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Agreement
With regard to the exchange of Trade Representatives entered into by and between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of The Kingdom of Swaziland on 27 Dec. 1984

Preamble
WHEREAS the Governments of the Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom of Swaziland are convinced that the exchange of representatives will significantly contribute towards the strengthening of friendly relations between them and the maintenance and promotion of peace, stability and cooperation in the region of Southern Africa.

AND WHEREAS delegates from the two countries, meeting in Pretoria on 31 March 1984 agreed in principle to exchange representatives;

NOW, THEREFORE, the Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom of Swaziland have agreed as follows:

1. In this Agreement, except where inconsistent with the context —
(a) “family” shall mean the wife or husband, as the case may be, the dependent children and any other relative approved by the Ministry or Department of Foreign Affairs on a reciprocal basis, of a representative referred to in Articles 2 and 3 or of a member of the staff of such representative;
(b) “moveable property” shall mean articles for the official use of the mission as well as articles for the personal use of the respective Trade Representatives and their suites;
(c) “official correspondence” shall mean all correspondence relating to the mission and its functions;
(d) “staff” shall mean all those persons who take part in the official work of the mission provided that these persons are employed exclusively for that purpose and provided further that these persons are not citizens or permanent residents of the receiving State;
(e) “suite” in relation to the Trade Representative shall mean his family, the members of his staff and their families.
2. THE Republic of South Africa will appoint to the Kingdom of Swaziland a Trade Representative with the function of looking after South Africa's interests in the Kingdom of Swaziland.

3. THE Kingdom of Swaziland will appoint to the Republic of South Africa a Trade Representative with the function of looking after Swaziland's interests in the Republic of South Africa.

4. The premises of the respective missions shall be inviolable. Agents of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the Head of the mission. The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. The premises of the mission, their furnishings or other property thereon and the means of transport of the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment or execution.

5. The archives and documents of the mission shall be inviolable at any time and wherever they may be.

6. The receiving State shall permit and protect free communication on the part of the mission for all official purposes.

7. The official correspondence of the mission shall be inviolable.

8. The diplomatic bag shall not be opened or detained. Should diplomatic couriers be employed, they shall be protected by the receiving state in the performance of their functions. Such couriers shall enjoy personal inviolability and shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention.

9. The respective Trade Representatives and their suites, shall enjoy immunity from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the receiving State.

10. The immunity specified in Article 9 of this Agreement may be waived by the sending State. Waiver must always be express and in writing.
11. The initiation of proceedings by a person enjoying immunity from jurisdiction as specified in article 9 of this Agreement shall preclude that person from invoking immunity from jurisdiction in respect of any counter-claim directly connected with the principal claim.

12. Waiver of immunity from jurisdiction in respect of civil or administrative proceedings shall not be held to imply waiver of immunity in respect of the execution of the judgement, for which a separate waiver shall be necessary.

13. The respective Trade Representatives and their suites shall enjoy all the rights and privileges pertaining to their office conferred by any law of the receiving State.

14. The private residences of the respective Trade Representatives and their suites shall be inviolable and the papers of such persons shall likewise enjoy inviolability. The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the private residences of the respective Trade Representatives and their suites against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the residences.

15. The personal baggage of the respective Trade Representatives and their suites shall be exempt from inspection, unless there are serious grounds for presuming that such personal baggage contains articles the import and export of which is prohibited by the law or controlled by the quarantine regulations of the receiving State. Such inspection shall be conducted only in the presence of the person concerned or of his authorised representative.

16. The sending State and the Head of the mission shall in the receiving State be exempt from all national, regional or municipal dues and taxes in respect of the premises of the mission, whether owned or leased, other than such as represent payment for specific services rendered. The exemption from taxation referred to in this Article shall not apply to dues and taxes payable under the law of the receiving State by persons contracting with the sending State or the Head of the mission.

17. The respective Trade Representatives and their suites, shall be exempt from all dues and taxes, duties, fees, rates or other charges levied by the State,
a provincial administration, a local authority or a statutory public utility corporation upon—

(i) the person concerned; or
(ii) any moveable property of such person; or
(iii) income derived directly from the holding of his Office:

Provided that any exemption granted to any person in terms of this sub-section shall not be construed as exempting such person from the necessity of complying with any formalities in respect of the importation of goods which are prescribed in any law relating to customs and provided further that such exemption shall not be construed as an exemption from charges levied for specific services rendered.

18.

If a motor vehicle which has been imported or taken out of bond without payment of customs duty in terms of Article 17 of this Agreement is sold or disposed of within two years of importation to a person not entitled to customs franchise privileges, the person who sells or disposes of such a vehicle may be called upon to pay duty thereon at the rate required according to the law relating to the payment of customs duty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties hereto acting through their representatives thereunto duly authorised, have caused this agreement to be signed in duplicate in the English language in their respective names at Pretoria on the 27th day of December in this year Nineteen Hundred and Eighty Four.

R.F. BOTHA
FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

M. MNISI
FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND

Text for this item issued by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs
South Africa and Mozambique

A. Declaration of 3 October 1984

Because of the South African Government’s commitment to peace and stability in Southern Africa, I, as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa, approached the Government of the Peoples’ Republic of Mozambique and informed that Government of South Africa’s desire to see peace in Mozambique. I was assured that the Mozambique Government reciprocated my sentiments. I then approached the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), which also expressed interest in peace in Mozambique.

Since then I have conducted negotiations, on the one hand with the Government of The Peoples’ Republic of Mozambique and on the other with Renamo, in order to work out a basis for peace in Mozambique which comprised the following:

1. Samora Moisés Machel is acknowledged as the president of The Peoples’ Republic of Mozambique.
2. Armed activity and conflict within Mozambique from whatever quarter or source must stop.
3. The South African Government is requested to consider playing a role in the implementation of this declaration.
4. The commission will be established immediately to work towards an early implementation of this declaration.

We have here today representatives of the Government of The Peoples’ Republic of Mozambique and of the Mozambican National Resistance. This declaration is made with their approval and their presence here signifies their assent thereto.

The South African Government agrees to play a role in the implementation of this declaration and to participate in the work of the commission.

Mozambican Delegation
Maj Gen J. Veloso, Minister of Economic Affairs in the President’s Office

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS RECORD 7
B. Remarks by Mr P.W. Botha, DMS, State President of The Republic of South Africa, on the occasion of a declaration on a cessation of armed activity and conflict in Mozambique

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I have been informed by the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs that a cessation of armed activity and conflict in Mozambique has been assented to by the Mozambique Government and RENAMO, and that the South African Government has been requested to play a role in the implementation of the declaration made this morning.
This is an important day for Mozambique and indeed for the whole of Southern Africa. When future historians look back at the political development of Southern Africa, 1984 will surely stand out as a milestone in the progress of the peoples of Southern Africa towards peace and stability.

Now is the time for men and women of goodwill to work together in the spirit of this declaration and the Accord of Nkomati. The path that lies ahead will be rocky and fraught with danger. At times the going will be difficult. There will be many obstacles along that path—some placed there maliciously by those who do not, for their own selfish reasons, want the peoples of Southern Africa to reach their destination. But through determined effort and inspired leadership, temporary setbacks will be overcome. Whatever the difficulties might be, the search for peace must be worth the greatest effort by all concerned.

The South African Government stands ready at all times to play a role in the search for peace, stability and progress in Southern Africa. This important event is a signal to the world that we here today are serious in our efforts to achieve peace in our region and to do so now. It is an indication to those within and without the region who do not want to see Southern Africa prosper that we will forge ahead despite their efforts to thwart us.

Peace in Southern Africa is important to us all. Let us move forward with confidence and let us make the attainment of peace in the region, an example to the rest of the world.

I wish you every success. May God's blessings accompany all of us in our acceptance of this great challenge.

C. Press Statement

Representatives of the Republic of South Africa, the Government of the Peoples' Republic of Mozambique and the Mozambican National Resistance met today in Pretoria and a Commission was established in terms of para 4 of the Declaration of 3 October 1984.

The Commission will consist of delegations of the Republic of South Africa, the Government of the Peoples' Republic of Mozambique and the Mozambican National Resistance. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa, Mr Louis Nel will act as Chairman/Convenor.

The Commission will conduct its proceedings behind closed doors.

D. Comment by the Minister of Foreign Affairs re RENAMO accusations: 30 October 1984

Commenting on a report to the effect that a spokesman for RENAMO in Lisbon had accused the Mozambique Government of refusing to negotiate
with RENAMO and had warned that the peace talks in Pretoria would not continue until FRELIMO "begins to act in good faith", as well as RENAMO's reported accusation that Mr R.F. Botha was an "unconditional ally" of the Government of President Samora Machel, Mr Botha said the following today in Rome:

"In his public remarks on the occasion of the signing of the Nkomati Accord and then South African Prime Minister and now State President, Mr P.W. Botha, stated that the South African Government believed that states with different social, economic and political systems could live together in peace and harmony.

The central theme of the Nkomati Accord is both Governments' commitment to non-aggression and good neighbourliness. The maintenance of peace and stability in our region is therefore of overriding importance to us.

After years of growing confrontation, both Governments decided that it was in their interest and in the interest of the region to have peace.

This desire culminated in the Nkomati and Cahora Bassa Accord. In terms of the Nkomati Accord, neither the South African Government nor the Government of the Peoples' Republic of Mozambique is obliged to assist each other to maintain peace and security in each other's country.

"Both Governments are, however, conscious of the need to resolve differences likely to endanger mutual peace and security or peace and security in the region by means of negotiations, enquiring, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or other peaceful means and we therefore undertook not to resort, individually or collectively, to the threat or use of force against each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence. South Africa remains committed to these objectives.

Furthermore, in terms of Article 8 of the Cahora Bassa Agreement of 2 May 1984, the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Peoples' Republic of Mozambique undertook jointly to take steps to ensure the protection of the transmission lines against attacks or any other form of interference without any commitment to the use of South African troops.

But we subscribe to the need for safeguarding the transmission lines by whatever means could be agreed on.

It is a fact that constitutional power in Mozambique was assumed by FRELIMO during 1975 in terms of an agreement with Portugal. The South African Prime Minister at the time, Mr B.J. Vorster, as well as other members of his Government accepted this change and indicated that South Africa was not interested in the colour or ideology of the new Government but in good neighbourliness and that the two Governments could cooperate with one another as long as we respected each other's sovereignty.

The purpose of our recent initiative has been to facilitate a ceasefire in Mozambique in the interest of all the people of our region. I believe that the majority of the people of Mozambique and the majority of South African citi-
zens share a sincere desire for peaceful progress. We already have enough problems to cope with.

We do not accept that the killing of thousands of Mozambicans will resolve that country's problems. If the armed activity and conflict within Mozambique continues, it is the enemies of Mozambique who will gain and all of us in the region will eventually pay the price, including RENAMO.

There are indications that foreign interests are working against our efforts to establish peace in our region. There rests a heavy responsibility on all of the leaders of Southern Africa to resolve their differences urgently and peacefully if we are to make progress in the many spheres of life demanding our attention. Our problems cannot be solved with bullets. They can only be resolved by a process of discussion, by trust and by a sincere desire to achieve understanding based on recognition for each other's particular cultural, social and political needs.

There are signposts in two directions in Southern Africa. The one points to cooperation, tolerance, moderation, understanding and the recognition of minority rights. In this direction we can all have peace, development and/or, basically, food to eat and a future to look forward to for all our people.

The other direction signals chaos, pain and suffering, continued fighting, more destruction, loss of human life and mutilation of human dignity. The organisations and leaders who choose this road may find that it will leave them with nothing to administer but misery, famine, economic retrogression and human decay. On this road all of us are destined to become losers."

E. Press Statement

On 29 and 30 October 1984 bilateral discussions took place in Pretoria between South Africa and the Peoples' Republic of Mozambique and South Africa and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO). Ministers R.F. Botha and Magnus Malan, as well as Deputy Minister D.J. Louis Nel, participated in these discussions from the South African side. These discussions resulted in a better understanding of the positions of the respective parties.

South Africa remains committed to play a constructive role in the implementation of the Pretoria Declaration of 3 October 1984.

F. 29 December 1984, Press Statement

The Minister of Foreign Affairs has said that he has now had the opportunity to study President Machel's speech at Manhica, and that he has also had
the opportunity to discuss aspects of the speech with members of the Mo-
zambian Government. The Government of Mozambique has categorically
confirmed that the Mozambican Government made no allegations that the
South African Government has broken the Nkomati Accord. In fact, the Mo-
zambian Government has expressed appreciation at the positive role that the
South African Government is playing to bring the Nkomati Accord to frui-
tion. The Government of Mozambique has however forwarded details of
alleged assistance to RENAMO, from the area of South Africa and from cer-
tain other countries, to the South African Government. These allegations
will be urgently investigated.

G. Reaction by the State President to allegations that RENAMO is operating against
Mozambique from South African territory—Cape Town 17 January 1985

The allegation that the tracks of the suspected murderers of two British
citizens in Mozambique led towards South Africa, is being investigated by
the South African Police and contact will be made with the Mozambique
security authorities in terms of the provisions of the Nkomati Accord.

I wish to point out that regular discussions take place between representa-
tives of the two Governments in connection with alleged breaches of the
Nkomati Accord. In addition the Mozambique Government has informed us
that there are indications that supplies are being delivered to RENAMO inter
alia by aircraft from various directions and from certain countries in Africa
and other regions. The Minister of Foreign Affairs recently visited the heads
of state of some of these countries in order to put it to them that the Mozam-
bique Government had evidence of such indications. The Minister of Foreign
Affairs has subsequently fully briefed the Mozambique Government on his
visits and has conveyed to the Mozambique Government the assurances of
the heads of state whom he visited that they will not allow their territories to
be used for the purposes of supplying RENAMO.

The Mozambique Government also informed the South African Govern-
ment that the Mozambique Government did not in any way accuse the South
African Government of breaking the Nkomati Accord but that there were
indications that assistance was being granted to RENAMO by certain indi-
viduals from a number of countries including South Africa.

These matters are being urgently investigated because the South African
Government will not allow South African territory to be used for the plan-
ning or perpetration of acts of violence against neighbouring states by any
individual or organisation.

The South African Government will not tolerate violent action against
Mozambique from South African territory and will not hesitate to act deci-
sively against persons who plan or perpetrate violence against Mozambique from South African territory or who flee to South Africa after they have carried out violent activities in Mozambique.

Indeed the South African Government deplores most strongly acts of violence in Mozambique and considers the continuation thereof to be a threat to the stability and orderly development of all the countries of Southern Africa.

The South African Government earnestly appeals to the leaders of RENAMO to reflect urgently on the destructive consequences to all the people of Mozambique of RENAMO's continued campaign of violence and also to reflect on the damage being done to the interests of Mozambique's neighbours including South African interests. The South African Government is convinced that the 3 October 1984 Declaration constitutes a balance and reasonable basis for a ceasefire and for the participation by all Mozambicans in the reconstruction of the country's economic development under the leadership of President Samora Machel who has declared his willingness to allocate a positive role to South Africa in any moves towards the implementation of the 3 October Declaration.

By Direction of The State President

Texts for Sections A to G issued by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs
United States and Southern Africa

A. Address by Secretary of State George Shultz before the National Press Club in Washington DC on 16 April 1985.

Much has been said in recent years about the need to rebuild the national consensus in foreign policy — the consensus that assures continuity and purpose in our diplomacy. I share that view.

Consensus does not just happen spontaneously. It must be nurtured, like a garden; it grows from knowledge and experience. Consensus should be a positive force: We need to decide what we are for and know what means are available to advance our goals; consensus cannot be simply a negative catalogue of what we are against. And we will achieve neither consensus nor results if our public discourse is simply emotional, or divorced from facts and from a realistic understanding of the problems at hand.

Today, I want to speak about an area of the world that has become a focus of interest and debate; and where both our policies and regional realities are too often misunderstood or even distorted. I am talking about Southern Africa.

A great human drama is unfolding in Southern Africa, as new nations struggle for stability and progress and as South Africa itself confronts the necessity of internal change. This drama has crucial implications for the United States. The region's future touches on our most basic moral convictions as well as our interests and our global responsibilities for security and peace.

On such an issue, above all, a national consensus is imperative. On a question of such overwhelming moral, practical, and strategic significance, our national policy must be coherent, considered, and effective. We simply cannot afford to let Southern Africa become a divisive domestic issue — tearing our country apart, rendering our actions haphazard and impotent, and contributing to the ugliest and most violent outcome.

Equally important — and I believe this deeply — the elements of such a consensus exist, based on our principles, our goals, and on our capabilities. Few Americans today would contest that we want to help the people of South Africa — black and white — build a just society; and we want to promote
peace, freedom, and progress throughout Southern Africa. Few Americans would contest that change is inevitable. The question now being debated is: How best can we help South Africans manage that change? What is the most effective way to promote a just and peaceful outcome?

Today I will outline the analysis and the facts that underlie our strategy. I do so with confidence that Americans overwhelmingly support the goals of racial justice, progress, and peaceful change, and are realistic enough to judge for themselves what policies work and don’t work.

Southern African Realities

In 1981, the new Reagan Administration found in Southern Africa a region marked:

— by growing racial tension in South Africa;
— by escalating cross-border violence;
— by Soviet and Cuban intervention in the region;
— by stalled negotiations for the independence of Namibia, a territory illegally ruled by South Africa; and
— by governments that were willing, indeed eager, to see the United States undertake an effective and forceful diplomatic role.

To play such a role we had to take into account hard realities.

The first reality is that South Africa’s denial of political rights to the country’s majority—apartheid—is not only morally indefensible; it is in the long run unsustainable.

South Africa’s blacks are making their voices heard, saying they are no longer willing to live under a system that denies them fair political participation; both demography and economics are on the side of those challenging the old order. The key psychological breakthrough will come when everyone in South Africa recognizes that change is coming; then the question shifts from “whether” to “how”. An upheaval of bloodshed and destruction would be a monstrous tragedy for all South Africans of all races.

Second, South Africa is not a small island. It is a regional powerhouse endowed with vast mineral resources and real economic might. It is the hub of the entire area’s economy and infrastructure. The bordering states—Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia—and even countries farther away such as Zambia and Zaire, are heavily dependent upon South Africa’s ports, industries, railway networks, and financial institutions.

At the same time, South Africa needs—but to a lesser degree—the markets, the labour, the transport systems of its neighbours. Any policy which ignores this symbiotic relationship is out of touch with reality. A scenario of upheaval in South Africa will spell disaster for its neighbours.

But for much of the past decade, this interdependence has been strained by hostility and armed conflict. This is the third reality: Southern Africa has been a region of conflict, with warfare or armed dissidence of one form or
another in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Namibia, Lesotho, and Angola. A senseless cycle of cross-border violence increased in ferocity as guerrillas operating from the black states thrust into South Africa, while South Africa turned on its neighbours with its military might and destabilizing efforts.

The violence has provided new opportunities for our global adversaries. And this is a fourth reality. Today there are about 30000 Cuban troops in Angola, along with Soviet and East European advisors. Soviet aid in the region has been almost exclusively military. Our adversaries have no constructive stake in the region, seeing rather in instability their best chance to expand their influence. When the Soviets and Cubans intervene in a part of the world far from their borders, we had better pay attention. Such intervention threatens African independence, as well as global balance. The peoples of Africa deserve better than the bankruptcy—economic, political, and moral—of the Soviet model. More and more Africans have come to look to the United States and the West for help in addressing the twin challenges of regional peace and economic survival.

This leads to a fifth reality—the importance of the American role. Of course there are limits to what we can do directly. Our influence over issues and players is not the determining factor in their actions. Nevertheless, we are not without potential to affect events. While the Soviets can fanning conflicts and supply the implements of war to pursue them, they cannot produce solutions. That peacemaking role can only be played by a power that has a working relationship and influence with all the parties, including, of course, South Africa.

I have devoted some time to describing the broad regional realities because the regional context is all-important. Its many dimensions are interrelated. The external environment has a direct bearing on the situation within South Africa; a white government that no longer sees itself as besieged from outside its borders will be better able to take the steps it must to reform its own society. Conversely, internal upheavals in South Africa can spill over and complicate the regional diplomacy. An end to cross-border violence is essential if the surrounding black states are to be able to devote their energies to economic development or to offer less tempting opportunities to Soviet adventurism.

From the outset, the Reagan Administration undertook to help influence the process of change:
— to accelerate the peaceful evolution in South Africa away from apartheid; and
— to diminish regional violence and instability that threaten lives and livelihoods throughout the region.

The complexities are daunting. But the United States has confronted an unsatisfactory situation, worked at the problem with care and determination,
and achieved a good measure of progress. There have been ups and downs, obstacles and setbacks. But through painstaking diplomacy, we have reached the point where the agenda we proposed is accepted by all participants; where we, not the Soviet Union, have a major say in helping shape the region’s political future. There is now less cross-border violence than there has been in eleven years. There has been more reform in South Africa in the past four years than in the previous thirty.

The gains are fragile. Nonetheless, the process of change is clearly under way—offering hope to Africa’s peoples if we continue to show responsibility and dedication in helping them manage that process.

**South Africa**

Let me start with the central issue of domestic reform in South Africa. In pursuing that goal, we have been guided by two important facts.

First, South Africa is not a closed, totalitarian society in which the government controls all aspects of life, all means of communication, all avenues of thought. While the white minority dominates the system, there is in that system a significant degree of openness, of political activity and expression—a generally free press, an independent judiciary, vigorous debate within the governing party and in parliament, and vocal critics of all viewpoints. There is nothing comparable in the Soviet Union. This degree of openness reflects the fact that white South Africa is not immune to the moral influence of the West; indeed the white community’s desire to be viewed as part of the Western world, and its growing recognition of the need for change, are among the grounds for hope for peaceful change. How many governments in the world would permit ABC’s “Nightline” programme to set up shop for a week, probe and dissect the country’s ills, film heated debates between government leaders and their most ardent critics, and then show these programmes to its people?

Second, we chose to focus on getting results. We cannot have it both ways: We cannot have influence with people if we treat them as moral lepers, especially when they are themselves beginning to address the agenda of change. South Africa’s neighbours recognize this. We must too.

By the same token, this has not kept us from speaking out—to South Africans of all races and to the American people. We have conveyed the message to the South African government that a more constructive relationship with the United States is possible, provided that it demonstrates a sustained commitment to significant reform toward a more just society:

— We have consistently called for an end to apartheid;
— We have spoken out forcefully for press freedom and against repressive measures such as forced removals, arbitrary detentions, and bannings;
— We have called for political dialogue between blacks and whites and for an end to Nelson Mandela’s long imprisonment;
— With our support, US businesses have become a positive force for change in South Africa by adopting the Sullivan code of fair labour employment practices and by providing educational, housing and other benefits worth more than 100 million dollars to their black employees over the past few years; and

— *We have developed nearly 30 million dollars in assistance programmes to train leaders in the black community to help them work more effectively for change in their own society.*

The truth is that South Africa is changing. For the most part, the transformation is being brought about by reality — by the growing realization that a modern industrial society simply cannot be governed by a pre-industrial political philosophy of racial segregation.

The old illusion that South Africa’s Blacks could live permanently or enjoy citizenship rights only in designated tribal homelands — so that in the end there would no longer be any “South African Blacks” — is being abandoned. Blacks are no longer prohibited from acquiring property rights in the supposedly “White” urban areas. The right of Blacks to organize trade unions has been recognized, and black unions are now a powerful factor on South Africa’s industrial relations scene; fully 50 per cent of trade unionists in South Africa are black. Central business districts are being opened to black businessmen, and cities like Durban and Cape Town are desegregating their public facilities.

Faced with the obvious injustices of forced removals of settled black communities, and with the obvious inability to stop the influx of Blacks into the cities, the government has suspended such removals and is shifting to what it calls an “orderly urbanization” policy.

The government has now acknowledged that it must consult with representative blacks about political participation outside the tribal homelands and at the national level; more local self-government is understood to be inadequate. Just this week, the government accepted a special commission’s report that calls for the abolition of laws banning interracial marriage and sexual relations — one of the most important symbols of apartheid.

If we recognize that white opinion holds the vital keys to change, then we must also recognize that change must originate in shifts in white politics. In this regard, in the past three years, the white government has crossed a historical divide: It has been willing to accept major defections from its own ranks in order to begin to offer a better political, economic, and social deal for the nation’s black majority.

These changes are not enough. South Africa is not now a just society. Serious inequities continue: repression, detentions without trial, and the prospect of treason trials for some black leaders. The issues of common citizenship for all, and of black political rights, have been raised but not yet concretely addressed by the government. The hated pass laws and influx con-
trol continue, though the government appears to be rethinking its actions on this front. Much more must be done. Change has just begun, but it has begun. Our job is to continue to encourage it.

The recent domestic violence is clearly a setback. All Americans are saddened and dismayed at the almost daily reports of violent encounters that have caused nearly 300 deaths among black South Africans over the past nine months. The United States has consistently, repeatedly, and publicly deplored this bloodshed and the police tactics that only produce killings and add fuel to the unrest.

There are no excuses for official violence against peaceful demonstrators. Any government has a duty to maintain law and order. Nevertheless, that cannot be done simply on the basis of force; law and order also means due process, and adequate channels for airing and resolving grievances.

But just as we recognize the right of peaceful assembly, so, too, if we are to be taken seriously, must we reject the right of any to take the law into their own hands. That is a formula for anarchy. We applaud the courage of those black leaders who press for non-violent change, confronted on one side by a surging mass of black bitterness and on the other by a long-unresponsive political system. We welcome the words of Bishop Desmond Tutu, Nobel Peace laureate, who urged a crowd of blacks at a funeral the other day: “Don’t undermine our wonderful cause. Let us not use the methods that are used against us by our enemies. When we finally achieve our goal of freedom, we must be able to look back with pride at how we got there.”

There are responsibilities for all South Africans, and most particularly for those in authority. We hope the government will move quickly and concretely to restore confidence in its reform about the road to a just society. We urge all South Africans to take advantage of openings for peace.

**Regional Security**

Peace within South Africa, as I said, is directly linked to the question of regional peace. A society that feels immensely threatened by outside forces is less likely to loosen the controls at home. Nor can black states normalize their relations with their South African neighbour so long as there is no convincing movement away from apartheid.

The United States has worked hard, and successfully, to maintain the confidence of the parties and to facilitate negotiated solutions:

— We helped bring South Africa and Mozambique together in the Nkomati Accord of March 1984, ending government-supported cross-border violence and promoting economic cooperation. This accord faces serious challenges, but both sides are committed to making it work.

— We helped Angola and South Africa agree on a plan for the withdrawal of South African forces from Angola and control of SWAPO and Cuban troops in Southern Angola. The war between South Africa and Angola is
over; there has in fact been peace for the last 14 months. The few South African troops left in Angola as part of a joint monitoring commission will be withdrawn this week as the final step of disengagement. The problems of Angola and Namibia are far from solved, but this marks important progress.

—Our diplomacy, in concert with key capital Western allies, has brought Namibia closer to independence than ever before. Agreement on a timetable for Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola is the one issue remaining in the overall settlement package. Let there be no mistake about it: UN Security Council Resolution 435 remains the only internationally acceptable basis for a solution.

—The United States has helped bring about understandings between Lesotho and Botswana, on the one hand, and South Africa on the other, averting potential conflicts.

—And we helped move Mozambique away from heavy dependence on the Soviet camp and closer to true non-alignment. We demonstrated to Mozambique that its best interests are served by closer cooperation with the West, and by rejection of confrontation with South Africa. The trend of our relations with Mozambique is positive and needs further encouragement.

All of these steps have lessened the danger of warfare. But the situation remains fragile; it requires the continued pragmatism, realism, and dedication of the parties involved. New opportunities have been created; they should be seized.

**America's Responsibility**

Southern Africa is thus, clearly and unmistakably, in a process of transformation. The only question is how this change will come about. The idea that our policy is simply reinforcing the status quo is an utter misconception—a display of ignorance of what is going on. We are engaged as a force for peace and for constructive change throughout Southern Africa. This is the only responsible course, and we will not be deflected from it.

Some believe that the United States should have nothing to do with Marxist regimes such as Angola or Mozambique, leaving them to cope with their predictable economic failures or throwing in our lot with their armed opponents. Such a notion ignores the realities on the ground in Southern Africa as well as significant distinctions between those two countries.

In Angola, when the Portuguese granted independence, a number of black liberation movements competed for power. A Marxist party took over the country in 1975 backed and sustained by the massive Soviet/Cuban intervention. UNITA, an important indigenous nationalist movement, was denied a share of power. The US Congress passed the Tunney and Clark amendments barring any US support for those Angolans opposing the Soviet/Cuban intervention—as if to grant the Marxist regime immunity against its own people; the Brezhnev Doctrine—which declares that Communist revolu-
tions are irreversible — was, in effect, enacted into American law. Since 1975, UNITA has waged a determined armed struggle in the countryside against the MPLA government’s monopoly of power; it has steadily grown in strength and territorial control.

We do not believe that Angola’s agony — still continuing ten years after independence — can be resolved militarily. In our contacts with both the MPLA government and UNITA, we sense little optimism about military solutions. Our diplomacy, therefore, has sought constructive alternatives to open-ended warfare and suffering. By focusing on the related international questions of Namibian independence and Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola, we have taken important steps forward. The principle of a regional settlement involving these two issues — Namibia and Angola — is now accepted; the next step is to agree on specifics. If we succeed, Africa’s last colony will achieve statehood, and foreign intervention and foreign forces will be removed from the Angolan equation. This can set the stage for all Angolans to work out their own future and achieve reconciliation at home.

In Mozambique, we make a different calculation based on different facts. Mozambique and South Africa have moved toward coexistence based on their own national interests. This prospect, which we encouraged, offered an opening for improved relations with Western nations and Western help for Mozambique’s shattered economy. We have seized these openings. By competing, we have strengthened a trend favourable to our interests. In these circumstances, our European allies, South Africa, and Mozambique’s other neighbours have thrown their weight behind that country’s turn toward moderation. We have done the same.

There are also those who believe we should cut our ties with the government of South Africa because of its racial policies. This is just as mistaken as the idea that we should refuse to deal with Angola and Mozambique because of their Marxist inclinations. We cannot bury our heads in the sand. We do not enhance our ability to influence change in the region by eliminating ourselves as an actor.

Some propose that we try to cut South Africa off, to run it out of the Western world through boycotts, embargoes, and sanctions. They argue that even if such actions do not bring about change, our position will “put us on the side of right.” I reject that view. It leads us down the road to ineffectual actions that are more likely to strengthen resistance to change than strengthen the forces of reform. It ignores the harm that such an approach will inflict precisely on the black majority whom the proponents of boycotts, embargoes, and sanctions purportedly want to help.

Opinion polls in South Africa by reputable organizations reveal that the overwhelming majority of black factory workers are opposed to disinvestment by American firms. An economy that even now needs to create 250,000 new jobs for young blacks each year, and that will have twice as many of
them entering the job market by the turn of the century, needs more job opportunities, not fewer.

I do not understand why it is good for American investors to create jobs for black workers in Zimbabwe or Zaire, but not in South Africa. And I suspect the tens of thousands who have flocked to the squatters’ camp at Crossroads outside Cape Town in a desperate search for work would not understand either. Nor would the more than one million Africans from the surrounding nations who have moved into South Africa in search of employment.

I do not accept the argument that it is in our interests to help a black middle class develop in Guinea or Gabon, but not in South Africa.

I do not agree with those who argue that American companies should promote the social and educational advancement of their black workers in Sierra Leone or Senegal, but not in South Africa.

Now, I am quite aware that some of the proposals now before the Congress are not, strictly speaking, disinvestment bills. Instead they are couched in terms of conditional bans on “new investment,” or new loans, unless certain political changes are made within a year or two. Other proposals would make the voluntary Sullivan Code mandatory and severely penalize firms that do not comply adequately. Well-intentioned as these proposals may be, let us not kid ourselves about their likely effect. Given the additional risks and uncertainties which such legislation would create, many US firms are apt to conclude that their continued presence in South Africa is simply no longer worth the candle. The result will be reduced American influence.

US firms, private US groups and foundations, as well as the US Government, have played an important role in influencing the changes we have seen. That is because they were there.

The only course consistent with American values is to engage ourselves as a force for constructive, peaceful change. It is not our business to cheer on, from the sidelines, the forces of polarization that could erupt in a race war; it is not our job to exacerbate hardship, which could lead to the same result.

At the same time, a clear bipartisan American voice that rejects apartheid as an unjust, anachronistic, and untenable system is another essential building block of a successful policy. And here I return to my opening theme of consensus. As long as Americans speak with contrary and confusing voices, our influence will be less than it could be.

What, then, can we as Americans agree on?

First, we can all agree that Southern Africa is an important part of the world that demands our attention.

Second, we can all agree that the pace of change, of reform and development in each of the countries of the region, depends on regional peace and stability. Continued conflict only helps perpetuate racism and poverty.

Third, we can agree that apartheid must go. It is a system contrary to all that we stand for as a nation.
Fourth, we can agree that we are more interested in promoting real progress than in posturing, debating points, or grandiose schemes that are likely to prove ineffectual.

Fifth, we can agree that in Southern Africa, as in every other part of the world, the engine of economic and social advancement is the productive private sector and its links to the global economy.

And, finally, we should agree that America's role must always be on the side of those seeking peaceful change. We should agree that we do not support violence, but that we do support—and will support aggressively—those who have committed themselves to promote change and justice.

These are the elements for a broad consensus that will allow America to speak with one voice.

We must recognize the importance of what has been taking place in South Africa in recent years, and we must reinforce that process creatively. Only by engaging ourselves can we hope to do so. We will not be the main actors in this human drama; that role must be played by the region's people—black and white Africans. But we must not stand by and throw American matches on the emotional tinder of the region.

Our morality and our interests coincide. America's values and America's global responsibilities both compel us to stay engaged, to work actively for justice and decency and reconciliation. We should be indignant at injustice and bloodshed—but indignation alone is not a strategy. The morality of a nation's policy must be judged not only by the noble goals it invokes but by the results and consequences of its actions.

If all Americans work together, this nation can be a major force for good. Thus we serve our highest ideals.

Text supplied by the United States Information Services, Johannesburg.

B. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker explains Southern African Policy at a White House Press Meeting on 3 Dec 1984

Assistant Secretary Crocker: Well, I'm pleased to be here to give a little sense of some discussions that we have just had here with the President and his top team on developments in Southern Africa.

I was able to provide something of an update in terms of the negotiations that we have under way on the issues of Namibia and Angola. The issue of getting Namibia's independence, of course, which is an important initiative of the Administration going back over three years now, and to give him some sense of where that matter stands; as well as to talk about our relations with the South Africans, our views of developments in that country, and to get the President's thoughts on both the regional dynamics in Southern Africa and,
as well, the situation in South Africa and our position there.

Question: How long were you with him?
Assistant Secretary Crocker: I guess we were over there about 25 minutes or so this morning.
Q: Long meeting—
Q: Did he have thoughts about our relationship with South Africa?
A: I'll be getting to that. I'm going to provide a bit of a scene-setter on this, and then we can go to questions.

I think we feel that the situation in the region needs to be clearly communicated and clearly understood with all appropriate audiences, including, of course, not only domestic audiences here, but in Africa as well. The President made very clear his strong support for the regional peacemaking effort that we've been engaged in on a most active basis for the past three and a half years, or so. We can take note, and we do, that the syndrome of cross-border violence has been substantially reduced, particularly in the last year to 18 months.

That there is, in fact, an active peace process under way in Southern Africa in which the various states are exploring peaceful alternatives to paths which otherwise could lead to heightened cross-border violence, internationalized violence, with dangerous implications for everyone.

At the same time, we are not, by any means, complacent. And we would not describe the situation in Southern Africa as one that is satisfactory. We don't yet have some of the agreements we are seeking on a regional basis, and the situation in South Africa itself does not enable one to be complacent.

We have made very clear, and the President reiterated his concern this morning, our deep concern about moves of repression in South Africa that could shut down peaceful alternatives inside that country.

We have repeatedly made clear our concern about detentions, for example, of moderate black labour leaders, precisely because, I think, all Americans who follow this subject recognize the important contribution that a free trade union movement can have to the process of constructive change in South Africa. So, we have expressed ourselves very clearly on that and will continue to do so.

You're all familiar with some of the recent headlines suggesting various forms of repression in South Africa and that's of concern to all of us. It is our view that there must be a sustained process of constructive change, away from apartheid. As the President has said repeatedly, that system we consider to be repugnant. All Americans share that view about a system which is based on legally entrenched racism. And hence we urge constructive change to continue.

Having said that, I think we also believe very strongly that one must look at the situation in South Africa in its historical context. There is a process of change under way in that country. It is essential that there be more of it; that it
be negotiated by all South Africans; participated in by South Africans of all races; and that it is South Africans themselves, rather than outsiders, who should be doing the negotiating.

So I think one can say, based on this discussion that we had this morning, the President is very supportive of, and feels very strongly about, our policy in Southern Africa. It’s an important part of the world. It’s an area of the world in which our interests and our principles coincide; they are not in conflict.

And we must pursue what we have been seeking to do, and are determined to continue our efforts. I think with those few initial comments, perhaps I might just say that we do strongly support the notion of negotiated change inside South Africa; that we believe there are some moves toward dialogue inside that country that should be expanded and accelerated. And to the extent that it is, all Americans will support it.

Q: It sounds like you’re against the demonstrations. And also, what—I mean, what overt moves has the United States made in terms of the homelands and so forth. You haven’t really made any protest against the uprooting of people—whole villages who have lived there for centuries—to other places. Where has the United States stood?

A: Well, you’ve asked two questions. I would say on the demonstrations that, obviously, this Administration, like any other, would support the peaceful right of Americans to express their views legally and peacefully on issues of concern. We share that concern.

On the issue of homelands and forced removals, our position is crystal clear, if one wants to look at the various statements that have been made, and the various expressions of concern, démarchés that we have made. We have weighed in very strongly and very clearly on the issue of forced removals of settled black communities.

Q: Well, it’s not enough, obviously.

A: I think if one looks at the record, one will see that—sure, it’s mixed, we’re not complacent about it. But the Government of South Africa is well aware of our concerns on this particular point which have been made clear to them.

Q: Let me go back to demonstrations, the first question. Why should the demonstrators who are arrested, sitting in at the South African Embassy here, not be prosecuted?

A: I think we have a strong position of concern about both the right of peaceful protest and the issue of the inviolability of diplomatic premises. Those are two issues on which we obviously have to make clear for our own worldwide reasons what our positions would be. If demonstrators wish to figure out some means by which they can be arrested without crossing that line, why that’s up to them.

The State Department has not weighed in, I don’t believe the Adminis-
ration has weighed in, in any fashion, as far as what the local police, District police, are doing.

Q: I don't think many people believe that the US Attorney here reached his position that people lawfully arrested— which means the officer believes a crime has been committed— ought not to be prosecuted without any advice from the US Government. Because, as you know, many people suspect the reasons they're not being prosecuted is to deny them what apparently they are seeking—and you can agree with them or not—and that is, a more public forum in the courts to press their cause and argument.

A: Well, as I say, I'm not aware of any effort by the department that I work for and with, to do that, or anywhere else in the US Government.

Q: So you deny that the US Attorney sought any kind of advice from the State Department at all on this?

A: I'm not aware of any.

Q: What evidence do you have of what you call the process of change under way, and the fact that there are certain moves toward negotiations internally?

A: I think it's a very important point, and it's one that needs to be better understood than it is in this country—is that, for the past five, six years or more, one can look at a number of changes taking place in South Africa—some at government initiative, some without reference to government, as simply a function of socio-economic change—that are significant changes in South Africa. One can look at rates of spending for black education; one can look at the opening up of trade unions on a democratic and peaceful basis to members of all racial groups. One can look—and this is more controversial—at the recently adopted constitutional changes which have the effect of ending the principle of a white political monopoly for Whites only in South Africa and very limited power-sharing for two other racial groups.

Q: But, I mean—

A: Having said that, of course, that constitutional change, as we have said repeatedly, avoids the main issue—it does not address the main issue—which is the participating in politics of the South African black majority. But to say that it doesn't represent any kind of a step, I think, is to miss the point.
There is ferment, there is change, there is more and more consideration being given, we believe, amongst various people in the white community, the white establishment, to further moves that must be taken.

Q: Isn’t that mitigated by the repressive moves—the recent ones?
A: We’ve made very clear that we’re extremely concerned about the repressive moves. And we cannot condone them; we do not condone them. In fact, if they were to continue they could shut down some of these possibilities that I’ve just been referring to. So it’s a mixed picture. Yes?

Q: This Administration has spoken out very loudly with regard to human rights abuses in Poland and the Soviet Union. While you say that you’ve made your concern known to the South African Government, it hasn’t been in the same form. There haven’t been presidential statements—the high profile focusing on the problem. Why is South Africa different from some of the communist repressive regimes that the Administration has criticized?
A: I think we’ve spoken out extremely clearly on this. If you look at various public statements by all levels of our government, including the President—if you look at his recent interview in the Washington Times, for example, you’ll see once again his position is very clear on these issues.

If you read, for example, the annual human rights reports which we in the State Department invest a great deal of energy in, you’ll find that the sections discussing the situation in South Africa pull no punches whatsoever. We don’t believe in doing that. We have weighed in very heavily—

Q: Have the American people ever heard the President speak out on this?
A: Well, he’s made various statements is all I can tell you. We’ve had other high level speeches—

Q: Can you recall anywhere the American people have heard him talk about this?
A: In press statements and interviews at various times in the past four years—if you wish us to pull the—

Q: Television? Have you ever been here to brief the President before on this.
A: We’ve had a number of briefings on the situation—

Q: With the President?
A: The point we’re getting to is, the point we’re trying to make is that there seems to be a level of tolerance here for the South African Government that is not given to other governments who do precisely the same things the South African Government does, including trade, including public statements, including—

Q: Votes on sanctions in the UN, etcetera—I mean, we are far more tolerant of the South African Government than any other it seems under the same circumstances, and the question is why? Is it economic?
A: I think I would look at it in terms of what is effective in the context of a given relationship. If one is talking about ways to influence change in South
Africa, and then one looks at the issue that you just raised, of economic sanctions, one has to ask some very tough questions. What will be the result if we are to seek—to undermine that economy, whose economy is, in fact, an engine of change? What will be the result if we make it official US policy to wage economic warfare against the people of South Africa? Is that doing the majority of the population of South Africa any good? What will it do to the neighbouring countries. I mean, those are the kind of questions we have to ask.

Q: But what about the underlying—we’re not talking about economic sanctions—I didn’t say sanctions, I asked if it was an economic question? Is that why we’re more tolerant—because of our trade and international trade with South Africa? What happens if—I mean, the United States exerts subtle pressure on other governments, economic pressure on other governments, far short of sanctions, that are not being used against South Africa.

A: I think there are many techniques that one can use and can point to; but, one must look at each individual relationship on its own merits. We are aware of the fact that our views and our relationships are important to the people and to the Government of South Africa, and we seek to keep that in mind as we proceed, using both quiet diplomacy and using occasions such as this to communicate as well as our efforts to bring about peace more broadly in the region.

Q: So why wouldn’t you do this on camera?

A: I can’t answer that—I think that’s much more a question of the ground rules that are set for events such as this.

Q: Well, if you want these views to be known—you tell us if the President gives an interview to a newspaper, you come out here, you’re on the record—but you won’t talk before a camera. I mean, once again you fall short; you come short.

A: I’ve talked on camera a number of times. I’m not against cameras. But I just think it’s a question of the formats that are used for these occasions. I’ll defer that question to those who own this space. (Laughter.)

Q: The American people—the American people own the space, do you not agree?

A: Thank you, Sam.

Q: Could you go into Namibia developments and your talks in Angola please?

A: Yes. What we’ve seen in the past two or three months is an important further threshold forward in that peace process concerning Namibia and Angola. We have a fair degree of agreement about the principles that must form part of a package approach to those two questions. We have seen the Government of Angola state publicly, and in fact communicate publicly, its proposals, which specifically include a planned reduction and removal of Cuban forces from Angola as part of that package. We have taken delivery of
Angolan proposals — brought them to the South Africans, we have South African counter-proposals, and we are at this point at the stage of seeking to narrow the gap between the two positions.

Q: What’s your view of Jesse Jackson going to South Africa?
A: Let me finish this question and I’ll be happy to take that one.

So, I think what one should recognize is that we have a gap to bridge. We are not making predictions as to how easily or soon that will take place. These are difficult issues, but we have, for the first time, a common framework of political principles which is accepted by both sides. We have the impression that both sides are negotiating earnestly and are engaged in that negotiating process. So we will continue. My Deputy Frank Wisner is in Angola, actually, right now with — the next round is under way, in terms of those discussions and we hope to move that forward as rapidly as we can.

Q: What is the gap that you talk about? What constitutes that gap?
A: The principal remaining issue will be the question of the timing and the sequencing as between, on the one hand, South Africa’s commitments and Resolution 435\(^1\) to pull out its forces from Namibia, and move Namibia to its independence, and on the other hand, the timing of the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. It’s principally that issue which is under discussion at this point.

Q: Well, are they going to be linked? Is one contingent upon the other? Are they going to be simultaneous? What is your objective?
A: Well, the objective is to get parallel movement on the two, and a formula that will be acceptable to both sides. We’re not defining this in terms of any specific doctrine but clearly, there’s got to be a sense, on both sides, that there’s something in it for the other.

Q: Well, have they both agreed to pull out?
A: They’ve both agreed to move forward with the process, but the precise timing has not yet been negotiated.

Q: But, I mean, they have agreed on the principle of a withdrawal?
A: They have agreed on the principle of a withdrawal.

Q: How does Savimbi factor into this?
A: The question of the conflict inside Angola — the civil conflict inside Angola — is not one that is part of this international negotiation. Having said that, we clearly would be only too happy, as I am sure everybody else would, to see peace come to Angola. It’s really an issue for Angolans themselves to decide how, and when, and under what auspices to address that issue.

Q: — Jesse Jackson?
A: Could you restate the question?
Q: Yes. What’s your feeling about Jesse Jackson’s proposal to go to South

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1. See *Southern Africa Record* no. 14, December 1978 p. 43
Africa? Perhaps negotiate, or whatever he wants to do there. Would that be helpful to the process?

A: Clearly we support the wish of any American to obtain approvals, visas, whatever is required to visit other countries, and we’ve made that—that very clear. I can’t predict what his purpose and what his negotiation might be about. I think you’d better address that question to him.

Q: Well, your reference earlier to outside negotiations, was that in reference to Jesse Jackson? You said that the problem there is to be solved by South Africans themselves and not outside negotiations.

A: I think what I said was not outside intervention, which is a very different point.

Q: You said negotiations.

A: Well, if I did say that let me correct it. What I mean to say is that the issues of change away from apartheid to a system based on consent of all South Africans is—are issues that must be negotiated—ought to be negotiated by South Africans themselves, not dictated from abroad, or as a result of foreign intervention. It does not mean that we do not express our views and that other Americans too, express our views, and people in Western Europe, or any place else.

Q: Does that go for Poland too? I mean, why is not some outside intervention helpful?

A: Well, let’s use the word more specifically then—what we mean by intervention. When I’m speaking here, one could say I’m involving myself in the process, but what I’m talking about by intervention is physical intervention. We do not believe that Southern Africa and South Africa, specifically, is going to be moved more rapidly toward constructive change.

Q: I don’t think anyone was talking about that.

Q: — pressure?

Q: Who has suggested the use of armed forces?

Q: What about outside pressure? We’ve used that with other countries.

A: There’s a significant amount of pressure that exists in our policy. I think that point needs to be stressed again, and again, and again.

Q: Well, let me ask you about Ted Kennedy last week who said that your policy of constructive engagement is simply giving credibility to what the South Africans are choosing to do.

A: I would turn that around. I think the statement—I think the proposition is rubbish. Our policy is sometimes misdescribed by people who haven’t bothered to read what we have been doing for the past four years. If anything we have been adding to the ferment that is taking place within the white community of South Africa.

It is not perhaps totally by accident that it’s during this administration that the National Party of South Africa split and that you saw a willingness of the Prime Minister, whom Bishop Tutu has described as a courageous man, to
do that — to split his party and to put forward limited constitutional propo-
sals of the kind we were talking about earlier. So, let's be very clear. Con-
structive engagement is not an embracing of any status quo.

Q: How did we bring that about?
A: I'm not going to comment further on it. And I think it'd be wrong for
Americans to try and crow and take credit. I'm just saying that it's not pure
coincidence.

Q: --- you are taking credit for it. (Laughter.)
A: I'm pointing out that there may be an historical coincidence. Yes?
Q: Have you checked on the labour leaders who have been detained? And
have you sought to obtain their release?
A: We have. We have weighed in on the issue of the labour detainees.
Q: You've checked on their status?
A: Yes, indeed.
Q: What is that then? What is it?
A: Well, there are a number of labour leaders — principally the General
Secretaries of FOSATU and CUSA who are two of the principal multi-racial
union confederations who have been detained for interrogation under the
Internal Security Act. There are others as well, but those are the two principal
individuals.

Q: And you sought to get — obtain their release?
A: We have made it very clear that we would like to see their release. Yes.
Q: Prospects?
A: I wouldn't want to predict that.
Q: Isn't that weighing in a way that you just said that you didn't think
should happen in South Africa?
A: No, I don't think so at all. We have consistently, and not just in recent
months, taken our views, sometimes strictly in diplomatic channels, other
times diplomatic channels as well as public statements, weighed in on various
things that concern us. And we will continue to do that. That's part of con-
structive engagement.

Q: Beyond making your views known — I mean, I'm getting the
impression that you're telling the South African Government that you don't
like what they're doing. Isn't there something between verbal protest and an
economic blockade that you all could be doing and are you doing it? Unless
you're satisfied with the pace of change.
A: I think we're always — we always have our eyes open for additional
things we can be doing, above all additional things we can be doing to com-
municate what it is we stand for, what it is we wish to see and to make sure
that message is understood with all the different audiences that are watching.

Q: Is it possible the South African Government doesn't know how this
Administration feels about apartheid?
A: Is it possible?
Q: Yes. Do they know?
A: I think it’s unlikely.
Q: Right. So, clearly, unless you’re satisfied with the pace of what’s going on—the pace of the change—if it’s rapid enough for you, then that’s fine. But isn’t there something else you could be doing? Have you thought about doing something other than verbal protest?
A: We have done more than verbal protest. That is the point. We have used various channels. We have made various suggestions, and we will continue to do that. I think you would understand—in this case as any other—that if we discuss all of this in the public arena there are limits to how effective one is very likely to be. But we will continue to look at all avenues that we think are constructive avenues. We’re not going to destabilize and add fuel to the flames and seek to wage economic warfare in the country. That is not consistent with our policy.
Q: So, you’re leaving open the possibility that you are doing something other than just talking to them, but you would rather not tell us what that is?
A: I wouldn’t want to speculate on—that we are doing other things. We always have our eyes open as to other things that might be done to be more effective—sure.
Q: Mr Crocker, getting back to Angola, you said that Savimbi is a domestic problem. But has the question of South African aid to Savimbi come up as part of the solution? And, secondly, at what stage are the plans to remove the South African troops from Angola?
A: The issue of South Africa’s relationship with UNITA has been discussed in the proposals put forward by Angola, and, in fact, the Angolans obviously do have concerns about their security and sovereignty in this whole process. We believe those concerns can be and will be addressed. They’ll be addressed in the context of implementing the overall settlement plan for Namibia, not as some form of precondition.
And the second question?
Q: About the South African troops in Angola.
A: Yes, the disengagement process remains, for the time being, with the Joint Military Commission being based at Ngiva, a town about 40 kilometres from the border. They have had recent high level meetings, and are planning to have one at ministerial level, that is, the South Africans and the Angolans some time in the coming weeks with a view to completing the process.
As far as we have been able to figure out, both sides feel that the process is working okay on the ground. But there is a desire to complete a disengagement.
Q: Can you give us the rationale behind the US position on the sanctions vote at the UN some weeks back?
A: I’m not sure which vote you’re referring to. Perhaps you could be more specific.
Q: Wasn't—it correct me if I'm wrong—but weren't we the only members of the Security Council that abstained on sanctions against South Africa maybe two and a half, three weeks ago?

A: I'd like to be sure of the specific resolution before answering, but we have abstained on a number of such resolutions, and I presume it's fair to say that we're not embarrassed to be a country which does what it believes in and stands for what it believes in.

Q: Which is not—but an abstention is.

A: No, it's not. Not by any means.

Q: Isn't that sending a certain signal to the South Africans?

A: It depends what the issue is. If one is saying, for example, that the UN Security Council has a right to approve or disapprove the constitutions of sovereign states, then that's a precedent that has pretty dramatic implications.

Q: Then we should vote against it if we think that's wrong. To vote present or to abstain is not taking a position.

A: It's taking a position. It's taking—

Q: Shows cowardice.

A: Most people who work in the UN system know very well what an abstention means.

Q: But somehow, it didn't upset the other members of the Security Council.

WHITE HOUSE AIDE: We're going to have to stop. How about one more.

Q: How do you explain, Mr. Crocker, Bishop Tutu's criticism of American policy toward South Africa if it is, as you say, rubbish that that policy is ineffective?

A: I would say that the description of our policy as ineffective is rubbish and I also think there's a considerable degree of lack of information and misunderstanding as to what it is we stand for, what we're trying to achieve.

Q: On Tutu's part?

A: Not only his. Obviously, many of the things we're doing in the region are not things that we can talk about in terms of press conferences. But it is abundantly clear and we intend to make it clearer.

Q: But you're saying—and I don't want to put words in your mouth, but I want to understand—you're saying that among others, Bishop Tutu doesn't have the information he needs to make that judgment?

A: I think that could be said, yes. In fact, the President said it not so long ago. So I'll say it again.

Q: It sounds like you're very concerned about the perception of our policy and that's why this briefing was staged today.

A: I think it's important that we be understood. We have been spending the bulk of our time the past four years with the constructive engagement policy in the region, communicating with others who are parties to negotia-
tions and if, in the process, we haven’t been giving weekly briefings to the press corps or in the State Department—

Q: It’s not a question of weekly briefings. These are developments, and we take positions at the UN that seem to support—

A: Seem to?

Q: Support South Africa. We have not been very vocal on all of these moves that they’ve made lately.

A: The record—I’m sorry, you have to look at it—is a clear one of our making it known what we stand for on internal South African issues while, at the same time, seeking to work with the South African Government and others on regional negotiations.

Q: May I ask—

WHITE HOUSE AIDE: Thank you, I think we’ve covered everything—

Q: Well, just one final wrap-up about what—the pressure beside a couple of verbal protests. I mean, you just tell us we’ve done things, but am I right, you haven’t told us what we’ve done other than these statements, is that correct? I just want to understand—

A: It’s not simply a function of protest on individual incidents. Let us look at some examples.

You have a threat of forced removals or detention of some labour leaders. On a specific case like that, there are protests and there are diplomatic démarchés, and so forth. There are very different kinds of pressures.

For example, when we say, as we do repeatedly, publicly and privately that this Administration, this Government, this country does not accept or endorse the homeland policy, what are we saying? Think about it. What we’re saying is that that doctrine, which is the basis of grand apartheid or territorial apartheid, is not something that we can condone or go along with. We cannot condone the de-nationalizing of South African black citizens. We consider all citizens—all South Africans to be citizens.

That’s a very clear form of pressure because it is the removal of American support from such a doctrine or such a policy.

Q: How does this removal get translated, though, into specific actions that hurt?

Q: It doesn’t affect the trade relations yet.

Q: Some people, believe it or not, don’t care what you say about them.

A: It gets translated very clearly. People do not recognize homeland travel documents. People don’t have negotiations or relationships with homeland governments. What that means, in fact is that, ultimately, South Africa is one country and all of its people must negotiate their future. That’s a powerful signal.

Q: Is there less pressure in this Administration than the previous one?
A: I would say that the techniques of communication and of getting our goals advanced are different.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

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C. US sees “Progress” in Namibia Independence Talks

Assistant Secretary of State, Chester Crocker: Testimony before the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee on Africa—21 February 1985

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the Sub-committee to discuss US policy toward Namibia. Ever since the United Nations took up the matter after the Second World War, the United States has been deeply involved in the problem of Namibia, the last major item on the agenda of African decolonization. In 1966 the United Nations revoked South Africa’s mandate over Namibia, originally granted by the League of Nations. In 1971 the International Court of Justice upheld the United Nations’ authority, determined that South Africa’s presence in Namibia was illegal, and stated that South Africa was obliged to withdraw immediately.

We continue to recognize that decision, but, of course, the problem is not simply one of determining the legalities of the situation and issuing condemnations. Despite earlier attempts by then Secretary Kissinger, it was not until the development of a consensus on UN Resolution 435 in 1978 that the international community began a sustained and intensive effort to resolve the problem through negotiation and diplomacy. The implementation of that resolution remains the goal of our policy. The resolution provides for free elections under UN supervision and withdrawal of South African forces from the territory.

This Administration strongly supports the goal of independence for Namibia and has invested a major effort toward achieving it. Success would strengthen US interest throughout Africa. We believe that such a settlement is the surest way to end the prolonged suffering in Namibia, to reduce the opportunities for outside interference, and finally to build sufficient regional stability to encourage South Africa to undertake with confidence the difficult political decisions it faces on the path of continued reform at home.

We have made substantial progress toward the goal of Namibian independence. Our efforts to resolve the remaining problems preventing a settlement have moved beyond a debate over principles and into a new phase of practical bargaining about a potential settlement package.

1. See Southern Africa Record no. 14, December 1978 p. 43
Picking up from the failed Geneva conference of January 1981, we and our Contact Group partners (the United Kingdom, France, West Germany and Canada) obtained South Africa's re-commitment to arrangements for bringing about Namibian independence under UN Resolution 435. We then achieved a significant further strengthening of Resolution 435 through a series of understandings negotiated in 1981-82 concerning (a) constitutional principles to guide the transitional constituent assembly and (b) other arrangements relating to the UN role and presence during the transition. The only remaining barrier to obtaining South African agreement to implement Resolution 435 is an acceptable agreement on Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. Last year we achieved substantial progress toward a resolution of that remaining issue.

A first step was the Lusaka Agreement, signed about a year ago, in which the US played a central role. We expected that this Agreement would give new impetus to the negotiations, stop the violence between Angolan and South African forces and end the presence of outside forces in southern Angola. Those objectives have been essentially achieved, and the violence that preceded the agreement was followed by 12 months of peace and practical cooperation between Angola and South Africa. Last week, the South African Government indicated publicly that the long awaited completion of the disengagement is near.

Because the United States was intimately involved in the Lusaka Agreement, both sides agreed that a US observer role would be useful. To support that US role, a liaison office was established on a temporary basis in Windhoek, the Namibian administrative capital. This office was established with the understanding of both the Angolan and South African governments in order to support US monitoring of the South African-Angolan Joint Military Commission which oversees the disengagement and to facilitate and complement communication between the two parties. The office has been symbolic of our commitment to the disengagement and to peace in the region. It has played an indispensable role in furthering our understanding of the security issues under consideration in the Joint Military Commission. Last April, Foreign Service Officer Dennis Keogh and US Army Lt Col Kenneth Crabtree gave their lives to support our commitment. With the disengagement effort now near completion, there is a diminished need for US monitoring from Windhoek, and the operation there has now been suspended. We are nevertheless maintaining the office facilities, and we are keeping open the possibility of sending US personnel back to the office, should events again require us to do so. Meanwhile, we will continue to monitor the disengagement closely and will, if necessary, travel to the area.

The Lusaka Agreement of last February built sufficient mutual confidence to permit the negotiations to enter into a new phase. Late last summer it became clear that we had moved beyond the stage of rhetorical debate on the
issue of “linkage”—whether Cuban troop withdrawal and Namibian independence should be related. Cuban troop withdrawal is, as a practical matter, and with the support of all concerned, being discussed in the context of the implementation of Resolution 435. In October, the Angolan government, for the first time, put a detailed and concrete negotiating proposal on the table. This major step forward was followed by a South African proposal a month later. There is agreement between South Africa and Angola on a number of broad principles. The main issue now is resolving the practical question of the timing of Cuban troop withdrawal in relation to Resolution 435, so that the essential requirements of both parties can be addressed. The United States, as mediator, has been conducting a quiet but continuous shuttle diplomacy between the two sides, encouraging them to consider ways to expand the common ground between them. This is by definition the kind of negotiation that is best conducted privately, but we can certainly say that we have made considerable headway and that both sides seem committed to serious negotiations. We are determined to do our part to explore actively ways to bring the two sides together.

The only acceptable basis for such a settlement is UN Resolution 435. We hear reports from time to time that thought is being given in South Africa and Namibia to exploring alternatives to Resolution 435, in order to accelerate the independence process by shelving the Cuban issue and changing the basic provisions of the UN Plan. The US Government does not believe there is substance to such reports, since it is most unlikely that a settlement diverging from that plan would gain international acceptance. As an originator and sponsor of Resolution 435, the US has no intention of backing away from it. Moreover, it is our clear impression from our contacts with South Africa and the Frontline States that their commitments to the plan remain valid. We maintain an active exchange with the UN Secretary-General and his staff on these and other issues in the negotiations in order to assure that we are fully updated on the positions of the many parties involved and to encourage necessary planning so that implementation can proceed when agreement is reached.

These negotiations are directly related to our perception of the internal problems in Namibia. A negotiated settlement is the only way to end the continuing political frustration of the Namibian people expressed openly by political parties and leaders inside Namibia as well as outside. It will, we hope, also end the frequent serious violations of human rights in Namibia, stemming from official policies and from the armed conflict between South African and SWAPO forces. We are striving for an internationally acceptable settlement that will end the fighting and result in the termination of South Africa's occupation of the territory. This is not, however, to say that the ending of the violations of human rights in Namibia should await a negotiated settlement. These violations can and should be dealt with now. Namibia dif-
fers from South Africa in that the formal system of apartheid was ended in 1978, although de facto segregation persists in many areas. Charges that police and security forces torture prisoners continue to be voiced by Namibian leaders. Both Government security units and SWAPO are reported to have murdered opponents. SWAPO increasingly uses bombs or mines in situations that result in civilian casualties. Curfews, humiliating searches and harassment by security forces greatly affect the daily lives of individuals living in the north.

The 1984 Human Rights report for Namibia shows a pattern of violations by the Government in many categories. Arbitrary detentions without charge are a common problem. Numerous individuals have been detained, often with no official acknowledgment of the fact. Some detainees have been released, notably the freeing in May 1984 of 74 of the remaining 75 prisoners from the Mariental camp, where they had been held since their capture in Angola in 1978. In an encouraging move, the South African Government released Herman Toivo ja Toivo—a long imprisoned founder member of SWAPO—last year. However, we have been concerned by new reports of a series of detentions last month in the north of Namibia.

A recent development that received widespread attention was the announcement of a requirement that all Namibian men register for military service. This announcement caused concern that all elements of the Namibian population would be obliged to join local military units fighting alongside South African forces to maintain South African rule. The registration appears to have slowed or stopped. Last year saw the banning of a critical local newspaper and the arrest of an outspoken former member of its staff. The banning was, however, subsequently rescinded and the charges against the editor dropped. We have made frequent representations to the South African government about human rights abuses, and we believe this has been a factor in some mitigating actions that the government has taken.

The negotiations for Namibia's independence have, like many multilateral negotiations, including the effort to end minority rule in Zimbabwe, been protracted, and this caused some to conclude that the effort is hopeless. Now, in recent months, talks on the remaining issues have moved forward. There is still difficult bargaining ahead, but the negotiations have entered a new and more hopeful phase as we seek a mutually acceptable compromise. We would regard a settlement as a major victory for peace and security in the region, for our diplomatic efforts and, above all, for the Namibians themselves, who have paid a very high price in their struggle for self-determination and independence. We are sparing no effort to succeed.

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South Africa and Namibia

A. MPC Proposals on the issue of the Independence of South West Africa/Namibia

1. Introduction

1.1 On 12 November 1983, the leaders of a broad spectrum of political groupings in South West Africa/Namibia convened the inaugural meeting of the Multi-Party Conference in Windhoek. The goal of the Conference was defined as follows in the MPC’s declaration of 23 January 1984:

“The MPC is a national effort committed to the urgency of bringing about peace, national reconciliation, independence and economic prosperity. It is our conviction that these objectives can neither be achieved by the condition of continued political subjugation nor a pious belief in the omnipotence of the military struggle. National reconciliation and meaningful negotiations can also speed up the process of independence.

“The Multi-Party Conference holds the view that the existing political and constitutional order is unsatisfactory and against the national interest of our people as a whole. We will therefore strive to find ways and means to devise a political and constitutional system acceptable to our people as a whole, and within the framework of the constitutional principles agreed to by the RSA and the Contact Group, and to contribute towards the removal of the obstacles in the way of a generally acceptable settlement and internationally recognised independence.”

After the South African Prime Minister, the Honourable P.W. Botha, had become aware of this declaration by the Multi-Party Conference, he invited the leaders of the party delegations in the MPC to Cape Town and expressed to them the position of the South African government on the independence of South West Africa/Namibia.
1.2 The Multi-Party Conference thereafter also took note of the position of the South African Prime Minister as expressed in his speech in the South African House of Assembly on 31 January 1984. The Honourable P. W. Botha stated:

"I believe that the leaders of South West Africa who came to see me (the leaders of the delegations of the parties represented in the Multi-Party Conference) are under no illusion about my government's determination to resolve this matter one way or another and as soon as possible. I therefore trust that South Africa's position is perfectly clear. It is up to the political leaders of South West Africa to decide what they are going to do and to do so urgently."

1.3 The Multi-Party Conference compiled and adopted by consensus, two important policy documents—THE WINDHOEK DECLARATION OF BASIC PRINCIPLES and THE BILL OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND OBJECTIVES—in 1984. Discussions were held with SWAPO in May 1984, under the joint chairmanship of President Kenneth David Kaunda of Zambia and the Administrator-General for South West Africa, Dr Willie van Niekerk. SWAPO, however, refused to sign the proposed joint communiqué. The Multi-Party Conference delegation thereafter visited the Governments of Gabon, Ivory Coast, Togo, Senegal and the United States and paid a courtesy call on the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Repeated efforts were made in the course of the year to involve SWAPO, under Mr Sam Nujoma's leadership, in the process of consultation and national reconciliation. These efforts, by President Kaunda, President Houphuet-Boigny and the Multi-Party Conference itself, with the support of President Houphuet-Boigny and President Eyedema of Togo have, however, produced no results thus far. The South African Government's offer to notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in writing, of the Government's preparedness to cease armed activity against SWAPO, on condition that SWAPO would likewise undertake to end its armed activity in and against the Territory, and the subsequent meeting between the Administrator-General and Mr Nujoma, also came to nothing.

1.4 It was against this background that the General Assembly of the Multi-Party Conference adopted a resolution, by consensus, on 30 October 1984, in which it called on other significant political parties, including SWAPO, to participate with the MPC, in a conference to promote national reconciliation and independence. The resolution also called for the cessation of all hostili-
ties before 31 December 1984 and indicated that SWAPO's response and those of the other parties would be awaited until that date. The resolution noted further that if the conference failed to materialize as a result of a lack of interest on the part of the other parties, the Multi-Party Conference would begin negotiations with the South African government about the appropriate manner in which to promote the independence of South West Africa/Namibia. The Multi-Party Conference began to formulate its proposals in this regard on 15 January 1985.

2. Proposed Approach

2.1 Transitional Government
The Multi-Party Conference has resolved to request that a TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT for the Territory of South West Africa/Namibia, consisting of a body exercising EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY and a body exercising LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY, should be instituted by means of an ACT of the South African Parliament or a PROCLAMATION of the South African State President.

2.2 Powers and Capacities
The Transitional Government should be invested with the powers and capacities which the Administrator-General for South West Africa presently exercises. The execution of these powers shall, however, be subject to certain procedural requirements which are specified herebelow.

2.3 Composition
The government shall be composed in accordance with a formula on which the parties in the Multi-Party Conference have already decided. The government shall conduct its business in the style of a Transitional Government of National Unity, in order to promote national reconciliation, the national welfare, and nationally-acceptable and internationally-recognized independence. It will therefore be unnecessary to have an election precede the institution of the government.

2.3.1 Executive Authority
2.3.1.1 The executive authority shall be a Cabinet of eight members, established as follows:
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance 3 members
Labour Party 1 member
National Party 1 member
Rehoboth Liberated Democratic Party 1 member
SWANU 1 member
SWAPO-Democrats 1 member

2.3.1.2 The members of the Cabinet will be assisted by eight Deputy-Ministers divided among the parties in the same way. The Deputy-Ministers may attend meetings of the Cabinet at all times and shall represent their Ministers in the Cabinet in the event of the Minister's absence.

2.3.1.3 All members of the Cabinet and all Deputy-Ministers shall also be members of the legislative authority.

2.3.2 Legislative Authority

2.3.2.1 The legislative authority shall be a National Assembly consisting of 62 members, established as follows:
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance 22 members
Labour Party 8 members
National Party 8 members
Rehoboth Liberated Democratic Party 8 members
SWANU 8 members
SWAPO-Democrats 8 members

2.3.2.2 The members of the Cabinet and the Deputy-Ministers are included among the 62 members of the National Assembly.

2.3.2.3 There shall be eight Standing Committees, for the purpose of discussion of draft legislation relating to the portfolio-responsibilities of the eight Cabinet Ministers. All bills, whether they originate in the Cabinet or with a private member, shall be referred to the appropriate Standing Committee for discussion and recommendation, before they become the subject of debate in the National Assembly. Each Standing Committee shall consist of members of the National Assembly, as far as possible in the same ratio as the representation of the parties in the National Assembly.

2.3.2.4 There shall be a Speaker of the National Assembly, elected from among the members of the Assembly. The Speaker shall not be a member of any of the Standing Committees and shall refer each bill to the appropriate Standing Committee for its attention, before the bill is admitted for debate on the floor of the Assembly.
Decision-making in the Government

Executive Authority

2.4.1.1 The Cabinet shall take its decisions by simple majority, provided that the Cabinet shall be competent, in cases which it deems appropriate and so decides with a simple majority, to depart from this principle and require another majority or consensus for a particular decision. The principle of collective responsibility shall only apply in cases in which decisions have been taken by consensus.

2.4.1.2 If any member represents to the Cabinet that a proposal pending before the Cabinet, will infringe a right enjoyed by that member or a party or group which he represents, the Cabinet shall defer consideration of the decision to enable the member to take legal advise on the question of the potential infringement and to present that advice to the Cabinet. If the legal opinion suggests that such a right will be infringed and if the Cabinet nonetheless wishes to proceed with the decision in question, it shall be obliged to submit the matter to the Constitutional Court for a ruling on the validity of the intended decision and its compatibility with the Fundamental Rights entrenched in the Act of Establishment.

Legislative Authority

2.4.2.1 Subject to the provision that all bills shall first be discussed in the appropriate Standing Committee and that the greatest possible degree of unanimity will be striven for in that Committee, the National Assembly shall be able to take its decisions by way of a simple majority. The National Assembly shall, however, be competent, at the suggestion of the appropriate Standing Committee or a member, to depart from this principle and to decide that a particular decision shall require a greater majority.

2.4.2.2 If any member represents to the National Assembly that a provision in a bill under consideration by the Assembly will infringe a right enjoyed by that member or a party or group which he represents, the Speaker shall rule that the Assembly shall defer consideration of that bill to enable the member to take legal advice on the question of the potential infringement and present that advice to the Speaker. If the legal opinion suggests that such a right will be infringed, the Speaker shall refer the matter to the Constitutional Court for a ruling on the validity of the bill and its compatibility with the Fundamental Rights entrenched in the Act of Establishment.
2.5 **Entrenched Provisions**

The Fundamental Rights embodied in the Bill of Fundamental Rights and Objectives shall be entrenched in the Act or Proclamation of Establishment for the term of the Transitional Government.

2.6 **Constitutional Council**

2.6.1 There shall be a Constitutional Council, established by the Act or Proclamation of Establishment and charged with responsibility for all constitutional matters and in particular, to draw up an independence constitution for the country. The Constitutional Council shall consist of an impartial chairman, without a vote, and sixteen members, composed as follows:

- The Judge-President of SWA (or another acceptable judge or retired judge) - Chairman
- DTA - 6 members
- Labour Party - 2 members
- National Party - 2 members
- Rehoboth Liberated Democratic Party - 2 members
- SWANU - 2 members
- SWAPO-Democrats - 2 members

2.6.2 The Cabinet shall have the right to appoint additional members to the Constitutional Council, from the ranks of other significant parties.

2.6.3 The Constitutional Council may appoint experts who are able to make a contribution to the proceedings of the Council, to an Advisory Panel. There shall not be more than five members of the Advisory Panel at any one time.

2.6.4 The Constitutional Council will welcome written contributions from members of the public and the academic community and will be able, in cases in which the Council believes it will be appropriate, to hear oral testimony from persons who have already submitted proposals in writing.

2.6.5 **Duration of Term of the Constitutional Council**

2.6.5.1 The Constitutional Council shall sit for a period of twelve months, provided that it may be disbanded upon completion of its task in a shorter period.
2.6.5.2 The Cabinet may, if the Constitutional Council has not yet completed a proposal for a draft Constitution twelve months after its first sitting, extend the term of the Constitutional Council up to a maximum of six further months, to enable the Constitutional Council to draw up a draft Constitution.

2.6.6 Decision-making

2.6.6.1 The Constitutional Council shall deliberate upon and adopt by consensus a draft Constitution for the country, provided that the Chairman may, if it is apparent after protracted debate, that consensus cannot be achieved on a particular point, permit the tentative adoption of that point by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of the Constitutional Council, subject to final ratification of the draft Constitution as a whole, by consensus, prior to the presentation of the draft Constitution to the Cabinet for further action. The procedure associated with such final ratification of the draft Constitution by the Council, shall not preclude alteration or modification of any provision of the draft Constitution adopted other than by consensus, or the substitution therefor of another provision on which consensus proves possible.

2.6.6.2 If the Chairman of the Constitutional Council reports to the Cabinet, after a period of not less than seventeen months, that the Constitutional Council is unable to reach consensus with regard to the adoption or ratification of a draft constitution, the Cabinet will make another arrangement within one month thereafter, with regard to decision-making in the Council.

2.6.6.3 The Fundamental Rights embodied in the Bill of Fundamental Rights and Objectives shall be entrenched in the independence constitution.

2.6.7 Action by the Cabinet after receipt of the draft Constitution

The Cabinet shall, within a period of three calendar months after the date on which it receives the draft Constitution from the Constitutional Council, arrange to have the draft Constitution submitted to the electorate for its approval.

3. Agreed Agenda for the Transitional Government

The member parties of the Multi-Party Conference have agreed in principle, subject to further discussion of the particulars, that a programme of action will be executed by the Transitional
Government with all due speed. This programme of action consists, *inter alia*, of the following:

3.1 Accommodation of the Transitional Government in the Tintenpalast.

3.2 The design and announcement of a political action programme to give practical effect to the Fundamental Objectives specified in the Bill of Fundamental Rights and Objectives.

3.3 New arrangements with regard to the utilization of surplus capital in the national interest.

3.4 Arrangements with regard to the transfer or utilization of education and training facilities which are presently not being used and which are under the control of a Representative Authority.

3.5 Arrangements to give effect to the principle of no mandatory racial classification.

4. **Undertaking by the South African Government**

The Multi-Party Conference is aware that the road to independence which the Conference has selected by requesting the South African government to install a Transitional Government in South West Africa/Namibia, will be a difficult one. President Houphuét-Boigny’s positive reaction to the MPC’s proposal was encouraging and creates the impression that at least certain African states may be prepared to demonstrate understanding of the need for an indigenous SWA/Namibia effort to promote national reconciliation and stable and prosperous independence. The reaction in certain British and West German circles will also not, it appears, be condemnatory. The Multi-Party Conference is, nonetheless, deeply aware that a close understanding with the South African government will be of decisive importance in the possible success of this endeavour. In particular, the Multi-Party Conference desires assurances on the following questions:

4.1 Continued budgetary assistance by the RSA.

4.2 Defence agreements between the South African government and the SWA/Namibia Transitional Government with regard to the protection of the Territory’s borders and military activity beyond its borders.

4.3 Firm agreement that the South African government will not henceforth negotiate on behalf of SWA/Namibia with members of the Contact Group, the Front Line States or the United Nations, regarding the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978). The Multi-Party Conference would appreciate it if members of the international community could be encouraged
on all occasions to negotiate directly with the Transitional Government regarding the independence of SWA/Namibia. It is, of course, understood that South Africa will continue to attend to its own interests in these negotiations.

WINDHOEK
27 March 1985

B. South African Government’s response to Multi-Party Conference Proposals.—
Statement by State President the Hon P. W. Botha DMS on 18 April 1985.

As regards South West Africa, Hon Members will have taken note of the statement issued by the Hon Minister of Foreign Affairs on 15 April 1985 concerning the disengagement of the South African forces in the Area-in-Question from southern Angola. South Africa has taken this action despite SWAPO’s continuing terrorist activities, but in the hope that its decision will enhance the prospects for peace in the region and will, in particular, be conducive to the withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola. However, this action will not materially diminish the ability of the Security Forces to protect the people of SWA/Namibia. On the contrary, it places the burden for ensuring that cross-border violence does not escalate squarely on the shoulders of the Angolan Government. It is for them to determine what course events along the border will take. South Africa is willing to hold Ministerial discussions with the Angolans on the maintenance of peace and stability in the region and on other questions of regional importance. The Angolans must accordingly decide whether they wish to proceed along the road of peace and dialogue or whether they wish to return to the cycle of escalating violence which characterized the situation before the Lusaka Agreement.

Another aspect which might interest Hon Members is that the command structure of certain police units in SWA/Namibia will soon be transferred from the South African Police to the Administrator-General of SWA/Namibia. When this occurs all police functions in SWA/Namibia will be exercised by the South West African Police Force. This is in keeping with the Government’s view that wherever possible, administrative functions affecting the Territory should be in South West African hands.

I now wish to address the proposals which the Multi-Party Conference of South West Africa/Namibia presented to me on 25 March 1985.

The MPC requests the establishment of an internal government, which would promote national reconciliation, national welfare and a nationally acceptable and internationally-recognized independence. The proposals include a Constitutional Council which would be responsible for constitutional questions, and in particular for the drafting of a constitution, which would
ultimately be submitted to the electorate for approval.

In considering the MPC’s proposals the South African Government has borne in mind the long period which has elapsed since South Africa accepted in April 1978 the Western proposal for the independence of South West Africa. In terms of that proposal the Territory should have become independent by the end of 1978. However, independence was repeatedly delayed because of deviations by the United Nations and SWAPO from the original Contact Group proposal, because of the bias of the United Nations in favour of SWAPO, and because of the continuing threat posed by the presence of Cuban forces in Angola.

In the meantime, the people of South West Africa have had to wait for seven years and are still unable to exercise their right to self-determination. The last countrywide election took place in December 1978 and led to an overwhelming victory for the DTA as it was then composed. Major responsibilities for the internal administration of the Territory were subsequently entrusted to a National Assembly and a Council of Ministers. This governmental structure was not recognized by the international community.

However, by the end of 1982 the original term of office of the National Assembly had already expired and had been extended by decreee. After the passage of four years during which time defections from the ruling party took place and dissent amongst the leaders was mounting, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers resigned in January 1983. The Council of Ministers was accordingly disbanded and on 19 January the National Assembly was dissolved. All the powers which it and the Council had previously exercised reverted to the Administrator-General. It was stressed at the time that this was purely an interim arrangement.

With a view to ensuring the continuation of internal institutions in South West Africa I announced on 20 November 1982, that the South African Government would decide, in the light of the situation prevailing at the end of February, 1983, whether another general election should be held in the Territory, and if so, on what basis.

At the end of February 1983 it was decided not to proceed with an election. Instead, the Administrator-General held consultations with the South West African parties and in April 1983 he proposed the establishment of a State Council which would advise him on political matters. The parties of the Territory preferred, however, to organize their own forum for discussion, which took the form of the Multi-Party Conference.

During my speech in Parliament on 31 January 1984 I said that it was up to the leaders of South West Africa to decide what they were going to do and to do so urgently. The MPC responded positively to this appeal.

On 24 February 1984 it issued a declaration of Basic Principles. On 18 April 1984 it reached agreement on a Charter of Fundamental Rights and Objectives. It decided inter alia that the people of South West Africa/Namibia de-
sired independence, free from external domination and prescription. It further agreed that the basic rights of all South West Africans should be guaranteed.

The MPC has never claimed to be the sole representative of the people of SWA/Namibia. It has proved that it was willing to discuss the future of SWA/Namibia with other political parties, including SWAPO. From 11–13 May 1984 it held discussions with SWAPO in Lusaka under the co-chairmanship of President Kaunda and the Administrator-General, Dr W. van Niekerk. At this meeting the parties managed to reach consensus on a number of important points. The hosts of the Conference were hopeful that all the parties present would sign a compromise joint communiqué. However, immediately before the final session, the leader of SWAPO met with a foreign diplomat in Lusaka who evidently persuaded him to change his attitude. Instead of signing the communiqué, SWAPO launched a vitriolic attack against certain members of the MPC.

In its statement of 31 October 1984 the MPC once again invited SWAPO and the other parties of the Territory to join it in discussions on the future of SWA/Namibia. SWAPO ignored its invitation and the MPC accordingly decided to proceed on its own. That SWAPO's views and the views of other SWA political parties are not included in the MPC's proposals is due solely to their own decision. Eventually, on 25 March 1985 the MPC presented its proposals to me.

It would have been preferable if the MPC had a clear mandate from the people of SWA/Namibia. And I want to make it clear here today that the MPC has committed itself to have any future constitutional plan tested by the country as a whole. However, a national election at this time would complicate current efforts to achieve an internationally acceptable independence for SWA/Namibia. The MPC has, beyond dispute, done everything in its power to involve all the parties of SWA/Namibia in its deliberations and it will continue to do so.

In considering the MPC's proposal the South African Government has taken the following points into account:

— Direct rule by the Administrator-General was intended to be an interim arrangement.
— The leaders of the Territory must themselves work out their constitutional future.
— The leaders of the Territory must accept greater responsibility for the administration of SWA/Namibia.
— The South African Government cannot consult the leaders of the Territory on an ad hoc basis, it needs to consult them in some institutionalized form.

Legislative and executive authorities for South West Africa will accordingly be re instituted which will be empowered to promulgate a bill of rights.
and establish a Constitutional Court and a Constitutional Council.

At the same time the South African Government wishes to emphasize that for as long as there is a possibility that the present international negotiations hold any realistic prospect of bringing about the genuine withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, the South African Government will not act in a manner irreconcilable with the international settlement plan.

Consequently:
— The South African Government will retain all those powers in respect of SWA/Namibia which are vested in it at this stage, including foreign relations and defence.
— All laws of the legislature will require the signature of the Administrator-General.
— South Africa will continue to negotiate with the United Nations and the international community on achieving internationally recognized independence for South West Africa. It will continue to consult with and be guided by the leaders of South West Africa and will try to involve them in discussions with the international community.
— While the current negotiations hold any possibility of bringing about the genuine withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, South Africa will regard any draft constitution produced by the Constitutional Council as a basis for future discussion or as a proposal which could be submitted to the Constituent Assembly envisaged in the international settlement plan.

The proposed arrangement in SWA/Namibia should accordingly be seen as an interim mechanism for the internal administration of the Territory pending agreement on an internationally acceptable independence for South West Africa.

The granting of more representative administration to South West Africa, as was the case in 1979, does not violate the South African Government’s international commitments. However, as I told Parliament on 27 April 1984, the people of SWA/Namibia, including SWAPO, cannot wait indefinitely for a breakthrough on the withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola. Should it eventually become evident, after all avenues have been thoroughly explored, that there is no realistic prospect of attaining this goal, all the parties most intimately affected by the present negotiations will obviously have to reconsider how internationally acceptable independence may best be attained in the light of prevailing circumstances.

In the meantime South Africa will continue to work for an internationally acceptable independence for South West Africa:
— It will continue to search for a reasonable formula for genuine Cuban withdrawal from Angola.
— It will continue to strive for stability and peace in the region by encouraging all the parties, including SWAPO and Angola, to resolve their differences around a conference table instead of by violence.
— As has already been announced, South Africa has completed the withdrawal of its forces from southern Angola. The MPLA Government will have to ensure that SWAPO does not step up its violence against the people of SWA/Namibia or face the possibility of a reversion to the situation which prevailed before the Lusaka Agreement.

— South Africa will continue to encourage dialogue between all the South West African parties in the hope that they will find a basis for a still broader consensus in respect of the future of the Territory. If the parties of SWA/Namibia cannot achieve a *modus vivendi* at this stage then the prospects for the success of independence, however it comes about, are limited. The parties must understand that no single group will be able to dictate what the future of the country will be.

— South Africa will continue to insist that all the South West African parties be treated equally and impartially. If the United Nations wishes to play a role in the future of SWA/Namibia it will consequently have to demonstrate that it will be able to carry out its functions impartially.

On these understandings we consider that the implementation of the proposals of the MPC can make a significant contribution to the goals of national reconciliation, national welfare and eventually the peaceful attainment of a nationally acceptable and internationally recognized independence.

Footnote: Text for items A and B of this Section supplied by the South African Dept. of Foreign Affairs.
Mr President; Your Excellencies; Members of the Royal Commonwealth Society; and Friends.

I last spoke to this Society in 1975, and dealt with the problem of poverty and the relations between the rich and the poor countries. I did so because it was topical; because of the Commonwealth Declaration of Principles of 1971; and because Tanzania is among the 25 poorest countries of the world in terms of per capita Gross National Product.

The last two reasons are still valid. Today, however, this is my subject because it is NOT topical — and needs to be for the sake of every country in the world. African starvation is topical, but the relations between rich and poor countries which underlie Africa’s vulnerability to natural disasters have been relegated to the sidelines of world discussion.

The Third World is now blamed for its own poverty. Each country is analysed separately by international institutions and by political commentators. Its problems are then explained in terms of socialism, its corruption, the laziness of its people and such-like alleged national attributes. The fact that virtually all Third World countries, and certainly all the poorest of them, are in the same plight is largely ignored.

In 1975 I referred to the Commonwealth “Ten Wise Men” Report; since then there have been the two Brandt Commission Reports, and many studies done under the auspices of the United Nations and other bodies. All said the same things; the condition of the very poor countries would worsen, and the slightly better off would stagnate, unless action was taken against the problems underlying the present situation, and unless resource transfers to the poor countries were considerably increased. Now a 1984 World Bank Report on Sub-Saharan Africa predicts: “even with some fundamental improvements in domestic economic management, per capita incomes in Sub-Saharan Africa will continue to fall during 1985–95”. All these warnings have been neglected, and this World Bank prophesy is ignored.

Yet these are not only problems for, and affecting the poor nations. The
reality of a single world economy still remains. One country’s exports are the imports of another, and vice versa. When poor countries are forced to reduce the volume of their imports because they can no longer afford them, there is an increase in unemployment in the richer countries.

Nor are the social effects of worsening poverty among the poor countries confined within their own national borders. For they mean rising hunger and malnutrition among the people, greater sickness and a reduction in productivity among the workers and peasants, and increasing vulnerability to the natural calamities such as those which have hit Africa so continually since the early 1970s. And disease spreads; famines too affect other countries as well as the one afflicted. And when suffering people react to their worsening conditions by civil disturbance, increased corruption, and a general break-down of law and order, a new flash-point of conflict threatens world peace.

Further, the debts and debt service charges of Third World countries have now reached levels which threaten the banking system and financial centres of the world. I notice that Europe complains bitterly about the effects on it of US deficits and the consequent high world interest rates. But we — the poor — have to pay those interest rates also. And we pay from our poverty, not from abundance: the ‘Without Representation’ taxation of the poor for the benefit of the rich.

The Third World’s heavy debt burden arose through a combination of modest development ambitions, and external events beyond the control of the Developing Countries. In the 1960s and early 1970s most debts were incurred for development work; this was very often infrastructural and thus not directly revenue earning, or very long term. But the debts incurred for long term capital investment are now by no means the whole of the problem — or indeed the major part of it.

After the first oil shock of 1973, many Third World countries borrowed to ease their adjustment to the new fuel prices. Credit was easy to obtain as Western Banks sought for profitable uses of the OPEC surpluses which were being entrusted to them, and the general world inflation of the period meant that real interest rates were low. The 1979 oil shock then hit with double force because it was followed almost immediately by recession in the Developed World, and by strict monetarist policies which were intended to reduce the rate of inflation. Simultaneously, interest rates sky-rocketed; whereas in 1971 Africa’s average nominal interest rate was 4.2 per cent, by 1981 it had reached 10.1 per cent. It has since risen much further. One estimate (in the Lever Report of the Commonwealth) suggests that the real interest rate for non-oil Developing Countries rose to over 20 per cent in 1981–82 and has not fallen significantly since.

The resulting huge debts are a national problem for the debtor countries; we undertook to repay, and honour demands that we do so. But we are increasingly unable to do so because of changes in world conditions since the
debts were incurred. The debts are therefore also a problem for the Developed Countries.

This immediately becomes obvious when a country like Brazil, or Mexico, or Argentina, is not able to meet major debt-service commitments; the financial centres of the world get together to protect the over-extended banks whose collapse would threaten the system. But it is also true in respect of the smaller debtors when they are considered together. This is why the creditors insist on a “case by case” consideration of debt-payment problems, with each debtor country sitting alone to face all its major creditors.

African countries as a group have the highest ratio of debt-servicing to exports, and of debt to Gross Domestic Product, of any region in the world. Africa as a whole has a debt of between 150 and 200 billion US Dollars; of this over $90 billion is owed by Sub-Saharan Africa alone. The debt-servicing for the latter is about 12 billion dollars when only long term debt is considered; that excludes payments of arrears and supplier’s credit commitments. It also excludes IMF repurchases and interest — which for Zambia, for example, by itself represents 26 per cent of export earnings.

It is not uninteresting that the interest alone, which was due from all developing countries in 1982, was about $66 billion — which is more than half of their combined deficits. And when rescheduling is attempted as a temporary solution to a current payment difficulty, it can usually be effected only at a higher interest rate than the original commitment. The poor countries borrow more and more just in order to pay higher and higher rates of interest. They thus compound their basic problem.

Debts and the very high interest rates are very important among the reasons why Third World Countries become desperately short of foreign exchange — which is a self-reinforcing process. A shortage of foreign exchange in the import-dependent modern sector of our economies leads to a curtailment of transport, etc., and so to reduced productivity and reduced ability to pay debt-services dues, or anything else.

But high interest rates are only one of the many mechanisms by which the resources transferred to Developing Countries through aid are all the time countered by the automatic workings of the international economy.

Over the long term perhaps the most important single factor is that changes in relative prices paid in international trade are automatic income transfers. In practice, these transfers are made from the poor to the rich, as the terms of trade for primary producers fluctuate wildly but on a downward curve. In its 1984 World Development Report, the World Bank said “between 1973 and 1981, low-income Africa lost as much as 23 per cent in the purchasing power of its exports to buy manufactures”. And in 1982, commodity prices achieved a post-war low in terms of manufacturing prices. In addition, and for the poorest Third World countries, the oil price changes
during that period had an equal if not greater adverse effect on the level of resources available for domestic consumption and investment.

Take, for example, Tanzania's terms of trade from 1980 to 1984. Taking 1980 as a base year, import prices had risen to 115.2 by 1984, and export prices to 103.3. In 1982 things were even worse, with import prices at 117.4 of the 1980 figure, and export prices at 95.4. In reality this means that resources were transferred from Tanzania to its trading partners—including Britain and other Developed Countries. And the transfer has been even greater for single-commodity exporters, such as copper-exporting Zambia. It is quite possible—indeed it not infrequently happens—that a fall in the price of a developing nation's basic exports results in a loss of resources available for development, and consumption which is larger than its total aid receipts.

So we are back in the vicious circle; Third World countries cannot pay their debts or maintain the volume of their imports. The deflation of their economies spreads to the Developed Countries.

In the face of these realities about the nature of our interdependent international economic system, there has over the last five years been a marked decline in Internationalist attitudes and practices. Many examples could be given of what appears to have begun in 1981 with the failure of the Cancun Summit Meeting to agree on any positive international action to deal with acknowledged North-South problems. Thus we see the reduction in the proportion of their Gross National Product which is allocated to Official Development Assistance by the OECD countries; in 1960, it was 0.51 per cent; in 1983 it was 0.37 per cent—and has since declined further. Official aid has, in fact, declined in real terms in recent years. This is particularly marked in relationship to the seventh Replenishment of IDA which, at $9 billion, is 25 per cent lower in nominal terms and 40 per cent lower in real terms than the Sixth Replenishment three years before. This reduction is despite the fact that China has since joined the World Bank and become eligible for IDA loans!

There is also the tendency to attack or undermine those UN agencies for development which are not under virtually complete Western control, with UNESCO, UNCTAD, and IFAD, being the major victims so far. This reflects an increasing determination by donors to use their aid for ideological and foreign policy purposes. For example, Zimbabwe had its aid cut by the United States because it voted a certain way at the United Nations. And some monies are now set aside to be allocated just to such African countries as accept an untrammelled capitalist economy.

Generally, the interdependence of the Developed and Developing Worlds, which the South knows from bitter experience, is not recognised in the actions of the economic North. Instead the South is faced by attitudes of impatience and irritation, or at best by compassion. The compassion of the ordinary citizens of the rich countries is very real; the outpouring of famine relief
monies from millions of people is evidence of that. But the compassion of their governments is often ritual; there is usually a reference to the problems of poor countries in communiques following meetings of industrialised country leaders, but their decisions at these same meetings do not reflect the expressed concern in action.

The Developed countries have a very large measure of control over the world economy. They act as a group, and make decisions which they see as in their own interests. The leadership of the group is in the hands of the nation with the most powerful economy—USA. Even the other major economic powers seem unable or unwilling to act as a group on any international economic matter if the US refuses to join in. The smaller powers of Europe—like Holland and the Scandinavian countries—do sometimes try to act on their own, but by definition they are not powerful enough to do much by themselves except bilaterally—and even then they sometimes come under pressure to conform to the larger "consensus" of the industrialised powers.

There is one international agency, however, which is now increasingly being used to back up anti-internationalist actions. The IMF was established to bring stability to world trade, and to encourage its expansion. Its decision making is virtually controlled by five major industrialised countries; for some purposes the USA alone can at least veto a decision by all other IMF members. The IMF has virtually ceased to concern itself with the economic problems of the rich countries for which it was originally conceived. It has become largely an instrument for economic and ideological control of poor countries by the rich ones.

Thus, for example, when poor countries are in deficit—for whatever reason—they turn to the IMF. They need foreign exchange urgently, and the World Bank as well as bilateral creditors and aid donors become very reluctant indeed to continue their support in the absence of an agreement with the Fund.

Yet in practice the conditions on which IMF credits can be obtained are inappropriate to the circumstances of Africa—probably of the whole Third World. The IMF is not designed to deal with structural imbalances; its credits are short term, and very expensive, at nine per cent interest, three years grace period and three years repayment. It uses its conditionality as a means of rationing its decreased resources in proportion to world trade. And every Third World country knows the litany of conditions with which it will be confronted.

It will be told to devalue—heavily and one go—before it gets an injection of capital; to increase exports and liberalise imports; to reduce government spending; to raise interest rates; to impose a wage freeze, to remove subsidies, and lift any price controls it has—and so on.

But when a country like Tanzania resists terms which it believes would make its economic conditions worse and imperil its social and political stabil-
ity, it pays a very heavy price. Not only is it denied the foreign exchange injection to which its membership of the IMF ought to entitle it, and not only does it come under heavy pressure from its creditors and donors, but it also has to continue paying foreign exchange to the IMF at its time of crisis.

For example, Tanzania's foreign exchange difficulties began to become serious in 1978, yet between 1978 and 1984 it has made a net foreign exchange payment to the IMF of 5.2 million SDRs. It cannot even get into arrears on these payments—they have to take priority over purchases even of food or minimum oil requirements. For if payments are not made when due, continued negotiation about a new agreement is suspended, and also it is designated as bankrupt by all other trading and financial partners.

What all this amounts to is an increasing tendency towards a kind of international authoritarianism. Economic power is used as a substitute for gunboats (sometimes—as in Nicaragua—it is used as an addition) in enforcing the unilateral will of the powerful. The sovereign equality of all nations is ignored, as is the future stability of the world as a whole.

In the face of this situation, when even negotiations about reform of the international economic order are blocked, what are Third World countries—what is the Third World—to do?

First, the Developing nations have quite clearly to undertake national internal struggle and reorganisation in the full consciousness that this means more hardship for the people, and can only be embarked upon with any hope of success if the people are willing to cooperate.

Further, we can try, and Tanzania is trying, to move towards greater self-reliance in the technology we use. You make a feeder-road by labour-intensive not capital-intensive methods and so on. Yet however primitive your economy, some fuel is necessary, some steel and spare parts, and so on.

Another "solution" frequently urged upon African and Third World countries is the greater encouragement of foreign private investment. In practice, investors are rarely interested in long term investment and are very selective. They are—understandably in the light of the genuine difficulties which exist—reluctant to go to really poor countries because their aim is profit, not development. It has been estimated that less than 10 per cent of the foreign direct investment in the Third World is to be found in countries with a per capita Gross Domestic Product of $500 or below. Nonetheless, we are told that the solution is to make the conditions more attractive to investors. There are many African countries which try. But however capitalist-oriented the African country, success is very limited. Even Europe apparently cannot make private investment more attractive than it is in USA; it is therefore difficult to see how Africa could do so. Especially when, at the same time, African states are being told to cut public expenditure, and generally add to austerity among the population—thus adding to social and political instability!

Cooperation among the Third World countries is a long term partial solu-
tion to the problems of Developing Countries. It is not the best solution from the world point of view, but helpful for themselves. However, it is not easy. First, the economies of the South are largely competitive, not complementary, except in terms of planned growth—which takes the kind of capital they do not have. Secondly, and without adopting a conspiracy theory of politics, it must also be acknowledged that South-South cooperation is made more difficult by the operations of the present international system. Individual decisions which may be compromising for a Third World partner are sometimes the price of short term relief for a country faced with a desperate situation. And if, for example, Zambia cannot pay its debts, it cannot pay those to Tanzania either, which in turn cannot pay money due to a country like India, and so on. No Third World country has any leverage to enforce priority in payment; that belongs to the IMF and the World Bank and the great powers of the world.

Nonetheless, cooperation—especially on a regional basis—is growing between Third World countries. In the Caribbean there is Caricom, in Asia the Colombo Plan, and so on. In Africa there are a number of sub-regional organisations, like ECOWAS, SADCC, and PTA, and the Organisation of African Unity is in the process of discussing what African states can do as a group to meet their pressing economic difficulties. The next Summit Meeting of the OAU will be devoted primarily to this subject. Over-all Third World cooperation is inching forward under the leadership of the Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement. And there are, of course, many functional cooperative groups—like the Association of Copper Producers, and OPEC itself.

But Third World cooperation is in any case only a long-term contribution to solving the economic problems of the Third World. And we are faced with desperate problems now.

So I come back to the question I posed in this building in 1975. Is it to be dialogue or confrontation between the rich and the poor countries?

If the rich refuse to discuss methods by which the Third World can repay its debts, should we continue to try to pay on the terms set, even at the cost of letting our people starve? If the interest rates on loans needed even to repay old debts continue to be set at levels determined by the deficit in USA, should we acquiesce? Should we continue to beg for charity from the ordinary people of the Developed Countries in order to support the existing international economic and financial structures of the world? The old age pensioner, who contributes his or her money to succour the hungry in Africa, would not like to know that if Africa did not have to pay billions of dollars in interest to bankers it would be able to do more for itself.

If dialogue continues to be refused—and we cannot now even get talks about the International Economic Order—should the Third World not use the power of its debt to force discussion? When Tanzania—or some other
poor country — is simply unable to make due payments, (which may amount to 80 per cent or more of its current and reduced export earnings!) it will not shake the international financial system; by itself such a country has no power except to scream and struggle, and keep itself afloat by whatever means it can. But if Africa decides to act as a group, the world’s financial system would take note. And if the Third World—or even the richer regions—stood together in seeking better terms, then there would be a real threat to financial stability, and discussions would be held.

The rich countries do act together, they do not have to do so. What I am saying is that the Third World should begin to work together and use its combined power—including the power of debt—to force upon the Developed World a series of interlinked discussions. There needs to be an urgent discussion about how and on what terms the debt problem can be dealt with. But the basic problem is wider than that. There also needs to be discussion directed at a reconsideration and reform of an international economic system which is working inequitably and inexorably against the interests of the poor, but which is inimical to all—with the possible but not certain exception of the richest state.

The unemployment in Britain and the falling value of its currency are not unconnected with the world economic jungle in which this country tries to earn its living. The economic chaos underlying the Depression of the 1930s, and leading up to the Second World War, was recognised as insupportable in the 1940s, and led to the reorganisation which is summed up in the words “Bretton Woods System”. That system has now collapsed—it collapsed in 1971, even before the first oil shock. It is time for men and nations to look at the Bretton Woods institutions again, and see how they can be reshaped in order to deal with the financial and economic problems of today’s world.

Mr President. It is a gloomy analysis I have been making, and my final remarks are controversial and extremely unpleasant—even to me. But the facts are not pleasant either.

Such a confrontation between North and South is not inevitable. But I cannot see how responsible leaders of the Third World can continue watching their people sink further and further into poverty and misery without any kind of protest against an international system which produces that poverty and misery. When the poor of the South eventually revolt against their condition, it is always their governments which bear the brunt. I do not say that those governments are always blameless. But all of them, good and bad, victims or surrogates, act within the confines of an iniquitous international economic system. Can such a situation go on for ever?

Why, however, do I talk in these terms to the Royal Commonwealth Society?

The Commonwealth represents a remainder of the North-South Dialogue—and still operates effectively within the limits of its own resources. It can
and it should work together for a wider dialogue and a greater commitment to internationalism. It can play a crucial role in achieving that goal, especially if it can do this in cooperation with the other smaller Developed Countries of Europe.

This Society has members who are influential within their own communities; I am hoping that they will use their influence in favour of preventing an economic cataclysm, just as I would like to see the Commonwealth itself also working against the threat of a political or military cataclysm.

Mr President: This is the last occasion on which I will be speaking — at least as President of my country — to the Commonwealth Society. I would like to pay two tributes before I leave.

The first is to Her Majesty the Queen. She is a concerned and active Head of the Commonwealth, and we are indebted to her.

The second is to the Commonwealth Secretariat and its able Secretary-General. They do get through a tremendous amount of work, and give great assistance in furthering practical cooperation among all members. On behalf of my country I would like to express appreciation.

And lastly, I thank you all for listening to me so patiently.

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