Hakkamas* talked about a reorientation program, organised by a Darfur region governor in 1991, in which they were involved.[12] The program aimed at training the *Hakkamas* to create a culture of peace, so that they would sing songs for peace rather than for war, and observe that Islam dictates that they ought to be peace builders rather than war instigators. They claimed they had abandoned singing war songs, alleging that when fighting erupted between their own tribe, the Rezaigat, and the Zaghawa tribe (1996), they sang reconciliatory songs rather than war-inspiring ones. The Zaghawa delegates that were interviewed, however, said the opposite, reciting defamatory songs sung against them during the war. A clearer example of *Hakkamas*' failure to abide by the teachings of the reorientation program is what they did during the Cherubino incident (episode two). The same *Hakkamas*, without sensing any contradiction, cited numerous examples of songs inciting the Rezaigat to retaliate for Cherubino's action and calling him and his militia insulting names. Cunnison (1963) was correct in making the point that the change of women's role is 'perhaps only possible if the society and the economy as a whole change'. Fortunately such changes are already taking place in the region. Most nomadic women are increasingly becoming settled farmers or urban residents, looking forward to communal peaceful co-existence rather than warring factions.

The Um Matariq women are, by far, the most affected by tribal warfare. Their own tribe, the Rezaigat, is the most involved in tribal fights with their Dinka neighbours to the south and with several other neighbours to the east and north. Consequently, many Rezaigat women have become widowed heads of household without prior training to assume such a role. Most widowed heads of household are now living in extremely poor conditions. Um Matariq women, therefore, wish the day would come when their own tribe would live in peace with all its neighbours. They have other suggestions to make such as that the man-dominated society be changed so that women have a say in what affects their lives, that the growing need be addressed for both men and women to be trained in peace culture and conflict prevention, management

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12     The group with whom the discussion was held included famous *Hakkamas* such as Haleema A. Mohamed and Hummura M. Abbakar.

and resolution, that literacy campaigns be launched among both men and women, but particularly among women, as the illiteracy rate is higher among women, and that women schoolteachers teach the children to be peace lovers, so that future generations would live in peace.

In Nyala town two groups of women were met: (1) the Women General Union (WGU) and (2) representatives of Dar Bakheita Charity Organisation, a non-governmental organisation (NGO). Although the WGU is a pro-government women's association, its members express independent opinions about the role of women vis-à-vis inter-group conflicts in the region. They reiterated almost all the suggestions that were made by the Um Matariq women, adding that, in fact, the WGU had been quick in responding to any violent conflict that took place in the area. They sent relief supplies to the victims and took the opportunity to engage in awareness raising among the rural women. Their activities, they contended, were greatly appreciated by their 'sisters' in the rural areas. The WGU group demanded full participation in government-sponsored peacemaking conferences, arguing that if men believed women were the cause of conflicts, then women should be given the chance to resolve such conflicts. As most WGU members are schoolteachers, the group asserted that women teachers were already teaching the children about a culture of peace and preparing them to become future peace constituencies.

Dar Bakheita is the only women's NGO to be found in Nyala. It is named after Bakheita, the mother of the organisation's founder, Fatima Mohamed el-Hassan. Fatima is a well-known gender activist at the regional level. She was a leading figure during the May regime (1969-1985) and a key person in mobilising women behind the citizen-based reconciliation campaign (1990). Her NGO is principally a charity organisation, trying its best to help children, the poor and the elderly; but it also concerns itself with issues of peace. Fatima strongly opposes the idea of government-sponsored peace-making conferences, asking instead for citizen-based reconciliation. Government-sponsored conferences, she contends, tend to serve political ends for the government rather than to address the root causes of conflicts. The citizen-based reconciliation, on the other hand, would go deeper into the root causes and thus put an end to conflicts. She calls for the empowerment of her own NGO and the establishment of similar women's NGOs that put peace as their primary concern. Fatima attributes inter-group conflicts to regional underdevelopment, and calls upon the government to launch development projects in the region to transform the subsistence economy into a market economy. Fatima also opposes government intervention in the selection of

tribal leaders (locally called native administrators). Government selection of such leaders undermines the traditional leadership selection practices, which guaranteed the selection of acceptable and effective leaders. Native administrators, she added, should not be politicised. They should be empowered to be able to maintain law and order within their communities. Rabbah (1998) takes the same position, recommending an entire role-change for the central government and native administration.

## 5. Implications for Researchers and Decision-makers

The role of women in public life in Western Sudan is contradictory. On the one hand, in many respects men subordinate women, but on the other, women have a great influence on the behaviour of men. Cunnison, who studied the Humr community of western Kordofan, reached the conclusion (1963:27) that:

> There is a stereotype of women in men's eyes: a woman is stupid and ignorant (for she does not take part in the discussions of tribal affairs); she is obstinate but she is gullible in the face of diplomacy; she is irreligious, she fasts all right, but she does not pray with the regularity of men, and when she does she gets the words mixed up; she is irresponsible. She would rather take all the milk herself than leave it to the starving calves; she has no idea of morals, particularly sexual morals (a matter at which men other than her brothers of course connive); and she is no man!

Such a culture of subordinating women still persists, although the region is experiencing a social transformation. But the shame culture that prevails among tradition-bound communities assigns the same women the role of being the arbiters of man's conduct. They can make or break a man's reputation by singing songs or mocking his deeds. Social analysts tend to perceive such roles as constant. For example, the perception of the role of women with regard to inter-communal conflicts is greatly influenced by this prototype of a woman's traditional role. On the one hand, women are persistently denied any role in conflict prevention, management and resolution. These are considered the domain of men. Furthermore, women are readily labelled as instigators of violence rather than promoters of peace.

The two positions that are held about women, i.e. sub-ordinated but feared, tend to overlook the changing role of women with regard to peace and war in western Sudan. With the exception of the women who live among the nomadic communities, who are quite few in number, the majority of women in Darfur region today are experiencing a change of role. They are increasingly becoming advocates of peace. The women whose tribes are frequently engaged in warfare are the most victimised. Tribal warfare makes most of them destitute, living as internally displaced persons and family supporters, without the benefit of having skills for gainful employment. The Um Matariq group that was interviewed represents, to a large extent, those victimised women who stand strongly against tribal warfare. They dream of the day when their identity group will live in peace with other groups. Indeed, they strongly protest the male-dominated decision-making process that places them in the miserable situation in which they find themselves. They are calling for an effective role for women in matters that affect their life.

Likewise, the urbanised and/or educated women react strongly against the male-dominated society that denies them representation in peacemaking conferences and other peace building processes. It has been indicated that some of these women, utilising the same shame culture, succeed in prompting their men-folk to seek communal peace rather than war. Other women have played a leading role in a citizen-based reconciliation endeavour that was about to mark out a new role for women had it not been for a government intervention that changed the process to a traditional government-sponsored peacemaking.

Although still working under the umbrella of the government, members of the Women General Union in Nyala display independent thinking and stand strongly for an increasing role for women in peace building. They are already playing such a role, utilising their limited resources and degree of freedom. It is regrettable that Darfur region has no women's NGOs that act independently of the government. Dar Bakheita Charity Organisation is the only women's NGO that makes itself partially concerned about peace issues. Its leaders have strong views about the necessity of encouraging citizen-based endeavours for conflict resolution, and for the creation of women's NGOs in the region with peace-making as their uppermost goal. The need grows for domestic and international women's NGOs to establish branches in the region to train women in a peace culture and, more importantly, to empower women to assume a new role in peace building.

Particular attention needs to be given to the *Hakkama* group of women. Their adverse role as instigators of violence has greatly tarnished the image of

women in the region. Attempts to change the *Hakkama* role through preaching and reorientation would, however, probably not succeed in changing their traditional role. As conflicts persist among nomadic identity groups or between them and the settled farmers, the *Hakkamas*, and indeed all women, will continue to perform their traditional role of inciting men to fight. Cunnison (1963) is correct in making the point that changing nomadic women's role is 'perhaps only possible if the society and the economy as a whole change'.

Fatima M. el-Hassan, the Dar Bakheita chairperson, is also correct in relating inter-group conflicts to the underdevelopment that characterises the region. In 1976 an International Labour Organisation (ILO) report described the mode of living in the region as being livestock raising and traditional rain-fed agriculture. To a large extent the same modes of living still persist. With natural resources steadily deteriorating because of climatic changes, competition among identity groups over dwindling natural resources makes inter-group warfare inevitable and therefore the chances for a peace culture become unattainable, not only for women, but also for men.[13] Programs of socio-economic development are a significant key to conflict transformation.

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13     For details about the steadily deteriorating natural resources, see El-Sammani et al 1987.

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# The Print Media and Conflict Resolution in Northern Uganda

*Consolata Acayo and Nathan Mnjama**

## Abstract

This article reviews the role of the print media in conflict resolution. Using Northern Uganda as a case study, the article seeks to demonstrate that the press can effectively be used either to fuel conflict in a region or to reduce conflict in a region. The article seeks to demonstrate the role played by the print media in conflict and conflict resolution in Northern Uganda. It discusses the role of the press in Uganda, traces the roots of the problem in Northern Uganda, describes the methodology used in gathering data for the study and presents the results obtained from the study, which was conducted in 2001. Finally, the article has identified specific recommendations which if implemented can be used to address the on-going conflict in Northern Uganda.

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## Introduction

Information has always been a basis for knowledge; and the latter is power (Hameso 1995). Lack of information contributes to knowledge deficiency, which leads to powerlessness. Therefore, access to information implies a form of empowerment, or better still, it signifies freedom from ignorance, freedom from servitude and ultimately freedom to choose. Just as information, or freedom of information, is useful to post-modernist society, it is equally vital for rural African societies, which account for more than seventy percent of the whole population in most of the countries (Hameso 1995). Everywhere, therefore, there is a need for the public and private provision of information, especially data relating to matters that directly affect the livelihood of people, such as health, education, basic product prices, politics and government policies. Unfortunately, however, lack of freedom to provide information is what characterises most of Africa. Under situations where freedom of information is resisted and where politics are not transparent, social evils such as corruption, abuse of power and violation of fundamental human rights cannot be exposed, and perhaps, will never be rectified. This article seeks to demonstrate the role played by the print media in conflict and conflict resolution in Northern Uganda. It discusses the role of the press in Uganda, traces the roots of the problem in Northern Uganda, describes the methodology used in gathering data for the study and presents the results obtained from the study, which was conducted in 2001.

## Freedom of the Press in Uganda

According to Kitchen (1956), attempts in Uganda to disseminate information through the newspaper can be traced back to 1907, when *Ebifa Mu Uganda* (News from Uganda), made its appearance as a fortnightly missionary newspaper. Other early publications include *Muno* (The Friend), a weekly publication founded in 1911, and *The Uganda Herald*, founded in 1912. *Matalisi* (The Messenger) followed in 1923, *Gambuze* (What is the News) in 1927, *Dobozi Lya Buganda* (Voice of Uganda) in 1927, *Mugobasonqa* (Followers of Reason) in 1948, *Ndimugezi* (The Wise Seek Advice) in 1951, *Amut* (News) in 1953, *Mwebingwa* in 1953, *Uganda Empya* (News Uganda) in 1953, *Saben's Commercial Digest* in 1954, *Uganda Mail* in 1954, and *Uganda Post* in 1954. *Uganda Argus*, founded in 1955, originated from *The East*

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*African Standard* which started publication in 1902, but with its circulation restricted mainly to Kenya, and *Uganda Eyogera* (Uganda Speaks). Among the East African British territories, Uganda can pride itself on having the highest literacy rate, considering the sizeable reading public. During the colonial period, there was a lack of a powerful English language press, and this encouraged the development of an aggressive and enterprising indigenous vernacular press in Uganda (Kitchen 1956). By 1970, there were 1,29 million pupils attending school, and by 1982 there was an increase of 37 per cent (44 per cent boys and 31 per cent girls) (*Europa Year Book* 1987). The adult literacy rate in 1995 was 61,8 per cent, and by 2000 it had grown to 65 per cent. These figures indicate the increase in the ability of the people to be able to read and write in the newspapers, and other print media.

Historically, the European element was represented by the *Uganda Herald*, which was first published in 1912. The Europeans claimed with some pride that this was the first newspaper of any kind to be published in Uganda. Wilcox (1975) was right when he said the colonial power strongly influenced the development of the press in Africa, Uganda included, by introducing a rather authoritarian press concept and restricting the growth of the indigenous press. They did this because they believed that the other papers did not carry information of their interest.

The Roman Catholic Church and the Church Missionary Society did publish and circulate some newspapers such as *Ebifa Mu Uganda* and *Muno*, first published in 1907 and 1911, respectively. These papers had a good deal of influence through their relatively large circulation of religious issues and matters of political and general public interest. There were high standards set in the production of these newspapers. According to Kitchen (1956), there were, however, no government newspapers or those under the direct supervision of the government as in Kenya and Tanzania (formally Tanganyika). This left provision for the free expression of information.

Today the major newspapers in Uganda include the *Daily Monitor*, which began after *The Weekly Topic* (founded in 1986) stopped publication, *The New Vision* (a daily newspaper founded in 1986), *Munno* (a daily newspaper in Luganda founded in 1911), *Taifa Uganda Empya* (a daily newspaper in Luganda founded in 1953), *The Star* (a daily newspaper founded in 1980), *Ngabo* (a daily newspaper in Luganda founded in 1979), *The Citizens* (a daily newspaper published by the Democratic Party), and *Munnansi* (a weekly newspaper in Luganda founded in 1980). There are also three other weekly newspapers, *Focus* (a weekly newspaper founded in 1983), *Independent*

*Observer* (a bi-weekly newspaper founded in 1988) and *Mulengera* (a weekly newspaper in Luganda). And finally, the two papers specialising in economic news: *The Financial Times* (a daily business paper) and *The Economy* (a weekly business paper).

Although the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government has permitted far greater freedom of speech than its predecessors, Drost (1996) points out that the government has not hesitated to act against journalists who overstep the mark, for instance by publishing sensitive information which may be considered to endanger the armed forces. Unlike the previous government, NRM has preferred to use legal sanctions rather than resort to arbitrary detention. The majority of the cases brought against journalists have either been dropped or resulted in acquittal.[1]

Despite these positive developments, the Ugandan government continues to detain and charge journalists under 'repressive sedition' and 'publishing false news' legislation, causing journalists to practice self-censorship. The paradoxical contrast in Uganda between a vocal and diverse press and the regular arrests and prosecutions of leading media figures results in part from the draconian press laws that remain on the books despite the constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of the press. Some of the laws used to prosecute journalists, such as the law on seditious libel, date back to the colonial era. The sedition statutes give the government brutal powers to arrest and prosecute journalists who raise the government's ire, as demonstrated in the cases outlined below. In 1995, the Press and Journalists Law came into effect after its adoption by the non-elected National Resistance Council. The law requires all journalists to be licensed, and provides for a Media Council which monitors and disciplines journalists and editors. Although the Media Council is empowered to arbitrate disputes between the media and the State, to discipline journalists, and 'to regulate the conduct and promote good ethical standards and discipline of journalists', the government rarely resorts to the Council for the resolution of disputes with the media, preferring to rely on more severe criminal sanctions (Press and Journalist Statute 1995: section 10, no 6).

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1    Offences under the penal code with which journalists have been charged include 'sedition and false news, criminal libel and treason' (Drost 1996). An amendment to the penal code introduced in 1988 allows the prosecution of anyone publishing information that is likely to 'endanger the armed forces'. This has made the press fearful of publishing information on issues touching on national security.

Wolfsfeld (1997) explains that the military as an institution believes in a culture of secrecy. This philosophy has passed into the Uganda style of ruling. Agreeing with Wolfsfeld, Onadipe and Lord (1999) also assert that, with the military in place, there is not much encouragement of transparency or freedom of press where the armed forces are concerned. This also affects the relationship between the media and the government.

Mutua (2001) argues that every morning in Africa, millions of people wake up and tune to government controlled radio stations and listen to the news on Africa, which is constantly interrupted by messages which support what are mostly authoritarian leaderships. Those who are lucky to read newspapers open pages of print from journalists working for their government or journalists terrified of their government (Mutua 2001). Many believe that the radio and the newspapers are never wrong! Those slightly sceptical of their local sources of information tune to short-wave bands and listen to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), the Voice of Germany or the Voice of America. These foreign agencies tell the Africans what the West thinks of Africans and what Africans should think of the West and subsequently what Africans should think of themselves. The press in Africa is very powerful and journalists should realise that whatever they offer their viewers, listeners and readers is absorbed as heavenly truth.

The Uganda Journalists Association Code of Professional Conduct (1996) states that journalists should at all times strive to separate their own opinions from factual news. Where personal opinions are expressed, the readers should be made to know this in no uncertain terms. Editorialisation which departs from the truth undermines the cardinal principles of journalism and subverts the confidence the public puts in journalists.

## Causes of Conflict in Northern Uganda

The conflict in Northern Uganda can be attributed to several factors. According to Museveni, who among his other functions is the chief spokesman for the NRM, the initial reason for the conflict in Northern Uganda was that the Acholi and Langi communities were deprived of their ability to get rich from looting other Ugandans. Museveni (1997:178) further states that: 'It was purely tribal opportunism that brought such numbers (50 000) of people to their side. In other words, the reason why those rebels in the north, organized on a tribal basis, were fighting for control of the national

government was that the NRM as a government had stopped them from looting.' Thus, in the beginning, the NRM saw the initial causes of the war as resource-related. The issue was who would be the primary beneficiary of Uganda's wealth.

Others in the NRM have acknowledged the importance of the issue of power. In an interview entitled 'Museveni's regime under attack' (1995), which was conducted by the Uganda Democratic Coalition (UDC) newsletter reporters, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebel spokesperson outlined their reasons for the on-going conflict in Northern Uganda, which started in 1986. They regarded President Museveni as a self-imposed dictator, denying Ugandans their civil and human rights, selling Uganda to foreign exploiters, making Uganda a colony of the Tutsi who have turned Ugandan citizens into foreigners in their own country, resisting the people's demands for multi-party democracy and a federal system, concocting a constitution which is intended to legitimise his brand of dictatorship, committing mass murders of innocent people in Northern and Eastern Uganda, and turning Uganda into a terrorist camp where he trains and supports guerrilla forces against neighbouring countries.

Okumu (1997) identified the following as causes of this conflict. There was the mistrust when Museveni first failed to keep the peace agreement signed between his National Resistance Army (NRA) guerrillas and the Ugandan government. Then, under the leadership of Tito Okello, there was mistreatment of former soldiers and grievances among certain groups of people. To Okumu therefore, the war is basically due to misunderstanding and mishandling of the situation (Okumu 1997). The persistent rebel activities in Northern Uganda have left the region in a state of crisis and turmoil. Despite several attempts by the government to stamp out this conflict, the LRA, often referred to as the 'Kony rebels', have also persisted, never strong enough to seriously destabilise the government, but never weak enough to die out completely (Human Rights Watch/Africa 1997).

The conflict in Northern Uganda also involves Sudan. The Sudanese Government spokesperson has repeatedly accused the Ugandan Government of providing military support to the rebel Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA). The Sudanese government therefore began to aid the LRA, relying on them to help fight the SPLA. This aid has turned the LRA into more of a threat than ever, since the rebels are now armed with land mines and machine guns in place of rifles, machetes and stones.

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## Statement of the problem

The civil strife both in the northern and western parts of Uganda has continued to take its toll, both in economic and humanitarian terms, while dialogue and reconciliation have kept eluding the country. Uganda has witnessed 15 years of conflict involving armed rebellion for most of the Northern Region, especially Acholiland (Gulu and Kitgum). The people of Northern Uganda have been deprived of their political, social, and economic development. There is hardly any peace in the land.

The human cost of the war has been huge. Thousands of people have been killed, maimed, injured, traumatised and displaced. Families have been broken and scattered. Hundreds of youths and children have fallen victim of rape, defilement, and abduction, and that has increased the risks of contracting diseases like HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases. There has been famine and malnourishment because the people were constantly on the run for their lives. Northern Uganda has suffered and is still suffering a great deal, making this helpless community a fertile ground for poverty, ignorance, and diseases.

With regard to the role of the media, different observations have been made. On the one hand, it has been said that the media, which could have played a crucial role in de-escalating the conflict, have been fuelling the conflict through their use of rumours and their dissemination of non-reliable information. On the other hand, it has been pointed out that the media coverage of the conflict in Northern Uganda has been limited. This could have been because the media were under instruction from the government not to cover events taking place there, or simply because they were not interested in covering matter relating to conflicts in the country.

What this study therefore seeks to establish, is whether the print media are fuelling and sustaining the present on-going conflict in Northern Uganda, and whether the same media can be utilised in resolving the conflict in the northern region of Uganda. Specifically, the researchers sought to:

1. Determine the nature of coverage by the print media of information relating to conflict and conflict resolution in Northern Uganda;
2. Assess the currency (in the sense of newness) of information published on conflict and conflict resolution in relation to the occurrence of these events;

3.    Obtain public opinion on the role of the media in disseminating information on conflict and conflict resolution in Northern Uganda.

Although conflict in the northern region of Uganda has been on and off since the country achieved independence in 1962, this study covers the 15 years from 1986 to 2000. 1986 was the year that the NRM government took power, which in effect gave birth to the current conflict in the northern part of Uganda. In the year 2000 the conflict in question was still going on, and the long period of conflict was becoming still longer. Geographically, this study was restricted to Northern Uganda, which includes Gulu, Kitgum, Apac, Lira and Arua. These are the areas that have been badly hit and affected by the on-going conflict in the region. Other Northern Ugandan areas included in this study are Kotido, Moroto, Soroti, Kumi, Tororo, Moyo, Nebbi and Arua.

## Research Methodology

The basic method used in this study was that of secondary data content analysis. In this method, most often used to describe events or process in society,[2] the researcher is not responsible for the collection of the original data. In this study the indirect observational data were not only analysed, however, but also supplemented by the use of interviews.

The researchers used purposive selective sampling based on their knowledge of the newspapers published in Uganda to choose the newspaper samples for content analysis. Due to time and financial constraints, only two were selected: *The Weekly Topic/Daily Monitor*, a privately owned newspaper, and *The New Vision*, a government-owned paper. The reason for choosing these newspapers is that the topic under investigation requires an examination of past events, and the papers chosen have been in publication since 1986, and throughout the period covered by the study. Another reason for choosing these two newspapers is that their readership is nationwide[3] as compared with the others, which are mainly regional.

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2    Soderlund and Carmen (1990:45-53) and Wolfsfeld (1997), both used content analysis to examine the volume of coverage of the information content, while studying the El Salvador Civil War, and the conflict over the Oslo Accords, the Intifada War and the Gulf War, respectively.

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Content analysis has helped the researchers to identify, enumerate, and analyse occurrences of information on conflict resolution in Northern Uganda embedded in communication articles of *The Monitor* and *The New Vision* newspapers. The population for this study was approximately 10 220 newspaper issues, based on a collection of the weekly and daily publications of *The Weekly Topic/Daily Monitor* and *The New Vision* over 15 years. Sampling was done randomly by years and months. The years selected were 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999 and 2000. The months selected varied from year to year, since they were randomly selected. However, each month selected was the same for both newspapers. Four months in a year were selected, and were all considered in this study.

There was a number of other newspapers that were also published in Uganda as shown above, but they have not been included in this study because of the following reasons:

1. The circulation of most if not all of these other papers is limited to particular geographical areas, and as a result, their readership too was limited.
2. Some of these other papers are mostly written in local languages, which, creates barriers for their use in the other regions.
3. The content of the information items was also limited to particular regions.

*Rupiny*, the sister newspaper published in Luo, was purposely left out, on account of the fact that *The New Vision* would have reported on the same or similar events concerning conflict resolution in Northern Uganda.

The information collected was on peaceful means of resolving conflict, the escalation of conflict, and other information that was neither on resolution of conflict nor on escalation of conflict, yet had something to do with the situation in Northern Uganda. The researchers specifically sought items that contained news or feature stories on conflict and conflict resolution in Northern Uganda, editorials on conflict and conflict resolution in Northern Uganda, opinion columns on conflict and conflict resolution in Northern Uganda and letters on conflict and conflict resolution in Northern Uganda.

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3    *The New Vision* newspaper, for instance, has been translated into four other languages: Luo (*Rupiny*), Iteso (*Etop*), Luganda (*Bukedde*), and Runyangkole-Rukiga (*Orumiri*). For this study however, only the English version was taken into account.

Interviews were conducted as a follow up to the content analysis. Interviews were held with readers of these newspapers based in Kampala and Gulu. This helped the researchers to establish the general views of the public about the role of the print media relating to the creation and sustenance of conflict, and the possible role in resolving conflict. The views of the publishing staff from both newspapers were also collected and they helped to establish the sources and nature of the information published. The interview was used here because this study was based on recalls of past events, and the researchers were able to probe best through the use of interviews. The interviews on the political issues in Uganda were carried out with the editors, sub-editors, and the journalists from both *The Monitor* and *The New Vision.*

A quota sampling technique, Purposive or Judgmental sampling, was used in this study to choose the sample, since interviews were merely supplementing the main research method of content analysis. A population of 70 newspaper readers who read both *The Monitor* and *The New Vision* was selected for inclusion in the sample. The 70 respondents were taken from the following categories: Makerere University students, Makerere University lecturers, business managers, political and opinion leaders, Church leaders, Local Council leaders (LCs) and members of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who are based either in Gulu or in Kampala. The researchers also used proportionate quota sampling to pick samples from the reader population.

## Summary of Findings

The major findings, identified from the content analysis of data from the newspapers and the interviews conducted with the media personnel, are the following.

Firstly, this study has established that the print media has a role to play in challenging and advising the belligerents in Northern Uganda on the inhuman acts and strategies taking place, by prominently publishing informa-tion on escalating conflict, peaceful means of resolving conflict, and related issues. The study has shown that the most important items are published on the front and editorial pages, since these are the areas which capture the interest of readers. According to the data collected from the newspaper contents, *The Monitor* had more information items located on the front pages than *The New Vision*, which suggests that *The Monitor* takes information on conflict and conflict resolution more seriously than *The New Vision.*

Secondly, the study has also established that *The New Vision*, which is a government owned paper, has been more consistent in its publication of information on conflict and conflict resolution in Northern Uganda than *The Monitor*, which is a privately owned paper. This view was also supported by interviews conducted among the journalists, reporters and editors working on political issues. *The New Vision* seemed to enjoy protection from the government, which has contributed to their consistency in the publication of material, as compared with *The Monitor*.

Thirdly, after tabulating, analysing and discussing the data, the study has shown that *The Monitor*, which is privately owned, had published more reports related to resolving the on-going conflict than *The New Vision*, which is government owned (291 and 252, respectively). At the same time, these data indicate that both papers are actively involved in the publication of information on conflict and conflict resolution in Northern Uganda. Moreover, this study has revealed that the newspaper readers are indeed aware of the conflict and the conflict resolution process in Northern Uganda. Out of the 70 respondents interviewed, 34 (48,6 per cent) indicated that individuals, churches, NGOs, the government and international bodies have made several attempts towards peaceful resolution of the conflict. Sad to say, none of these efforts has led to the cessation of conflict in Northern Uganda.

Fourthly, this study has also established that the media actually do suffer from different forms of victimisation or persecution – such as warning, arrest, harassment, assault, court proceedings and imprisonment by the government – due to the publication of information that is deemed to be contrary to the government's view. The study has demonstrated that journalists from *The Monitor* face a lot more victimisation or persecution for reporting on conflict in Northern Uganda than their counterparts from *The New Vision*.

Fifthly, the study has also revealed that for news items on conflict and conflict resolution in Northern Uganda, the print media rely heavily on information obtained from victims or witnesses. Other sources also used included the government security forces and correspondents who responded to the information obtained in *The Monitor* and *The New Vision*. It is noted, however, that these newspapers do not have much information from the opposition (the rebels).

Finally, *The New Vision* newspaper, which is government owned, published more information items on conflict escalation and peaceful means than the privately owned *Monitor* newspaper. *The Monitor* in turn published more information on 'other' issues, which resulted in a higher number of published

items in *The Monitor* (291) than in *The New Vision* (252). On the whole, these newspapers contributed more to the escalation of conflict than to its resolution.

## Recommendations

This study has identified some elements, which are prerequisites for a successful utilisation of the print media in improving its role in the resolution of the ongoing conflict in Northern Uganda. These recommendations include: privatisation of the media, freedom of expression, enabling laws to enforce media freedom in the army, and publication of factual information. Each of these issues is discussed separately below.

## Privatisation of the media

This study recommends that all media be privatised, so that there is fair reporting, probably with less interference and censorship from the government and other political bodies. This would create competition in the field of media production and greatly improve the quality, and currency of the information disseminated, not only on conflict but also on other related issues. In this way, the media will not have to depend entirely on the government as source of their information (Liebes 1997). The continuous dependence on the government as the main source of information makes it difficult for the media to provide an independent voice. The media therefore need to be privatised so that they can freely have access to information, which will give citizens a better chance to perform their role in an enlightened manner. In the Algerian press, for instance, media freedom hit a high point between 1989 and 1992, when a new constitution put an end to the country's single-party tradition and opened the door for democracy and press freedom throughout the nation. In 1990, journalists received a 'green light' for a private press when the Algerian government offered 30 months paid salary to any journalist who left the state media to pursue a media venture of his own. The state even offered workspace and reduced printing costs (International Crisis Group 1998).

## Freedom of information

Freedom of information is an important element of the international guarantee of freedom of expression, which includes the right to seek and receive as well as to impart information and ideas. In most countries, the need for legislation, which will ensure the free flow of information, is obvious.

In Uganda, freedom of press has been hindered by the fact that freedom of information is not necessarily guaranteed (The Human Rights Reports 1998). This study recommends that the government of Uganda reconsider its position on censorship of the media, as this practice contradicts the fundamental rights embodied in the Uganda Constitution, which allows freedom of speech and expression. Removing the threat of censorship will enable the media to voice different political opinions and also to make the opinions of the citizens known to the public.

## Enabling laws to enforce media freedom

Uganda's constitution provides for freedom of the press, and the government has generally respected these rights. The Press and Media Law, which took effect in 1995, requires journalists to be licensed and to meet certain standards, including holding a university degree. The law provides for a Media Council to suspend newspapers and to deny access to state information (US Department of State 1999). The government has not vigorously enforced these laws, however, and its provisions had not been used against any journalist in its first three years (US Department of State 1999). It is believed, however, that many journalists would rather go to court than to the Council when dealing with complaints, which throws doubt upon the Council's authority (Wamboka 1999).

This study, therefore, recommends that certain laws, such as the Law on Sedition and Publication of False News and the Press and Media Law mentioned above, be removed from the Penal Code Act to give reporters and journalists freedom to write and express themselves without fear. Moreover, there is the need to eliminate any acts of controlling the free flow of information like censorship, which threatens the Ugandan journalists. The future of freedom of press in Uganda has to be secured.

## Training and education

This study has further noted that, because the processes of information gathering and communicating are complex and ever changing, journalists need to constantly sharpen and up-grade their skills. Onadipe and Lord (1999) indicate that the training needs vary enormously between individuals, but some basic categories in writing and editing skills, basic news values, coverage planning, interviewing and investigative techniques, photojournalism, layout, programme editing for electronic journalists, media ethics, conflict management techniques, legal frameworks, marketing and distribution are

necessary. With many of the basic skills lacking, more specialised tasks suffer, such as political reporting, conflict reporting, legal affairs, financial and economic reporting, and social development reporting.

In Uganda, very few journalists have had exposures to any kind of war reporting training, instruction on how to protect themselves and their sources in a conflict situation, instruction on how humanitarian law and human rights law should apply in conflicts and how conflict resolution theory and practice can be of relevance to the media and the events they are covering (Onadipe and Lord 1999). This study has also revealed that training and education can play a substantial role in catalysing changes at the deepest level for the media. It is easy to change external factors, like behaviour and structure, but it is far more difficult and challenging to transform unseen internal values and beliefs. The development of appropriate skills and knowledge can therefore help the media people to become key agents of change.

This study therefore recommends that journalists and media personnel should be trained and educated specifically in the areas of conflict and war reporting, to enable them improve in this field. This could involve working with local groups and local media in planning and producing community public affairs programming aimed at issues such as development or reconstruction priorities, inter-group relations, reconciliation, local governance and public participation issues, conflict and conflict resolution.

## Professional workshops, seminars and conferences

One vehicle for improving professional output is focused training through workshops which reach substantial numbers of media practitioners. Integrating professional skills training – on collecting, editing, and disseminating information – with discussion and hands-on work experience with substantive policy issues – such as election or constitutional coverage, governance issues and developmental priorities and practices – can be a very effective training method.

The structure of workshop sessions, as discussed by Onadipe and Lord (1999), could depend on a range of variables such as the number of media participants, existing skill levels, availability and interest, the range of subject matter to be discussed, and the possibility of further training in particular areas – all of which would be determined at the planning stages with major input from potential participants.

One important aspect of the workshop approach to training is the need for follow-up and refinement of lessons learned when the media practitioner is

back on the job. To provide continuity and support in the workplace one possible option is the establishment of mentoring systems, whereby senior practitioners agree to be 'on-call' to provide professional advice and constructive criticism to a number of junior colleagues. This could involve overseeing their output, transmitting their own skills, and suggesting areas for further development related to previous training. This kind of on the job support could provide continuity and reinforcement of the initial training and a means of monitoring its impact and shortcomings.

There is need for enhancing the professional level of journalists and people working in the media especially in Uganda. Joining professional workshops, seminars and academic programme in the field of journalism can help to attain this.

Workshops can also provide opportunities for bringing together professionals from different areas within the country and within regions to share experiences and broaden their knowledge of relevant professional and contextual developments. International participation of trainers and other specialised resource persons is also a means of improving comparative information sharing, international networking and broadening the perspectives and knowledge base of local practitioners and the outside specialists.

This study therefore, recommends that Ugandan journalists and media personnel organise frequent workshops, seminars, and other academic programmes, where they can always come together and discuss and share different view points in order to try and improve in the coverage, printing and publication on conflict and war reporting.

## International Community

The study noted that several attempts have been made towards the resolution of conflict in Northern Uganda but to no avail. Each time attempts are made, they have been frustrated by either the government or the rebels.

This study therefore, recommends that the government of Uganda calls on the International community to exert pressure on the Sudan President, Omar El Bashir, to use the Sudanese influence on Joseph Kony to conform to the peace process taking place. The international community should also actively encourage the resumption of the peace process which was started in 1994. Considerable interest in this notion has been encountered in the United States Government and diplomatic missions of other friendly countries, so the same could be done for Uganda. Sustained support for negotiations could be helpful to the leadership of the government and to others. Public media

attention to the northern conflict and to the negotiation process could have a positive effect. It could also help to assure the Acholi people that – contrary to the belief of many – the international community is, indeed, concerned with their problems.

## Non-Governmental Organisations

The study has noted that a number of NGOs have been involved in the rehabilitation and peace building in Northern Uganda. NGOs such as SCF-Denmark, UNICEF, ACORD, Human Rights Watch, GUSCO, some of which are currently providing rehabilitation programmes to the rescued and abducted children.

This study therefore, recommends that these NGOs should also help to facilitate a peace agreement. The Acholi people should be prepared to peacefully reintegrate the vast majority of LRA insurgents in their communities. The Catholic Church, the Church of Uganda, and Islamic leaders are well placed to support and initiate the peace and reconciliation process. These NGOs could also work together with the media to help achieve peace in this region.

## Resolving conflict in Northern Uganda

As part of a vibrant society concerned with the peaceful resolution of disputes predicted on the rule of law, common justice and people-centred security, the media has a role to play in providing channels of communication between the government and the governed, presenting fresh perspectives, and as a watchdog capable of sounding a genuine alarm. The study has noted the several attempts to resolve the conflict in Northern Uganda, which have always been frustrated by either the government or the rebels. The researchers in this case recommend that the media work together with the other conflict resolvers to be able fight together for peace and to achieve better results.

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# Non-Citizens in a Democratic Space: Perspectives on Human Security in Zimbabwe's Large-Scale Commercial Agriculture under the Land Reform Programme: 1980-2002

*Peter Mayavo* *

## Abstract

This article is conceived in the context of the controversial and ambiguous 'fast-track' land reform programme orchestrated by the ZANU (PF) government

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since 2000. It discusses human security as a way of redressing an imbalance in mainstream security discourse that has put disproportionate emphasis on the security of the state, with little regard for the safety of persons within the borders of that state. Far from emphasising personal security over state security, the article makes human safety the measure of state security. Thus, the extent to which the people of a particular state live in freedom and safety, under just laws, and with their essential needs met, is the extent to which that state is secure. The article argues that the land reform programme was contradictory in that it aggravated the socio-economic status of farm workers, thereby making them even more vulnerable to security threats. For many 'foreign' farm workers, who lack ethnic and nationality rights to own land, prospects of ever returning to countries of origin have waned over the years, and yet the elderly workers were probably the most affected by the government's land reform programme. Human security values identify the safety and welfare of people as the central objectives of state security.

## 1. Preamble

In his opening devotion to the Land Conference held on 19-22 November 2001, at the Great Zimbabwe Hotel, Masvingo, Reverend Murombedzi Kuchera of the Zimbabwe Council of Churches called for justice and fair play in the land reform programme in Zimbabwe. Quoting from the Bible, he chanted thus, 'Let justice roll down like waters, and righteousness like an ever-flowing stream' (Magaramombe 2001). This appeal is quite in tandem with the notion of democracy, respect for human rights, and the quest for peace and security. It should be emphasised from the outset that human rights are an essential element in peace-making and peace-building, and that the deprivation of human security within states definitely endangers regional and inevitably international peace and security. This, therefore, calls for a paradigm shift from a tradition that has tended to subordinate human security to national security. While national security emphasises military protection of the state's territorial integrity and of governmental structures and functions, human security has as its hallmark the protection of the worth, dignity and safety of the individual as integral parts of humanity. According to Davies Hubert (1999:3):

> Human security means safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats. It is a condition or state of being characterized by freedom from

pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety or even their lives … It is an alternative way of seeing the world, taking people as its point of reference, rather than focusing exclusively on security of territory or government. Like other security concepts … it is about protection. Human security entails preventive measures to reduce vulnerability and minimize risk, and taking remedial action where prevention fails.

Thus, real national security does not entail a formidable military equipped to keep foreign powers at bay. Instead, it is defined by favourable social, political, and economic conditions for the promotion of human development, human rights, and democracy. Therefore, the primary threats to the safety and welfare of individuals are not external military forces bent on imposing their will on an otherwise safe and stable national order. Rather, the primary threats to people are internal and manifest in conditions of economic failure, violation of basic rights, and political marginalisation.

The implementation of the concept of human security has, however, remained controversial and slow. While human security has internationally been recognized as the true measure of state security, hundreds of millions of people still had no experience of safety by the turn of the century. This is in spite of the reality that entrenched economic, social, and political marginalisation can perpetrate a structural violence that threatens personal safety, well-being, and security, and lead to widespread overt violence. Naidu (2001:9) insists that:

> While the security and behaviour of states are obviously central to the security of persons, the inordinate focus on sovereignty, state structures, the military defence of territory, and, in too many cases, straightforward regime survival, frequently comes at the expense of, and with little regard for, the security welfare, or safety of persons.

Thus, deprivation of human security within states endangers people's fundamental human rights – and international peace and security in general. True security arises from 'alleviation of stress-related conditions in the individual and society, breaking a vicious cycle of poverty and desperation, maladaptive behaviour, and resultant entrenched societal problems' (Naidu 2001:9).

It is in this context that this article seeks to expose threats to the security of farm workers in Zimbabwe as a result of the ambiguous and

controversial land reform programme, which was supposed to guarantee such security in the first place. Farm workers have hardly been considered a subject of research into development policy, and yet they have perhaps been the most affected by developments in the large-scale farming sector. A large proportion of farm workers in Zimbabwe have their roots in the neighbouring states of Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique. On the eve of independence in 1979, the approximately 5 500 (largely white) commercial farmers employed a total of 335 000 workers. Although this number was to drop to about 263 500 in 1983, it rose again to about 285 000 in 1989 (Balleis & Mugwetsi 1994:6). The number of farm workers continued to rise, approximating 320 000 in 1992 and 347 000 by the late 1990s (Loewenson 1992:35). By January 2000, there were about 400 000 wage-earning workers on large-scale commercial farms in Zimbabwe, forming about one quarter of the formal sector labour-force, and between 11 and 18 per cent of the total population (Central Statistical Office 2000). Together with their families, these workers made about two million people and contributed as much as 17 per cent of the country's Gross National Product (GAPWUZ 2002).

## 2. Non-Citizens in a Democratic Space

Problems of farm workers in Zimbabwe have been compounded by lack of Zimbabwean citizenship. 'Citizenship' implies the entire mode of incorporation of a particular individual or group into society (Prah 1997). This multivalence of citizenship enables a simultaneous and interconnected struggle for membership or identity or both, with the intention of ensuring access to rights that are disbursed by state institutions. Citizenship rights can be described as a bundle of rights that are necessary for individual freedom and which, among other things, guarantee participation in the exercise of political power as a voter or representative, as well as enable the attainment of a modicum of economic welfare and security (Shafir 1989). Or citizenship rights can simply be defined as the right to share to the full in the social heritage and life of a 'civilised' being as defined by the prevailing social standards.

In the colonial era, the state recognised two types of political identity: civic and ethnic. Civic identity was that which was racially defined. Citizens' rights, both civil and political, were limited to white settlers who were considered the civilised. Africans became subjects who were excluded from this regime of rights (Mamdani 1996, 2000). At independence, the change

that took place in the domain of citizenship was the de-racialisation and universalisation of the civic space, such that everyone was now recognised as a civil citizen, at least in theory. As in post-colonial states elsewhere on the continent, at independence, the Zimbabwe government gave universal citizenship rights to 'foreigners' who had lived in the country 'for a number of years'. It should be stressed that many of the 'aliens' had historically been living and working in the country, and that they had come to identify themselves with Zimbabweans. In fact, while the Tripartite Labour Agreement of 1936 signed by Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, for instance, spelt out a two-year contract labour period for foreign workers, employers complained that the period of stay limitation was too short and, therefore, retrogressive in-as-far as it affected 'labour efficiency' and stability. The result was that most of the farm workers stayed for periods much longer than the stipulated two years, or even permanently, without renewing their contracts. The Migrant Workers Act of 1948 would allow migrant workers who had had 'ten years of uninterrupted residence (to) remain in the country where they worked', while the Lusaka Agreement of 1947 had spelt out that those who had migrated clandestinely with their families and worked for ten consecutive years, were to become *bona fide* residents of their country of employment (National Archives of Zimbabwe 1947). This issue was further guaranteed in the erstwhile Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which aimed at stabilising labour at the place of employment. All this ensured that most of the workers concerned would stay in Zimbabwe for the rest of their lives. At independence, developments such as civil war in Mozambique caused foreigners to continue to gravitate to Zimbabwe to take menial jobs as farm labour. By 2000, about 30 per cent of the total farm worker population were 'alien' (GAPWUZ 2002).

Since farm workers and conquered African subjects were not allowed to share in civil citizenship, identity particulars in the colonial period were largely meant to ensure effective control of Africans. For this and other reasons, all forms of identity particulars were unpopular among Africans. Besides such legislation as the Pass Laws, the Native Regulations Ordinance, and the Masters and Servants Act, there were the Tripartite Labour Agreement, the Lusaka Agreement as well as the Migrant Workers Act, which made possession of identity certificates mandatory. The three latter Agreements made provisions for the issuing of identity certificates or passes to prospective labour migrants from any one of the three territories to the other two. Migrant workers detested their identity and registration certificates, leave passes and travelling permits,

which they saw as a monument of colonial oppression and exploitation. Furthermore, due to a lot of red tape involved in the issuing of these documents upon migrating, many prospective workers were often delayed or even denied entry into Southern Rhodesia. They often protested by faking loss of such particulars; or they destroyed them and migrated clandestinely. Most of the farm workers in the colonial period did not, therefore, place much value on identity particulars. In any case, the particulars hardly played any role in getting and keeping a job on a farm. Southern Rhodesian employers were generally not strict with identity requirements of the law because of their dire need for a steady supply of ultra-cheap labour. Furthermore, current national boundaries were an artificial colonial creation and a majority of people living along these boundaries placed little or no relevance to their existence. Boundaries often cut across families, and movement across them remained common with or without identity particulars.

At independence, the Zimbabwean citizenship became important to farm workers who could no longer afford to lead the isolated life of the colonial period. Promises made by the new majority government for improvement of the socio-economic welfare of farm workers, among other sections of the new Zimbabwean society, dictated possession of Zimbabwean citizenship. Zimbabwean identity particulars, as proof of citizenship, became critical to many aspects of life. However, while the new independent government extended civil rights to all non-Zimbabwean residents who had been living in the country 'for a number of years', it became difficult in practice to obtain identity particulars. For a number of reasons, including the seasonality and mobility of farm labour it was difficult to prove to registry officials that one qualified for citizenship. To get Zimbabwean citizenship, 'foreign' workers should meet the qualifications.

> Those who have a long history of employment in this country must have had work permits when they first arrived in the country. They should also have been registered somewhere, for instance, with the African Workers' Bureau. When they apply for citizenship now, their fingerprints are first vetted and then the state will consider whether to grant citizenship or not (Muchemenyi, Interview).

The above criteria unfortunately disregarded a large number of those with a long history of employment and stay in Zimbabwe, who for many reasons did not have the documents. Illiteracy and ignorance over issues involved in

acquiring citizenship or civil documents (birth certificates, national identity cards and passports), as well as the prohibitive labour regime and lack of co-operation from farmers, saw a majority losing out. A study in the Makoni district of Manicaland in 1999, carried out by SNV Netherlands Development Organisation[1], revealed that 75 per cent of the children of school going age did not have birth certificates (SNV 1999).

It should further be stressed that the citizenship which government promised 'foreigners' was civic only, but it was only through ethnic citizenship that one could inherit one's father's identity. Only when the line of the father was highlighted and that of the mother obscured could children be born as Zimbabwean or aliens, as their fathers were. Individuals would be issued with identity particulars classifying them as Zimbabwean or alien. However, 'alien' has not been an identity that signifies access and proximity to economic and social rights. While all blacks in Zimbabwe, including farm workers, were once colonised subjects without civic rights, at independence farm workers in general, and those of foreign descent in particular, continued to be subjects in a political space that had witnessed 'democratic' forces of liberation struggle remove the unjust and exploitative colonial regime.

Thus, reminiscent of the western liberal citizenship, the type of citizenship promised to farm workers in Zimbabwe was flawed. The exclusionary practices of liberal citizenship saw class, cultural or ethnic 'foreigners', especially immigrants, being condemned and often criminalised and denied the rights and services of incorporation. Millions of the legal immigrants and criminalised illegal immigrants continued to face exclusions from the rights and services that their labour and humanity should have entitled them to. More often than not, 'foreign' farm workers have been treated as refugees, largely considered a liability and not an asset, or as miserable destitutes who should be grateful just for being let in. Ironically, while 'foreign' migrant labour has largely remained trapped in what Zeleza (1997:375) calls 'the exclusionary fictions of nationalism', with their rights to the possibilities of citizenship being 'spurned by the stubborn narratives of immigration and otherness', the movement of capital across national boundaries has often been followed by the formation of transnational legal regimes that accord corporate citizenship rights. Thus, a growing xenophobia towards 'foreigners' has witnessed the suppression of the civil rights as well as economic and social

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1    Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwilligers (Foundation of Netherlands Volunteers).

rights of migrant farm workers, at a time when the concept of human rights has evolved to emphasise the extension of these rights to all persons *simply for being human* (my emphasis), regardless of country and citizenship. In fact, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights categorically states in its preamble that 'recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world'. Article 1 of the Declaration proceeds to say that 'all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights', while Article 3 emphasises that 'everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of the person' (The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948). In Zimbabwe, the xenophobia against 'foreigners' has continued to direct policy and attitude towards farm workers. As a result, these workers have been exposed, with shocking consistency, to widespread human rights abuse that has threatened their very humanity.

Under the Citizenship Act, one can be a citizen of Zimbabwe by birth, origin, or marriage. However, the bulk of children, born of 'alien' parents on Zimbabwe's commercial farms, have also been considered aliens even under the Constitutional Amendment (No. 14) Act of 1996, which was an attempt towards a remedy of this situation. Section 5 (3) of this Act states that:

> A person born in Zimbabwe on or after the date of commencement of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 14) Act, 1996, shall be a citizen by birth if at the time of this birth his father or mother is a citizen of Zimbabwe (Government of Zimbabwe 1996).

Although this Amendment helped those children with at least one parent as Zimbabwean citizen, it only catered for children born on or after the date of this particular Amendment. This dispensation could have been widened in scope to include any person that could prove that at least one parent was Zimbabwean. In 1999, the government recognised that those who entered the country as indentured labour during the Federal period from 1953 to 1963, and their children, were entitled to Zimbabwean citizenship. However, while this was a positive move on the part of government, farm workers who fit this category found it difficult to prove that they in fact met the criteria. Those who could prove that they entered the country during the period of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland joined the band wagon of all those that had since qualified for citizenship, but found it difficult to acquire Zimbabwean civil documents. The Citizenship Amendment Act (2001) worsened the fate of farm

workers, for people born of a foreign parentage were required to renounce their right to their parents' nationality and failure to do so resulted in their losing Zimbabwean citizenship. Interviews established that many farm workers, especially women and children, did not have documents establishing Zimbabwean citizenship, either lacking papers altogether or carrying national identification cards bearing the designation 'alien', which have brought little benefit to these workers. Farmers have also been unwilling to assist their workers in obtaining identity particulars because, among other reasons,

> an unregistered worker is easier to exploit. Without any form of identification, the worker can easily succumb to the fear that the farmer instils in him, and … fear is the basic tool of management on commercial farms (Mupinda, Interview).

## 3. Land Reform and Farm Workers' Security

The disadvantages faced by farm workers in their living and working conditions, and with respect to their political and social rights, largely derive from their lack of land rights in Zimbabwe (Loewenson 1992, Amanor-Wilks 1995, Moyo et al 2000). At independence, the government declared itself to be socialist in ideological orientation, implying that it was committed to principles of equitable distribution of resources for the benefit of the disadvantaged social groups such as women, children, peasants, and workers. Steps were accordingly taken towards addressing the severely unequal and intolerable differences between the economically privileged minority and the impoverished black majority. Thus, the coming of independence heralded optimum opportunity to build democratic institutions intended to promote the much-awaited human security. The ordinary majority looked forward to the emergence of expanded democratic spaces, as well as commitment to protection of human rights and basic tangible material benefits, once majority rule had been achieved.

In the early 1980s, the post-colonial state adopted land reform policy criteria driven by the imperative of resettling the landless that had been dispossessed of land by discriminatory laws of the racist colonial government. The war of liberation had largely been fought over land. In fact, supporters of the liberation struggle had been christened *vana vevhu* in Shona, or *abantwana benhlabathi* in Ndebele, or 'children of the soil' in English. (Tshuma 1997, Martin & Johnson 1981).

Literature on land alienation in colonial Zimbabwe abounds. Africans were dispossessed of their fertile land and driven into remote, dry areas known as reserves, where they lived in crowded conditions. Before 1980, it was illegal for 'alien' Africans, male or female, to own land in rural areas. This resulted from the colonial conception of citizenship. If men were born or patrilineally descended from outside the country they could not own land even if they married local women. African women, local or not, could only get land through their spouses (if the latter were indigenous) or as widows with dependent children who would have been living on the land. A significant proportion of farm workers fits this category and hardly had a local rural home in the colonial period. Their ethnic identity failed to qualify them for land ownership since their ancestors and customary rights were located outside the country. Thus, independence brought high hopes for a better future for the marginalised farm workers.

When the post-colonial government gave citizenship to non-Zimbabwean residents in the early 1980s, it promised that this would enable them to get land rights on farms acquired for resettlement. In practice, however, this remained a dream to the intended beneficiaries due to the inadequacies of the universal citizenship, which denied them economic rights in rural areas. Most farm workers failed to acquire Zimbabwean identity particulars, thereby making it extremely difficult for them to be considered for resettlement. The inscription 'alien' on national identity documents of the few who could show proof of 'Zimbabwean citizenship' also disqualified them from land ownership. It should further be noted that the land resettlement policy criteria adopted by the Mugabe government at independence gave priority to the landless people who were married with dependants, or divorced or widowed, again with dependants. Refugees, with dependants, returning from the war of liberation, were also considered for resettlement. All groups of people had to show proof of Zimbabwean citizenship, which the bulk of farm workers could not provide, even if they qualified by virtue of landlessness. Some farm workers, however, managed to resettle themselves on abandoned farms and state land in different parts of the country, and were officially recognised as resettlement farmers ex post independence (Herbst 1990, Alexander 1994). A shift in land policy in the mid-1980s into the 1990s, towards more 'efficient' and 'productive' farmers resulted in a negative official policy towards farm workers, who were now characterised as foreigners, unproductive and *persona non grata* on resettlement farms.

In fact, in 1982, the then Minister of Lands and Agriculture, Kumbirai Kangai, had revealed the official attitude of government when he said:

> Nobody can expect government … to say that these people, who are of Malawi, Zambian and Mozambican extraction, should be accommodated elsewhere. You know as much as I do that they cannot even be accommodated in the TTLs[2] (Commercial Farmers' Union 1982).

Under the 1992 Land Acquisition Act, government combined the need to solve the problems of landlessness with the necessity of having an economically viable farming sector. Thus, to qualify for resettlement the state considered physical fitness to make productive use of the land allocated to them, plus economic competency to ensure effective use of land. Thus, a system of awarding points based on factors measuring farming competence and need was introduced. Under this system, the maximum number of points an applicant could score was 100. In order to qualify, they should score at least 50 per cent of the maximum possible score. 80 per cent of the total marks were attached to 'competence' factors while 20 per cent were attached to 'need' factors. Landlessness, being unemployed, and having dependants were some of the 'need' factors that constituted 20 per cent of the total. 'Competence' factors included level of education (with full marks being awarded for secondary education), farming skills (with full marks being awarded for possession of a Master Farmer Certificate), and age and health condition (with persons of the age-group 36-48 being considered of prime age (Ncube 1997:23, Kinsey 1999).

It is clear that the new regulations were meant to enrich the already rich, particularly male adults. Furthermore, no specific recognition was given to farm workers as the policy was lopsided in favour of 'competence' factors, opposed to 'need' factors on which farm workers could be assumed to be able to score more marks. For farm workers, qualification for competence factors entailed citizenship status. While the Land Acquisition Act empowered the state to acquire farms for purposes of resettlement, it was silent on the fate of farm workers on the farms to be so acquired, in clear contradiction with the Labour Relations Act (1985, 1996) which obliged the new owner of any

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2    Tribal Trust Lands.

acquired/purchased enterprise, including a farm, to be responsible for their workers (Government of Zimbabwe 1985, 1996).

It was only in the late 1990s, due to advocacy efforts by the General Agriculture and Plantation Workers' Union of Zimbabwe (GAPWUZ), non-governmental organisations, and academics, that farm workers were accepted as a category to be resettled. Thus, great strides were made within the policy framework for the provision of farm workers in the land reform and resettlement programme. Thus, the 1998 Land Reform and Resettlement Phase II framework plan acknowledged the need to provide for farm workers. This resulted in the incorporation of issues of land rights by farm workers under the draft 1999 Land Policy Document (Government of Zimbabwe 1999). All these efforts were, however, rendered irrelevant by events under the government-sponsored 'fast-track' land reform model since 2000. After the results of the February 2000 Constitutional Referendum, a wave of farm 'invasions' by 'war veterans' gripped the country into the June 2000 parliamentary elections and the March 2002 presidential poll. The 'invasions', no doubt a response to the unfolding political developments, were subsequently followed by the introduction of the 'fast-track' land resettlement programme, which unfortunately negated all the gains achieved by farm worker advocacy in terms of farm workers' rights to land. In fact, the revised Land Reform and Resettlement Programme Phase II document of April 2001 shows that government had reneged on its earlier commitment to the issue of land rights for farm workers. Even though these workers were not precluded from applying for land under the 'fast-track' land reform programme, they were automatically disqualified by their ethnic identity. The process of registering for land formally involved registration with rural authorities, including the Rural District Council of the communal area from which they came. No mechanisms were in place to enable the workers to access the new allocations easily. Moreover, farm workers of foreign descent were more vulnerable than their 'local' counterparts in having no other place to go to. Stix Machacha of Tanagula Farm in Norton commented, 'I am an alien. My roots are in Zambia. I have nowhere to go. My whole family is here. My father is a pensioner'. (Interview).

In fact, as early as June 2000, the National Employment Council (NEC) for the agricultural industry (a tripartite body of government, employers and the labour union), published a report noting that, as a result of farm occupations, at least 3 000 farm workers had been displaced from their homes, 26 killed, 16 000 assaulted, and eleven raped (National Employment Council 2000).

In the hey-day of the polarised political environment during the period between the 2000 Constitutional Referendum and the presidential poll in March 2002, violence against farm workers was linked to the support given to the labour-driven opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) by white commercial farmers and, by perceived implication, their workers too. In particular, during the Referendum, GAPWUZ had participated in voter education among farm workers and were believed to be campaigning against the government-sponsored proposed constitution. Government, thus, associated GAPWUZ and its labour constituency with the opposition MDC. Consequently, 'war veterans' sealed off the farming community against GAPWUZ and non-governmental organisations that had been working with farm workers. GAPWUZ alleges that the newly formed government-backed union, the Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU) deliberately undermined its efforts to organise in large-scale farming areas. Meanwhile, terror and mayhem ruled the day in the large-scale commercial farm sector.

There was a welter of recriminations against the farm community. There were vitriolic attacks on white farmers and their workers. One 21 year old male farm security worker described how he was threatened and assaulted:

> They came to my house on 27 February this year (2001). The first thing they wanted was for me to get out of my house. They came at twelve at night. They were six, one war veteran who was acting as the leader, the others were even younger than me. They told me to move out. They told me to shift everything by the morning so that they could come. During the night when they came they said, 'We know that all of you people who belong to that farm are MDC'. I came here for work (the next morning). They followed me here. I was standing outside here close to the window. They grabbed me by the hand and then they hit my hand off the window bar. Whoever felt like they wanted to hit me was hitting. They forced me to go to the house … Whoever felt like it was clapping (hitting) me. I was clapped at least seven or eight times (Human Rights Watch 2002).

There were also cases in which farm workers attacked and beat those occupying a farm. Such incidents often resulted in reprisals in which the worst victims became women, children and the elderly, and yet these cases received the least media coverage.

As politicians stormed workers' farm compounds and ejected families from their homes, women, particularly those with siblings, and the elderly

became easy targets. They could hardly escape the beatings and tear gas, while huts were set ablaze and women were allegedly raped (*Daily News* 2000). Even more, a person could be so physically disabled that the very meaning of being human is lost. Amputation and torture in pursuit of punishment or revenge are obvious deprivations of the human right to physical well-being. When women are raped and children beaten up and abused, human security is violated, and there can be no human rights without human security. Major publicity was given to farmers who fell victim to political violence, while workers generally remained 'invisible'. Many workers were forcibly removed from the acquired farms since they would not have been on the list of those earmarked for resettlement.

Alleging government involvement in the whole scheme of violence on large-scale farms, Jerry Grant, then vice-president of the Commercial Farmers' Union, which represents the largely white commercial farmers, expressed shock at what he called deliberate action by government to cause chaos on farms. He insisted that the 'invasions' were orchestrated by the government, which blamed whites for its referendum defeat, and yet government claimed that the 'invasions' were a spontaneous manifestation by the people of desperate land hunger and a peaceful protest against the rejection of a constitution that contained a provision allowing government to acquire white farms without compensation. Meanwhile, despite court orders issued to evict farm occupiers, President Mugabe declared on several occasions that government would not drive the farm 'invaders' off the farms until the land issue was resolved. He perceived the 'invasions' as the vanguard of a land revolution, necessary for the completion of the goals of the liberation war (*The Herald* 2000a).

By October 2001, 2 041 farms had been acquired under the 'Fast-Track' Land Resettlement Programme since 2000, and a total of 123 979 households were resettled. In the northern parts of the country, for instance, the three provinces of Mashonaland West, Mashonaland Central and Mashonaland East had a total of 46 868 households resettled of which only 793 were farm worker households. Given an average figure of 40 households per farm in the three provinces, this translates to 38 360 farm worker households, meaning that 37 567 households were not catered for. Considering that each farm worker household had an average of five members, it means that a total of 187 835 people were not catered for (Government of Zimbabwe 2001).

Two key problems emerged from the manner in which the whole land redistribution exercise was handled under the 'fast-track' land reform programme. The first relates to party-political channels used to access forms

for applying for land, and the discrimination in the allocation of plots. The second relates to the key role of the 'war veterans' in distributing and allocating land, the same people that farm workers claimed were responsible for violence and intimidation. Thus, the official structure for allocating land through civil servants and elected rural district council officials was often superseded by informal processes governed by war veterans and their associated ruling party functionaries. Since these processes were effectively unregulated, beneficiary selection could be highly politicised. Thus, the overlap between the ruling party and government in the structures responsible for allocating land under the 'fast-track' land reform programme posed problems. One senior government official, in fact, expressed the observation that there was a thin line between government and ZANU (PF). He emphasised, 'I don't separate the government from ZANU (PF). ZANU (PF) is the ruling party. It is the party that is in power. ZANU (PF) is the one that is driving the manifesto and championing the resettlement programme' (Human Rights Watch 2002:8). From the above, it is clear that land allocation was tied to support for the ruling party.

At any rate, high-ranking government officials, including a minister and a governor, publicly stated that only ZANU (PF) supporters would be settled on the land that had been acquired (*The Herald* 2000b). The absence of a holistic approach to land reform, however, brought serious repercussions on marginalised groups such as farm workers who were the most vulnerable, experiencing displacement, destitution and loss of employment. For those white farmers who remained on the land, uncertainty affected their workers in that farmers had difficulties in accessing credit from financial institutions since they could not guarantee harvest of their crops. Others, however, chose to vent their anger on their workers by retrenchment, purportedly because their farms were earmarked for acquisition. Thus, some workers were laid off or had their working time reduced severely, which meant a reduction in monthly wages, that stood in 2001 at Z$4 181 for the lowest paid full-time worker (Statutory Instrument 335 2001). The Land Acquisition Amendment Act (2001) witnessed retrenchments of workers when farmers were served with notices of acquisition and immediately ceased operations. In many cases lack of compensation led to loss of income meaning serious impacts on food security and livelihood, inability to plan ahead, and homelessness.

Low levels of education made it difficult for farm workers to secure any other form of employment outside the farms. Some, therefore, settled illegally on private property or in prohibited areas, while others joined their

counterparts in established informal settlements scattered around farming and peri-urban areas. This happened because a large number had cut ties with relations in communal areas (where such ties had existed) and, therefore, have had nowhere else to go. At Chihwiti and Gambuli informal settlements in Makonde district of Mashonaland West, over 60 per cent of the residents were found to be former farm workers (Magaramombe 2001:21).

The aged farm workers have had probably the worst experience. Elderly workers in the agricultural sector include those workers who, despite having reached retirement age, have continued to provide services to the employers, usually under 'special' conditions. These workers constitute a special group of workers who also include those with physical or mental disabilities, employed to do some of the work normally done by able-bodied employees (Chadya & Mayavo 2002). Under the Labour Relations Act (1985), retirement age in the agricultural sector has been sixty years. Some farmers allowed their elderly workers to stay on farms doing 'lighter' chores or engaging in their own self-sustaining activities as a form of 'pension'. However, the 'fast-track' land reform programme made many of them destitute and extremely impoverished as they were stripped of all these benefits. The absence of social safety nets to cushion them from these problems made life difficult for them. The compulsory pension scheme introduced at independence did not benefit farm workers. Proof of identification has always been required on claiming benefits, and many have lost out on this technicality due to lack of identity particulars. Worse still for 'foreign' elderly workers, hopes of ever owning a piece of land or decent accommodation have faded like prospects of tracing their roots. Interviews established that several factors militate against the 'foreigners' going back to their countries of origin. Some have lost contacts with families and relatives back home. For Mozambicans, for instance, civil war has been cited as a deterrent. Meagre wages and inadequate savings have made prospects of accomplishing the journey back home more remote as the years passed by. Some have generally been ashamed of going back with absolutely nothing but bother for their families.

Thus, despite having lived in Zimbabwe for generations, farm workers lack the ethnic and nationality rights needed to own land. As a result, upon retirement, many 'alien' farm workers have either sought refuge in old people's homes or, if lucky, lived with their children or those few relatives who would have, somehow, obtained land in communal areas. The rest have become 'squatters'. By 2000, the 'squatter' population had, indeed, become formidable. As Moyo (1999) estimates, 'squatters' amounted to over 200 000

families in various locations within communal areas, private commercial farms and on state land. As at 2002, the problem of resettling farm workers had not yet been resolved.

## 4. Conclusions: The Way Forward

From the above, it is clear that the life of a farm worker in Zimbabwe, like that of a slave, does not accord with human dignity, and, therefore, fails to meet the standards required by human rights. It is in this context that human rights have often been called 'inalienable', meaning that if they are alienated the life left is not fully human life. Thus, the appeal of human rights is to the 'good' side of the human nature.

When certain groups of people are driven out of their homes and become 'displaced persons', it constitutes human rights abuse and a violation of human security in particular. The United Nations High Commissioner for refugees, Sadako Ogota warned that 'today's human rights abuses are tomorrow's refugee movements' (Naidu 2001:7), which, therefore, calls for a permanent solution to the farm worker crisis. This involves establishing permanent settlement, with legal tenure, for farm workers (and ex-farm workers) either on acquired farms or elsewhere, in order to enable the farm worker community to be completely integrated into the national economy.

Lack of Zimbabwean citizenship has perpetuated a vicious cycle of poverty among farm workers because of little or no prospects for better jobs elsewhere. Debates over the constitutional reform process in Zimbabwe could see an incorporation of labour rights, particularly citizenship rights, in the Bill of Rights. Furthermore, citizenship rights would guarantee that farm workers are considered for resettlement. Adoption of the SADC draft protocol on the free movement of persons within the community could go a long way towards addressing human rights concerns of farm workers (and other workers in similar positions) in the sub-region. Key provisions of this draft protocol of 1996 relate to entry into member states, residence, and citizenship rights of peoples. Among other things, the draft protocol emphasises the need to formulate policies on free movement of persons as well as extension of citizenship rights to those who seek it from within the region. It also seeks to remove all restrictions on the freedom of establishment for citizens of other member states in a given territory, as well as the right to participate in all such human activities as citizens of the host state. This could go a long way

towards respecting the inviolable human rights of farm workers in Zimbabwe. This requires, among other things, a clear government policy on farm workers. Workers on acquired farms should be given priority to be resettled on that land, and should be given adequate compensation.

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# The Politics of Conflict Resolution in the Democratic Republic of Congo: The Inter-Congolese Dialogue Process

*Kasaija Phillip Apuuli**

## Abstract

The overall aim of the paper is to examine the process of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) from the aborted Addis Ababa meeting, through the Sun City I process of February-April 2002, the December 2002 Pretoria agreement up to the Sun City II final talks of April 2003. The specific aim is to look at the politics surrounding the conclusion of the 'final' peace agreement of Pretoria

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in December 2002. We explore the debate as to whether this agreement will hold, thus finally bringing peace to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The thesis of the paper is that the agreement affords the DRC the second opportunity, after the failed national conferences of 1991-1992, to peacefully settle the conflict that has been on-going since DRC's independence in 1960. However, we also note that many obstacles remain before total peace can be achieved in the DRC.


## 1. Introduction

A committee, composed of Bemba's Congolese Liberation Movement (CLM), Joseph Kabila's government and other elements of the civil society in the DRC, has since May 2002 been huddled in the port city of Matadi, over-seeing the writing of a new constitution[1] which will lead to the establishment of an interim administration and to general elections after thirty months. Under the agreement that was reached between the Kabila government and Bemba's CLM on the fringes of the Sun City talks, the former remains president for the interim period and the latter becomes the Prime Minister. The other major rebel group, the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD-Goma), and some unarmed opposition groups have been left in the cold. The deal as it has been noted, 'heralds the end of anti-Kabila coalition and confirms the isolation of RCD-Goma and its principal ally, Rwanda' (International Crisis Group 2002).

The Sun City I talks were part of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) initiated under the Lusaka Agreement of 1999. The ICD is aimed at forging a new political dispensation in the DRC that involves not only incorporating the Congolese belligerents, but also the unarmed political opposition to the Kinshasa government and the 'life blood of the nation' represented by the members of the civil society. The Sun City talks brought together 360 delegates from all the groups mentioned above.

Firstly, this paper is premised on the argument that the Inter-Congolese Dialogue has provided an opportunity for all stakeholders in DRC politics to discuss the future of their country. Since the country attained independence

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1    Differences are reported to have cropped up as delegates in the Kabila camp of *Mouvement du 17 Mai* who have accused Jean Pierre Bemba of trying to hand over power to the followers of Mobutu. See *Africa Confidential*, 43 (10), 17 May 2002, p. 8.

in 1960, this is only the second time that the Congolese people have gathered and genuinely looked at the way they are governed. The first time was the 1991-1992 national conferences that brought together all the political forces in the then Zaire to chart out the future of the country. This process was scuttled by dictator Mobutu.

Also, the Sun City I through the Sun City II talks marked the beginning of a real regional discussion on the security and economic issues at the heart of the Congolese conflict. It also tackled the issue of Rwanda's security, and especially the disarmament of the Hutu militia based in the DRC (International Crisis Group 2002).

Secondly, we argue that the international community has played a great role in seeing to it that the conflict in the DRC ends peacefully. Part of the reason the parties to the conflict came to the negotiating table was the pressure exerted on them by both the regional and international communities. The current fighting that is taking place in the Ituri region and parts of North Kivu calls for renewed international pressure on the belligerents to go to the negotiating table.

## 2. Situating the Argument

Intra-state armed conflict was, especially in the past, frequently seen as a zero-sum game. Outcomes other than winning or losing were inherently atypical (Ohlson & Söderberg 2002:13). The arguments raised were, for example, that the conflict issues were too intractable, the goals too incompatible and the values at stake completely indivisible, leading to strong polarisation that impeded negotiated compromise solutions to intra-state conflict. Zartman (1995:332-333), however, notes that analysts are today more inclined to see intra-state war as something that can be traced back to legitimate grievances and 'normal politics gone bad', and that such wars can and should be resolved through negotiated compromise. Fischer (1993:247-248) on the other hand, has noted that protracted social conflicts are often rooted in the frustration of basic needs, such as denial of recognition, participation or distributive justice. When two actors get stuck over one or more intractable and seemingly indivisible issue, conflict resolution becomes more difficult. This is often the case with intra-state conflicts.

Conflict resolution can be seen as a phased process (Ohlson & Söderberg 2002:15). The phases in a conflict resolution process overlap in

time and substance. Each phase has certain key characteristics and critical elements. In addition, developments during one phase influence the potential for action in the next one. Sometimes, the process arrives at a crucial breakpoint, necessitating a choice between alternative courses of action. One such course of action is the signing of a peace agreement. On the basis of phase shifts and breakpoints, three general phases can be distinguished: the dialogue phase, which precedes a peace agreement; the implementation phase, when the stipulations of the agreement are carried out; and the consolidation phase, when consequences and changing circumstances resulting from the implementation of the agreement are to be internalised and accepted by peoples and elites. Our concern here is the peace agreement, implementation and consolidation.

If the dialogue phase leads to a mutually agreed upon peace agreement, then the power-induced 'negative' pressures that initiated the dialogue must be complemented by more constructive pressures that bring down the levels of mutual fear and distrust, and generate increasing trust between the party elites.

There are at least three hypotheses on peace agreements (Ohlson & Söderberg 2002:15). First, durable peace is, as a rule, not likely to be achieved if, through the use of leverage, third parties impose a settlement on the parties. Agreements signed under pressure are less likely to hold than voluntarily signed agreements. Second, agreements that address the key conflict issues and concerns of the parties – as perceived by the parties at the time of the agreement – are more likely to hold than agreements that do not. Third, an agreement that includes all parties with potential to resume hostilities is more likely to hold than one that does not. We shall discuss the Inter-Congolese Dialogue within this conceptual framework.

## 3. The Road to the Sun City II Agreement

The DRC has been mired in conflict since the war that ousted former dictator Mobutu started in October 1996. The war tentatively ended in May 1997 when Laurent Desire Kabila[2] took over power in Kinshasa. However, the

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2    Laurent Desire Kabila was assassinated on 17th January 2001 purportedly by one of his bodyguards, and his son Joseph Kabila succeeded him as President of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

peace was short-lived, as soon thereafter Kabila fell out with Uganda and Rwanda, two of his principle allies that had helped him come to power. A new war started in the DRC in August 1998 when Kabila decided to send home the Rwandese soldiers who had all along been providing his security. Soon thereafter, fighting broke out between the Congolese army and the Rwandese. Uganda later joined the fight, ostensibly accusing Kabila of failing to curb the rebel incursions of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) into Uganda. Other motives, such as Uganda wanting to lay its hands on Congolese natural resources, have been cited, however, as having motivated the government of Museveni to intervene.

When the Rwandese and their rebel allies of the Rally for Congolese Democracy-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML) threatened to take the capital Kinshasa, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and initially Chad joined the fighting on behalf of Kabila. The Rwandese and the rebel RCD-ML were soon stopped in their tracks from taking Kinshasa. Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia argued that they had intervened to save Kabila under the auspices of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) whose constitution demanded that member states come to the aid of one of their own if she was attacked. Suffice to note that the DRC joined the SADC soon after Kabila came to power.

The RCD was created by Uganda and Rwanda when it became clear to the two countries that Kabila was not the right person to be leading the DRC. Initially, the idea was to have the RCD replace Kabila and remove him from power. The RCD was initially led by Professor Wamba dia Wamba. However, due to leadership wrangles, it broke into the two factions of RCD-Goma and RCD-Kisangani at the end of May 1999.

After many diplomatic meetings[3] and conferences to end the conflict in the DRC, the Lusaka Agreement was finally negotiated and signed in July 1999. The agreement has been hailed as the real 'African solution to an African problem'. It was mooted and negotiated by the parties to the conflict themselves. Among the issues covered by the agreement is that of initiating, under a neutral facilitator, an Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) aimed at establishing a new political dispensation for the DRC. The facilitator, chosen by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) after consulting the parties, was the former president of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire. Initially, the Kabila

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3    For the full details on the numerous diplomatic summits and meetings, see Apuuli 2000.

government frustrated Masire's work. This was because Laurent Kabila tried very hard to avoid a dialogue that he considered too threatening to his power.[4] However, after Laurent Kabila's assassination, his son, who succeeded him unequivocally, agreed to support Masire's work as a way to show the international community that he was committed to ending the war.

## 4. The Failed Addis Ababa Talks

Former President Masire went about trying to kick-start the dialogue. Under the Lusaka Agreement, the dialogue was aimed at bringing both the armed and unarmed opposition in the DRC together. Between July and August 2001, a preparatory meeting was held in Gaborone, Botswana, to come up with an agenda for the talks.[5] A follow-up meeting between the three main belligerents – the government, the RCD and CLM – was to follow in Abuja, Nigeria, in September 2001.[6] Finally in October 2001, the dialogue took off in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa. The talks did not go far, as delegates were soon contesting the presence and absence of some other delegates. The Kinshasa government contested the absence of the Mai Mai, religious denominations, political parties and the RCD-ML representatives. Also the issue of money cropped up. The donors had pledged to finance the talks to the tune of $5 million, but only $250 000 was available. The talks ended unceremoniously. The Kinshasa representatives were the first to leave Addis Ababa. Suffice to note that earlier on, the talks had been dealt a blow when President Joseph Kabila announced that he would not be travelling to the talks. Instead he announced that he would be holding elections in the DRC as soon as possible because the Addis talks were in danger of being manipulated by forces who were not included in the talks (International Crisis Group 2002:7). The facilitator of the talks promised that they would be continued at an unspecified date in South Africa.

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4    For a detailed discussion on what Laurent Kabila did to frustrate Masire's efforts, see International Crisis Group 2000.

5    For a complete discussion on what transpired in Gaborone, see International Crisis Group 2001:5-7.

6    The talks did not take off as the RCD's Alphonse Onusumba and CLM's Jean Pierre Bemba did not show up.

## 5. The Sun City I Talks

The Sun City talks, lasting 45 days, were meant to open on 25th February 2002. However, the opening was marred by disagreements over representation and accreditation of the representatives. The delegations manifested a lot of mistrust for each other. It is reported that 'scuffles broke out as delegates were being issued accreditation [and] members of the rival political groupings started pushing each other around in the crowded offices.'[7] The rebel representatives argued that some people that had come from Kinshasa were a creation of Kabila and, therefore, stooges of the Kinshasa government. Before the talks opened, Jean Pierre Bemba declared that he would boycott the meeting because 'it lacked legitimacy as many of the political parties invited to the talks [were] not true opposition groups but fronts for [President Joseph] Kabila's supporters.'[8] The talks were delayed by a few days due to these wrangles. Finally, when they got underway, there was the issue of the position of Kabila. The rebel representatives, especially of RCD-Goma, argued that since the talks were aimed at establishing a transition government for Congo, Kabila could not remain president.

Soon, after all the initial hitches had been dealt with, the talks were threatened by renewed fighting in the DRC. Also, in the middle of March 2002, fighting broke out between government forces and the rebel RCD-Goma troops for the town of Molero on the shores of Lake Tanganyika, ending with the latter capturing the town. Earlier on, the RCD-Goma rebels had captured the town of Pweto. As a result of this fighting, the government delegation at Sun City quit the talks. The facilitator sent out two envoys to verify reports of the fighting. The Security Council condemned the fighting and demanded that the rebels withdraw from the captured towns.[9] The international community had grown tired of the continued conflict in the DRC and the Security Council was ready, therefore, to bring its influence to bear and see to it that the talks proceeded. The government delegation only returned after the rebels agreed to quit the town.

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7    *The Monitor*, Wednesday, February 27, 2002.

8    *The Monitor*, Wednesday, February 27, 2002. See story, 'Congolese discuss new Government', p. 16.

9    Resolution 1399 (2002).

## 6. The Mbeki Plans

The most contentious issue at the dialogue concerned the sharing of power. Before President Mbeki got involved in the talks, the delegates had been wrangling over whether Kabila should remain the transitional head of state or not. The position of RCD-Goma was that Kabila is/was part of transition for up to thirty months.

The Mbeki Plans can be outlined as follows. The Council (also called the *Conseil Supérieur de la République*) would be made up of: the transitional president, five vice-presidents from the rebel movements (for Defence, Security, Interior and Elections, Finance, Economy and Reconstruction), a prime minister, and five deputy prime ministers from the unarmed opposition. This Council would supervise the process of unifying the Congolese territory and the armies of the warring parties. It would also set up a Defence Council including armed rebels to oversee the withdrawal of all foreign troops.

There would also be a cabinet that would guarantee national reconciliation and prepare for elections. In addition, a parliament of 500 hundred members would be created (drawn from the five components of the national dialogue), a special court, an appeals court (to deal with the legal aspects of the transition), an electoral commission and a media commission.

Disagreements arose as to the distribution of positions, the most contentious one being that of the transitional president. Initially the two main armed groups, RCD-Goma and CLM, and Tshisekedi's Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) were opposed to Joseph Kabila remaining transitional president. The UDPS in particular, through its delegation of Valentin Mabuke and Eve Bazaiba Masudi, argued that appointing a belligerent as head of state would be to reward fighting, and hence it demanded that Tshisekedi be appointed the transitional president. However, at the eleventh hour the CLM dropped its objections to Kabila being the transitional president. The RCD-Goma agreed on this position as well, knowing that it would get a vice-president's post and control both the integrated army and arrangements for general elections. The Kabila government got worried by this and argued that this was almost equivalent to a *coup d'état*, as it would bring conflict from the field into the government. As a result, it went ahead to seal a deal with the CLM on the fringes.

However, both the UDPS and RCD-Goma were not to lose out completely under the Mbeki plan. Both groups stood to gain something. Under the plan, Kabila would remain the president. However, his decisions

would have to be approved by the two vice-presidents made up of the CLM's Jean Pierre Bemba and RCD-Goma's Adolphe Onusumba[10]. Mbeki wanted Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba to be the prime minister, with the vice prime ministerial positions going to Roger Lumbala of RCD-Nationale (RCD-N) and Mbusa Nyamwisi of RCD-ML. This was supposed to be the deal that was to be reached on the 15th April 2002.

Under the RCD-Goma proposal, Kabila would be a non-executive president. The position of first vice-president, which would also be responsible for the Defence, Finance and Elections portfolios, would be taken by itself. Under the deal, Bemba would be the second vice-president, with veteran Etienne Tshisekedi being the prime minister. Five posts of deputy prime minister would be created under the RCD-Goma proposals. However, as everybody knows now, everything was scuttled by the Kabila-Bemba deal as negotiations were continuing.

## 7. The Kabila-Bemba Deal

The deal that was announced on 18th April 2002 is titled, 'The Political Agreement on Consensual Management of the Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo'. The deal, apart from nominating Joseph Kabila and Jean Pierre Bemba as transitional president and prime minister respectively, creates several new institutions of the Assembly, Senate and Senior Army Council.

The president would be the supreme commander of the army, which he would control through the Senior Army Council. A law would be passed determining the precise powers and functioning of this Council. The president would nominate and revoke ministers and senior officials with the counter signature of the prime minister, who would be the head of government and preside over the Council of Ministers.

The prime minister would have the power to turn down a candidate after consultation with the group concerned that would have nominated him/her. The president would have the power to turn down candidates for posts concerned with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Interior.

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10    As at the time of writing, Azarias Ruberwa had replaced Onusumba as the leader of RCD-Goma.

The deal further states that given the consensual character of the transition, the Assembly cannot vote on a motion of no confidence in the Prime Minister and his government. In addition, it states that except in cases of treason, extortion or corruption, the president of the Republic, the prime minister and the presidents of the Assembly and Senate will remain in office throughout the transition.

The Assembly would consist of 425 members designated by the groups represented at the ICD, and the Senate would have sixty-five members. The president of the Assembly would come from RCD-Goma, and that of the Senate from the opposition parties.

A mechanism would be put in place for the formation of a new national army, which would comprise the forces of the government, the CLM and the RCD. The RCD-Goma would have a Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Defence and also have equal representation with the government and the CLM in the National Defence Council, which is to preside over the reform of the national army. The RCD-ML, RCD-N and the Mai Mai would also be part of the mechanism.

Further, a working group would be established to develop a transitional constitution for the country. As we write, a draft constitution has already been produced.

Lastly, the civil society would be allotted the responsibility of organising Elections, the Media, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, a Human Rights Commission, and an Ethics and Anti-Corruption Committee.

This agreement was signed by more than 70 per cent of the delegates taking part in the Dialogue. Out of the 366 delegates at the ICD, at least 258 signed the deal. Besides the government and CLM delegations, all but five civil society delegates, at least thirty of the sixty-nine unarmed opposition delegates, RCD-ML and RCD-N have supported it. The rest of the delegates comprising close to 30 per cent, led by RCD-Goma, opposed the Kabila-Bemba deal.

## 8. Bemba's Unpredictability

Jean Pierre Bemba is a creation of Uganda. Initially, Uganda supported the RCD before it became fictionalised. But it appears that Uganda changed its mind and decided to throw its weight behind a new group, the Congolese Liberation Movement (CLM). It is actually reported that the Uganda army, the

Uganda Peoples Defence Force (UPDF), actively participated in some of the rebel CLM's offensives against the Kinshasa government troops.[11] Over the years, however, the behaviour of the CLM and Bemba in particular has become unpredictable for Uganda. This unpredictability can partly be explained by the behaviour of President Museveni. Not wanting to put his eggs in one basket, President Museveni increasingly supported numerous rebel groups in the DRC conflict. This was viewed by the CLM as under-cutting its power. For example, President Museveni supported Wamba dia Wamba's RCD-ML, Mbusa Nyamwisi and Tibasiima Ateenyi's RCD-ML and Roger Lumbala's RCD-N. The leaders of these groups were habitual residents in Kampala. Even when conflicts arose within these groups, Museveni played a mediating role.[12] Museveni is quoted as having said, 'a good hunter sends out several dogs to hunt because he cannot know in advance which one will be the best.'[13] Museveni's support of the various groups fighting in the DRC therefore unsettled the CLM.

Before the aborted Addis Ababa talks, the CLM and RCD-Goma entered into an agreement. Olivier Kamitatu, the Secretary General of CLM, and Azarias Ruberwa, the Secretary General of RCD-Goma, signed a declaration adopting a common strategy for the talks. The two groups also created a special military unit aimed at neutralising the negative forces which are mentioned in the Lusaka Agreement. Also it is reported that the CLM forces have been getting help from the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA) to fight the forces of RCD-ML of Mbusa Nyamwisi.

Relations between Uganda and Rwanda have not been on good brotherly terms over the last few years. The two governments of Uganda and Rwanda have been at each other's throats since their armies clashed three times in the DRC city of Kisangani. Thus, accusations and counter-accusations have recently characterised their relations. How Bemba could strike deals with

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11   For example, when the CLM forces were fighting for the control of the town of Buta in Eastern Congo, the Ugandan army actively participated in this battle. See Apuuli 2001/2:22.

12   For example, when in November 2000 differences cropped up in Wamba's RCD-ML, the Kampala authorities brought all the different factions together and established a united group called the Congolese Liberation Front under the leadership of Jean Pierre Bemba.

13   *The East African*, 29 April 2002. See story 'Museveni's dog that broke away from the pack.'

RCD-Goma and Rwanda without the nod of Uganda is mind-boggling. However, Bemba's deal with the Kinshasa government at Sun City must be seen in the context of the recent CLM's unpredictability. It appears as if Uganda gave Bemba a go-ahead. For example, President Museveni was the first foreign leader to congratulate Bemba on becoming the transitional Prime Minister of the DRC.[14] President Museveni could have done this in order to spite Rwanda, whose RCD-Goma had got practically nothing from the Sun City I talks.

As the other delegates were haggling in the plenary, the Kinshasa government and the CLM were huddled in fringe talks. Before the official talks were to close, a bombshell from the fringe talks was dropped. The CLM and the Kinshasa government had clinched a deal. Under the agreement reached, Jean Pierre Bemba would become the interim Prime Minister of the DRC while Kabila would remain as president for an interim period lasting 30 months.

Disbelief, defiance and cries of foul from the other delegates greeted the announcement of the deal. The RCD-Goma has even gone to the extent of calling the deal a 'coup d'état'.[15] The deal has left the RCD-Goma accusing the CLM and the government of Kabila of bad faith. Adolphe Onusumba, the former leader of RCD-Goma, argued in anger: '[W]e are on the legal side. They are the ones who spoiled what the Congolese were expecting.'[16] The deal sent all the other groups into disarray. However, they attempted to save face by establishing an alliance of their own to counter the deal. As a result, the groups that were left out have established the Alliance for the Protection of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ASD). The alliance brought together both armed and unarmed groups. These include: veteran opposition politician Etienne Tshisekedi's UDPS, Rafael Katebe Katoto's Dynamic for a Neutral Transition, the USA based Rally for a New Society, the Congolese National Movement-Lumumba, and the Lumumbist Progressive Movement.[17]

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14    IRIN Reporting, April 24, 2002. See story 'Bemba, Okitundu visit Kampala.'

15    BBC News Reporting, Friday, 26 April 2002. See story 'New Alliance in DR Congo', www.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/newsid_1952000/1952857.stm.

16    See note 15.

17    *The Monitor*, Saturday, 27 April 2002. See story 'Rebels unite against Bemba-Kabila deal, Congo split feared', p.1.

## 9. The Pretoria Process

The Sun City Kabila-Bemba agreement was attacked as not being all-inclusive. Both parties to the agreement and the international community as a whole called on the parties of the ICD to re-open the talks so as to reach an all-inclusive agreement.

According to Zartman (1995:341-42), successful mediation must involve the key external patrons of the belligerents. The pact was vehemently contested by Rwanda, who intimated that the deal would fail because it had left out the RCD-Goma, a principle player in the conflict. Patrick Mazimhaka, President Kagame's Senior Advisor and Congo Envoy is reported to have said that '[T]his so called peace accord [of Kabila and Bemba] does not only leave out the RCD-Goma but all the other parties. It is a provocation that is likely to cause more problems than solving them.'[18] Colonel Charles Kayonga, a Defence Advisor to President Kagame is reported to have echoed similar sentiments when he said, '[T]hat deal cannot work when the RCD is out. It is only one side that has signed it, yet there are many players in the DRC conflict.'[19] Uganda's Foreign Minister James Waphakabulo went to the Rwandese capital Kigali, trying to sell the deal to the Rwandese.[20] The Kabila-Bemba deal was actually concluded by default. Fundamentally it was done because of the intransigence of RCD-Goma on the question of power sharing. And in the background lay the failed negotiations between the governments of Rwanda and the DRC over the disarmament of the Hutu rebels known as the *Armée pour la libération du Rwanda* (AliR).[21]

Rwanda also accused President Kabila of bad faith. When the heads of state and government met in Lusaka in March 2002 to review the extent to which the Lusaka agreement had been implemented, they asked the Kinshasa government to be open and allow the Inter-Congolese Dialogue to map out institutions for a new dispensation in Congo.[22] By reaching a deal with only

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18     *The East African*, Monday, April 22 2002. See story 'Rwanda pours cold water on DRC peace deal', p. 1.

19     See note 18.

20     *The Monitor*, Wednesday, February 27, 2002. See story 'Congolese discuss new Government', p. 16.

21     International Crisis Group 2002.

22     See note 13.

one party, Rwanda contended that the Kabila government had abandoned the spirit of Lusaka.

A new process to reach an all-inclusive agreement to end the DRC conflict opened in Pretoria, South Africa, in October 2002. The beginning of this process marked the end of the Kabila-Bemba deal of April 2002. The Pretoria meeting brought together representatives of the government, RCD-Goma, CLM, political opposition, civil society, RCD-ML, RCD-N, and the Mai Mai.[23] This process was held under the mediation of the United Nations Secretary General's Special Representative to the DRC, Moustapha Niasse, and South Africa's Local Government Minister, Sydney Mufamadi. The spirit within which the Pretoria agreement was concluded was that of 'inclusion, nation building, accountability and respect for the territorial integrity of the DRC'.

However, we should understand the political context in which these talks were held. All the parties to the DRC conflict were under tremendous pressure to end the conflict. The international community, including the United Nations and the donor community, exerted tremendous pressure on the belligerents to find a peaceful settlement to the conflict. It began dawning on the rebel movements on the ground and the government of Congo that the conflict could not be won militarily. But let us see how the pressure was exerted.

The donor countries and institutions were unhappy with the continued unrest in the DRC. The governments of Uganda and Rwanda were under pressure to withdraw their troops from the DRC lest they risk losing continued donor aid. In turn, these two countries exerted pressure on the rebel movements they supported to reach an all-inclusive agreement. On July 30th 2002, the government of Rwanda concluded a peace agreement with the government of the DRC in Pretoria, South Africa. Under the agreement, Rwanda committed herself to withdraw her troops from the territory of the DRC. In turn, the Kabila government promised to apprehend all the *genocidaires* who were operating on its territory. However, the donor institutions had a hand in the conclusion of this agreement. It is reported that 'the donors forced [Rwanda] two weeks before the signing of the Pretoria agreement during its Article IV consultations with the IMF in Washington. …during the consultations, it became evident that Rwanda could not expect to get access

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23   See the Preamble of the Global and all-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC, 16 December 2002.

to donor funds while its troops remained in the DRC'.[24] This set the tone for the government of Uganda to conclude a peace agreement with the government of Kabila.

In September 2002 the governments of Uganda and DRC reached a settlement in Luanda, Angola. Under the agreement, Uganda committed to withdrawing her troops from the DRC by April 2003. Also, the parties agreed to set up the Ituri Pacification Committee to bring peace to the troubled Ituri region where ethnic conflict between the Hemas and the Lendu was simmering. Suffice to note that the government of President Museveni was under tremendous domestic and international pressure to withdraw the Uganda troops from the DRC.

The United Nations Security Council also precipitated the re-starting of the ICD process at Pretoria. Since the start of the second rebellion in the DRC, allegations of the illegal exploitation of the Congolese natural resources by the invading foreign forces had become rife. In November 2002, the United Nations Panel on the Illegal Exploitation of Congolese Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the DRC came out with its final report. Before this, they had come out with interim and addendum reports. One conclusion of the panel was that the foreign forces of Uganda and Rwanda had engaged in the illegal exploitation of Congolese natural resources including gold, diamonds, timber, nobium and tantalite. In the interim report released in January 2001, the panel asserted that Presidents Kagame and Museveni were on the verge of becoming the godfathers of the illegal exploitation.[25] This prompted President Museveni to institute an internal Commission of Inquiry[26] of his own, to probe the allegations. The allegations nevertheless tarnished Museveni's good guy

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24  *Africa Analysis*, No. 408, 18 October 2002.

25  The UN Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other forms of Wealth of DRC of 16 January 2001, para. 211.

26  The Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth in the DRC. The Commission was established under Legal Notice Number 5 of the Uganda Gazette of 25 May 2001 issued by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Commission was composed of Justice David Porter as Chairman, and Justice J.P. Berko and Mr. John Rwambuya as members. Mr. Bisereko Kyomuhendo was secretary, and Alan Shonubi the lead Counsel. It released its final report in May 2003. President Museveni and his family were found not to have either engaged or benefited from the illegal exploitation of Congolese natural resources. But his brother Salim Saleh, in-law Jovia Salim Saleh and former Army Commander James Kazini were found to have engaged in the illegal exploitation.

image, in the end wounding it especially in the eyes of his admirers. As a result, Museveni was encouraged to find a peaceful exit strategy from a conflict that had become messy.

The withdrawal of the allied forces from Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola put pressure on the Kabila government to reach a peaceful settlement with its belligerents. After the inconclusive Sun City process, both domestic and international pressure was exerted on President Kabila to re-start the dialogue that would involve all the belligerents. The pressure was exacerbated by Rwanda's threat to restart the war if all-inclusive talks were not held. President Kagame's Advisor, Patrick Mazimhaka was quoted as saying, 'Kabila could have speculated that with Bemba on his side he could have more power … and might try to push RCD [Goma] out. If that is the case it will lead to another war.'[27] Having no allies on its side to counter the Rwandese threats, the Kabila government had no choice to take a peaceful trajectory.

The multifarious rebel movements that dot the DRC landscape had no choice other than seeking a peaceful settlement through the ICD process. A number of things happened since the signing of the inconclusive Sun City agreement. Firstly, international and regional diplomacy was dead against the continuation of the conflict. Secondly, new groups were established since Sun City I. These new groups arose from the disintegration of the old rebel movements, but also completely new ones were formed. For example, in the South Kivu province, a new federal movement sprung up, with the aim of fighting for a federal state exclusively for the Banyamulenge. In Ituri province, Mbusa Nyamwisi's militia called *Armée Patriotique Congolais* (APC) disintegrated into factions. Some sections of the militia do not like the idea that Mbusa Nyamwisi joined the Kabila-Bemba transitional government.[28] Thirdly, as the conflict dragged on, it became evident that no group would ultimately win outright. Some groups therefore started fighting rearguard

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27  BBC News Reporting, Monday, 22 April 2002. See story 'Government snubs new DR Congo Talks',
www.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_1944000/1944299.htm

28  Fighting has been raging since January 2003 in the Ituri region as the numerous forces, mainly those of Lumbala, Nyamwisi, Lubanga, Chief Kahwa and Bemba, attempted to capture the main centres in the region. The situation has been complicated by the ethnic clashes that have continued to occur between the Hema's and Lendu, the two main ethnic groups that inhabit the region.

rebellions.[29] As a result the frontline military positions became frozen. Peaceful settlement therefore, became the only way forward.

Therefore, the re-opening of the ICD process in Pretoria in October 2002 should be seen in the context of the domestic, regional and international political environments.

## 10. Details of the Pretoria Agreement

The agreement provides for a transitional president assisted by four vice-presidents drawn from RCD-Goma, CLM, the government and the political opposition.[30] The four vice-presidents will also be in charge of the following commissions: Political – RCD-Goma, Finance and Economic – CLM, Reconstruction and Development – the government, and Social and Culture – the political opposition.[31]

The transitional legislature will be composed of a National Assembly composed of 500 members[32], and a Senate composed of 120 members.[33]

The agreement provides for the creation of a united national army. This is to be drawn from the government forces, RCD-Goma forces, and CLM forces. In the same spirit of uniting and reconciling the different forces, the army will include elements of RCD-Liberation Movement, RCD-N and the Mai Mai.[34]

The agreement creates a Superior Defence Council (*Conseil supérieur de la Défense*) to be composed of the president, the four vice-presidents, the minister of defence, the minister of internal affairs, the minister of foreign affairs, the army commander, and the commanders of the air force, land forces and navy.[35]

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29    For example, RCD-Goma has been fighting a rebellion started by an ex-Tutsi Congolese officer called Commander Masunzu in the South Kivu province. A group called RCD-Originale broke off from RCD-Kisangani with an aim of joining the Kinshasa government.

30    The Pretoria Agreement, Article V (1) (B) (d).

31    The Pretoria Agreement, Article V (1) (C) (h).

32    The Pretoria Agreement, Article V (2) (b).

33    The Pretoria Agreement, Article V (2) (f).

34    The Pretoria Agreement, Article VI (a) and (b).

35    The Pretoria Agreement, Article VI (e).

The agreement distributes ministries between the parties[36] as follows: Seven ministerial slots and a vice-president for each of the following: the government, RCD-Goma, CLM and the political opposition. The civil society groups will receive two ministerial and three vice-ministerial slots. The RCD-ML, RCD-N, and the Mai Mai will each get two ministries and two slots of vice-ministers.

The Pretoria agreement was handed over to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue facilitator, Ketumile Masire, who organised a meeting in Sun City aimed at hammering out the final stages of the whole dialogue process. This meeting brought together all the parties to the Pretoria process, which culminated in the signing of the Sun City II agreement of 1 April 2003. This agreement was concluded against a backdrop of ethnic conflict in the Ituri region between the Hema and the Lendu. The conflict was exacerbated by the involvement of the Rwanda and Uganda troops. The delegates were under regional and international pressure to reach a final settlement, so that the Ituri region could be sorted out. At the time of writing most of the parties have designated their people to the different posts given to them under the agreement.[37] The transition government was to have been inaugurated on 29 May 2003, but was put off due to the withdrawal of RCD-Goma from the committee that was drawing up the final settlement. The dispute arose when the group accused the Kinshasa government of trying to keep the post of head of the army and of wanting to control the majority of the military regions.[38] At the time of writing, the transitional government is yet to be installed. Three things however have been reported. These are – the renewed fighting in the East of the country involving (allegedly) the Rwandese army, and the ethnic conflict pitting the Hema and the Lendu in the Ituri region. President Joseph Kabila attempted to reach a ceasefire agreement at Dar es Salaam with all the five factions[39] in the Ituri conflict, but nothing has come out of this.[40] Thirdly,

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36   The Pretoria Agreement, Annex I (4), (5) and (6).

37   For example, the RCD-Goma and the government have designated Azarias Ruberwa and Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombansi as vice-presidents in the transition government.

38   UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, May 29 2003. See story 'Swearing-in of transitional government delayed'.

39   These are: Parti pour l'Unité et la Sauveguarde de l'Intégrité du Congo (PUSIC), Front des Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes (FNI), Forces Populaire pour la Démocratie au Congo (FPDC), Forces Armées du Peuple Congolais (FAPC), and the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC).

under international pressure the Uganda army has withdrawn from the Ituri hot crucible. The results of the withdrawal are yet to be seen, but fighting has continued to rage in the region despite the presence of the observers of the United Nations Mission to Congo (MONUC). The United Nations Security Council has authorised the deployment of a robust force composed of the French, Belgians and the British. South Africa has also announced that it will be sending troops to be part of the multinational force. The Canadians are assisting with logistics. However, peace is yet to be brought to the area.

## 11. Conclusion

Our exposition above has attempted to describe the Inter-Congolese peace process from the failed Addis Ababa talks to the 'final' talks concluded with the signing of the Sun City II agreement in April 2003. We have also attempted to give reasons behind the conclusion of the agreements under the dialogue process. We have noted that the parties in the DRC conflict have been pressured to engage in the process by the regional, international and even domestic communities. If peace is to finally come to the country, then this pressure on the parties has to be sustained because it seems that left on their own, they would renege on their promises.

Secondly, the situation in the East of the country continues to be worrying. Ethnic fighting continues in the Ituri region between the Hema and the Lendu. The ethnic conflict is being stoked by the national power struggle between the Kabila government of Kinshasa, RCD-Goma, the CLM of Bemba and a myriad of new groups who have come up in this confusion. The situation has been exacerbated by the involvement of the countries of Uganda and Rwanda who continue to bicker over a number of issues, the most important of which being the unresolved question of who started the three Kisangani clashes that pitted the Rwandese and the Uganda armies against each other. The governments of Uganda, Rwanda and DRC are solely responsible for training and arming the different militias that are operating in the Ituri region. These third parties have a responsibility to rein in the Ituri parties, whom they helped create, and get them to accept the ICD process. As Ohlson

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40    UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, 16 May 2003. See story 'Ituri factions recommit themselves to peace'.

and Söderberg have pointed out above, durable peace can only be ensured through this.

While contextualising the ICD process, we noted that Ohlson and Söderberg have averred that peace agreements that are all-inclusive are likely to hold. This pertains truly to the conflict in the DRC today. Since the signing of the Sun City II agreement, rebel factions that had been left out of the peace process have arrived in Kinshasa ready to join the transition government. Even when disagreements have emerged during the construction of the government, parties have not gone back to war, but rather they have agreed to settle their differences at the negotiating table. No group wants to be associated with having been the one that scuttled the process.

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# Book Reviews

## Second Track/Citizens' Diplomacy: Concepts and Techniques for Conflict Transformation

John Davies and Edward (Edy) Kaufman (eds.) 2002
Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 318 pp.

### *Reviewed by Jannie Malan*

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As the subtitle indicates, this book is about concepts and techniques for conflict transformation. But as the title shows, it is especially about getting more people involved, and about taking culture seriously.

The focus on culture is written into the title indirectly, but strikingly – by the slant mark and the two qualifiers of 'diplomacy'. At first sight one may be inclined to ask why such a double description was chosen. One realises quite soon, however, that the rationale was a strong cultural sensitivity, which led to a combination of the terms used in the North and the South. Protracted social conflicts, which occur in both halves of the globe, are almost always based on a lack of respect for culture, race, religion or language – mentioned in this order on page 2. The crucial importance of bridging cultural divides is therefore stressed (pp. 7-8). Conflict is a social phenomenon, 'inseparable

from the cultural frameworks in which it has emerged', and in dealing with conflict, facilitators have to put aside their own cultural preconceptions. They have to elicit from the parties what *their* perceptions are, and what *they* regard as a suitable process through which the conflict might be addressed.

Such a cultural open-mindedness is promoted and practised throughout the book. A chapter is devoted to 'Mapping Cultures' and developing 'Strategies for Effective Intercultural Conflict Resolution'. A very useful 'Wheel of Culture Map' is used to help us understand the contexts in which cultural similarities and differences function. Suggestions are given for initiating dialogue and negotiation cross-culturally, and for responding with appropriate flexibility. Particular emphasis is placed on understanding why people of another culture think and act as they do.

This book, however, promotes more than just cultural inclusiveness. In line with the main thrust of second track or citizens' diplomacy, it propagates the involvement of more people in processes of dealing with conflict. Official diplomacy often complicates a conflict situation through power-greedy obstinacy or duplicity. (Double-mindedness was included in the semantic fields of the Greek adjective that contributed the 'diplo' of 'diplomacy'.) Official diplomacy may also play its role to de-escalate and/or resolve a conflict. In both cases, however, the unofficial diplomacy of professionals, opinion formers, and influential community members can be of wide- and far-reaching significance. It can counteract stubbornness and craftiness, and it can complement tactfulness and sincerity.

In a series of very informative and stimulating chapters, non-official possibilities before, during and after talks are thoroughly discussed. Very valuable insights and skills are emphasised with regard to preparatory stages, the pivotal phase of problem solving, and the ongoing work of empowerment and reconciliation.

In the first section of the book, the dynamics of complex social conflicts and of interactive conflict resolution are explored. The importance of human needs, especially the need for recognition and acceptance of identity, is highlighted. Particular attention is therefore given to ethno-political conflicts and the risk factors for ethno-political violence. At the same time encouraging recent trends are discussed, including the extent to which minorities have made significant gains through peaceful means.

The remarkable evolution of the field of Interactive Conflict Resolution, of which Citizens' Diplomacy forms an important part, is outlined and discussed. This overview can fill one with appreciation for what has already

been accomplished, and for the privilege of being involved in such a meaningful field. So much can indeed happen when members of conflicting identity groups or states get together and engage in effective communication. People can move from a rigid preoccupation with positions towards a willingness to understand the needs of the parties and undertake creative problem solving. Impartial facilitators with social science expertise and appropriate practical experience can play an important role. Frank analyses can be made. Root causes can be probed. Mutual understanding can emerge. Surprising solutions may be discovered. And from the unofficial but influential representatives of the conflicting groups, such insights and options may radiate to wider constituencies and to official decision makers.

The second section takes us further into what is announced by the subtitle of the book: concepts and techniques for conflict transformation. As throughout the book, the contributions of the various authors are based on clear-sighted scholarship and experienced practitionership. Theory and practice are integrated in mutually enriching ways, and current insights are convincingly presented. For instance, conflict prevention, management and resolution are acknowledged as specific agendas, but the persistent emphasis is on the comprehensive objective of conflict transformation. Effective ways are discussed in which complex social conflicts can be approached and responded to – from addressing root causes, through finding satisfactory solutions for the real problems, to facilitating the emergence of reconciliation.

Of particular importance, both theoretically and practically, is the chapter exploring seven strategies for dealing with social conflicts. As a starting point, general approaches are distinguished according to their basic sources of motivation: power, rights or interests. Then, however, two crucially important dimensions are brought into the discussion. The first is the dimension of forms of relationship, in which the main options are dependence, independence and interdependence. At the same time the behavioural tendencies typically corresponding to each of these options are emphasised: yielding, contending and integrative behaviour. The second dimension is the one of identity, in which different levels of collective identity are distinguished: contact groups, cultures/nations, and humanity as a whole. In the light of these three perspectives and nine subdivisions, an extremely useful discussion and a synoptic diagram of seven possible strategies are given. Although these perspectives and strategies are presented in an order revealing increasing degrees of social reasoning and awareness, the more complex ones are not supposed to replace the simpler ones. The different

strategies can function in complementary ways. In each situation a different one or a particular balanced set may be optimal. To facilitate the planning of the most appropriate approach in specific circumstances, twenty pages are devoted to most helpful descriptions and discussions of the seven strategies. Key aspects are outlined, and illustrative examples are referred to. Possible outcomes are mentioned, but also limitations that have to be taken into account.

Although all these approaches and their applicability are discussed without bias, no secret is made of the advantages of the interest-based approach, which figures prominently in three of the seven strategies. 'The bulk of this book is an exploration of how this interest-based approach can be applied in managing protracted intergroup conflicts' (p. 114).

Applications are offered, but not in prescriptive ways. Concepts and techniques are presented in a spirit of exploring and sharing. Significant suggestions can be found in each of the twelve chapters, but the two chapters of section three form an exceedingly valuable package of recommendations, which make up more than a quarter of the book. This section is focused on the 'Innovative Problem-Solving Workshop'. It is based on practical experimentation over a decade, and on the work of researchers and practitioners over more than three decades.

The rationale of the entire programme and of each part is given, in order to provide more insight to the facilitators and enable them to communicate transparency and encouragement to the participants. With regard to the overall planning, it is suggested that the first third of such a workshop be focused on establishing a working relationship among the participants, aptly called 'Partners in Conflict', and the remaining two thirds on searching for common ground and innovative solutions. For a series of fifteen days, practically tested and improved recommendations are made about items to be explained and discussed, exercises and activities to be used, and sensitivities to be respected. Of particular interest and importance is the incorporation of the ARIA technique, with ample time allocated to each of the four stages – antagonism, resonance, invention and action (p. 71). The fifteen-day pattern is not given as a rigid recipe, however, but merely as 'one model'. It is emphasised that the duration may vary from two days to several months, and that the contents have to be selected and the method designed according to the particular conflict and the needs of the participants.

There was a good reason for presenting in so much detail the section on innovative problem-solving workshops. It was done in response to urgent

requests from participants for written material 'to build on in furthering the process of conflict resolution in their communities' (p. 184). It is really encouraging that parties involved in complex conflicts experience participation in problem-solving workshops as so worthwhile that they feel the urge to share their experience with others. Quite appropriately, then, the last section of the book deals with training-of-trainers programmes and action evaluation. An ever-growing number of citizens should indeed be trained to develop and practise conflict transformation insights and skills.

In my opinion, this book can be strongly recommended. It should be of great theoretical, practical and inspirational value to all who are interested in the field of conflict transformation, and particularly to those already committed to work in this field. It provides introductory, additional and advanced material (plus references to more than 280 sources from the last four decades). It should help to get more people involved in solving the deep-rooted problems of unaccepted identity as well as the persistent problems of social, economic or political injustice. It should make more people aware of the possibilities of re-humanising enemies, restoring justice and promoting reconciliation.

# Promoting an Integrated Approach to Combat Gender-Based Violence: A Training Manual

Margaret Oguli-Oumo, Imelda M. Molokomme, Monde M. Gwaba,
Valencia K.D. Mogegeh and Lucia Kiwala 2002.
London: Commonwealth Secretariat. 88 pp.

### *Reviewed by Chenai Mufanawejingo*

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Awareness Programme.

As Gender-Based Violence (GBV) continues to be endemic in different forms, the need for various tools to combat it is enormous. In a move to contribute towards adopting a holistic approach to the fight against GBV, the Commonwealth Secretariat has produced a training manual entitled *Promoting an Integrated Approach to Combat Gender-Based Violence.*

The 88-paged manual is meant for training managers, middle level professionals, development workers, extension workers and policy makers and planners in general. It aims to assist and encourage all relevant organisations, state and non-state agencies, traditional and non-traditional organisations to work together. This includes women's human rights organisations, civil society, parliamentarians, the private sector and all government ministries.

The problems inherent in current strategies to address GBV are addressed, especially the lack of collaboration between different agencies and individuals combating this kind of violence. It draws on experiences from workshops and consultations facilitated by the Commonwealth Secretariat in Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia,

Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe and with the SADC (Southern African Development Community) Secretariat.

The manual is based on the Commonwealth Secretariat's model framework for an integrated approach to combat violence against women, and draws on the strengths of the Gender Management Systems (GMS) principles, a Commonwealth approach to gender mainstreaming. The integrated approach is designed to assist governments, the private sector, civil society and other agencies to understand GBV as a multi-faceted problem that should be addressed in a holistic manner.

The argument and emphasis in the manual is that an integrated approach improves co-ordination and collaboration among different stakeholders and subsequently enhances efficiency in delivering services in support of victims, survivors, and perpetrators of GBV. The integrated approach also enables governments to address violence against women as a complex social problem that requires an overall national policy framework and plan of action.

The publication thus aims to promote policy coherence and development of comprehensive programmes to eliminate GBV at local, national and regional levels. The manual is divided into five sections: a background which includes the concept, definition and causes of GBV; a statement of the purpose of the manual; suggestions about the duration of a training programme; the suggested training approach, goal and objectives; and a facilitator's guide which includes notes that can be given to participants as handouts, and references.

There is reference to key regional and international human rights standards and commitments to address GBV, and the role of governments in curbing the problem and meeting their obligations as spelt out in, amongst others, the SADC Declaration on Gender and Development (1997) and its Addendum: Prevention and the eradication of violence against women and children, the Beijing Declaration and Platform For Action (BDPFA); and the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).

There is no doubt that the *Promoting an Integrated Approach to Combat Gender-Based Violence* is key in providing new directions for policy and programme review, formulation and implementation, and in fostering closer strategic links between stakeholders. The manual is a timely contribution towards the achievement of the Beijing commitments and goals, as the world moves steadily towards the end of the UN Women's Decade (Beijing + 10) in 2005.