



HORN OF AFRICA BULLETIN

ANALYSES • CONTEXT • CONNECTIONS

Analyses

- ▶ **Kenya's imperfect reconciliation**
- ▶ **Responding to violent radicalization in Kenya**
- ▶ **Climate change and regional security**
- ▶ **Conflict profile**
- ▶ **An overview of AMISOM in south-central Somalia**

Resources

Kenya's imperfect reconciliation

After more than 50 years, survivors of atrocities committed by the British during the 1952-59 State of Emergency in Kenya received the first government acknowledgement and expression of regret for what happened to them. This was from the British government in June 2013.¹

The Kenyan government is yet to make a similar acknowledgement. In fact, it was just about 10 years ago when the Kenyan government unbanned Mau Mau.² The group's uprising triggered the State of Emergency of 1952 and the organisation's ban that year. It was banned for the remainder of the colonial era and under successive post-independent governments until the ban was lifted in 2003.

One reason the Kenyan government may not have acknowledged the atrocities committed during the State of Emergency is because those violations were not only committed by British colonial officers. Other Kenyans working for the colonial government also took part in the violations.

Some of them went on to become powerful and influential individuals in Kenya's post-independent governments. Leaders and members of the Mau Mau, for the most part, remained a marginalised group. Many of the Mau Mau families have lived with stigma for several generations.

This is despite the Mau Mau uprising being glorified each year when the state marks Madaraka, or Self-government, Day (1 June); Mashujaa, or Heroes, Day (October 20); and Jamhuri, or Independence, Day (12 December). This is despite school children being taught a sketch of Kenya's independence struggle that portrays the Mau Mau uprising in glowing light.

This contradiction has never been addressed. The oppressed and the oppressor have lived in the same village for decades. The early post-independence government made some efforts to settle some of the people displaced by the colonial government from their lands in the Mount Kenya region. These people were moved to the Rift Valley region. The whole process was fraught with controversy.

Back then, reconciliation did not figure in official pronouncements. At best, Mau Mau fighters were encouraged to leave the forest where they had been hiding and surrender their arms. For the past five decades, members of the same ethnic group,

the Kikuyu, have lived with this history of the oppressed and oppressor with no government effort at reconciliation. It is as if once the oppressor from outside, the British colonial officer, left, nothing else needed to be done.

This state silence about a heart-wrenching part of Kenya's history has continued to direct the country's politics to date. The irony is the British government has broken part of its silence, even if it took the threat of a lawsuit. Successive post-independence governments have not taken a similar step, though they have periodically made anti-colonial statements.

A structured approach to reconciliation

Unfortunately, the violations committed during the colonial period were not part of the mandate of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) that worked from 2009 to 2013. One reason given at the time was that the commission's mandate would be too wide and its work unwieldy if it was to investigate the violations of the colonial period. The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, however, had a wide mandate covering 1963 to 2008. Still, the commission could not avoid the colonial period. In its report it acknowledges that the effects of the colonial land grab are still felt in the land and ethnic conflict and tensions of present-day Kenya.³

The formation of the TJRC marked a break with previous government investigations into violations or atrocities. Reconciliation was never one of the terms of reference of previous investigations.

The idea of a truth commission had been discussed for years in Kenya. There had been some debate, however, about whether such a commission should have a justice-only mandate. That debate took place largely within human rights and faith-based groups. The violence that followed the December 2007 presidential election left little doubt that any future truth commission should have a reconciliation mandate.

That can be seen as one part of the reconciliation agenda, which informed the negotiated settlement of the January-February 2008 post-election violence. The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission's reconciliation mandate was limited to how to reconcile those affected by past violations. The negotiated settlement of 2008 also considered the need to have a government organisation to prevent or mediate present-day conflicts and tensions. This led to the formation of the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC).

Post the 2007 election is the first time in Kenya that reconciliation and related matters have been managed in a structured and systematic approach. The Kenyan bureaucracy no longer treated reconciliation as just an item on a list of priorities. It built institutions around reconciliation and added those institutions to its budget making processes. Thus, for the first time, reconciliation had clear institutional and financial backing.

Then the politics of the day interfered. The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission spent several months dealing with the question of conflict of interest facing its chairman, instead of focussing on its undeniably wide mandate. The issue of the chairman's conflict of interest became the subject of debate among the political class. This dented the commission's credibility as a perception grew that it may not be able to resist political manipulation and preserve its independence. The back and forth and in and out of court battles over this issue delayed the commission's work and its final report, further denting its credibility.

The work of the NCIC was not easier, either. It worked with existing mechanisms such as the district peace committees to forestall the escalation of conflict in some of Kenya's known flashpoints. It steered a country-wide process of forming councils of elders among different ethnic groups as an avenue of managing intra- and inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts. Among ethnic groups that did not traditionally have an apex body for all elders, this led to such councils being dominated by former public servants who served particular political interests.

The National Cohesion and Integration Commission did produce two reports analysing the ethnic breakdown of employees in civil service and public universi-

ties.⁴ The reports looked at this issue in the context of the constitutional threshold of ensuring the public service was representative of Kenya's ethnic groups. The reports also analysed whether the employment trends reflected efforts to include groups that had been marginalised and gender balance, all requirements of the constitution.

Several cabinet ministers and public university leaders reacted defensively, arguing, among other things, the commission's information was out of date. The disparities the commission identified have not been addressed—or if they have, no public official has reported that that is the case.

Unfinished business

The lack of political will, more than anything else, has hampered progress on the reports and work of the National Cohesion and Integration Commission as well as the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission. Both commissions have complained that they are or were underfunded and lacked other resources to be more effective. Those deficiencies are symptoms, rather than the cause, of the commissions' limited achievement.

Reconciliation is about political acts, both substantive and symbolic ones. This is the reasoning underlying the reports of the NCIC and the TJRC.

The reports on the ethnic composition of Kenya's public service the NCIC is aimed at changing government employment policies so that the real and perceived domination of public jobs by Kenya's largest ethnic groups is addressed. The government remains the largest employer in Kenya so increased opportunities for marginalised groups in public jobs would enhance the cohesion of Kenyan society. To date, however, the country's top leadership has not made even cursory affirming statements about the NCIC's reports.

Since the TJRC handed over its gigantic report in May 2013 to the president, the government has not acted on any of its recommendations. The National Assembly has not adopted the TJRC report. But at the height of public debate in 2009 about a local tribunal to investigate and try the suspected perpetrators of the post-election violence, the TJRC had been advanced as the best avenue to deal with those atrocities. The cabinet in a July meeting concluded that the country's energies would best be spent seeking justice and reconciliation through the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission. Many of the individuals who were in the cabinet then, still hold public office, including the president and deputy president.

The TJRC report recommends symbolic and substantive political acts of reconciliation, with timelines, a guide on how to implement its recommendations, including draft legislation for that purpose. Among the symbolic acts the TJRC recommended was the president publicly apologising for the massacres, assassinations and other violations the commission investigated. The report set a six-month deadline for those apologies. To date, even that has not happened.

It has been argued that Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto agreeing to campaign on one political platform in the 2013 elections and becoming president and deputy president has reconciled their respective ethnic groups. The reality is only the elites of those ethnic groups have been reconciled. The ordinary people among Kenyatta's and Ruto's ethnic groups, or ordinary people across the country are yet to experience real reconciliation.

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1 See <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/statement-to-parliament-on-settlement-of-mau-mau-claims>

2 Legal Notice No 148: Revocation of Order Declaring Society Dangerous to the Good Government of the Republic of Kenya dated 27 August 2003 and signed by Minister of State Christopher Murungaru. <http://kenyalaw.org/kl/index.php?id=582>

3 Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Volume I, page ix, 3 May 2013

4 Appendix I and II of The Report of The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Volume III, 2013

Responding to violent radicalization in Kenya

The 2 February police raid on Masjid Musa Mosque in Kenya's coastal city of Mombasa has spawned heated debate and controversy. The invasion was in apparent response to intelligence reports that suggested the gathering was a recruitment forum for the Somalia-based al-Shabab militant group. During the operation, police, ostensibly recovered banners with terror slogans, laptops and DVDs with incriminating information and a gun. In the process, however, a number of people lost their lives and the police arrested more than 100 others. By mid-February, more than 100 others. So far 41 have been released, including children, while a Muslim lobby group claims 4 others are still missing.

While some praised the police for their commendable job of fishing out "extremists" perceived to be a danger to Kenya's security, others, especially Muslim leaders, affected families and some human rights representative expressed concern over the actions of the police. Of particular concern were the images of police entering the mosque with their shoes on, which is considered offensive in Islam. Led by the Mvita member of parliament, Abdulswamad Shariff Nassir, they demanded an apology from the government and called for release of underage detainees that they said had been in the mosque to perform their "normal" prayers. Intriguingly, the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) through its Secretary General Sheikh Adan Wachu called on the government to take stern action against those perceived to be perpetrating violence in the name of Islam while arguing that violence from rioting youths was not the solution for problems facing Muslims in Kenya.

Reflecting on the general dynamics of the war on terror in Kenya, there have been widespread accusations against the Kenyan government, particularly the Antiterrorism Police Unit (ATPU), by human rights organizations and activists for committing human rights abuses. Indeed, the recent past has witnessed assassinations of several religious figures and individuals perceived to be linked to extremist ideologies in mysterious and yet-to-be-explained circumstances. According to a 2013 report¹ jointly written by Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI) and the Open Society Foundations, in 2007, 85 people were rendered to Somalia and later to Ethiopian authorities and in 2010 after the attack on World Cup fans in Kampala, 9 Kenyans were extradited to Uganda for their alleged participation.

Whereas over 30 terror attacks have taken place on Kenyan soil since 2011 when Kenya sent its troops into Somalia, culminating in the Westgate Mall Attack in which 63 people lost their lives, calls for sterner actions by the government as well as allegations of unconstitutional conduct on the part of law enforcers is a cause for concern. This is because one of the common tactics used by most terror groups is manipulation of grievances to gain support from their communities. Amidst such high-handedness, there is also the risk of victimizing innocent civilians. It is instructive that efforts to bring perpetrators of terrorism and violent extremism to justice have so far yielded less success in Kenya as most of them have been acquitted due to lack of sufficient evidence.

Whereas multiple actors have traded accusations against each another, it is imperative to note that the fight against extremism in Kenya can only be won through cooperation between police and the Muslim community. This is because extremist ideologies emerge out of context-specific grievances. In the case of Mombasa the central issue has been the collective sense of marginalization and alienation since independence hence underlying the need to address structural issues of marginalization and unemployment that affect these groups. Although this is not to suggest that marginalization independently leads to radicalization and violence,² the need to review the shortcomings of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012 to ensure it conforms with-existing human rights protection standards is critical in this fight.

The angry reaction from a large section of Muslims as expressed in social media and an overall perception among Muslims that entering a mosque with shoes on was still unacceptable regardless of the situation at hand, portray the urgent need for cultural sensitivity in the police service. Seemingly, there was no other option for the police during the operation on Masjid Musa but balancing that with an explanation of the situation at hand or even by offering an apology for the “unavoidable situation” of breaching their religious norms could have neutralized the situation. Otherwise, such actions not only serve to polarize an already bad relationship between the community and law enforcers, but also promote community vulnerability to succumb to the views of radical groups. Of immediate concern, therefore, is for the government to open up channels of communication with the leadership of these groups for them to feel respected, appreciated and included in national socio-economic and political processes.

Aside from that if, as alleged, the ATPU is involved in extrajudicial reprisals, such acts merely continue to serve terrorists’ missions and further allegiance to extremist ideologies by the Muslim population, particularly the youth. Of importance, therefore, is for the police to double their efforts and improve their public relations so that they are not only perceived as a ruthless force but also winning the trust of the community as their protector. This will be a major step towards addressing the numerous structural problems facing Muslims in Kenya. Fundamentally, Muslim communities need to be aware of their vulnerability to extremist elements that use religion and the concept of Jihad to propagate their ulterior motives. In this regard, Muslim leaders should popularize alternative peaceful methods of addressing their problems and counter those that use places of worship for political purposes

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1 <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/tired-taking-you-court-11-19-2013.pdf> (Accessed on 6 February 2014).

2 Anneli Botha, “Assessing the vulnerability of Kenyan youths to radicalization and extremism,” ISS Paper 245, April 2013

Climate change and regional security

During the past few decades, most parts of Africa have experienced three major climate related upsets: rise in average surface air temperature, a significant change in the rainfall pattern, particularly in the Sahel, and drought in southern, eastern and northern parts. Since the 1950s, the Horn of Africa has particularly become prone to intense and frequent droughts. The International Panel on Climate Change predicts that the rainfall pattern in the Horn will be severely affected with reduced precipitation.

Human activities, such as deforestation and increased industrialization, are the prime suspects of the global climate change. There have been alarms that by 2050, greenhouse emissions will become two-fold compared to pre-industrial times¹ and with a rise of 2-5 degrees centigrade, the rapidly changing climate will worsen the depletion of scarce resources of land and water, leading to severe resource scarcity.² As a result, developing countries; specifically those who are already suffering from

economic and political instabilities will face bigger disasters.³ Particularly, the Horn of Africa is plagued with numerous security issues such as, civil wars, poor governance, chronic poverty, HIV/AIDS and lower economic development. For instance, in Somalia and Sudan, multiple effects of such issues have exacerbated the conditions for violence and insecurity.

In addition, reduced rainfall and droughts were key factors indirectly associated with violent conflicts in the region. These climatic conditions led to changes in the soil regime, depletion of pastures and watering points, and displacement of the local communities.

People living in poor conditions, who are dependent on agricultural production and other renewable resources, are the most vulnerable to climate change. There are predictions that due to frequent droughts, crop yields in the Horn of Africa will reduce by 50%.⁴ As a result, decreased precipitation will lower the production of maize which is a staple food for most of African people. This will consequently threaten food security with increased food prices and growing number of hungry and malnourished people. Since early 1990s, Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and Somalia have been experiencing more frequent and intense cycles of droughts. For instance, 80% Ugandans are dependent on rain-fed farming, and agriculture contributes for 30%-40% of the national GDP.⁵ According to a study, during the drought of 2007-2008, Uganda faced severe food shortages led by failure of food production as much as by thirty percent.⁶ The worst in the last 60 years, the drought during 2011-12 caused humanitarian crises in Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti and Ethiopia. As a result, livelihoods of 9.5 million people were affected and thousands of starving Somalis took refuge in the neighboring states. Food scarcity attributes to health insecurity and frequent occurrences of water-borne diseases such as malaria, diarrhoea, and respiratory problems in the Horn of Africa.⁷

May provoke group rebellion

The IPCC 2007 report warns that during the next few decades, climate change will increase the scarcity of the natural resources, especially in ecological sensitive areas, which may provoke group rebellion. The findings reveal that climate change and variability will increase inequality at regional and country levels due to poor (or better) adaptability within and among groups or states. The underlying logic of this is that it can potentially cause deprivation of one group who would rebel against the other to cause political instability.

Climate change also challenges regional peace and stability, as conflicts arise within economically weak societies due to their lower capability to fight against the new weather hazards. For instance, pastoral conflicts in the Horn of Africa are triggered by scarcities of fundamental resources of land, wood and water. Millions of local people were forced to leave their homelands and establish new settlements near the cities on environmentally fragile lands. Later the scarcities of these dwindling resources and lack of provision of basic services led to ethnic animosities and civil strife. In 2009, many pastoral communities were affected in northern Kenya when a long spell of drought severely contributed to some level of environmental degradation. This led to scarcity of natural resources and reduced availability of watering points and depletion of pastures. Kenya's case of pastoralist communities suggests that the scarcity of resources coupled with other socio-economic issue, triggered an armed conflict among the local communities. The study also identifies some other related sources of conflict—for instance, migration of pastoralist communities, sharing of watering points and cattle rustling during rainy season, due to dramatic climatic variations.⁸

Studies also indicate that during the periods of less precipitation, the likelihood of conflict significantly increases.⁹ Focusing at this approach, conflict in Darfur has often been linked to climate change and land degradation.¹⁰ Variation in the rainfall pattern and longer periods of drought during 1970-80s considerably contributed to

intensity of the Darfur conflict. The local government had poor institutional system which further attributed to social decay and shortfall in the GDP of the country. All these factors combined led to a violent conflict in Darfur.

The deeper analysis of the relationship between climate change and conflicts comes to a general conclusion that resource scarcity is either directly or indirectly associated to most of inter- and intra-state conflicts in the Horn of Africa region.

Major challenge for the Horn of Africa

Understanding the critical relationship between security and climate change is a major challenge for the Horn of Africa. To deal with the potential threats of climate change, establishment of social and technical ‘ingenuity’ institutions can provide adaptation techniques during the times of crisis. Therefore, African nations must look for innovative ideas needed for climate change adaptation as well as mitigation. Simultaneously, social and technological ingenuity is also required, otherwise the ingenuity gap can increase the vulnerability of economically weak and poor societies.

Additionally, there is a gap in developing strategies for regional cooperation to support local communities for adaptation rather than mitigation.¹¹ At the same time, policymakers and practitioners in the field of environmental security, conflict management and peacemaking should develop strategies to tackle climate change as a threat to global, regional and national stability and peace.

The management of the environment must be incorporated in policy development because protecting the ecosystems can help slowing or reversing global warming, as these are the matters of life and death for many societies. To control the security impacts of climate change, it is vital to facilitate more research and awareness among those communities who are most vulnerable to climate change. It is important to strengthen regional and local environmental norms as well. Especially, in places where issues of depletion of natural resources, such as desertification, deforestation and soil erosion etc. are linked to climatic changes; there is a greater need for the formulation and implementation of national policy measures

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Conflict profile

An overview of AMISOM in south-central Somalia

From Operation Restore Hope in the early 1990s up to the unfolding ‘Stabilisation Plan’, foreign military forces have been engaged in the conflict in south-central Somalia at various stages. Invariably, rather than bringing an end to what had set off two decades ago as an internecine clan-based civil war, every foreign military intervention has ended up exacerbating and widening the conflict.

At present, military contingents from six African countries are clubbed together under the military component of AMISOM—the African Union Mission in Somalia. (Howsoever small, the mission has political and humanitarian components as well.) In addition, the United States has been regularly sending in drones and Navy Seals for strikes against al-Shabab. Experts from a number of European countries are engaged in training and providing technical advice to both the Somali National Army, a loose and disparate group of clan militias—and AMISOM.

Authorised by the UN Security Council Resolution, 2124 and first deployed in March 2007, AMISOM now comprises 21,586 soldiers in addition to 540 police officers, with troops drawn from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Sierra Leone, Kenya and Ethiopia who are deployed in six sectors carving up south and central Somalia.¹ (Kenya and Ethiopia were not originally part of the AMISOM contingent and their troops had had an independent operational presence, mainly in regions along the Somalia border, before formally putting the AMISOM hat on.)

Ugandan troops are deployed in Sector 1, which comprises the regions of Banadir, including Mogadishu, and Lower Shabelle.

Kenyan forces are responsible for Sector 2 that covers Lower and Middle Jubba, mainly in support of the regional administration of Jubaland. Sector 3, comprising Bay and Bakool as well as Gedo (Sub Sector 3), comes under Ethiopian command.

Djiboutian forces are in charge of Sector 4 which covers Hiiraan and Galgaduud while Burundian forces are in Sector 5 which covers the Middle Shabelle region. In addition, Sierra Leone forces are in charge of Sector Kismayo covering the port city and its surrounding areas.

According AMISOM authorities, the “military component has been instrumental in helping Somali National Security Forces push the Al Qaeda-affiliated terror group, al-Shabab, out of much of southern Somalia including most major towns and cities. It has created a relatively secure environment which has allowed the Somali peace process to take root, allowed local population the opportunity to...establish accountable local governance institutions that can begin to deliver services as well as rebuild the local economy and create linkages to the national economy and government.”²

Relevance to the local context

The sectoral approach taken by AMISOM reflects the linkage between the Somali conflict and geopolitics of the Horn of Africa as well as the international community’s response to the phenomenon of militant Islamist movements. The Kenyan and Ethiopian forces are mainly concentrated in areas along the Somalia border with the overt purpose of securing their Somali-dominated border regions, create ‘buffer zones’, containing the threat of al-Shabab and gain domestic political mileage.

But it also means that the civil war in south-central Somalia, with barely 4 million inhabitants afflicted by decades of conflict and recurring famine, has morphed into a regional and international conflict whose resolution no longer depends upon the actions and policies of local Somali armed actors alone. What ends regional and international military strategists aim to achieve in south-central Somalia and how long a combat operation like AMISOM can continue without an internal Somali political settlement will determine if there’s any hope of a conflict-free Somalia.

Second, sectorisation reinforces and encourages the trend of fragmentation and disintegration of Somalia. While the northern, mainly one-clan family regions of Puntland and Somalia have long set themselves up as autonomous, independent states, a multitude of regional, mainly clan-based, established or aspiring regional authorities in south-central Somalia. Alliances with foreign powers have become as important for the competing leadership of these regional authorities as local intra-Somali clan alliances. Many of them, including the Somali Federal Government, may not survive long without AMISOM's military cover. And how so many competing regional administrations and a federal government with limited writ would be able to forge an amicable, viable federation, especially if and when there is no AMISOM cover, is a quandary without a foreseeable solution. Even in areas AMISOM helps 'liberate' from al-Shabab control, peace and 'stabilisation' remains elusive mainly due to rival clan claims to territorial control and resources.

Third, the presence of non-Somali forces to complement the political and humanitarian intervention by the international community provides ample propaganda fodder to groups like al-Shabab that do not recognise the legitimacy of the Somali Federal Government or the regional authorities. Is it possible for foreign non-Somali forces to not only completely defeat a resilient enemy that employs unconventional means of warfare, religious nationalistic rhetoric and belongs to an international militant network, but also help resolve the ever so complicated clan feuds over land, resources and political power that have been going since the collapse of the state in 1991?

Is there an exit strategy?

Seven years of AMISOM and intermittent incursions by other regional and world powers before have not been able to settle the Somalia question. While the structure of the conflict has been changing and shifting over time, the goal of eliminating al-Shabab solely through military means appears to be counterproductive so far. The prospects of an early move towards cessation of hostilities and agreement on a peaceful settlement are as bleak today as ever. If anything, the threat has spilled off into the neighbouring countries whose forces are operational inside south-Central Somalia.

No military operation can go on forever. Policymakers in the Horn and in other capitals round the world will have to find alternatives to just relying on military means to tackle the Somalia problem. What needs to be decided is that under what conditions and in which circumstances the regional countries contributing to AMISOM will decide that Somalia and Somalis can be left to their own devices.

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1 All the information and data on AMISOM in this article is taken from <http://amisom-au.org>

2 Source: <http://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/military-component/>

RESOURCES

Crisis in South Sudan

As the world's newest state has descended into civil war just a couple of years after its independence, the future of South Sudan remains a big concern for regional policymakers. In this policy paper, Abraham Awolich, a founding member of the Sudd Institute, Juba, tries to "make sense of the current crisis" which he asserts "emanates mainly from a mismanaged political discord."

Read the paper at <http://suddinstitute.org/assets/Publications/Unwarranted-carnageAwolich.pdf>

Forging two nations

The independence of South Sudan has left the two countries and the region facing new challenges. Edited by Elke Grawert and carrying research pieces by academics and writers from both Sudans, *Forging two nations: Insights on Sudan and South Sudan* analyses the aftermath of independence and how it is shaping the politics and society in the two countries.

See this link: http://publications.ossrea.net/index.php?option=com_sobi2&sobi2Task=sobi2Details&catid=3&sobi2Id=2804&Itemid=0

Top priorities for the continent in 2014

Foresight Africa

“For Africa to achieve transformative progress,” says this report by the Brookings Africa Growth Initiative, “policy solutions must come from African sources.”

Containing a dozen chapters, *Foresight Africa* identifies the most critical issues facing the continent in 2014 and beyond. From employment for urban and rural youth to the myths about African industry and shifts in financing sustainable to climate change and piracy, the report attempts to suggest policy prescriptions and approaches to manage the continent’s many pressing problems.

Available at http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/foresight%20africa%202014/Foresight%20Africa_Full%20Report.pdf

Aid and state-building

Written by Ken Menkhaus and published by the United Nations University, *Aid and institution-building in fragile states: The case of Somali-inhabited eastern Horn of Africa* looks at the Somali-inhabited regions of in the eastern Horn. It notes that while “institution-building in Somalia has met with high levels of failure for two decades... successes have occurred in other Somali-inhabited regions of the eastern Horn, and have been especially present at the local and municipal level.”

The paper can be downloaded from http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/2014/en_GB/wp2014-002/

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The *Horn of Africa Bulletin* (HAB) is an international newsletter, compiling analyses, news and resources primarily in the Horn of Africa region. The material published in HAB represents a variety of sources and does not necessarily represent the views of the Life & Peace Institute (LPI) or the cooperating partners, the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) and the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA). Writers and sources are normally referred to, although in exceptional cases, the editors of the HAB may choose not to reveal the real identity of a writer or publish the source.

