SOUTHERN AFRICA RECORD contains the original texts of, or extracts from, important statements by political leaders, government representatives and international organisations, concerning international relations in the southern region of Africa. In addition to statements on issues of current concern, some significant statements made in the past are included in the RECORD from time to time. The reproduction of these policy statements of the past and present, is intended for information and reference purposes, not only for students, but for all those who are concerned with the relations between the countries of Southern Africa.

Statements are reproduced if and when texts become available (not in chronological order), and it must be emphasised that the selection of statements included in SOUTHERN AFRICA RECORD should not be regarded as exhaustive or even representative. Nor should the selection be regarded in any sense as indicating a viewpoint as to the relative importance of one or other statement over another not reproduced or reproduced in a later number of the RECORD. In any case, as the Institute itself cannot, in terms of its Constitution, hold a viewpoint on any aspect of international affairs, no views expressed in any statement reproduced in the RECORD should be identified with the Institute.

Published by the South African Institute of International Affairs. Four issues per year. Subscription rate R10,00 per annum (surface mail). R14,00 per annum (overseas airmail). Price per copy R2,50 (plus postage for overseas airmail).

Uitgegee deur die Suid-Afrikaanse Instituut van Internasionale Aangeleenthede. Vier uitgawes per jaar. Intekengeld R10,00 per jaar (landpos). R14,00 per jaar (buitelandse lugpos). Prys per eksemplaar R2,50 (plus posgeld vir buitelandse lugpos).

Orders for the RECORD should be addressed to the Administrative Secretary, S.A.I.I.A., P.O. Box 31596, Braamfontein, 2017, South Africa.
Negotiations on SWA/Namibia:

A. Correspondence between the UN Secretary-General and the South African Foreign Minister, concerning proposed Geneva Consultations
   (i) Letter dated 5 November 1979, from the UN Secretary-General
   (ii) Letter dated 7 November 1979, from the South African Foreign Minister
   (iii) Letter dated 7 November 1979, from the UN Secretary-General
   (iv) Letter dated 8 November 1979, from the South African Foreign Minister
   (v) Letter dated 8 November 1979, from the UN Secretary-General
   (vi) Letter dated 9 November 1979, from the South African Foreign Minister
   (vii) Letter dated 9 November 1979, from the UN Secretary-General
   (viii) Letter dated 10 November 1979, from the South African Foreign Minister
   (ix) Letter dated 12 November 1979, from the UN Secretary-General
   (x) Letter dated 13 November 1979, from the South African Foreign Minister

B. Supplementary report of the UN Secretary-General, dated 20 November 1979, concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978)

C. Letter dated 5 December 1979, from the South African Foreign Minister to the UN Secretary-General, concerning the proposed demilitarized zone

D. Telegram dated 3 March 1980, from a representative of the President of UNITA to the UN Secretary-General

E. Further report of the UN Secretary-General, dated 31 March 1980, concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978)

F. Letter dated 12 May 1980, from the South African Foreign Minister to the UN Secretary-General
Zimbabwe:

A. Statement regarding the elections by the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, in the House of Lords on 4 March 1980

B. Extract concerning policy towards South Africa from an interview with the Zimbabwean Prime Minister-elect, Mr R.G. Mugabe, broadcast on the Voice of America on 24 March 1980

C. Excerpts from a statement on US policy towards Zimbabwe, by the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Richard M. Moose, before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa, on 27 March 1980

D. Interview with the Zimbabwean Prime Minister-elect, Mr R.G. Mugabe, by the "Tanzanian Daily News", on 10 April 1980

E. Address to the nation by the Governor, Lord Soames, on 14 April 1980

F. Statement by the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, in the House of Lords on 15 April 1980.

G. Independence message by the Zimbabwean Prime Minister, the Hon. R.G. Mugabe, on 17 April 1980

H. Address to the nation by the Zimbabwean Prime Minister, the Hon R.G. Mugabe, on 21 April 1980

Statement concerning the UN by the South African Foreign Minister, the Hon. R.F. Botha, on 13 December 1979

SABC Television interview on 9 March 1980, with the South African Foreign Minister, the Hon. R.F. Botha, concerning South African relations with Zimbabwe and SWA/Namibia
NEGOTIATIONS ON SWA/NAMIBIA

A. Correspondence between the UN Secretary-General and the South African Foreign Minister, concerning proposed Geneva Consultations

(i) Letter dated 5 November 1979, from the UN Secretary-General

You will recall that on 1 October a working paper entitled "Monitoring and the Establishment of a Demilitarized Zone" was transmitted to your Government in connection with the question of Namibia. In view of the urgency of the situation, I consider it essential to hold high-level simultaneous consultations with the Parties concerned at the earliest possible opportunity.

To this end, I should like to invite your Government to be represented at these consultations and would propose that they be held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, between 12 and 15 November. Invitations have been extended to the Governments of Angola, Botswana, South Africa and Zambia, as well as to Swapo. Invitations to be represented have also been extended to the Governments of Mozambique, Tanzania and to those of the Western Five. From the UN side, I shall be represented by Mr Brian Urquhart, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs; Mr Martti Ahtisaari, my Special Representative of (for) Namibia and Mr Abdulrahim Farah, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Questions, accompanied by senior military and political experts.

(ii) Letter dated 7 November 1979, from the South African Foreign Minister

Your Excellency

I have the honour to refer to your letter dated 5 November 1979 regarding a proposed meeting in Geneva to discuss the question of South West Africa.

In conveying my Government's response to the proposals of the Five regarding the demilitarized zone, on 12 October 1979,\(^1\) I stated _inter alia_ that during the discussions with Sir James Murray it was indicated that in order to consider whether the demilitarized zone could be a substitute within the framework of the Settlement Proposal, for the monitoring of Swapo bases, it would be necessary to obtain more details and satisfactory assurances. Therefore, as early as August 1979 it was suggested that such

1. This document is not available
details and assurances could best be provided in discussions between the military commander of UNTAG and the South African military authorities.

The working paper of 1 October to which you refer in your letter did not contain the information the South African authorities were hoping to receive in this regard. In my response of 12 October I accordingly listed some of the questions which are indicative of the practical problems of implementation and asked whether they could be elucidated, e.g.—

Will the conditions which apply to the South African Forces in terms of the proposal equally apply to Swapo personnel, e.g. will all parties be required, prior to cessation of hostilities, to simultaneously announce undertakings to abide by a ceasefire with effect from a specified date?

Do you or do you not consider Swapo to be the sole and authentic representative of the people of South West Africa/Namibia?

(iii) Letter dated 7 November 1979, from the UN Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to your letter of 7 November 1979, regarding the proposed consultations in Geneva on the question of Namibia.

On receiving your initial response of 12 October, and before issuing the present invitations, I carefully considered your suggestion that South African and United Nations military personnel should jointly examine the issues. As indicated to your Permanent Representative in New York, however, I concluded that the issues had both political and military implications and would, therefore, need to be resolved in the wider context. In arriving at this conclusion, I also considered the questions and views which were conveyed to me by the other Parties.

In these circumstances, it appears to me that the most appropriate next step should take the form of high-level consultations in Geneva. During these consultations, all relevant military issues can be considered at an early stage, as part of the wider effort to implement Security Council Resolution 435 (1978). It is also my view that the various clarifications to be provided must meet the concerns, not of any one party, but simultaneously, of all involved. To this end, the United Nations delegation will be led by Under-Secretary-General Urquhart, of whose experience in such matters you are no doubt aware. He will be accompanied by senior colleagues and by political and military experts fully fami-

1. See Southern Africa Record, no. 14, December 1978, p. 43
liar with the situation in Namibia. I believe, moreover, that the presence of the Western and Front Line Governments, with which South Africa and Swapo negotiated the original settlement proposal (S/12636),\(^2\) will assist in the process of clarification of the matters arising from the working paper.

As to the question which you raised concerning representation at the consultations, it is my view that South Africa remains the interlocutor in regard to Namibia, particularly as your Government has stated that South Africa retains authority in Namibia pending the implementations of the Settlement Proposal (S/12950 para 5).

In the light of these clarifications, I trust that Your Excellency will agree to send an appropriate delegation to Geneva, so that the questions raised by your Government, and by others, in relation to the working paper can be resolved with a view to the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). In view of the dates contemplated for the consultations in Geneva, I would appreciate the earliest possible indication of your intentions.

(iv) Letter dated 8 November 1979, from the South African Foreign Minister

I have the honour to refer to your letter of 7 November 1979 regarding the proposed consultations in Geneva on the question of South West Africa/Namibia.

I assume that the consultations with your Representatives and with the Five will be exploratory and will not exclude subsequent discussions as already proposed by me between UNTAG military personnel and South African military authorities, to elucidate certain practical issues and to give the UNTAG military personnel an opportunity of acquainting themselves with the situation in the Territory.

The South African Government must, however, insist that the leaders of the democratic parties in South West Africa be invited in their own right to present their views. I must again reiterate that their views are of the utmost importance. Furthermore, as you know, and as was indicated in my letter of 7 November 1979, these leaders were present when similar discussions were held in New York during March 1979. Subject to your positive response the South African Government will be prepared to send a delegation to Geneva.

(v) Letter dated 8 November 1979, from the UN Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to your letter of 8 November concerning the consultations proposed in Geneva on the question of Namibia.

As indicated in my letter of 7 November, it is my view that the consultations should not merely be exploratory but should seek to resolve the various questions, both political and military, raised by your Government, and by others, in relation to the working paper, with a view to the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978). Should satisfactory progress towards agreement on the principles of the working paper be achieved in Geneva, subsequent discussions could be held as necessary between the competent military and other personnel in order to elucidate practical issues relating to implementation, and to arrange any appropriate reconnaissance in the area.

As regards formal invitations to the Geneva Consultations, my view remains as expressed in my letter of 7 November. However, should members of the Organizations to which you refer, be in Geneva, my Representatives would again be prepared to meet with them, as they did in New York in March.

(vi) Letter dated 9 November 1979, from the South African Foreign Minister

Excellency,

I have the honour to refer to your letter of 8 November 1979.

Pursuant to your letter of 7 November 1979, I conveyed to you South Africa's willingness to send a delegation to Geneva on the assumption that the consultations with your representatives and with the Five will be exploratory and will not exclude subsequent discussions as already proposed by me, between UNTAG military personnel and South African military authorities, to elucidate certain practical issues and to give the UNTAG military personnel an opportunity of acquainting themselves with the situation in the Territory.

It is my conviction that no decision on the principle can be taken before practical implementation has been studied. You will, therefore, appreciate that the proposed consultations in Geneva cannot be regarded as anything but exploratory.

With regard to the importance of inviting the leaders of the democratic parties of South West Africa/Namibia, I should be glad if you would urgently furnish me with the following information:
(a) In what capacity has Swapo been invited by you?
(b) On what basis and how was the invitation extended?
(c) What is the extent of United Nations involvement in the financing of the transport, accommodation, subsistence and administrative costs of the Swapo delegation that has been invited to attend?
(d) What will the detailed responsibilities of the military component of UNTAG in the DMZ be? What will their size at any given moment be in Angola, Zambia, Botswana and South West Africa/Namibia, bearing in mind the figures for UNTAG agreed upon. How will they be deployed in the DMZ and how will they carry out their responsibilities?
(e) What will the status be of MPLA, Cuban, Zambian and Botswana forces in the proposed DMZ or any other zone close to the South West Africa/Namibia borders? Are there any specific conditions which have been attached to their presence and, if so, are they to be monitored?

I also stated that the South African authorities still felt that the only way of "elucidating these and related questions would be for the military personnel concerned jointly to examine the issues, while at the same time enlightening themselves locally as to the situation on the ground".

We have had no reply as yet to these and the other questions posed in my communication, and my Government still feels that the meeting of the military personnel is an essential step to meaningful further discussions.

It is noted that you have also invited Swapo as well as the Governments of Mozambique and Tanzania, while the democratic political parties in South West Africa have been excluded. When similar discussions were held in New York during March 1979, they were present. My Government has repeatedly made it clear that the views of the democratic leaders of South West Africa in these matters are of paramount importance.

The South African Government would therefore reiterate that:

(a) as a preliminary step, the military personnel of UNTAG have discussions with the South African military authorities, at the same time acquainting themselves with the situation in the Territory;
(b) At any ensuing further discussions, arrangements be made for the leaders of the democratic parties in South West Africa to be afforded an equal opportunity to present their views.
(vii) Letter dated 9 November 1979, from the UN Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to your letter of 9 November concerning the proposed consultations in Geneva.

Given the background to the negotiations on the question of Namibia and the imperative need to move towards the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), I believe it is important that the Geneva Consultations make real progress towards agreement on the principles of the working paper, and not be viewed merely as a further round of exploratory talks. I realize that the consultations will be conducted on an *ad referendum* basis.

As regards Swapo's participation in the consultations, I would refer Your Excellency to the working paper. It is evident from it that the co-operation of Swapo is necessary to the success of the arrangements and this, indeed, is underlined by the questions you have raised in your response of 12 October. It was obvious in the circumstances that Swapo should be invited to the consultations.

As to the status of Swapo, Your Excellency will recall that it is a party to the Settlement Proposal and has thus always participated in consultations on these matters. I should also like to refer Your Excellency to my Report of 29 August 1978 (document S/12827)¹ which, in dealing with the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), states that UNTAG will act with complete impartiality.

We are proceeding with arrangements for the consultations in Geneva and are looking forward to the participation of your delegation.

(viii) Letter dated 10 November 1979, from the South African Foreign Minister

Excellency,

I have the honour to refer to your letter of 9 November 1979. You intimate that "the consultations will be conducted on an *ad referendum* basis." In my letter of 8 November 1979 I indicated why the South African Government consider that the consultations should be of an exploratory nature. Our viewpoints on the nature of the proposed talks do not seem to be so far removed from each other as to militate against our participation in the proposed discussions. We should accordingly concentrate on the need to invite the democratic political parties to Geneva.

¹ See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 14, December 1978. p. 9-19
You also contend that Swapo “is a party to the settlement proposal and has thus always participated in consultations on these matters”.

This applies with equal force to the democratic political parties.

May I recall that South Africa, in accepting the Settlement Proposal on 25 April 1978, stated emphatically that its acceptance was based on the prior concurrence of the democratic political parties.

Furthermore in my letter to you dated 22 December 1978 I informed you that the leaders of South West Africa had expressed their support for an internationally acceptable settlement with a view to achieving international recognition of South West Africa’s independence and the peaceful co-existence of the nations of Southern Africa, as well as support for the initiative of the five Western Powers.

I added that “the South African Government thus having complied with its commitment to conclude its consultations with the leaders of South West Africa,” decided to co-operate in the expeditious implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978).

When South Africa was invited by the Five to attend the simultaneous talks which were held in New York during March 1979, the very same issue of participation by the democratic parties arose. Initially the democratic political parties were not invited. I wrote on 15 March 1979 to the Five Foreign Ministers:

... the South African Government will be prepared to participate in discussions concerning implementation of the Settlement Proposal. However, in arriving at this decision we were influenced by intimations that all the political parties in South West Africa would be included in the envisaged talks. In fact, we were told by some of the parties that they had been ‘invited’ to attend the proximity talks and that a guarantee had been given to them that they would have the same ‘access’ as Swapo.

This position now appears to have changed in view of the following statement issued on behalf of the Permanent Missions to the United Nations of the Five which has just come to our notice:

‘In a public statement issued on March 12, 1979, our Governments announced that invitations had been extended to the Foreign Minister of South Africa, the President of Swapo, and the Foreign Ministers of the Front-line States and Nigeria, to come to New York for proximity talks concerning Namibia on March 19 and 20. Our Governments also stated that United

1. See Southern Africa Record, no. 12, May 1978, p. 32
Nations Secretary-General Waldheim has advised us that he will be available for consultations. No other individuals or groups have been invited to participate in the proximity talks. We have consistently kept all Namibian groups informed of developments in the settlement effort, and will continue to do so.'

I have now learnt that in view of this latest development, the political parties in South West Africa are reconsidering their position. Inevitably South Africa's attitude might be affected by the decisions of these parties. Any suggestion that Swapo is the only political party in South West Africa and entitled to preferential treatment is completely unacceptable to the South African Government. It follows, therefore, that in coming to a final decision, the South African Government will have to take into account the attitude of the other political parties in South West Africa.

On 16 March 1979, US Secretary of State Vance wrote to me as follows:
Let me assure you that the talks are for the purpose of reaching an understanding on the implementation of the Proposal in order to remove all misunderstandings that could complicate UNTAG's deployment and operation. The talks are designed to discuss implementation of the Proposal and not to renegotiate the Proposal.
I and the other Ministers are prepared to meet with all parties from Namibia to discuss implementation of the Proposal and I urge you to encourage all the parties in Namibia to go to New York.

Subsequently the representatives of the Five in South Africa informed the leaders of the democratic parties direct that they would be welcome to attend the discussions in New York and that they would be given equal access. This was acceptable to the parties.

It was on this basis, and on this basis only that the South African Government agreed to send a delegation to New York in March 1979.

You, Mr Secretary-General, are convening the simultaneous discussions in Geneva and we hope that you will approach the matter in a practical manner. If South Africa had adopted a legalistic approach, the Settlement Proposal would never have materialised.

You have consistently stated that you are acting in terms of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). This resolution does not single out Swapo to the exclusion of the democratic political parties. In fact on 30 March 1978 the Five stated:
We firmly believe that a peaceful and realistic settlement of the Namibian question is only possible if all sides, including both you and the United Nations, are prepared to set on one side the long-standing legal disputes that have bedevilled consideration of this question for over thirty years. You will be aware both of our views, and of those of the United Nations on this matter. We would, however, have quickly reached a dead end in our negotiating efforts if we had sought to resolve these disputes one way or the other. We are sure you would agree with us that it is the interests and wishes of all the people of Namibia, whatever their race or political party, that are of paramount importance.

The South African Government fully subscribes to these sentiments.

In these circumstances I urge Your Excellency to accommodate the position of the democratic political parties in such a way that they will feel able to go to Geneva.

As you are aware the South African Government is guided by the attitude of these parties and our decision to attend the Geneva discussions will therefore depend on a reasonable arrangement satisfying them.

It will be clear to you that it is impossible for the South African Government to adopt a position now which is irreconcilable with the position adopted in March 1979.

You draw attention to your report of 29 August 1978 which, in dealing with the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978) states that "UNTAG will act with complete impartiality". Bearing in mind all the assistance and preferential treatment the UN has in the past accorded Swapo, the democratic political parties are extremely sceptical about this promised impartiality. Needless to say the unwillingness to invite these parties to the Geneva consultations will strengthen their scepticism and create further suspicion.

(ix) Letter dated 12 November 1979, from the UN Secretary-General

Your Excellency

I have the honour to refer to your letter of 10 November 1979 concerning the consultations in Geneva on the question of Namibia, which was communicated to me in the afternoon of 11 November.

In my letters to you of 7 and 8 November 1979, I set out the basis of my position on the matter of the presence during the
current consultations in Geneva of the organizations to which you refer. I assume that you will have informed them of my response.

I wish again to make clear that my representatives in Geneva would be happy to meet with the representatives of these organizations in the same manner and with the same access as in March. For purely practical reasons, I have asked the representatives of the Western Five to inform these organizations directly and urgently of the above.

In these circumstances, I very much hope that South Africa will be able, without further delay, to join the consultations which are now under way in Geneva.

(x) Letter dated 13 November 1979, from the South African Foreign Minister

Excellency

I have the honour to refer to your letter dated 12 November 1979. You refer to your earlier letters of 7 and 8 November 1979, in which you set out the basis of your position on the matter of the presence during the current consultations in Geneva of the democratic parties of South West Africa/Namibia. You add that you assume that I will have informed them of your response.

Your letter of 7 November on this issue reads:

As to the question which you raised concerning representation at the consultations, it is my view that South Africa remains the interlocutor in regard to Namibia.

and later:

I trust that Your Excellency will agree to send an appropriate delegation to Geneva.

In your letter of 8 November you wrote:

As regards formal invitations to the Geneva consultations my view remains as expressed in my letter of 7 November. However, should members of the organizations to which you refer be in Geneva, my representatives would again be prepared to meet with them, as they did in New York in March.

In order to correct your misconception on the matter I wish to assure you that the democratic parties would undoubtedly have summarily rejected your formula as an acceptable basis for participation. Indeed they are reported by the press to have regarded the general gist of the formula as conveyed in press reports from New York to be a calculated slight.

However, I now note in your letter under reply that you indicate for the first time that your representatives in Geneva would
be "happy to meet with the representatives" of the democratic parties of South West Africa/Namibia in their own right, and not as part of a South African delegation, as was formerly implied.

I have now learned that these Parties have, in general, responded favourably to your invitation conveyed to them through representatives of the five Western countries which have been concerned in the negotiations. I understand that their reaction on the whole has been to accept your invitation for them to participate in the consultations in their own right, on the assumption that they will be accorded the same treatment as any other which has been invited.

In the light of the decision by the democratic parties to participate, the South African Government has decided to send a delegation to Geneva on the basis that has been indicated to you. The delegation is leaving for Geneva today.

Texts supplied by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and Information

B. Supplementary report of the UN Secretary-General dated 20 November 1979, concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978)

1. On 26 February 1979, I reported to the Security Council (S/13120) concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) on the question of Namibia. Therein, I noted the differing interpretations and perceptions of SWAPO and South Africa regarding the implementation of certain provisions of the Settlement Proposal and concluded that the outstanding issues referred to in the report should be resolved along the lines there specified.

2. Thereafter, I had an exchange of correspondence with the Government of South Africa (S/13143, S/13148, S/13156, S/13172 and S/13173). It became apparent from this exchange that the two principal outstanding issues to be resolved in order to facilitate the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) centred on paragraphs 11 and 12 of my 26 February report. With a view to resolving these outstanding issues, consultations were held with all concerned in New York between 18-26 March 1979, but agreement was not reached. I nevertheless continued to seek to resolve the differences. I was, however, informed by representatives of the South African Government that certain elements of paragraphs 11 and 12 remained unacceptable.

1. See Southern Africa Record, no. 15, April 1979, p. 31-41
3. On 15 July 1979, I met with the late President Neto of Angola in Luanda. At that meeting he suggested the establishment of a demilitarized zone on the northern frontier of Namibia with a view to facilitating the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). In this connexion he asked me to explore and develop the concept of the demilitarized zone as a means of resolving outstanding issues. President Neto also informed me that Angola would have no objection to the establishment of a United Nations liaison office as proposed in my report of 26 February. I also had talks in Luanda with the President of SWAPO.

4. During the Meeting of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, held in Monrovia from 17-20 July 1979, I discussed in depth the latest developments concerning the question of Namibia with African leaders, including those of the Front-Line States and the current Chairman of the OAU, President Tolbert of Liberia. Early in August, I was informed that the Summit Meeting of Front-Line States, held in Lusaka, had endorsed the proposal of President Neto for the establishment of a demilitarized zone. In September 1979, I had a further opportunity in New York to exchange views on the demilitarized zone with President Tolbert, and followed this with a discussion with the Secretary-General of the OAU.

5. On 1 October 1979, I submitted for consideration by the neighbouring States, as well as by the Government of South Africa, a working paper concerning monitoring and the establishment of a demilitarized zone on the Angola/Namibia and Zambia/Namibia frontiers, aimed at facilitating the implementation of the United Nations plan. Following preliminary reaction from Governments concerned, I suggested holding simultaneous high-level consultations in Geneva under the auspices of the United Nations to clarify questions arising from the working paper, with the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) in mind. To this end, I extended invitations to all those who had participated in the consultations in New York in March.


7. The consultations were held at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, between 12-16 November 1979. I was represented at the consultation by Mr Brian Urquhart, Under-
Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, Mr Martti Ahtisaari, my Special Representative for Namibia, and Mr Abdulrahim Farah, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Questions, accompanied by senior military and political experts of the Secretariat.

8. The consultations covered all aspects of the concept of the demilitarized zone in relation to the United Nations plan as approved by Security Council resolution 435 (1978). In this connection, the functions of UNTAG arising from the demilitarized zone were fully discussed in the context of the relevant provisions of the Settlement Proposal. Provisions of the working paper in regard to the involvement of the neighbouring States and SWAPO, as well as of the Government of South Africa, were also considered. Further, views were exchanged on the relevant paragraphs of my report of 26 February 1979, in the context of the demilitarized zone proposal and arrangements envisaged for the cessation of hostilities.

9. In addition, my representatives met with the representatives of other Namibian organizations present in Geneva.

10. At the conclusion of the consultations, the Front-Line States accepted the concept of the demilitarized zone and the broad outline of the working paper. SWAPO also accepted the concept of the demilitarized zone. It was indicated that, provided that South Africa also accepted the concept, detailed technical discussions could follow.

11. Extensive consultations were held with the South African delegation on all aspects of the concept of the demilitarized zone. During these, a series of questions was discussed regarding the responsibilities of the various parties and the manner in which the demilitarized zone would be monitored and established. The South African delegation undertook to report on the consultations urgently to its Government, with a view to obtaining its earliest possible reaction, after the necessary consultations, concerning an acceptance of the concept of the demilitarized zone.

12. I shall not fail to inform the Council immediately of the reaction of the South African Government concerning the acceptance of the concept of the demilitarized zone.

S/13634
C. Letter dated 5 December 1979, from the South African Foreign Minister to the UN Secretary-General, concerning the proposed demilitarized zone

Excellency

The South African Government must reiterate emphatically that it is irrevocably committed to ensuring that:

a) the security of the people of South West Africa/Namibia is not endangered; and

b) the wishes of the people of the Territory as to their constitutional future, are not thwarted by intimidation and acts of terrorism.

Within the framework of this commitment, the South African Government has examined, in consultation with the democratic parties of the Territory, the idea of a demilitarized zone on both sides of the northern borders of the Territory. On the basis of these consultations the South African Government accepts the concept of the zone provided agreement is reached in further discussions, inter alia, on the following:

1. The number of South African bases remaining in the DMZ;
2. Acceptable arrangements regarding the disarmament of SWAPO personnel on the closure of bases, i.e. 7 days after certification of the election;
3. The deployment of an acceptable percentage of UNTAG inside the DMZ in the light of practical requirements;
4. Agreement on practical arrangements between the UNTAG military commander and the South African military authorities;
5. Confirmation that the Settlement Proposal accepted by South Africa on 25 April 1978 (S/12636) remains unchanged.
6. Confirmation that the claim for SWAPO bases inside SWA/Namibia, which is in any case not provided for in the Settlement Proposal, will not be revived.

Text supplied by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and Information

D. Telegram dated 3 March 1980, from a representative of the President of UNITA to the UN Secretary-General

We have always hoped that all the parties concerned with the project of the creation of a demilitarized zone in the south of Angola would take up contact with UNITA which effectively controls the population in that zone.

1. See Southern Africa Record, no. 12, May 1978, pp. 25-30 and 32
As we have learnt by radio that a delegation of the UN was in the region in connection with this subject, we have decided to send this telegram to you to state the following:

(a) We demand to become a party to take part in putting into effect the plan for the creation of the zone in question.
(b) We call for a guarantee of freedom of movement for our populations which live from cattle.
(c) If the UN forces which will establish themselves north of Namibia try to intervene in the life of the peaceful populations under our authority, UNITA will take all the appropriate measures.
(d) After having fought Portuguese colonialism for fifteen years and after four years of resistance against Russian-Cuban neo-colonialism, we consider that a new intervention by foreign forces in the south of Angola, on the side of Cuban forces, will not be tolerated by our people and by our UNITA movement.

Our foreign representative, Mr Jeremias Chitunda, who is in New York at this moment, is authorized to discuss this problem with your representative if you consider this useful.

Text of the copy of the telegram sent to the South African Prime Minister, and supplied by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and Information

E. Further report of the UN Secretary-General, dated 31 March 1980, concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978)

1. On 20 November 1979 I reported to the Security Council (S/13634) concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) on the question of Namibia. In that report I described the course of events subsequent to the publication of my report of 26 February 1979 (S/13120), and to the various endeavours relating to the resolution of the two principal issues left outstanding, connected with paragraphs 11 and 12 of the latter report. In particular, I referred to my meeting with the late President Neto of Angola in Luanda on 15 July 1979, during which he had suggested the establishment of a demilitarized zone on both sides of the northern border of Namibia with a view to facilitating the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). President Neto, at that meeting, asked me to explore and develop the concept of the demilitarized zone as a means of resolving outstanding issues.

2. Simultaneous high-level consultations on this subject were held in Geneva, under the auspices of the United Nations, be-

1. See Southern Africa Record, no. 14, December 1978, pp. 43 and 54
tween 12-16 November 1979. The demilitarized zone proposal, as discussed with the parties concerned, has the following principal features. The provisions of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) would continue to bind the parties in all their terms. In addition thereto, the Governments of Angola, South Africa and Zambia would agree to the establishment of a demilitarized zone to facilitate the implementation of the Settlement Proposal (S/12636).3 The purpose of the zone, which would be free of the military forces of the parties and of SWAPO, would be to assist the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in its monitoring and border surveillance functions. It would be understood that in their respective territories Angola and Zambia would have the co-operation of SWAPO in the implementation of the agreement. The zone would be defined as being of 50 kilometres' width on each side of the Namibia/Angola and Namibia/Zambia frontiers, and having a demilitarized character. In the Caprivi Strip the Botswana/Namibia border would reduce the width of the zone. Each Government concerned would be responsible for the demilitarization of its portion of the zone. Within the zone UNTAG would operate freely to carry out its responsibilities. The police forces of the parties concerned would remain in the zone and would extend full co-operation to UNTAG. The zone would be established 14 days after the cease-fire for the duration of the transition period. In the 14-day interim period between the implementation of the cease-fire and the establishment of the zone, UNTAG would have access to all its parts. Selected locations would be excluded from the demilitarized zone. The details of these locations, and practical arrangements relating thereto, would be worked out with the parties. In general such locations would include the military base, its supporting airfield, population centre and the immediate environment. The "immediate environment" would not generally be expected to mean a distance greater than five kilometres from the perimeter of the installation or population centre. It would be clearly inconsistent with the purpose of the demilitarized zone for any massing of troops to take place within the selected locations on either side of the border. The provisions of the Settlement Proposal for phased withdrawal of the South African Defence Forces (SADF) would also apply in the selected locations. On the Namibian side of the border the SADF, within such selected locations, would be restricted to base and by the twelfth week be withdrawn in accordance with the Settlement Proposal. UNTAG would monitor the bases, logistic resupply and authorized movement of military personnel by land and air. SWAPO forces would

be excluded from the selected locations. There would also be provision for UNTAG monitoring operations in the zone in co-operation with the police and other civilian authorities.

3. At the conclusion of the Geneva consultations, the Front-Line States accepted the concept of the demilitarized zone and the broad outline of the proposal presented to them. SWAPO also accepted the concept of the demilitarized zone. It was indicated that, provided South Africa also accepted the concept, detailed technical discussions could follow.

4. On 5 December 1979 the Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa, in a letter addressed to me (S/13680), stated that South Africa accepted the concept of the zone, provided agreement was reached in further discussions, inter alia, on six matters set out in his letter.

5. On 9 January 1980, I addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/13740), in which I informed him of my intention to proceed with the detailed technical discussions referred to in my report of 20 November 1979. I also stated my intention, subject to the Council's consent, to appoint Lieutenant-General Prem Chand of India initially as the Commander-designate and later as Commander of the military component of UNTAG. On 12 January 1980 the President of the Council informed me that the Council agreed with my proposal (S/13741) and I thereupon made the appointment to which I had referred.

6. During consultations held by the Security Council on 31 January 1980 I made a statement concerning a mission to southern Africa which, in its initial phase, would be led by General Prem Chand. I stated that General Prem Chand would visit Angola, Zambia, Botswana and Namibia to have detailed technical discussions on the question of the demilitarized zone. He would also review the deployment of the UNTAG military component in the light of the situation taking the opportunity to review the original proposals for the deployment of UNTAG made in August 1978 and January 1979. He would also discuss a variety of matters which would require the co-operation of the relevant authorities, in particular on logistic questions. I further indicated the specific technical tasks which he would undertake in the various countries which he would visit. I estimated that this part of the mission would take approximately three weeks, at the end of which time it would be my intention for other senior officials from United Nations Headquarters to join it to discuss with the Governments concerned any outstanding problems concerning the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), in particular with relation to the demilitarized zone.

7. General Prem Chand, accompanied by senior military and
political experts from the Secretariat, visited Angola from 5-11 February, Zambia from 11-17 February, and Botswana from 17-18 February. He held detailed technical discussions with Government Ministers and senior military and civilian personnel relating to the functioning of the proposed demilitarized zone, and to arrangements concerning liaison offices. The wide range of subjects covered in the discussions with the Governments also included liaison regarding patrolling in the demilitarized zone and co-operation on logistic matters. As regards the matter of selected locations in the demilitarized zone, as described in paragraph 2 above, the Governments of Angola and Zambia indicated that they would require an over-all total of seven such locations in their sectors of the demilitarized zone. The mission reached agreement with the three Governments on arrangements for the establishment and functioning of UNTAG liaison offices in their respective capitals. These would be essentially civilian, but would include some military personnel. They would serve as the principal channel of communication between the United Nations and the Governments concerned, with particular reference to the commitment of host countries in regard to the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia. In this connexion, they would also perform such functions as would be entrusted to them by the Secretary-General within the context of agreements reached with the Governments concerned for the implementation of the United Nations plan. The Government of Botswana confirmed that there would be no need for a demilitarized zone in its country because SWAPO did not operate there and would have no bases in Botswana during the transitional period. General Prem Chand also had opportunities for aerial reconnaissance, and to examine the various practical implications of the demilitarized zone proposal on the ground.

8. General Prem Chand had meetings with SWAPO in Luanda and Lusaka at which SWAPO confirmed its acceptance of the concept of the demilitarized zone and was informed by the mission of the understandings reached with the Governments of Angola and Zambia as regards the implementation of the proposed zone. SWAPO informed the mission that it would respect the wishes of Angola and Zambia in respect of the implementation of the demilitarized zone in their respective territories. However, it was opposed to South Africa having selected locations in the Namibian sector of the demilitarized zone. In this connexion the mission indicated the terms of the Settlement Proposal which provide, inter alia, for the total withdrawal of the SADF from the area of the proposed zone by the end of the twelfth week after the cease-fire.
9. General Prem Chand then proceeded to Namibia, where he remained from 18-29 February. He held extensive and detailed discussions with the General Officer Commanding, South West Africa Command, and other senior SADF personnel, relating to the full range of practical questions concerning the operation of the proposed demilitarized zone. General Prem Chand travelled approximately 7,500 kilometres in the Territory to observe the prevailing conditions, principally in the forward areas on the northern borders of Namibia, and carried out a full reconnaissance, by ground and air, of the Namibian sector of the zone.

10. On 29 February General Prem Chand and other members of the mission accompanying him proceeded to Cape Town where, on 1 March, they were joined by Mr Brian Urquhart, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, Mr Abdulrahim Farah, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Questions, and Mr Martti Ahtisaari, my Special Representative for Namibia. General Prem Chand reported that, in his opinion, given the co-operation of all the parties and the necessary support, the military aspects of the Settlement Proposal and the proposed demilitarized zone constituted a practicable undertaking, on the basis of the arrangements discussed, and of my report of 29 August 1978 (S/12327). He also referred to the cooperative attitudes which he had encountered in all the territories which he had visited.

11. Talks between the United Nations mission and a delegation from the Government of South Africa, led by Mr Brand Fourie, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, took place in Cape Town from 4-7 March. Mr Urquhart and his colleagues were also received by the Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa, Mr P.W. Botha, and met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr R.F. Botha.

12. Discussions with the Government of South Africa were held within the framework of Foreign Minister Botha's letter of 5 December 1979 (S/13680). In an opening statement on 4 March, Mr Urquhart summarized the results of General Prem Chand's mission and emphasized the urgency of overcoming the remaining obstacles to the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) as soon as possible. He recalled that the demilitarized zone proposal had been put forward as a means of resolving outstanding issues impeding such implementation, and that these issues, which were not directly connected with the demilitarized zone, could be effectively dealt with only after South Africa had accepted the demilitarized zone proposal. The
discussions proceeded on this basis and were principally concerned with the practical arrangements connected with the demilitarized zone.

13. The South African delegation requested further clarifications in respect of the manner in which UNTAG would meet its responsibilities in the proposed demilitarized zone, stating that such information was necessary in order to enable the SADF to determine whether the concept was workable. Ensuing discussions covered a wide spectrum of matters, after which the South African delegation confirmed to the mission points of agreement previously reached with General Prem Chand regarding liaison, communications, demarcation and logistic arrangements. The mission confirmed to the Government of South Africa and (sic.) the United Nations concept of deployment in and monitoring of the demilitarized zone and outlined the principles and framework according to which United Nations resources would be employed in this regard. The mission, while recalling that the proposed arrangements for the demilitarized zone as set out in paragraph 2 above set no upper limit on the number of selected locations, drew the attention of the South African delegation to the designation by Angola and Zambia of a total of seven such locations in relation to any requirement in this regard which it might wish to make. The mission was informed that the SADF would be unable to regroup in seven selected locations because of the limited size of and facilities at, existing bases. The South African delegation stated that such a limitation would present insurmountable logistic problems, considering that the SADF is currently located in approximately 40 bases in the demilitarized zone area. It recalled that while the Settlement Proposal provides for the restriction and monitoring of the SADF from the commencement of the transitional period, it allows the SADF a period of six weeks within which to reduce its troop level to 12,000 and 12 weeks within which to vacate the zone entirely. The delegation asked that these matters be taken into account in regard to the designation of selected locations on the Namibian side of the demilitarized zone. It suggested 20 selected locations, informing the mission that this would represent a 50 per cent reduction in the number of bases which it would otherwise be entitled to retain under the Proposal during the first 12 weeks of the transitional period. Further, with respect to the reduction of its bases by 50 per cent, the Government of South Africa expressed the view that the designation of seven selected locations by Angola and Zambia did not require any commensurate reduction of bases on their part.

14. The South African delegation, while emphasizing that it
did not doubt the good faith of the Governments of Angola and Zambia, requested further clarifications regarding the manner in which these Governments would in practical terms ensure the fulfilment of their commitments under the United Nations plan. In particular it requested confirmation that the breadth of the demilitarized zone north of the Caprivi Strip would be 50 kilometres, and that in their respective territories, Angola and Zambia would have the co-operation of SWAPO in the implementation of any demilitarized zone agreement. Further, the South African delegation desired information on the arrangements envisaged by Angola and Zambia for the restriction and monitoring of SWAPO in their respective territories.

15. In the course of the discussions, the mission informed the South African delegation that, in order to meet its additional responsibilities in the demilitarized zone, the military component of UNTAG would certainly need to be deployed at the authorized upper limit of 7,500. The mission also confirmed to the South African delegation that the Settlement Proposal, as reflected in Security Council resolution 435 (1978), remained unchanged, the demilitarized zone proposal having been conceived to facilitate the implementation of the resolution. Additionally, progress was made relating to the proposed UNTAG status agreement, and the duration of UNTAG was discussed.

16. At the end of the talks, the South African delegation stated that its Government reaffirmed its acceptance of the Settlement Proposal and its decision to co-operate in implementing Security Council resolution 435 (1978). It informed the United Nations mission that the South African military authorities, on the basis of the information provided, would test and evaluate the feasibility of the United Nations concept in regard to the demilitarized zone, for presentation to their Government. The Government's conclusions would be transmitted as soon as possible.

17. In his concluding statement, Mr Urquhart urged the South African Government to give the United Nations its response on the demilitarized zone in the minimum possible time. He emphasized that, in their consideration of the military aspects of the Proposal, the South African authorities should bear in mind the special nature of United Nations peace-keeping operating procedures. He hoped that their judgement would be formed in this light and not by reference to the military procedures pertaining to a national defence force. He urged that the South African Government reconsider the number of selected locations which it had proposed on the Namibian side of the demilitarized zone. Mr Urquhart reiterated that a solution to the outstanding questions would be greatly facilitated by South Africa's acceptance of the demilitarized zone proposal, as well as by some
reasonable expectation of the early implementation of the Proposal as a whole. In this connexion, he stated the desirability of setting a target date for implementation and pointed out that a date not later than 15 June would avoid further delays due to climatic factors in Namibia. He stressed that this date would have to be tied in practice to the six week period which was estimated to be the minimum for effective mobilization of the military component of UNTAG. He also noted the progress which had been made on the various necessary practical arrangements including the status agreement. Mr Urquhart emphasized the serious concern in the international community concerning reported internal developments in the Territory, which, if pursued, could prejudice the implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

18. The mission next held talks in Gaborone, making an en route overnight stop in Windhoek on Saturday 8 March. The mission was received in Gaborone by President Seretse Khama and held discussions with the Government of Botswana on 9-10 March. From there it travelled to Luanda, where it held discussions on 11 March with the Government of Angola and with the President of SWAPO, Mr Sam Nujoma. The following day it was received by President dos Santos of Angola. On 13 March the mission held discussions with the Government of Zambia and was received by President Kaunda. On that date it was also received by President Machel of Mozambique. On 14 March the mission was received by President Nyerere of the United Republic of Tanzania in Dar es Salaam. Members of the mission visited Monrovia to brief President Tolbert of Liberia, the current Chairman of the OAU, and Addis Ababa, to brief the Secretary-General of the OAU. They also visited Lagos and briefed the Government of Nigeria.

19. At the various meetings the mission gave an account of its talks with the Government of South Africa in Cape Town. The Governments of the Front-Line States, and SWAPO, made it clear that their main interest was in the early implementation of resolution 435 (1978), in which task they pledged their full cooperation. The Front-Line States also indicated that if there was a definite undertaking by the South African Government for early implementation, they believed that it would be possible to resolve outstanding issues in a satisfactory manner. They reaffirmed their position regarding the demilitarized zone proposal as a means of resolving outstanding issues impeding the implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

20. I should like to take this opportunity to place on record my deep gratitude and appreciation to the Heads of State and the Governments of the countries visited by the United Nations mission for the co-operation and facilities extended to it.
Observations

21. The technical discussions which took place in the first phase of the mission described above have served to clarify the proposed arrangements and working methods for the demilitarized zone, UNTAG liaison offices in the Front-Line States, and the deployment of the military component of UNTAG. The United Nations mission has provided the parties concerned with all pertinent information on the practical arrangements. I am of the opinion, in the light of the findings of the mission, that UNTAG could, with the co-operation and support of all concerned, function and fulfil its obligations satisfactorily on the basis of the arrangements discussed.

22. There is a limit to the degree of precision with which the details of an operation of this nature can be established in advance, especially when there is no firm indication that it will start on a specific date. United Nations experience has shown that many anticipated problems which, in the abstract, may seem difficult, can be worked out relatively easily in practice provided all concerned wish to go forward and are prepared to co-operate in achieving the over-all objectives of the proposed undertaking.

23. The South African Government has indicated that it needs some time to review its position in the light of the discussions with the mission and of recent developments in the area. It has stated, however, that it will give its reactions to the proposals made by the mission as soon as possible.

24. I am fully aware of the gravity and weight of the decisions that have to be taken by the parties concerned, of the anxieties on all sides regarding the possible future course of events and of the need to build a climate of confidence. I feel, however, that we have come to a point where the necessary political decisions have to be taken to move this matter from the stage of discussion to the stage of implementation. It seems to me that if the present opportunity for an early and peaceful settlement is lost, the likely alternative developments would have grave consequences for the region. I would hope therefore, that, on the basis of the exhaustive discussions which have been conducted over the last two years, it may prove possible to move expeditiously to the process of implementation.

S/13862
F. Letter dated 12 May 1980, from the South African Foreign Minister to the UN Secretary-General

1. As has been repeatedly stated, South Africa seeks an international settlement of the Namibian question. In this spirit the South African Government accepted the concept of a demilitarized zone (DMZ), as a possible substitute for the monitoring of SWAPO restriction to base as provided for in the Settlement Proposal accepted by South Africa on 25 April 1978.\(^1\) It did so on the understanding that certain issues would be satisfactorily resolved. Thus a number of aspects of the DMZ were fully explored during the visits of the United Nations teams to South West Africa/Namibia and to South Africa in February and March 1980, respectively, as outlined in paragraphs 9-17 of Your Excellency’s report of 31 March 1980 (S/13862).

2. In an effort to facilitate implementation of the Settlement Proposal (S/12636), South Africa, in the course of the discussions, accepted that
   (a) the South African port of Walvis Bay could be used by UNTAG for logistic supply;
   (b) maximum logistic assistance within the limitations of South Africa’s own resources could be provided to UNTAG;
   (c) the air component of UNTAG could be militarized;
   (d) South African bases in the DMZ, which South Africa would under the Settlement Proposal be entitled to retain during the first 12 weeks of the transitional period, could be reduced by 50 per cent;
   (e) the full authorized military component of UNTAG could be deployed (the reserve battalion no longer remaining in the country of origin as had been agreed previously).

3. On the basis of information made available to it, the South African Government has now tested and evaluated the feasibility of the DMZ, especially whether it could be a possible substitute for the monitoring of SWAPO troop restrictions to base.

4. In the context of its effort to make the DMZ a feasible proposition, and for reasons fully explained to the United Nations teams, the South African Government wishes to be informed whether the introduction of the DMZ would mean that
   (a) the South African Government’s offer to reduce its bases inside the DMZ by 50 per cent to 20 selected locations is accepted;

---

1. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 12, May 1978, p. 32
(b) the effectiveness of UNTAG inside the DMZ will be increased through the deployment of a substantially larger percentage of UNTAG in the entire zone;
(c) acceptable arrangements regarding the disarmament of SWAPO personnel on the closure of bases, i.e. 7 days after certification of the election, would be made;
and
(d) the claim by SWAPO to bases inside the Territory would not be revived.

5. It would of course also be desirable that all elements present or operating in the DMZ extend their co-operation to make this proposal effective. In this regard I refer to a telegram addressed to Your Excellency by a representative of the President of UNITA on 3 March 1980, and copied to the South African Prime Minister. A copy of the text is attached. The implications of this communication should not be underestimated.

6. South Africa has been pressing for urgent implementation of the Settlement Proposal since accepting it on 25 April 1978. Various opportunities to implement it have been frustrated as a result of deviations condoned by the United Nations at the insistence of SWAPO. The successful implementation of the Settlement Proposal or of any proposal designed to achieve a peaceful solution will continue to be seriously jeopardized if all the parties are not treated on an equal basis. There is no justification for the General Assembly to declare one party the sole representative of the Territory and to act accordingly. The parties are entitled to equal consideration of their views.

7. Your Excellency will be aware of the extreme concern which exists regarding the impartiality of the United Nations, a prerequisite to free and fair elections. Moreover, it has consistently been the South African Government's position that equal treatment should be extended to all political parties participating in the political process. You will recall that the representatives of the political parties in SWA/Namibia found it possible to agree to travel to Geneva for the simultaneous consultations conducted there in November 1979, on the demilitarized zone, when you were able to assure them that they would have equal access to your representatives. They interpreted this reaction on your part as an acknowledgment of their equal interest in deliberations affecting their future. However, General Assembly Resolution 34/92

See item D. in this issue
of 12 December 1979 reverted to the affirmation that SWAPO is the sole and authentic representative of the people of South West Africa/Namibia and granted increased financial assistance to SWAPO, again severely compromising the United Nations' claim to impartiality.

Pursuant to this resolution, the Council for Namibia embarked on a series of visits on which representatives of SWAPO were to be included. These visits were to cover various countries, including the Five for the first time since the commencement of their settlement initiative.

8. The South African Government deems it imperative that all participants in the political process must now be placed on an equal footing, at least by those directly responsible for implementation. Accordingly the South African Government wishes to be informed whether

(a) the Secretary-General and the Secretariat will refrain from giving effect to the recognition by the General Assembly of SWAPO as "the sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia";
(b) the Secretariat, which has a major fiduciary and practical role in regard to the impartial implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978),\(^3\) will refrain henceforth from giving effect to those elements of General Assembly resolutions, and resolutions of subordinated bodies, in respect of South West Africa/Namibia, which single out SWAPO for preferential treatment not accorded to other political parties;
and
(c) the Secretary-General, as Head of the Secretariat, will refrain from applying funds from the regular United Nations budget, for the exclusive use of SWAPO, to promote its aims and purposes, *inter alia*, through its office in New York and its inclusion in the activities of the Council for Namibia, for which it is financially assisted by the United Nations.

9. The political parties of SWA/Namibia rightly demand fair and equal treatment. I urge Your Excellency to enable the South African Government to satisfy the political parties as to the impartiality of the envisaged UN involvement in the process leading to an election and independence.

10. As soon as the issues raised herein have been resolved the South African Government would co-operate in implementing Security Council resolution 435 (1978).

---

3. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 14 December 1978, p. 43

Text supplied by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs
A. Statement regarding the elections by the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, in the House of Lords on 4 March 1980.

The results of the Common Roll Elections held last week were announced this morning. They gave Mr Mugabe's ZANU (PF) Party 57 seats, Mr Nkomo's Patriotic Front Party 20 seats, and Bishop Muzorewa's UANC Party 3 seats.1

In his report to the Governor, the Election Commissioner concluded that, despite some distortion of voting as a result of intimidation in certain areas, the overall result would broadly reflect the wishes of the people. It has been the virtually unanimous view of the British, Commonwealth and other international observers who witnessed the elections, that they were, in the circumstances, free and fair. The exceptionally high turnout provides an indication of the confidence of the Rhodesian people in the conduct of the elections and the secrecy of the vote.

The Government are grateful for the efforts of all those concerned with the organisation of the elections for their unstinting work. The need now is for national unity and reconciliation.

The Governor has seen Mr Mugabe, as Leader of the Party with an absolute majority of the seats in the House of Assembly, and asked him to set in train the process of forming a government which can contribute effectively to these goals.

An important step towards reconciliation and the integration of forces has already been taken with the start of joint training between units of Mr Mugabe's and Mr Nkomo's forces and of the Rhodesian Army, under the supervision of British members of the monitoring force. The growing confidence and contact between the two forces means that the role of the monitoring force is increasingly one of liaison and training and there will be a phased reduction in its size. The first members will return to the United Kingdom today.

The Government would wish to record once again its thanks to all members of the force for the admirable way in which they carried out their difficult task, above all in winning the confidence of all sides.

The people of Rhodesia have now made their choice of government under conditions agreed by all the Parties at Lancaster House, who committed themselves to accept the outcome of the election. It is no less important that the other aspects of the Lancaster House Agreements should be faithfully observed.

The Independence Constitution2 which will shortly come into

1. See *Southern African Record*, no. 19, April 1980, p.59
2. *Ibid.* p.21
force provides safeguards for the minority community and will ensure that they can continue to play their full part in the life of the country.

Britain’s task now is to assist in the orderly transfer of power to a stable government. The Governor will do all that he can to ease the transition and to help overcome whatever problems may arise in the period until independence.

Text supplied by the British Information Office, Johannesburg

B. Extract concerning policy towards South Africa, from an interview with the Zimbabwean Prime Minister-elect, Mr R.G. Mugabe, broadcast on the Voice of America on 24 March 1980*

Question: Mr Prime Minister, What sort of relations do you want to have with South Africa?

Mugabe: In respect of international relations, our policy is that of non-alignment. And, in respect of our immediate neighbours, we would like to pursue a policy of co-existence. And hence, in respect of South Africa, we will pursue a policy of non-interference in each other’s affairs. As long as South Africa is prepared to refrain from interfering with our internal affairs, we shall accordingly reciprocate and not interfere in her internal affairs. I think this is the type of policy we believe works and can make for the necessary harmonious relations between us and South Africa in respect of our trade links. Our view is that we shall continue to use South African routes, and whatever trade has been established between us and South Africa will continue.

There were some South African troops in Zimbabwe. Are they still there?

I’m under the impression just now that most have moved out. If any are still there, you can rest assured that they are on their way out.

When you say you want to have a peaceful co-existence with South Africa, is that possible. I mean do you feel that you can deal with a country that endorses Apartheid?

If we say we shall pursue a policy of co-existence with South Africa, we are not necessarily accepting the philosophy of Apartheid. We know that Apartheid is abominable, it’s repugnant to the whole international community, it’s repugnant to the generality of the people of Zimbabwe and we cannot, therefore, actually espouse it, nor can we condone it.

But we accept that South Africa is a geographical reality. And as such, we must have some minimum relationship with it. And we believe that we cannot ignore that reality, and we cannot

* From the MacNeil-Lehrer Interview, March 24 1980, co-produced by WNET-TV, New York, and WETA-TV, Washington D.C., Copyright 1980 by Educational Broadcasting Corporation and GWETA.
ignore the historical ties that have existed between it and ourselves, and we cannot ignore the economic reality that our country has been linked with South Africa over years, in trade and commerce.

Mr Prime Minister, have you considered what you might do if the members of the Black majority in South Africa came to you and said, “Please, Mr Mugabe, help us do in our country what you accomplished in Rhodesia?”

That would be a legitimate appeal. If they came to us and said we should help them do what we have done, here, I would regard it as a legitimate appeal; but it's not one which I can provide a response to. It's the whole of Africa which should be summoned to deal with the problem in South Africa. Through the OAU, we shall pledge ourselves to do all we can to assist the liberation struggle in South Africa.

But as a single country, we cannot be seen to be taking up arms against South Africa. It is not our responsibility. It is the responsibility of the South Africans themselves. And through the OAU, through the non-aligned movement and the United Nations, we shall do our best to give them the necessary assistance.

You have said that you can co-exist with South Africa. As you know, many Western countries, particularly the United States, have been criticised in the past, even by Blacks here in the United States, for continuing to trade and have normal relations with South Africa. Do you feel that the United States and other Western countries should continue on the same basis as you are planning to continue?

Well, if the United States should continue to carry on trade with South Africa is not a matter the Zimbabweans should decide. It is entirely a matter for the United States. But obviously, where there is a decision or an agreement by the international community, say by the United Nations, to impose definite sanctions on South Africa, that's a different matter. The United States is duty-bound to comply with the requirements of the agreement. And if that were to happen, we would have, ourselves, to examine our position. And if we can assist, we will certainly do so.

But, of course, it must be realised that our position is different from that of the United States. South Africa is our neighbour here. Our rail lines go through to South African ports, our trade has been linked with South Africa for quite a long time, which is a different matter. With the United States, South Africa is not their geographical neighbour and they don't have the difficulty, therefore, being unable to isolate South Africa geographically.

In our case, we have to accept the phenomenon of being contiguous to South Africa, which is not quite the case with the United States.
If you had to make a prediction, Prime Minister, how long would you say Apartheid would last in South Africa?

Well, I cannot say. But given the fact that the struggle here is won, that the effect of our victory here might be to bring about some transformation, not only on the part of the majority of the people of South Africa, but also of the majority of the Afrikaner population in South Africa. Given that phenomenon, then, one would like to believe that change will come to South Africa sooner than other people think.

You mean voluntary and peaceful change?

Well, whatever change comes, it will amount to change, as long as it transforms the present system. Whether it will be peaceful, I think, depends entirely on what those in government decide to do.

C. Excerpts from a statement on US policy toward Zimbabwe by the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Richard M. Moose, before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa, on 27 March 1980

The realization of an independent Zimbabwe under a democratic constitution following free and fair elections was one of the primary goals of the Administration’s policy in Southern Africa. We undertook to offer the leaders and the people of Zimbabwe an opportunity to realize their aspirations through a peaceful, negotiated settlement. We wanted to create an alternative to armed struggle. Through what began as a joint US-United Kingdom negotiating effort, and ended in a brilliant and daring United Kingdom negotiating effort our objectives were attained.

I will not not dwell on the transition period which is already very familiar to most of you. In spite of some very tense moments, elections were held as scheduled, February 27-29, and all the Parties participated. The Commonwealth observer group, which had been designated an important role at the August Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka, issued an interim report which stated essentially that under difficult circumstances the elections were “free and fair”. Other official and non-official groups reached generally the same conclusion; this information accorded with our own appraisal . . .

Few predicted that Robert Mugabe’s appeal would be as strong as it was. His strength resulted from various factors, including:

(a) His image as a Nationalist who organized the principal and most successful fighting force;
(b) His identification with the majority Shona tribal group;
In the past, Prime Minister Mugabe was labelled a dedicated Marxist in many circles, his former rhetoric has on occasion been somewhat strident. However, I believe we should judge him in an African context and deal with him both on his presently stated intentions and his future actions. As the leader of a guerrilla, nationalist movement, he accepted assistance from wherever he could obtain it ...

It is impossible, of course, to predict the exact course Mugabe will take. However, he has adopted a moderate and conciliatory approach in recent months, and his initial steps in the post-election period have been encouraging. For instance, he has indicated:
(a) His recognition of the important role Whites play in Zimbabwe and his desire for them to remain;
(b) His intention to work within the free enterprise system and to bring changes gradually so as not to jolt the basic productivity of the economic structure;
(c) His plan to concentrate on under-utilized land for redistribution for Africans and leave highly productive European farm land intact;
(d) His nomination of General Peter Walls to preside over the integration of the armed forces and his appointment of two prominent Whites in his Cabinet;
(e) His allocation of four Cabinet portfolios to ZAPU to broaden the base of his government.

The reaction throughout black Africa to developments in Zimbabwe has been positive. Zimbabwe is expected to become a member of the UN., the Commonwealth, the OAU and the Front Line soon. The Prime Minister has also stated his intention to pursue a non-aligned foreign policy and that he will seek good relations with all Zimbabwe's neighbours.

Through his public acknowledgement that South Africa's (existence) "is a reality", Mr Mugabe indicated he will seek to work out a pragmatic relationship with that country, perhaps along the lines which now exist between Mozambique and South Africa. In this connection, however, Mugabe has made a distinction between not allowing Zimbabwe to be used as a forward base for military activities directed against the Republic and opposition to apartheid which he has forthrightly condemned.

The South African reaction to date has been reserved, but nevertheless encouraging. The dire predictions which many made about the consequences of a Mugabe victory have not
materialized; there is growing comprehension within the South African Government that it is in its own self-interest to establish a realistic relationship with the new government in Zimbabwe, and that to have a relatively stable, effective administration in Zimbabwe is far preferable to economic and political turmoil with all its negative consequences for that country ... 

Prime Minister Mugabe has witnessed at first hand the severe difficulties which confront newly independent governments which attempt radical change too quickly, therefore he is likely to move cautiously, and will seek Western co-operation as he charts his country's future. The new Prime Minister understands that to succeed, his government must enable the people of Zimbabwe to improve their own well-being. He knows that his government must produce results and he is looking to us and others in the West to help. He has already spoken of his high esteem for the US and his desire to form genuine bonds of friendship with America. He will also be looking to the US to honor its pledge at Lancaster House to co-operate with a multi-donor effort for economic and agricultural development for Zimbabwe in a regional context.

One of our first steps to assist the new process has been a five million dollar contribution to the UN High Commissioner for Refugee Repatriation. We also plan to get underway a modest, but highly visible, assistance program as soon as possible after independence. We have already sent a Congressional notification on re-programming two million dollars from fiscal year 1980 regional economic support funds. While we will have to work out details with the new government in Zimbabwe, these funds are intended for use for rural rehabilitation, principally for health units in the "Tribal Trust Lands".

The British have indicated, however, that there is an immediate need of some forty to forty-five million dollars for reconstruction in Zimbabwe, and have announced they will initially be contributing more than fifteen million dollars for this purpose. At the same time, the British have launched an international appeal to obtain assistance for Zimbabwe and have approached us to make a substantial contribution. We are examining how we can further expand the amount of our assistance since the short-term need is so great. Our review is not yet complete but we hope to be able to increase our commitment during this fiscal year.

On a longer range basis, the British have pointed out that Zimbabwe will need significant help for economic development and continuing reconstruction. They underscore that this is a particularly good investment since the infrastructure has the potential to reach the take-off point within a comparatively short period of about five years. With the backing of the Congress, and we will be looking to each of you for support on this matter, we
intend to develop a more substantial assistance program for fiscal year 1981 for Zimbabwe.

We contemplate that these resources will be drawn from the Southern African Regional Economic Support Fund account. We have not yet made any specific determination as to amounts, but are very much aware of this committee's recommendation and would hope to do even better. The utilization of these funds, of course, will depend on many factors, including how the new government sorts out its own priorities and how Zimbabwe desires us to co-operate. We envisage a significant portion of our aid might be directed at agricultural development — but this would not, of course, be used for any "buy-out" scheme.

It is our expectation that the present liaison office in Salisbury will be up-graded to Embassy status after independence. We also hope to have an Ambassador nominated soon thereafter.

Another point which I would like to stress is that the Rhodesian settlement has important implications for the Southern African region as a whole. I have already referred to the interests of the Front Line in ensuring that the settlement works. With regard to Namibia, how events evolve in Zimbabwe will certainly have considerable influence. It has been argued that because of the success at the polls of the parties representing the former guerrilla forces, South Africa will seek to delay for some time implementation of the UN settlement plan. Others reason that there will be considerable pressure for South Africa to opt for an internal settlement which it can more readily control. On the other hand, assuming the situation develops relatively smoothly in Zimbabwe, responsible officials in Cape Town and Pretoria should come to realize that a negotiated settlement among all the parties is the best way for a peaceful, lasting transition that will be in the long range best interests of South Africa.

A stable society in Zimbabwe, which can effectively accommodate all of the races living there, can also provide an important model to South Africa. There are already some signs that those South Africans who were initially perturbed, are taking a second look at Mugabe's stunning victory and are beginning to draw some conclusions for their own internal situation. There could be a greater sense of urgency in promoting domestic reform.

The Rhodesian settlement, therefore, has enormous implications the Southern African region as a whole — for Namibia, South Africa's internal system, and the direction of the Front Line States. There are also potential pitfalls to be sure, but there are likewise great opportunities which we must seize. Our adversaries will seek to promote division and turmoil, and to exploit any openings we offer them. We must deny them such op-
portunities. Instead, we must lay aside our own past differences over our policy towards that area of the globe and join in recognizing that there is now an entirely new situation in Zimbabwe.

To delay could be highly detrimental to our interests. We are on the verge of a widely accepted legal independence and government by majority rule for Zimbabwe. We, the Congress, and the Executive, must work together with the British and other concerned states in consolidating this impressive achievement.

Washington Viewpoint, no. 11, 31 March, 1980

D. Interview with the Zimbabwean Prime Minister-elect, Mr R.G. Mugabe, by the “Tanzanian Daily News” on 10 April 1980*

Question: Prime Minister, how do you feel about the achievement of Independence and how do you as a Zimbabwean feel about being the first Prime Minister?

Answer: ... that in fact independence should be granted them and this was the effect of the vote they had, it was the effect of the agreement that we reached at Lancaster House and I am therefore very proud that the moment for our independence has come. It is an honour to the people of Zimbabwe who have striven hard for so many years, have sacrificed a lot to achieve this day.

What are the immediate changes that your government plans to effect?

Well first is the fact of independence which in itself is the major overhauling change, change of the political order as it were, and here you now have a majority rule government and naturally this brings in its trail the need for us to ensure that a social economic system is one which will reflect therefore the wishes of the majority and operate to bring benefits to the majority of the people. What this means to us is the fact of our having to examine which areas need immediate attention. I think we have examined these areas already and now we have pin-pointed the areas where immediate changes must be effected. There is the area of resettling the people—you know, lands and resettlement where we feel the responsibility of the government should be, with speed, to bring about the resettlement of people who have been displaced by the war and who now stand in need of land, stand in need of facilities that will enable them to establish a home once again. We are therefore going to move with speed in this area. I think it is an area in which you have two or so million people affected if you take the population outside the country — the refugee population of nearly a quarter of a million, and you have in the protected villages perhaps half a million, and when you have the many

* Interview conducted by Mr Reginald Muhango
thousands of others who have been forced away from their homes, and so the government has to cope with having to resettle between one and a half and two million people. Well that’s only one area which entails quite a lot. It is not just provision of land and provision of the necessary financial and technical assistance for the programme but it also brings with it the need for bringing to the people educational services, health services, need for provision of water, electricity perhaps — not just now until we are able to electrify as many rural areas as possible.

And then in the private sector the need to review immediately the white structure in this structure and to work together with the entrepreneurs in those areas to improve the conditions of work, and to have the workers organised so that you have groups of workers who are co-ordinated in their efforts not only to demand for better wages but also to work towards achieving high productivity and the development of skills, so that you have, as their skills develop and productivity increases, a proportional development in your wage structure.

Then of course in the Public Service things are not as pleasing as they should be. One is dismayed at the fact that there has not been any advancement of the African population there, but the past policies are known and their racial connotations are a matter that is public knowledge and we are going to have to modify that and bring about an advancement of the African population as well. But as we do that, of course, we also have to work towards the retention of the present skills and avoid their having to flee from the country so that we, once again, are in a predicament where we have to import them.

These are some of the things which we have on our minds and where we are going to have to effect some changes in the immediate future, but we are also examining the cost of living and we will try to see what we can do to alleviate the lot of the people. But one way is, of course, to give them higher wages which I said we are going to advert our attention to, alongside the people in the private enterprise.

*Is your message of national reconciliation getting across to all the people in Zimbabwe?*

That is a principle that I have omitted because I have taken for granted that it is now public knowledge that we are working on the basis of creating a greater peace than we have had before. Yes our message of reconciliation, which is a message of really peace, has had an effect I think in all areas of the country and amongst all people of the African population and the European population. I think it has helped to allay some of the fears which were obvious at the time of the elections, namely that government was
going to victimize the Whites and adopt a vindictive policy. We have had to explain that this in fact has never been our intention. That we fought the war because we had a just cause to fight for, but now that that just cause has been achieved and independence is coming there was no need for us to be vindictive, no need for recriminations, no need for us even to continue to remember the past, and the moment was one where we should, all of us, work towards achieving greater peace.

Is there a possibility, having been given such a wide mandate by the people, to expect constitutional changes soon?

Constitutional changes if required, of course, will be effected in a constitutional manner as provided in the Constitution but at the moment I think we want to try the Constitution and see how it works. If we do find in practice that the Constitution has certain knots which need to be untied, that in fact it is burdensome in some respects, well naturally we will adopt the procedure that is provided in the Constitution for its amendment.

What are the main lessons learned from the war by all races in this country?

I think the war has been a kind of — (I don't know what to call it) — but it has been an instrument which has brought about a transformation in the minds of many people. In the minds of those who were fighting to bring about change the fact that it has been a positive instrument to effect that change. Therefore that it is the factor which has produced a political settlement and at the end of it people can have a political settlement which in fact makes war unnecessary any more; that therefore it cannot be an instrument of government; that you can't govern through the military instrument as such; that at the end of the military exercise there is need for a political settlement. Need therefore for a conciliation because that is what a political settlement implies. On the part of the opponents to change, I think also a realization that there is a limit to which you can go in resisting the wishes of the majority; that both of us have learned one thing — that there should be a political order where the interests of the majority are paramount, where everybody can participate in a democratic process of electing a government of his own choice.

And I think on both sides there has been this one lesson, at the end of it all it has really been an exercise at reconciliation; that war has been an instrument to bring about reconciliation if one looks at it that way. I think both sides will not forget the ghastly side of the war — the deaths that it has caused; the suffering that it has caused; that these must be a constant reminder that war can only be resorted to as the last choice, as the last option. And that in future we should try to avoid a conflict of this nature. That
therefore this moment demands that our armed forces must be integrated into one army to avoid a recurrence of this kind of conflict. And so I think the evil side of the war, if one might call it that, I think it is a thing we must remember all the time so that we can prevent further wars and be able to negotiate peacefully where negotiations are called for; that those in government must not resist the political pressures that come from the people. If they do it can result in war.

But there are things which must be forgotten of course — the fact that we were once opponents, we were once enemies. I think that is the side to be forgotten. And that all of us now have been transformed into allies because the independence has not come just for the people who fought for it. . . . They are citizens of the country and so we are bound together by the fact of settlement, as allies, and this brotherhood must be consolidated. It is the basis of our nation.

*Now that ZANU has moved into government, is there any programme to restructure it?*

Yes, sure, we will restructure the party so that it takes the form of a political party in the context of a political order that accepts democracy. Previously, of course, we were operating from outside and there was no scope to allow us to operate as a political party because of the nature of the conflict that existed. Now that conflict is over and the party has got to be grounded, it has got to be rooted amongst the people everywhere, not as a military party as it used to be, but now as a political mass party with appeal to all people on a non-racial basis and hence we are having to restructure the party from grass roots upwards.

*Are there still South African troops inside Zimbabwe and when will they have to leave?*

This is one of the things I insisted had to be done soon after I assumed the reins of government. Namely that all South African Nationals in the army, and any other Nationals for that matter in our army, Nationals who did not have Rhodesian citizenship, should leave the country, should leave the army immediately. And the process has been going on and I think it is about to be completed — there may still be a few, but I think the bulk have now left.

*It astounded the whole world, how you were able to organize and politicize the people, from outside the country and then the few days you were given when you came back, and yet won so convincingly. What was the magic?*

The magic has been really a combination of the military tactic with the political tactics. We never had believed in ZANU that you win the struggle just through the barrel of the gun. When we said
so, what we actually meant was that the barrel of the gun had to have a popular base. We tried earlier on to infiltrate people from 1966, April 1966, infiltrate groups on a commando basis — you know a kind of conventional basis. They were not a match for Rhodesian troops and we had to recognize our inadequacies. In that respect we did not have any air support and so we had to build support amongst the people. And hence we adopted a strategy from 1972 on — I was then still in prison but Chitepo was leading and was in touch with us — a strategy of building a popular base, basing the war on the people and this is what happened in 1972 in the North-East when we opened the Eastern and South-Eastern fronts in January 1976, the offensive took the same shape.

But it was only at the beginning of 1978 when we went out to win effective support, party support, amongst the people. Then we called it the year of the people. The year of bringing people together with the party, and the party together with the people, and we cultivated committees amongst the people in the operational zones which took control where civil administration had broken down of the elementary administration in those areas, and also operated the production processes of the areas and so on. And got the people together. Then, of course, there was the role of our political commissaires. We have always said politics leads the gun and in every section we had five commanders. A section could vary from nine to eleven or twelve people and in every platoon you had also the same level of commanders, but we never used platoons as such, we used sections and then a number of sections would constitute perhaps a detachment and that kind of thing. Then you had this five. You had the commander himself, you had the commissaire, you had the logistics commander, you had then the intelligence officer, and then you had the medical man. So you always had a commissaire no matter how small the unit was, you see, whose role was not just to bring about the recovery of morale where it was being lost amongst the forces, but who would also champion the question of politicizing the masses and this is where we differ in our operational methods with ZAPU.

ZAPU was probably following the rational method of just the gun, the gun. Well the gun will have an effect but we followed the Maoist line — the people win the people, you swim amongst the people as fish in water and this is what paid off, but also because we were more effective in our operations when the people started seeing that we were their saviour as it were, and this is what won us the day. Eventually, of course when we came to elections the organisation had already been done by the war and we needed to
make an appearance in public and then consolidate that support which we had cultivated during these many years of the war. And this is really what mattered. People were able now, because we were present, to express their genuine feelings. Whereas before they felt suppressed as it were. But now, even those labourers on the farms could defy their employers, you see, and come out in vindication of their own conviction.

Text of transcript supplied by the Southern Rhodesian Diplomatic Mission, Pretoria.

E. Address to the nation by the Governor, Lord Soames, on 14 April 1980

It is almost exactly four months since I arrived in this country. I and my colleagues came to serve here for the period necessary to bring about a ceasefire, to enable elections to be held and to help bring your country to legal independence. In a few days, Zimbabwe will become independent, and I shall hand over power to the government which the people of this country elected. My task will then be completed, and I shall return to London.

As we are preparing for the ceremonies which will mark Independence, it is worth, perhaps, pausing for a moment to consider some of the events of the last few months. So much has happened. So many difficulties, inevitable in such a process, have been faced and overcome. Elections have been held which, in spite of all shortcomings, have been generally recognised as a true expression of the people's will. From them there has emerged a government under the Prime Minister, Mr Mugabe, which is taking up the reins and the heavy responsibilities of government. A political solution has brought to an end the war which has ravaged and divided your country for many years. A start has been made in welding together, under the direction of General Walls, a new national army from the forces which a short time ago were locked in conflict. The task of reconstruction in the countryside has begun.

Zimbabwe is now recognised by the world at large. People are now free to travel without fear or favour within and beyond the country's frontiers. Normal relations are opening up again with neighbouring countries. All of this gives us the very real prospect that Zimbabwe will enjoy a prosperous economy based on its natural resources, and on the still richer human resources which should now be united in a common effort.

In the seven weeks since the election, I have come to know your Prime Minister and his government and have, I hope, been of some help as they worked out their future policies and prepared themselves for the difficult task of governing. I have noted with
admiration and respect the spirit of reconciliation which has formed the Prime Minister's words and actions over these weeks, and his obvious determination to sustain the unity of the nation and its economic strength.

I want to assure you of the continuing and strong interest which H.M. Government feel in the welfare of Zimbabwe. We are demonstrating our will to help in a practical way. We have already provided an immediate grant to assist with reconstruction, and we shall shortly be announcing a programme of aid for development and technical assistance to Zimbabwe over the next few years. Britain will also be providing a military training team, in response to the request of your government, to advise on the training of the new army and to build on the close ties which developed between the Commonwealth Monitoring Force and the Zimbabwe forces earlier this year. We have urged other countries to follow our lead and to provide generous assistance. It is our hope that many will respond.

Independence at midnight on April 17 will be an historic moment. Then it will be for the government and the people of Zimbabwe to grasp the opportunities that now exist for a more secure and peaceful future and for economic progress, with the world at large ready and willing to trade with you. It is time now for everyone to turn away from the conflicts of the past, to look ahead and work together for the future.

Text supplied by the Department of Information, Salisbury.

F. Statement by the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, in the House of Lords on 15 April 1980

Rhodesia will come to independence as Zimbabwe on Friday 18 April. Her Majesty the Queen will be represented at the independence celebrations by His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales. I shall represent the government. My noble friend the Governor of Southern Rhodesia will leave Salisbury on Independence Day. Britain is thus about to terminate its constitutional responsibility for Rhodesia and to transfer power to a government freely elected, under British supervision, by the Rhodesian people. I am sure that your Lordships will wish to join me in wishing the new country every success.

We look forward to working closely with the government of an independent Zimbabwe headed by Mr Mugabe. I am pleased to announce that, subject to Parliamentary approval, the government intends to commit over three years aid totalling seventy five million pounds to Zimbabwe. The aid to be given within this total commitment includes a seven million pound grant for urgent
post-war reconstruction, an allocation of five hundred thousand pounds for joint funding with British voluntary agencies of projects which they undertake in Zimbabwe, contributions to our share of expenditure through any extension of the Lome Convention to Zimbabwe and to the special appeal of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and further humanitarian assistance. The bulk of the seventy five million pounds will be devoted to a substantial bilateral aid programme which will be allocated in agreement with the Zimbabwe Government. A mission from the Overseas Development Administration will visit Zimbabwe shortly after independence for talks with incoming Ministers to identify projects.

At the request of the new government we are providing assistance with police training, broadcasting, the civil service and the foreign service. We are also providing, separately from the aid programme, assistance with the training of the future Zimbabwe army.

Because of the marked extent to which the aid programme is already committed over the next two years, and in order to minimise the impact of this very substantial pledge to Zimbabwe on the level of UK assistance to other countries, my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer has agreed exceptionally that there should be made available from the public expenditure contingency reserve a sum of eight million pounds in 1980/81 (with consequent adjustment of the cash limit) and of seven million pounds in 1981/82.

We welcome Zimbabwe's accession to the Commonwealth as the forty-third member. This calls for further legal provisions (and) an order under the Zimbabwe Act will be laid before parliament in draft in the next two days for approval by resolution. The principal purposes are to continue the application of certain United Kingdom laws in relation to Zimbabwe notwithstanding its change in status. Similar provision has been made for the application of United Kingdom law in respect of other Republics within the Commonwealth.

The Zimbabwe Act 1979 granted an amnesty in United Kingdom law for political offences connected with UDI. A similar amnesty was granted in Rhodesian law, and has subsequently been extended by the Governor in a general pardon covering all political offences up to the elections.

Now that full amnesty has been granted to all those responsible for the situation which led to the imposition of sanctions, the government feel that it would no longer be appropriate for any further prosecutions to be initiated for sanctions offences. The measures applying sanctions in United Kingdom law have of
course been revoked. I am informed by my rt. hon. and learned friend the Attorney General that only one case, an appeal, is at present before the courts, and that no other prosecutions are pending. The amnesty will not reopen past judgments. An order will be laid before Her Majesty in Council in due course to give effect to this decision.

Text of transcript supplied by the British Information Office, Johannesburg.

G. Independence message by the Zimbabwean Prime Minister, the Hon. R.G. Mugabe, on 17 April 1980

Long live our Freedom.

The final countdown before the launching of the new state of Zimbabwe has now begun. Only a few hours from now, Zimbabwe will have become a free, independent and sovereign state, free to choose its own flight path and chart its own course to its chosen destiny.

Its people have made a democratic choice of those who as their legitimate government, they wish to govern them and take policy decisions as to their future. This, indeed, is the meaning of the mandate my Party secured through a free and fair election, conducted in the full glare of the world’s spotlight.

Whilst my Government welcomes the mandate it has been freely given and is determined honour it to the letter, it also accepts that the fulfilment of the tasks imposed by that mandate are only possible with the confidence, goodwill and co-operation of all of you, reinforced by the forthcoming support and encouragement of all our friends, allies and well-wishes in the international community.

The march to our national independence has been a long, arduous and hazardous one. On this march, countless lives have been lost and many sacrifices made. Death and suffering have been the price we have been called upon to pay for the final priceless reward of freedom and national independence. May I thank all of you who have had to suffer and sacrifice for the reward we are now getting.

Tomorrow we shall be celebrating the historic national event which our people have striven for nearly a century to achieve. Our people, young and old, men and women, black and white, living and dead, are, on this occasion, being brought together in a new form of national unity that makes them all Zimbabweans. Independence will bestow on us a new personality, a new sovereignty, new future and perspective, and, indeed, a new history and a new past.

Tomorrow we are being born again; born again not as indi-
viduals but collectively as a people, nay, as a viable nation of Zimbabweans. Tomorrow is thus our birthday, the birthday of great Zimbabwe, and the birthday of its nation. Tomorrow, we shall cease to be men and women of the past and become men and women of the future. It's tomorrow then, not yesterday which bears our destiny.

As we become a new people we are called to the constructive, progressive and for ever forward-looking, for we cannot afford to be men of yesterday, backward-looking, retrogressive and destructive. Our new nation requires of everyone of us to be a new man, with a new mind, a new heart and a new spirit. Our new mind must have a new vision and our new hearts a new love that spurns hate, and a new spirit that must unite and not divide. This to me is the human essence that must form the core of our political change and national independence.

Henceforth, you and I must strive to adapt ourselves, intellectually and spiritually to the reality of our political change and relate to each other as brothers bound one to another by a bond of national comradeship. If yesterday I fought you as an enemy, today you have become a friend and ally with the same national interest, loyalty, rights and duties as myself. If yesterday you hated me, today you cannot avoid the love that binds you to me and me to you. Is it not folly, therefore, that in these circumstances anybody should seek to revive the wounds and grievances of the past? The wrongs of the past must now stand forgiven and forgotten.

If ever we look to the past, let us do so for the lesson the past has taught us, namely that oppression and racism are iniquities that must never again find scope in our political and social system. It could never be a correct justification that because the Whites oppressed us yesterday when they had power, the Blacks must oppress them today because they have power. An evil remains an evil whether practised by white against black or by black against white. Our majority rule could easily turn into inhuman rule if we oppressed, persecuted or harassed those who do not look or think like the majority of us.

Democracy is never mob-rule. It is and should remain disciplined rule requiring compliance with the law and social rules. Our Independence must thus not be construed as an instrument vesting individuals or groups of individuals with the right to harass and intimidate others into acting against their will. It is not the right to negate the freedom of others to think and act as they desire. I, therefore, wish to appeal to all of you to respect each other and act in promotion of national unity rather than in negation of that unity.
On Independence Day, our integrated security forces will, in spite of their having only recently fought each other, be marching in step together to herald the new era of national unity and togetherness. Let this be an example for us all to follow. Indeed, let this enjoin the whole of our nation to march in perfect unison from year to year and decade to decade towards its own destiny.

We have abundant mineral, agricultural, and human resources, to exploit and develop for which we need perfect peace. Given such peace, our endeavours to transform our society and raise our standard of living are bound to succeed. The mineral resources lying beneath the surface of our country have hardly been scratched, nor have our agricultural and industrial resources yet been fully harnessed. Now that we have peace, we must go fully out to exploit them. We already have a sophisticated infrastructure. Our expertise is bound to increase as more and more educational and technical institutions are established to transform our unskilled manpower.

The whole world is looking on us this day. Indeed many countries in the international community are amazed at how we have so quickly and unexpectedly moved from war to peace. We have certainly won the goodwill of many countries and can confidently expect to benefit from the economic and technical aid they are able and willing to provide for us.

May I assure you that my Government is determined to bring about meaningful change to the lives of the majority of the people in the country. But I must ask you to be patient and allow my Government time to organise the programmes that will effectively yield that change. There are people without land who need land, people without jobs who need jobs, children without schools who need schools and patients without hospitals who need them.

We are also fully aware of the need for increased wages in all sectors of employment. My Government will certainly do its best to meet the existing needs in these areas. But you have to assist us by being patient and peaceful.

I now finally wish to appeal to you, wherever you are, to participate fully, tomorrow and Saturday, in the Independence celebrations that have been organised throughout the country. There are, of course, those of you who have the duty to maintain essential services. These services must indeed be maintained so that the celebrations are facilitated. Maintaining such essential services during the celebrations is a significant contribution to their success.

I wish to thank Her Majesty the Queen for having sent us His Royal Highness, Prince Charles, the Prince of Wales, to represent her and officiate at our Independence ceremony, where he will
perform the symbolic act of severing our colonial ties with Britain. As you are aware, this historic ceremony will be witnessed by Heads of State or Government and representatives of nearly 100 countries plus representatives of several international, political and voluntary organisations. The ceremony will also be reported and relayed to millions of people in the world by the mass media.

May I enjoin you all to regard this solemn occasion with honour and dignity, and participate in the celebrations that follow it with jubilation. Let us rejoice over our Independence and recognise in it the need to dedicate ourselves to national unity, peace and progress.

I now wish to pay tribute to Lord Soames, our Governor for the most important role he has played in successfully guiding this country to elections and independence. His was from the very onset a difficult and most unenviable task. And yet he performed it with remarkable ability and overwhelming dignity.

I must admit that I was one of those who originally never trusted him, and yet I have now ended up not only implicitly trusting but fondly loving him as well. He is indeed a great man through whom it has been possible, within a short period I have been Prime Minister, to organise substantial financial and technical aid from Britain and other countries. I am also personally indebted to him for the advice he has constantly given me on the art of managing the affairs of government. I shall certainly be missing a good friend and counsellor, and so will our independent Zimbabwe and all its people.

I also wish to thank all our distinguished guests for the honour they have given us by coming to attend our Independence celebrations behalf of their countries or organisations. Their presence in our country signifies a bond of solidarity and friendship between their countries or organisations and our country. Without the support they have given us towards our liberation, this national day would never have come about. Thanks, therefore, for all the material, political, diplomatic and moral support they have given us.

Sons and daughters of Zimbabwe, I urge you to participate fully and jubilantly in our Independence celebrations and to ensure that all our visitors are well entertained and treated with utmost hospitality.

I shall be one in spirit and love, in loyalty and commitment with you all.

Forward with the Year of the People's power!
Long live our Freedom!
Long live our Sovereignty!
Long live our Independence!

Text supplied by Department of Information, Salisbury.

Good night!
H. Address to the nation by the Zimbabwean Prime Minister the Hon. R.G. Mugabe, on 21 April 1980

Citizens of Zimbabwe I greet you.

Long Live our Freedom.

In my Eve of Independence broadcast I stressed the need to bury the past and look to the future, and I said that; “Our new mind must have a new vision, and our new heart a new love that spurns hate, and a new spirit that must unite and not divide. This is the human essence that must form the core of our political change and national Independence”.

It was in this spirit, therefore, that my Cabinet made recommendations to the President, His Excellency the Rev. Canaan Banana, for the granting of an amnesty to persons serving prison sentences who were not covered by the Governor’s amnesty.

Acting on this recommendation, the President today (April 21) exercised the prerogative of mercy, and within the next few days some nine thousand prisoners will be released from gaols throughout the country. At the same time an additional remission of sentence has been granted to those prisoners who will not be released immediately.

To those being released, I would point out that this amnesty must not be construed as condonation of their criminal acts or as a licence to commit further acts of crime or violence but, rather, to take this chance to mend their ways.

While the majority of Zimbabweans have responded magnificently to my earlier calls for responsibility and reconciliation, manifest in the spectacular celebrations we have all witnessed and enjoyed countrywide, it is regrettably apparent that certain elements of the population persist in committing acts of lawlessness and violence. It is my duty, therefore, to take this opportunity to warn such elements that my Government will be taking the sternest possible measures to deal with offenders, and that my warning this evening should be taken as final.

Before I close, I would like to say a few words about our Independence celebrations. The tributes that have been transmitted to me personally, and that continue to pour into my office from all corners of the world, bear ample testimony to their signal success.

Understandably, it has been for me not only an occasion of great moment but also one of pride and joy as well as one of humility and emotion. It is fitting, therefore, that I extend my special thanks to everyone concerned in making the birth of our new nation of Zimbabwe a triumph.

And finally, my congratulations go to our various national
sporting teams for their notable successes over the period of the celebrations, wearing for the first time the colours of Zimbabwe in international competition.

Long Live our Freedom.

Text supplied by the Department of Information, Salisbury.

STATEMENT CONCERNING THE UN BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER, THE HON. R.F. BOTHA, ON 13 DECEMBER 1979

The General Assembly of the UN has conducted a plenary debate on so-called apartheid and another on South West Africa. It has adopted seventeen resolutions, with one to come, on the former and six resolutions on the latter item. South Africa rejects all these resolutions, which violate the UN’s own principles, which maliciously support strife rather than seeking genuine and constructive solutions and which together amount to no more than political manoeuvering to bring pressure to bear on South Africa. South Africa is used as a lightning conductor to attract the wrath and condemnation of the General Assembly away from those countries in real breach of the Charter, perpetrating genocide and other atrocities, actively supporting subversion of other member states, propagating violence and neglecting the development of their own peoples. There are more than thirty items out of an 152-item agenda which directly affect South Africa and have been put there on the initiative of countries who seek chaos in our region, instead of the peace called for by the Charter. For the most part they are countries that themselves do not know the meaning of “election” or have had one-man, one-vote, once only, and the most vociferous of them contribute the least to the UN budget — 70 together do not even provide one percent of that budget.

The image of apartheid created by the United Nations is a lie. South Africa could to all intents and purposes join other UN members in condemning the policy of apartheid which the UN documentation seeks to lay at South Africa’s door. Such a system of oppression and racial hatred does not apply in South Africa. Indeed there are many situations in countries, members of the United Nations, which are deserving of United Nations condemnation; countries unable to provide the most fundamental human needs; countries making war against and undermining other countries — here on the African continent — countries guilty of officially-supported international piracy.

The UN conveniently ignores the real flash points and uses South Africa as a scapegoat. It has a highly developed system of
double standards. In South Africa's case, hundreds of statements are maliciously made annually repeating *ad nauseum* the previous year's shopworn allegations in the hope that the lie would become the truth by repeating it. The motives and the methods of certain member states are downright dishonest. Reading the Apartheid Committee's report, for example, is like taking a walk through the Chamber of Horrors and the images are just as deliberately distorted. The Committee's research department, the Centre against Apartheid, sifts through volumes of press and other material South Africa — selecting only what is negative and derogatory and compiles a compendium of half-truths, innuendos, disparagement and vilification. Nothing positive about South Africa is ever recorded. No contribution is ever asked from South Africa. The material is not subjected to the test of critical review and comment by South Africa. But the report is sent into the world as gospel.

We all know that the General Assembly has violated its own Charter for thirty years by directly involving itself in the internal affairs of a member country. Today even Western countries appear to have quieted all twinges of conscience about this regular Charter breach. What is much more serious is that South Africa has, since 1974, unconstitutionally and contrary to every legal precept been prevented from participating in the proceedings of the General Assembly and presenting its own case. Even the Organization's own Legal Counsel gave the opinion that South Africa's exclusion was illegal.

And this is the Organization which tries to beat South Africa with the stick of human rights! The Organization which professes to speak in the name of democracy has only a handful of true democracies as members. The remainder are military, civilian and communist dictatorships. Many of these countries that propagate human rights do not provide their own peoples with the fundamental necessities of life — food, housing, health, education, freedom of expression and religion. Freedom House, a liberal independent institution, finds that a number approaching half of the United Nations members, among them some of our severest critics, rate lower than South Africa on its empirical scale of political freedom. Where does the hypocrisy end?

It is this dishonest attitude and unethical procedure that makes the United Nations a cynical gathering and deprives it of credibility and stature in international intercourse. This is in contrast to the important and constructive role that South Africa is playing in Southern Africa today. The United Nations is mischievous in the extreme. It will be no influence for reason, progress and sanity in Southern Africa, but will be used by our enemies to obstruct
peaceful development and understanding between White and Black. It is also clear, however, that these efforts are becoming increasingly irrelevant for the future of our region. In the role the United Nations has chosen for itself it is at present not only redundant in Southern Africa but a menace.

Text supplied by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and Information

S.A.B.C. TELEVISION INTERVIEW ON 9 MARCH 1980, WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER, THE HON. R.F. BOTHA, CONCERNING SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS WITH ZIMBABWE AND SWA/NAMIBIA

Question: Mr Mugabe re-affirmed his intention to maintain good relations with South Africa and Zimbabwe and according to all reports he was surprisingly reasonable and positive on subjects such as sports ties, diplomatic relations, tourism and even the proposed constellation of states for Southern Africa. What is your comment?

Minister R.F. Botha: Our attitude has been clearly expressed by the South African Prime Minister and it is in line with past practice and attitudes on our part. We do not interfere in the affairs of our neighbours or others and, should any neighbour wish to have friendly relations with South Africa and a good-neighbourly relationship with us, then naturally that is to be welcomed, but of course deeds must first prove that that is the case. In fact, although we do not discount the possibility, that is our attitude. We do not choose the ideologies or the colour of the governments surrounding us. Any attempt, any indication from a neighbouring state, that it would not use its territory as a springboard for attacking South Africa or for perpetrating subversion by terrorists or so-called refugees, any move in that direction is to be welcomed, because that will bring about greater stability, and stability in Southern Africa is the corner-stone of South Africa's Southern African outlook.

Mr Botha, there have been suggestions in the news media that South Africa backed the wrong horse in the Rhodesian election, and that it had no idea that Mr Mugabe would in fact win the election. What do you say to that?

Yes, this is simply part of the hindsight commentators, the wise-after-the-event-boys. It is so easy, you know. I can go back to Roman times and tell you exactly, today, where Julius Caesar made certain mistakes, or Napoleon, etc. But the fact is, that is not true at all; the fact of the matter is that the South African Government planned for all exigencies and events. At no stage did any member of the South African Government believe that Bishop Muzorewa or the one or the other would win an election outright.
Let me say it, I do not think that anyone expected Mr Mugabe to win by such a wide margin; that is true. But now what does it matter? What does it really matter if we had knowledge beforehand of the wide margin of victory for Mr Mugabe? How should we have used that, what should we have done with that knowledge? Should we have invaded Rhodesia; should we have tried to stop that by force? This just shows to you how futile it is, how almost ridiculous it is now to come and claim that, simply because no one knew exactly by what a wide margin Mr Mugabe would win, that that constitutes a miscalculation. A miscalculation of what? The South African Government proceeded in its planning from a number of possibilities and one of those possibilities was a Mugabe win, and that is all I can say.

There have also been suggestions that the Prime Minister acted gracelessly not congratulating Mr Mugabe on his victory.

Well, I am not aware of a telegram of congratulation sent by Mr Mugabe to Mr P.W. Botha when he became Prime Minister. Neither am I aware of such a telegram congratulating the leader of the Progressive Federal Party when he became the leader of that Party. The relations between two states are not determined by telegrams of condolence and congratulation. They are determined on a day-to-day basis of deeds, of actual facts, of how the one behaves in practice *vis-à-vis* the other one. Now, when the relations between us and Zimbabwe can develop on the basis of sound, good relations and mutual respect for the sovereign integrity of one another, then we stand ready to build up economic ties with that country, trade ties with that country. We have refrained all along from making public statements, we have deliberately refrained from making public statements, which would have disturbed the situation in that country. We have gone out of our way to create an atmosphere of calm so as not to induce the Whites of that country to start a stampede, running out of that country. I think in every respect during the past two months, this Government, the South African Government, has acted in an exemplary way, which is proved by the fact that the British Government publicly congratulated and thanked the South African Government for its constructive role, something which no British Government has done for two to three decades.

Sir, reports from Salisbury this morning quote one of Mr Mugabe’s senior men as saying that South Africa concluded a secret deal with ZANU before the election not to back a coup against it, in exchange for non-intervention in our internal affairs. What is your comment on that?

That again proves the preference there now exists in South Africa for sensation. I made a public statement to the effect that representatives of my Department from time to time met the
representatives of all the major political parties of Zimbabwe, as could be expected from representatives of my Department. We exchanged views. From their side, as far as I remember, Mr Mugabe's men indicated to us that they were fearful of a South African military intervention in Rhodesia. From our side we indicated that we would wish all the parties to observe the ceasefire arrangements, to halt all intimidation and to give the election a chance to develop and progress according to free and fair lines. We indicated well before the election that we were ready to co-operate with any government elected in a free and fair election, if that government would not allow its territory to be used as a spring-board for perpetrating subversion against South Africa. Now, this is no deal. This is a view that we conveyed to all the parties taking part in the Zimbabwe election.

Mr Botha, how does the Rhodesian election result affect the South West African issue?

In the short term, it has the effect of hardening the attitudes of the democratic parties inside South West Africa/Namibia, in the sense that some of the leaders of those parties now say that the South African Government must be more careful than before, must be more on its guard than before, not to allow a process in South West Africa, in which intimidation would bring about a swing in any election, one way or the other. They are more acutely aware, I think, of the danger now of such an eventuality. Secondly — and this is not readily recognised — it is seen that in the case of Rhodesia, all the parties were accorded equal treatment by the administering authority, Britain. Even a man like Mr Smith, who in terms of British law — I am not saying that it is right or wrong — but in terms of British law, Mr Smith was a rebel, was a man who violated British law, was invited to Lancaster House. The British Government did not for one moment indicate that it considered one particular party as the sole and authentic representative of the people of Zimbabwe. Now this is also a very important facet of the events in Rhodesia. I think you will find that the parties, that the democratic parties of South West Africa, will now insist to a greater extent that Swapo should not be considered the sole and authentic representative of the people of South West Africa.

Exactly where do we stand at the moment with the South West African issue, after last week’s negotiations?

We are on a knife’s edge. We have accepted the idea of a demilitarized zone, but we want certain assurances, assurances of a practical nature, that that concept can be implemented in practice, in such a way that there would be a fair and free election. Now this is what our talks have dealt with during the past few days and weeks. The United Nations team that was here conveyed to
us their opinion as to how this project of a demilitarized zone ought to be implemented. We are now studying the information conveyed to us and as soon as possible we will have to make up our minds. We will have to complete our examination of all the details furnished to us and then indicate to the United Nations whether we think that that plan, the demilitarized zone plan as conveyed to us, could be something that we could agree with, so that the rest of the settlement plan could be implemented. I cannot say to you today what our decision will be. There are grave matters at issue here, which will have to be considered by our military experts, but we will do so as soon as possible. But I want to warn that, as far as South West Africa is concerned, I do not think that that is going to be an easy decision, one way or the other.

*So there won't be any more negotiations before we give our view on the demilitarized zone?*

There may be informal exchanges — that I cannot tell you — but basically we are not considering and examining the results of the talks just completed, in order to come to a decision as to whether to accept that idea in the sense of implementing it, and that is going to be a very grave, a severe decision, because one way or the other the consequences are going to be very, very important.

*Suppose we tell them we cannot accept the demilitarized zone, will that be the end of the South West Africa situation?*

No, no! I think we must refrain from proceeding in this way. Let the South African Government first examine the results of these talks and all the information supplied to us, and let us then bridge that difficulty when and if we come to it.

*Sir, now the Southern African scene in general. A senior American spokesman said immediately after the election that America’s attention was now moving to South Africa, what did he mean by that?*

It did not come as a surprise to me, the remark he made. I think what he meant by it was that they would now pay all their attention to efforts to “liberalize” and “free” South Africa, to make it a “free” country on the basis of one-man, one-vote. I think this is what he intended to say, but perhaps did not spell out. This is a repulsive remark, full of vindictiveness, coming from a country that cannot afford to pay any attention to anything except the equilibrium that it ought to restore between itself and Russia, the Soviet Union, and unless it does that, unless the United States now seriously attends to the restoration of the equilibrium between itself and Russia, there will be nothing to attend to in a few years from now.

*Mr Botha, the Prime Minister yesterday again highlighted the dangers facing the country against the backdrop of Afghanistan, the West’s inabil-
ity to help us and the Russian Bear's activities in Africa and I think nobody can blame the average white South African for thinking that his future is bleak and grim. Where is the white man in South Africa heading do you think? What is he heading for?

Under the leadership of the Prime Minister we are heading for a bastion of democracy and freedom and co-operation and a greatness and good relations and tolerance and understanding, under the leadership of this Prime Minister. That is what the white man can achieve. But then there are certain conditions attached to this potential achievement and this is what the South African Government, with our leader, the Prime Minister, is trying to convey to the South African public. What we are trying to say to the South African public is that we do not blame you for sometimes viewing the outside world or your environment in a sort of tunnel-vision way. What I mean by this is, if a man finds himself within a tunnel, his sight is restricted and limited by the circumference of the tunnel opening. What he sees through that restrictive and restricted opening is not a lie. The single rock or tree or patch of grass that he might be seeing, that in effect is the truth. The problem is that he must move out of the tunnel in order to view the whole landscape and all the factors involved in that landscape. This is what the Prime Minister is doing. The Prime Minister is not rejecting; he is trying to persuade; he is trying to bring together. He is trying to instil into the South African public the urgent need for recognising our priorities if we want to survive and prosper, and this he cannot do as long as too many people stay within the tunnel and refuse to come out of it and to become part of and see the wide spectrum of the whole landscape which is offered once one moves out of the tunnel, and this is of extreme importance. On the one hand, I think the Prime Minister is emphasising a deterrent which he has done very effectively. He has warned against the cataclysmic dimensions of a clash between Black and White and this is not merely a warning aimed at Whites. This is also a friendly warning issued to our black leaders. They also ought to be aware of the cataclysmic proportions of a military solution that might be attempted to resolve our problems. Also they would have nothing to administer or to govern after such a clash. On the other hand, he is encouraging and persuading leaders to come together to consult and not to shoot it out; to talk and see whether we cannot in that way — through mutual understanding and tolerance, trying to see the other man's point of view — come to an understanding to the very important issues affecting us and confronting us. And that is why we are talking of a form of confederation of states.

That form of confederation of states can be brought about by
multi-lateral treaties between autonomous states agreeing on important matters like the external relations of such a constellation, the diplomatic relations towards other states or groups of states, trade, security and military security. Surely these are matters on which we could all agree. Then as far as the internal relationships of these various autonomous states are concerned, there is vast work to be done in the field of health services, transport, communications, industrial settlement and development, water provision, power provision, energy provision, agricultural services, agricultural expansion, food production, dam construction. There is always a lifetime of work waiting for Black and White in these fields, which could steadily and dramatically improve the quality of life of all our peoples. Lastly, but not less important, there is the question of the rights of individuals and of the states within such a constellation of states. This is going to be a very, very difficult area to discuss, but discussed it must be and the Prime Minister is preparing the South African public for these discussions. He is preparing Black, White, Coloured and Asian for a new era in which we are going to sit around the table to work out our priorities and to determine a future of prosperity and freedom for all our children. This is his aim, and while this is his aim, surely, surely he can ask our people to get out of the tunnel and to view the beautiful landscape that awaits all of us.

Text issued by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and Information.