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The Brazzaville Agreement:

Question:
Let's start with the obvious - the Brazzaville agreement. That undeniably is the biggest accomplishment of the Reagan administration in Africa. You pursued it for eight years, and your predecessor pursued it for a shorter time. What happened in 1988 that brought this to fruition finally?

Mr Crocker:
Well, I might take issue with your opening point about this being the major accomplishment in Africa, but, anyway, it's an important accomplishment, there's no question about it, and it's very satisfying to everybody who has been involved. And there have been, over these eight years, hundreds of people on our side who have been involved. So it's a big prize. It means a lot to Africa and to us and to other people.

Eighty-eight was an interesting year. I guess I would say that what happened in 1988 was that people decided that they could not resist the logic of something which had been very logical all along. Why? Perhaps because they realized that there would be a change of administration and they wanted to have the right people around when they decided to make peace, because, otherwise, they would have to start out with a whole new structure, a whole new policy, a whole new team. That was a factor.

There had been ample time for everybody to explore military solutions. They had not worked, as we knew they would not, so the quagmire of war became less and less attractive. That's a factor. I think the changing climate in US-Soviet relations was a factor...

Question:
Was there anything in particular in 1988 that happened that made you feel that you were about to get to an agreement?

Mr Crocker:
It became more and more likely, in our view, that we would get it, once people did still more things to create an involvement like, for example, signing the New York principles in July. Those principles were very important and they were the first tangible building block of the tripartite talks since they started in May. Everybody could point to those and say, 'That's a good combination; there's something in that for everybody.'...
Question:
A number of African countries helped the negotiation process along. Could you cite a few and say how they helped?

Mr Crocker:
Yes, there was widespread support. I would cite Cape Verde, which for years has been trying to help bring about these contacts, going back to the early 1980s, hosting many meetings between the Angolans and South Africans, sometimes with us, sometimes without us.

I would certainly cite Congo as a key country, because since April of 1987, we had seven different meetings in Brazzaville, and they helped to restore the direct contact between us and the Angolans in April of 1987, which led to a series of meetings in July of 1987, September of 1987 and then January of 1988. All of them flowed from that April 1987 meeting in Brazzaville.

Then, they stuck their neck out repeatedly in 1988 to keep inviting us back even though we did not quite finish our business. So I think their leadership was appreciated. They used their influence not just to provide facilities, but to push the parties along; so they played a key role.

There was a key juncture when we could not get agreement among the parties on where to meet, when the Egyptians raised their hands and said, 'We'll try,' and it worked. That was back in June of 1988.

So there were a number of countries. Nigeria has supported the process, Cote d'Ivoire, Zaire, and, I think in a general sense, the Zambians, the chairman of the front-line states. It is quite a long list - the Moroccans have been very supportive - some of them quietly, some of them more publicly.

Question:
It has been said also that the Soviets played a major role ultimately in the process as well. Could you talk about that?

Mr Crocker:
We have been talking with the Soviet Union throughout the course of this administration about southern Africa and the structure of a settlement. I think I could say that by the end of 1987, the Soviets began more clearly to see the logic and to see what was in it for them, and to begin exploring the possibility of actually lending support to the structure for a settlement, as opposed to taking a hands-off position or actively blocking it.

During the meetings, during 1988, they had an observer present in most of those meetings, not in the negotiating room, not at the table, but at the margins, I guess you could say. I would meet with my Soviet counterpart on a regular basis, and we would explore the obstacles and discuss possible
solutions.

We had no doubt that they were using their influence in a discreet manner with the parties they were closest to, but as you know, they were also meeting at times with the South African delegation, too. This was new ground for the Soviets.

Their policy in this regard has moved much closer to what we would call common sense, recognizing the realities of the region. We have seen some results from that.

Reconciliation in Angola:

**Question:**
The next logical step in this process would be the reconciliation and a negotiated solution to the Angolan civil war. How do you see that coming about?

**Mr Crocker:**
I have no doubt that this agreement is going to support and strengthen the chances for internal dialogue and reconciliation of Angola. I think almost everybody sees it that way.

Dr Savimbi has said that he sees it that way, that this is the logical way to proceed, first the external factors, the foreign troops, then the internal issues. But he is not alone. Many African leaders have said the same thing, publicly and privately: Let's get the Namibia Resolution 435-Cuban withdrawal issue settled and then there will be no remaining obstructions or obstacles so that African neighbors of Angola can more freely speak to the Angolan government about the importance of them addressing the issue.

Exactly how this will happen is very hard to predict. When people talk about an African solution, I think what they often mean is one that is characterized by quiet procedures and discretion, people saving face, maybe starting indirectly with the passing of messages and then moving to more direct talks....

**Question:**
The US position on recognizing Angola has been that once the Cubans leave, we can consider recognizing the Luanda government diplomatically. Is that still the case? Would the United States recognize the Luanda government if the Cubans leave, even without reconciliation?

**Mr Crocker:**
That is a future question, a hypothetical question. What we have so far is an agreement that will lead, if it is implemented faithfully, to a Cuban withdrawal and Namibian independence. Certainly, a major factor is the
good-faith implementation of that agreement, and has been all along. Cuban withdrawal is a major issue as Americans look at the question of our relationship with the government in Luanda.

There is also another factor, and it is the continuing civil war. I think it is fair to say that these are both important.

As a practical matter, it would be my personal view that as Cuban withdrawal is implemented, pressures for reconciliation will grow, as a matter of common sense. I'm not sure these are really separate issues; these are really two sides of the same coin. As Cubans leave, it's my prediction that Angolans will be increasingly talking to each other. That's one man's prediction.

South Africa/Apartheid:

Question:
Let's switch to South Africa itself. Constructive engagement appears to have worked in the case of Namibia and Angola, in this agreement, but it seems not to have worked yet within South Africa. Some people say that it has not moved the South African government away from apartheid at all; others disagree.

How would you characterize the last eight years in the US attempts at moving South Africa away from apartheid? Has it moved away? Have sanctions helped or hindered? How has it worked?

Mr Crocker:
The first point I would make is that we have this imperial illusion - some of us in this country - that an American policy is going to end apartheid. And there are many Africans who fall into the same trap, perhaps because they - some of them - may think of us as supermen. We are not. There are not any American solutions.

Apartheid is going to be ended by the work and the struggle of South Africans, and I feel very strongly about that. If anything, I feel stronger about it now that I did eight years ago. Whether it is constructive engagement or some other approach, it would be a false question to say, 'Has it ended apartheid?'.

There has been some progress on some aspects of apartheid in the 1980s. There have been more changes in social and economic apartheid in the late 1970s and up to the mid-1980s. I'm thinking of such things as the totally revolutionized labor law situation, the trade union movement, the pass laws, a number of things.
There have been more changes of that kind in that time period than at any time since 1945. But it has been reluctant, it has been slow, it has been piecemeal, it has failed to address the most important issues. It has, in fact, the way it has been handled, led to the big movement of black unrest in the mid-1980s, which, in turn, has led to great new waves of repression against blacks, further human rights abuse, detentions and so on. So it is a very mixed picture.

I think I would add that as far as sanctions are concerned, you are not going to end apartheid by creating a wasteland, an economic wasteland, in South Africa. You are not going to end racism by impoverishing the economy of South Africa.

If people were looking for a signal of how we feel about apartheid, our sanctions are a signal; but we are, I think, required to look beyond signals and look at results. I am not impressed with the results of sanctions in practical terms. We have more than enough signaling going on. What we now need is to be engaged with everybody, effectively on a daily basis, as I think we are, looking for openings, pushing people towards thinking creatively about their own future. But you are not going to achieve that by washing your hands and going home.

Question:
How do you see it developing during the next administration? Are you optimistic?

Mr Crocker:
I am optimistic that President-elect Bush knows what he is doing in foreign affairs, that he is a man who feels very strongly about the importance of Africa in our foreign policy. He knows Africa well. He has been there on a number of occasions as Vice President. He knows many African leaders personally over a number of years. He is deeply committed to justice, development, and stability in Africa. I am optimistic that he, in fact, will seek to maintain continuity in many of these areas of policy we have been discussing. So, in a general sense, as somebody who has worked hard and long on African issues, yes, I am optimistic.

Mozambique, Front-Line States:

Question:
You had mentioned Mozambique. How would you characterize the situation there and the US relationship with Mozambique?

Mr Crocker:
I think we have a strong and healthy relationship with Mozambique and we have done a lot on our side to build that relationship, but so have they. I think the relationship is in pretty good shape.
Mozambique, however, is not in such good shape, as its leadership knows very well. There has been some improvement in areas under government control, as far as the economy is concerned, and that should be taken note of. There has been some improvement in the government's effort to reach out to the churches and to various elements in society which may have felt not included in the past.

There certainly have been clear improvements in our bilateral discussions and dialogue. Mozambique has worked as a very cooperative partner with us on regional diplomacy in terms of trying to find alternatives to confrontation with South Africa.

There still is a war raging in Mozambique and it is having a fierce, inhuman toll. There is a way to go in terms of what Mozambique is going to need to do to find peace with itself.

But overall, I think our new relationship with Mozambique is one of the major accomplishments of this administration. I am very proud of that accomplishment. We started out with total hostility; we were barely on speaking terms. And yet, I think it a big accomplishment because it sent a powerful signal to all the region of what we stand for and on what basis we are prepared to cooperate.

**Question:**
What are the possibilities of ending the war? Negotiations? Is it military? How do you see the future?

**Mr. Crocker:**
I am not very optimistic about military solutions. There are not many places in the world where they work these days. There are not many in Africa, certainly. The government, in my judgment, does not yet have the means to impose itself by sheer force throughout the countryside, nor do I think it is trying to. I think it is trying to combine a strong security apparatus with more creative and imaginative political policies, and that's very important.

There really are two handles to the solution. One is that relationship Mozambique is trying to build with South Africa, and South Africa with Mozambique. That, I think, will make a big difference in terms of drying up support for Renamo and leading to more secure borders for Mozambique.

The other is the internal dialogue issue. It is a very sensitive matter. It is not for us to get involved in, but the government of Mozambique has not closed the door to finding some means to communicate with its armed opponents. That's an important factor, as well. We hope that they find ways to pursue that.
Question:
How are the Front-Line States faring now that the Namibian/Angola solution is here? They are still trying to break the economic domination of South Africa through SADCC (Southern African Development Coordination Conference) and other means. How are we going to help them economically?

Mr Crocker:
We have developed some important regional programs, as well as bilateral programs, to aid the Front-Line States, both directly and via SADCC projects, and we will continue that, I am quite confident.

The main constraint there, in fact, is a budgetary one here. But we had a pretty good consensus, I think, in Congress for this approach to supporting SADCC, and I have no reason to think that will change.

We believe in the goal of diversified economies and diversified transport routes for the Front-Line States. We do not see it, however, as a question of either/or. These countries are always going to have links with South Africa and vice versa. It's not a question of trying to break up a regional economy; it's really trying to diversify one. That is the way we see it.

Conclusion:

Question:
I would like to end this on a positive note. Are there any clear success stories in Africa that one could put a spotlight on? We rarely read about them in the newspapers, but I am sure there are some that could be pointed to.

Mr Crocker:
There are a number you could point to, I think. Most success stories are quiet and, of course, that's why they need a spotlight occasionally.

Botswana is a very quiet success story in so many ways. It's had some recognition, but I think it can always use more. It lives in a rough neighborhood, that country, I mean a really rough neighborhood. It's surrounded by governments which, in the main, do not share its decency and its values. And it's hard, I think, to live as a landlocked, small, weak country in that kind of a neighborhood, maintaining democratic values, maintaining a very high economic growth rate....

[Text supplied by United States Information Service, Johannesburg.]
Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr RF Botha, in Cape Town on 10 February 1989

A spokesman for the Department of Foreign Affairs confirmed on enquiry that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr RF Botha, today visited Maputo where he held discussions with President Chissano about, among other things, his recent remarks which implied possible American involvement in solving the conflict situation there.

Minister Botha, for his part, explained to President Chissano what the South African Government had in mind in this regard. The two governments agree that the situations in Angola and Mozambique are totally different from one another.

Because the two governments are in agreement about the aim to end the conflict in Mozambique and in the whole of Southern Africa, there is no mediator role for a third party to play.

South Africa and Mozambique agree that, should the US or other countries wish to play a constructive role in achieving an end to the conflict, they would be welcome to discuss it with the two governments concerned.

The governments of Mozambique and South Africa will also inform the American government about their discussions.

Mr Botha conveyed the greetings and good wishes of the State President and the Acting State President to President Chissano.

Statement at close of second session of the Joint South Africa/Mozambique Commission for Economic Affairs, Cape Town, 21 February 1989


The Co-Chairman of the Commission, Mr JWH Meiring, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa and Mr A Mazula, Minister of Labour of Mozambique confirmed their commitment to put into practice in 1989, the ideals enunciated by State President PW Botha and President J Chissano at Songo in 1988.

The Commission achieved consensus on the following matters:
- The Commission will remain the main policy coordinating body of all matters between South Africa and Mozambique.
- The Commission will meet at least twice a year alternatively in
South Africa and Mozambique.

The technical sub-committees will be responsible for the de facto implementation of decisions of the Commission.

The following sub-committees were agreed upon:

- Sub-committee for Commercial Affairs (to include Tourism and Investment)
- Sub-committee for Rail, Air and Harbour Services.
- Sub-committee for Road Infrastructure and Civil Aviation.
- Sub-committee for Labour.
- Sub-committee for Natural Resources (to include Agriculture, Conservation, Fisheries, Water).
- Sub-committee for Health.

The Sub-committees are to report progress on identified areas and projects to the next meeting of the Commission which is currently scheduled for the middle of 1989.

The delegations accompanying the Co-Chairman comprised senior officials of various departments concerned with the subject matter relating to the proposed sub-committees' fields of reference. The deliberations of the Commission were conducted in a friendly manner characteristic of the spirit of friendship and co-operation evidenced by the Songo meeting.

[Texts provided by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs.]

Extracts from a presentation by Dr Prakash Ratilal on Mozambican and South African relations since the Nkomati Accord, at a Conference of the Africa Institute, 21 March 1989

... To comment on relations between Mozambique and South Africa requires some reflection on the recent past of these relations, to identify the obstacles and hindrances in order to designate the steps to take so that the future is the one we want for our children, as well as for ourselves.

... The options open to us are few - perpetuate instability and tension or act in order to establish a stable climate of understanding, peace, security and cooperation.

This is not merely an academic task. Whatever the path, it affects the day-to-day life of millions of people, citizens of Mozambique, of South Africa and of each of the countries in southern Africa. Each one of us is part of this broader southern African community. We are tied by historical, geographical, economic and even cultural and social links. An active position in favour of understanding and respect between our two states could allow the possibility of a better future for each and every one of the peoples of the region.
In the middle of 1984, I was invited by UNISA (the University of South Africa) and SAFTO (the South African Foreign Trade Organisation) to participate in a Conference in Johannesburg on "Trade and Investment in Southern Africa". The Nkomati Accord had been signed a few months earlier. A new era in relations between Mozambique and South Africa was dawning. There were prospects for viable economic and financial relations between businessmen and financiers in each country. There was a general feeling that the dark period of aggression, destabilisation, boycott, sabotage and economic blackmail was coming to an end. We were confident that the time had come for mutually advantageous cooperation. We thought that the Nkomati Accord would establish good neighbourliness and tranquility in the relations between Mozambique and South Africa and would end external aggression and establish peace in Mozambique. With great euphoria, official delegations, business people and others travelled backwards and forwards between Mozambique and South Africa.

Today we ask ourselves what crushed that great enthusiasm, this will to have peace and cooperation, publicly declared with the aim of promoting stable relations of respect and mutual security. The Nkomati Accord, celebrated by two sovereign states, was intended to promote good neighbourliness and cooperation for the benefit of both. The lengthy negotiations leading up to its signing show that there existed, and we think still exist, common interests between the two countries at bilateral level, in the context of southern Africa and in relations with the whole world.

Relations between Mozambique and South Africa testify to the complementary nature of very important economic sectors - the port of Maputo has always been regarded as the natural outlet to the sea for the northern and eastern Transvaal and there was a time when it handled seven million tonnes of South African cargo a year - since the beginning of this Century. Mozambicans have gone to work in South Africa - 130 000 Mozambican miners in one year, as well as tens of thousands of other Mozambicans who worked on farms - they were and are partners who have contributed, and still contribute, to the creation and expansion of the wealth that South Africa enjoys today. Tens of thousands of South Africans used to spend their holidays in Mozambique. The huge Cahora Bassa hydro-electric scheme, one of the world's largest, was built basically to supply electricity to South Africa. Many other projects were implemented or were under preparation.

One of the aims of the Nkomati Accord was precisely to enlarge this complementarity between two neighbouring states, drawing on economic interdependence which would benefit both sides. Economic relations would have contributed to strengthening security between the two countries.

The fifth anniversary of the signing of the Nkomati Accord passed just a few days ago. Good neighbourliness, peace and progress, declared by dignitaries from both countries to be the will of the two governments and
peoples, have still not been achieved.

The continued violence inside Mozambique, the increase in terrorist actions perpetrated by the so-called MNR or Renamo, widely described as armed bandits by Mozambicans, has created a climate of instability in which life and property are at risk. This violence is blocking the normal development of multifaceted relations between Mozambique and South Africa.

A report on the situation of displaced Mozambicans prepared by a consultant for the US State Department and widely disseminated in April last year, documents the atrocities committed by the armed bandits and the scorched earth policy being practiced against Mozambique.

The continuation of external aggression and destabilisation has already cost, directly and indirectly, the lives of six hundred thousand Mozambicans of which, according to UNICEF and Gersoni, at least 100 000 were murdered with wanton savagery. Hundreds of thousands of others have been tortured and mutilated by having noses, ears, lips and breasts cut off. Material damage now amounts to some ten billion dollars (more than 25 billion rands), corresponding to four times the annual GNP of Mozambique.

As a result of this murder and violence, about 5,6 million Mozambicans, 40 per cent of the population, have been forced to abandon their homes and property. In other words, one million families are suffering unspeakable hardship. They are in critical condition and struggling for their very survival. Some 200 000 children have no knowledge of their parents' whereabouts or have witnessed their murder.

The armed bandits have also carried out large-scale destruction and sabotage of infrastructure, vehicles, factories, generators, power lines, railways, roads and bridges. They have destroyed 2 599 primary schools and 822 health units in the rural areas and 44 agro-industrial enterprises. Over 1 300 trucks, tractors and buses - some burnt with passengers still inside - and 900 mostly private shops have been systematically looted and destroyed. The bandits steal food, clothes, household goods, radios, bicycles and other items from the people. A senior USA government official has described the MNR's barbarity as one of the most brutal holocausts against ordinary human beings since World War II.

My present position in the National Executive Commission for the Emergency has enabled me to witness these atrocities and destruction. If any of you present here, today, or your associates would like to witness a little of this drama in order to understand better the tragedy in Mozambique, it can be arranged.

If the objective of the armed bandits is to take power or to promote an alternative society for the Mozambican people, it is not comprehensible why
they destroy bridges, equipment and factories. By attacking and decimating the people and property, both private and public, the armed bandits are implementing an anti-national project. What is happening in Mozambique is not civil war. It is terrorism on a huge scale, until now commanded from outside with the objective of keeping Mozambique, and the other countries of the region, in a state of permanent debility.

In August 1985, 17 months after the Nkomati Accord was signed, a variety of documents were found when the bandits' main base in the Gorongosa mountains was captured. Many of these documents made references to meetings between the MNR bandits and the South African authorities, demonstrating that the Nkomati Accord was being violated. Weapons, logistical and communications equipment and messages were still flowing regularly from South African territory to the armed bandits.

The Gorongosa documents were widely publicised at the time, and the South African Foreign Minister admitted that Mozambique's charges were in fact true. He described what had taken place as technical violations....

... Mozambique is going through a very difficult period in its history because of external destabilisation and to a lesser extent because of prolonged drought and periodic floods.

However, Mozambique's relations with all countries and international organisations helped it to face continuing destabilisation and other external factors. Their contributions helped the Gross National Product to increase by 4.0 per cent in 1987 and 4.6 per cent in 1988, with 5.0 per cent forecast for this year.

South Africa could have participated in the economic recovery and the growth and development of the Mozambican economy. That was in fact one of the objectives of the Nkomati Accord, which has until now been rendered infeasible by the forces of aggression. Several projects agreed by enterprises in both countries and approved by the governments soon after Nkomati were suspended or made inviable by banditry.

A prevailing climate of security is indispensable to the implementation of economic projects, to the tranquility of nationals and foreigners alike. Only when this climate of understanding, good neighbourliness and confidence is restored will we be able to say that the Nkomati Accord has achieved one of its main objectives....

... No country in southern Africa - not even the Front Line or SADCC countries together - poses an economic or military threat to South Africa. However, systematically and openly-stated threats against the countries and personalities of the region come from pro-apartheid forces in the region.
The anti-colonial connotations in the foundation of the South African state are in contradiction with attempts to hinder the independence of other sovereign countries in southern Africa. These countries won independence after struggles in which South Africa was never on their side. It is in connection with the Republic of South Africa that these countries today face the greatest difficulties in relationships, notably on questions of their national security.

Despite southern Africa's strategic position and its enormous potential, most of the countries in the region, including Mozambique and South Africa itself, are facing serious economic, financial and social difficulties. This is the price of confrontation and destabilisation....

... The existence of guarantees for inter-state security, as well as mutual respect and permanent dialogue constitute the fundamental basis of any solution to the problems in southern Africa. In my opinion, these are the necessary conditions for economic growth and development and to promote the well-being of the people....

Throughout these past five years, while not forgetting the critical times, one can say that the possibility and the will for peace and cooperation has always remained open between representatives of the two governments. This road would open the way towards economic and technical cooperation between our two countries.

The Songo meeting in September last year between the Presidents of South Africa and Mozambique put fresh dynamism into relations between the two countries. That meeting demonstrated that the spirit of the Nkomati Accord still lives. However, it must be strengthened through practical action. Following that summit meeting, the Joint Security Commission was revived and an Economic Cooperation Commission and several specialised sub-commissions were created. They have met regularly, and there are interesting prospects on the results that may be obtained.

Obviously there are still many obstacles to be overcome. One cannot talk of cooperation on Cahora Bassa or the use of the railway linking the Transvaal to Maputo when a week later those same projects are out of operation because of sabotage. Ambivalence must be overcome. Undertakings should be respected in order to build up confidence and credibility.

The Mozambican authorities are doing everything possible to have the aggression stopped, by adopting a series of political, social and economic measures. A law on amnesty was passed. In just one year more than three thousand armed bandits, including some chiefs, returned to the country, where they have been pardoned and are being helped to restore their productive base and reintegrate into society.
At the same time, effectively dismantling the apparatus which supports the MNR is fundamental. The MNR was transferred in 1980 by its creator, the Rhodesian secret services, to South Africa, where it was developed and made more powerful. The armed bandits were created by external forces and their activities would cease with an end to the supplies and support they still receive from outside. Participating in the dismantling of this terror machine would be a positive and active way to implement the Nkomati Accord.

To believe that terrorism is a way to subjugate any country, no matter how weak, is, in my opinion, a strategic error. It is also a tragic error that has cost the lives of thousands of people and caused huge material damage. It has been said many times since Mozambique's independence that Frelimo would not last six months more. Although it is deeply scarred, the country still exists and there is no credible alternative to the Frelimo government. Mozambique is part of the community of nations and it is benefiting from its relations with all countries, irrespective of their political, economic, social or ideological regime.

Mozambique's economic potential is enormous. There is huge scope for bilateral and multilateral cooperation in fisheries, transport, agriculture, industry, mining and tourism. The foreign investment law in force in Mozambique offers satisfactory benefits to those who want to invest.

There are companies from the four corners of the world investing and carrying out projects in Mozambique. Some South African companies are successfully operating with Mozambican companies. The forces of aggression are increasingly out of place in today's world, which is characterised by easing tension and disarmament. By helping to make aggression less feasible, the business community could make prospects for cooperation more feasible, and draw the obvious benefits.

Trust, seriousness and hard work will ensure that the Nkomati Accord and the recent agreements on Southwestern Africa will become reference points in history to which mature and far-sighted men and women dedicated themselves for the common good.

I am sure that the extension of current efforts will generate respect for human dignity and will foster democracy for all human beings throughout the southern African subcontinent, irrespective of their skin colour or beliefs. Then our children and your children will be able to awake without fear of bombs, of warplanes or of cannon. I am convinced that the Nkomati Accord will be regarded as an instrument which made it possible for Mozambican children to bathe on South African beaches and for South African families to travel regularly to the beautiful holiday resorts in Mozambique.

[This paper is based on the talk given by Dr Ratilal at a conference of the]
Africa Institute and is reproduced in part here with the approval of that body.

Statement by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 22 March 1989

The Department of Foreign Affairs rejects the statements made by Dr Prakash Ratilal, Co-ordinator, National Commission for the Emergency, Mozambique, in Johannesburg on 21 March 1989 concerning help to Renamo from 'sectors' in South Africa. The government of Mozambique has not brought new matters regarding Renamo to the attention of the Joint Security Commission which meets on a monthly basis. South Africa has incessantly requested that Mozambique produce evidence of breaches of the Nkomati Accord. The same demand has been made of other governments repeating such allegations.

Two incidents were recently raised in the Commission by South Africa after public Mozambican statements had implicated South Africa, i.e. the shooting incident at Muzi on the Natal border and the recent press statements of a Mr Tivane relating to his alleged experiences at Skukuza. Both these incidents were subsequently investigated jointly by the Commission. In the first case it was found that a South African soldier had in fact been shot by Mozambican forces on South African territory and not in Mozambique as originally alleged, likewise the allegations of Mr Tivane of a Renamo training camp in Skukuza, which Mozambique had broadcast, were accepted as being untruthful: indeed, Mr Tivane has been taken back to Skukuza with the South African and Mozambican authorities and no trace of anything to do with Renamo was found.

The South African Government has on numerous occasions made it quite clear that it does not support Renamo and unsubstantiated insinuations of this nature which are not raised in the Joint Security Commission only serve the interests of those opposed to the positive improvement of relations between the two countries. It is regretted that senior officials from Mozambique appear to fan the anti-South African propaganda put out by the Mozambique media and ignore the findings of such bodies as the Joint Security Commission or the positive activities of the Joint Commission for Economic Affairs, the various aid projects and development assistance granted to Mozambique over the past twelve months.

[Text provided by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs.]
Q: Mrs Thatcher, many African leaders, including some who have fought long and hard for their independence, have been telling you that the way to bring about political change in South Africa is the mixture of armed struggle and sanctions. Now, leaving aside the rights and wrongs of sanctions, hasn't it been rather arrogant of you to dismiss their arguments out of hand?

Mrs T: I have never dismissed their arguments out of hand. I have sat and argued it through with them at Commonwealth conference after Commonwealth conference, steadily argued it through. And in the end, you will have seen, the argument which I have put has in fact prevailed. Those that believe in sanctions have not in fact imposed them, and have not imposed them for one of the very reasons which I said: first, they will damage your own people enormously, and, secondly, you don't set out to relieve the poverty and starvation, say in a place like Ethiopia, and then say, well we're going to put it on in a place like South Africa. This is just totally absurd. (I have frequently said to my fellow heads of governments, sitting in a Commonwealth Conference in a rather nice hotel, very well looked after: Really, I find it utterly repugnant that you should talk about putting on sanctions to people who are thousands of miles away, who are trying in fact to get a living; and then in fact you're going to take it away from them by some of the sanctions.)

Q: But they say they don't mind [the sanctions].

Mrs T: Oh no, no they do not. Some of the people who speak for them say they don't mind. And some of those people who have advised it, have never put it on themselves. Never!

Q: You say sanctions don't work, but didn't the mixture of sanctions and arms struggle work in Zimbabwe, isn't that what got rid of Ian Smith?

Mrs T: Sanctions most certainly didn't work. If anything they strengthened the economy of what was then known as Southern Rhodesia ... Southern Rhodesia had done what's known as UDI and had previously been under British rule. In South Africa, South Africa was given independence seven or eight years after the Boer War as the Union of South Africa and has been an independent country for a very long time.

Q: It is the same problem of white minority rule?
Mrs T: In that sense it is the same problem, but the Zimbabwe way is not open to South Africa because South Africa is an independent country.

Q: South Africans have made it clear that they would like you on this trip to go to South Africa now. Is there any chance that you might go?

Mrs T: No there isn't, because I've made it quite clear that I couldn't go until something quite positive happens and Mr Mandela is released. Because, if I did go, I think it might be misinterpreted, and I wouldn't have that for worlds. I think that there are chances of things improving enormously in South Africa, once Mr Mandela is released. Then I think it opens the way for negotiations to start. But I couldn't go just at the moment until there are more signs of that happening.

It would be two things: the release of Mr Mandela and his freedom to put his own views, and a forsaking of violence as a way to proceed. When the release of Mandela happens, I believe that opens up the possibility for negotiations, and it will have to be solved by negotiations. At the same time you'll be keeping the economic success of South Africa, which gives everyone a very much better chance of coming through to a highly successful country.

Q: If the South Africans were to release Nelson Mandela while you were on this trip, would you consider then popping across the border?

Mrs T: I don't think they will, and I have a very full programme. But it would make possible a visit, at some time. Whether I would have enough time to do it then, I think would be debatable. But it would make it possible. But I don't think they will, they don't work that way. So although it's a theoretical possibility, I don't think it's likely to happen just exactly while I'm there.

Q: I get the impression Mr Pik Botha raised your hopes on this, that he said it might happen.

Mrs T: He was very frank - and I hope I am not misinterpreting him, which I try not to do - that he himself wished to see the release of Mr Mandela, and he, too, thought that it would open the way to negotiations. So I think that it's on the agenda.

Q: He has been claiming, Foreign Minister Pik Botha, that South Africa is ready to enter a new era, both in its relations with its neighbours and internally. Now, do you think that South Africa is about to do this or not?

Mrs T: I am told that things have already changed enormously in South Africa. I can't judge; it's a long time since I've been there. I think
the last time was round about 1972 - the only time I went. And I'm told by everyone who goes that there is an enormous change, that things are economically very much freer. We have been helping, as you know, particularly with the education of black South Africans. But I know that there are now far more black South Africans who matriculate than there are white South Africans, which you may say, is as it should be, but it's also happening. And, of course, some of the fundamental changes of laws have taken place under President Botha. So I'm told that things are changing there. We naturally are anxious for things to move on to the next stage. I think most people accept that it must happen, and that it will happen. It's as if a new world is waiting to be born.

Q: What in your view is the next stage, that they should take?

Mrs T: Well I've indicated I think if Mr Mandela is released I think that negotiations become possible with some of the other many leaders of black South Africans. Obviously they're not a homogenous people any more than we are in Europe. It's not possible, I think, for Chief Buthelezi, who's head of the Zulus, it wouldn't be possible for him to negotiate unless Mr Mandela were released. Another very able person who comes here and talks to us sometimes is Chief Mubusa of the South African Swazis and we've helped him with refugees who've poured across the border from Mozambique, from the atrocities of Renamo, and there are several others who have been used to having power each in their own particular sphere. Now none of them could enter into negotiations before the release of Mr Mandela together with the freedom to put his own viewpoint. We can't tell them how to do those negotiations, they'll have to do them themselves, they really will. You can't dictate to people, nor should you try, sometimes you can do things and offer things which may make it easier for them to do it, but they have to live in that country, they have to live there together, all of them, they've all got to make a future there.

And I think there has been another tremendous advance, if I might call it that. Three years ago we would not have thought that they could reach the agreement that they have on Namibia. Now it's come about. That's a real plus. Both South Africa and the United States negotiated with Angola, and the elections will take place in Namibia for Namibian independence in November. And that's a great plus for everyone, and also the Soviet Union was very actively involved in influencing Cuba.

Q: Is Namibian independence now inevitable in your views? Is that definitely going to happen, or could that still crumble?

Mrs T: I believe that Namibian independence is inevitable. We have put in, you know, part of our part of the contingent of the United Nations forces; we have put in the Signals, because upon them depend all the communications.
Q: Prime Minister, you seem to set great store in the release of Nelson Mandela, but you seem reluctant to talk to the organisation that he leads, the ANC. And it would seem rather strange that you should be advocating that Mr Nelson Mandela be released, when his followers who are outside, who are not in jail, you are not keen on talking to them.

Mrs T: I don't talk to those people, until they have called a halt to violence. I thought the Eminent Persons Groups who came from the Commonwealth - remember after the Bahamas Commonwealth Conference - really had it right when they said: 'Yes we believe the answer is in negotiations in return for a suspension of violence'. I think those were their words. I think the government of South Africa would like a renunciation of violence. We didn't quite get that, and I do not talk to those who, in fact, pursue their ends by violent means. I believe the answer to this one is through negotiation...

Q: (Interruption): But Mr Mandela is the leader of the ANC.

Mrs T: Look, we are trying to get a way through by saying Mr Mandela should be released and should be free - and this is a part of the bargain - should be free, in fact, to put his own view, but not - no one is free (to do this) - to exercise violence. One tries to get a law-abiding country. Violence is anarchy and the rule of the gun and rule by force. It is not something which I have any sympathy with at all.

Q: Would you be wanting one man, one vote in South Africa?

Mrs T: I think you'll have to have one person, one vote. That does not necessarily mean in a unitary state. They will have to work it out. From my knowledge of South Africa, it is made up of many and varied peoples. They will have to work out how it is done.

Q: So you are suggesting a federal system for the country?

Mrs T: It is not for me to suggest. It is not for us, from this country, to suggest or to impose. It is for us to say that you are the people who are going to live there; you are going to have to work this system. It is not for us, whether from your own very estimable organisation or from Number 10, to impose. It is for us to say that you must get down to negotiations, the world is waiting and wanting it. You're all going to have to live there with one another, and therefore you must come to what you find a good working arrangement for you to live in peace and to develop the economy of that country to the advantage of you all.

Q: You say you don't like violence in any shape or form, but you yourself have been prepared to use violence over a matter of principle, i.e. the Falkland Islands. How can you turn to (criticise) people who say, 'We want
to use violence, we have to use violence for principles that we believe in?"

_Mrs T_: The Falkland Islands was invaded, totally against international law and totally in denial of the right of self-determination of those people. We went back to restore international law, to restore their right to self-determination and to restore the sovereignty. That was in flagrant violation of international law.

_Q_: But hasn't the South African government flagrantly violated all human laws and the laws of the United Nations?

_Mrs T_: I wonder if you're suggesting that, whenever we find the violation of human rights, we should march in. I think you would be in very great difficulty, if that is your proposition, very great difficulty. We are proposing that this should be resolved by negotiation.

_Q_: There has been a lot of speculation that you were trying to get together some kind of Southern African regional conference to which South Africa would be invited, to try and solve Southern Africa's problems. Is there any truth in this speculation?

_Mrs T_: I am not myself trying to get together such a conference. I am just very anxious indeed that South Africa should start to tackle her own problems. I am ... 

_Q (Interruption):_ Would it be a good idea, if you are not, to call it yourself?

_Mrs T_: Again, I think the countries of the region possibly have to (do it). If they come along and say, 'Will you help?', that's different. But look, I only have to say to you, 'You're obviously an ex-colonial overlord', and we therefore have to be very, very super-sensitive as to how we deal with things. And there is certain help which is readily available. Some people will say, 'Well, can you give us help about drafting a constitution?' Of course, we can! We've got people who've done heaven knows how many of them. They ask for help, it is there. But to try to impose it upon them, is a pretty insensitive thing to do. I'm very much aware, particularly when we go to that Commonwealth conference, that I am there as one country equal with others. It means that we have to be careful in the way in which we even offer help.

_Q_: A lot of people in black Africa feel that, if you have the muscle, you should use it where it comes to South Africa. You and Japan, and America and Germany and France - if you all got together and used the muscle, then South Africa would change.
Mrs T: I'm not sure what you call the muscle. I think South Africa is changing. The number of reforms which actually President Botha has implemented are very considerable indeed. They set South Africa on the path to reform, after she'd got off to the wrong way in apartheid. I think, if you want people to come the right way, to ending apartheid, you have to encourage them.

Transcript of the press conference given by the Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher, in Harare, on Thursday, 30 March 1989

Prime Minister:

For us, this has been a very good visit, very quietly impressive. We are immensely grateful for the generous hospitality which has been arranged everywhere we have been and for the very, very warm welcome we have received. There is obviously a great bond between Zimbabwe and the United Kingdom and particularly for this government, because of the history.

I had delayed coming here for some time and was very anxious to see how Zimbabwe was getting on with her development and I think you will agree that she is getting on very well indeed. We wanted to have some idea of how the aid which the United Kingdom has given was being used. That, too, I thought impressive.

The land settlement scheme we saw this morning seemed to us extremely good in every way, not only for the variety of agriculture and the kind of village and rural life they were having, but also the education they were giving in the schools and the health service which they received.

We also saw British investment in Zimbabwe. As you know, most of it is pre-independence, but what we saw this morning was the first really big investment in Zimbabwe since independence.

We also set out to see the help we were giving with regard to military assistance for Mozambique and the training of the Zimbabwe armed forces. You will be aware that after independence, we set out to help to weld three armies into one loyal to Zimbabwe and after that, we were asked by the President of Mozambique if we could also help to train some of his army to tackle Renamo. You saw where we were doing that and I just felt very proud of everything the British Army is doing and the way in which it is carrying out its duties.

There, too, we are giving aid. We announced while we were here an extra pounds sterling 500 000 particularly for equipment for the Mozambique soldiers fighting Renamo. I also announced an extra pounds sterling 500 000 for the Zimbabwe soldiers who are helping in Mozambique, and among
other aid we announced were pounds sterling 3 million for refugees from Mozambique and also pounds sterling 10 million of aid for Zimbabwe for normal purposes, either for project aid or for land settlement, and pounds sterling 10 million for Mozambique. So we are keeping up our record of help - very practical help, steady help - and continual interest in this region.

I think if people are coming to invest here, they are going to look for three things, as I indicated at the gold mine earlier today:

They are going to look for a good economy and I think they find it in Zimbabwe, whether it be in the agricultural work or in the increasing industry or in the potential development.

They also look for a stable political system. That is extremely important if you are making major investments in a country in Africa, and I think they find great stability in Zimbabwe.

They will also, as I indicated, look for an investment code. If you can choose where to put your investment in the world, you are not going to put it into a country unless there is some sense of certainty that you will be able to get out a reasonable profit from your endeavour and be able to keep some of the other profit in order to invest within. Now, they have not yet got that investment code. There is to be a major investment conference in London in May for more investment for Zimbabwe and they indicated that they are likely to have a code of practice ready, and I think when they have got that, there will be a lot more people who will choose to invest in Zimbabwe because they will find it a good country to invest in.

With regard to the politics, I think there is enormous hope for the politics of the region. Again, like East-West in a way, more hope than I have seen for a long time. Perhaps the dominant factor is South Africa.

I now have a policy of seeing Ministers from South Africa. I think perhaps we isolated them for too long. I think it would have been better if we had seen more of them - they might then have seen how the rest of us live in a society which knows nought of differences between races and eschews racial discrimination.

I saw recently Pik Botha when he came to London and I shall see other Ministers if they come near London, to see exactly what is happening in South Africa, to see if there is anything we can do to help to influence it in the direction in which we wish it to go.

With regard to Mozambique, you will have seen the report on Renamo compiled by the United States. One of the most brutal terrorist movements that there is and the record of atrocities was utterly horrific to anyone who
read them. He [President Chissano] really has a very considerable problem on his hands. I think he and other people are anxious to have some kind of reconciliation in Mozambique, but it is not easy to see how it can be brought about. In the meantime, we shall do everything we can to step up the training of his army so they can properly defend some of the villages and the railway lines and really make inroads into the people who are supporting terrorism and who are fighting a horrific battle.

Namibia: again, two or three years ago, we would have been surprised had we forecast that we would be sitting here today and that the United Nations were already in there to have the kind of election, I hope run in precisely the same way as we ran it in Zimbabwe nine years ago. And, of course, the Cubans withdrawing from Angola again is very good news.

So throughout the region - Botswana has always been a very stable and good economy - there is more hope, there is an understanding that it is best to solve these problems as far as possible by negotiation. I think that is now understood for the greater part in South Africa, although obviously President Mugabe and I have differences of view on this. We have long known about them. I think I am right. I know that he hopes he is wrong, because it would be better if there were no violence there and it were solved by negotiation.

I think perhaps I have talked enough. What have we covered? We have covered an effective aid programme, we have covered the very good future, both economically and politically for Zimbabwe, and we have covered the greater political hope that there is in this region, which is good news for us all.

Question (Morning Herald):

... Why is it that you said on the BBC last week you would not be prepared to meet with the ANC until it renounced violence, that Mr Mandela would have to renounce violence to be released from jail, but that you will meet with members of the South African Government, when they commit daily acts of very real violence against the black civilian population, including children?

Prime Minister:

If you look at the entire context, you will see we have tried always to try to settle things by negotiation. In the end, that was what settled things for Zimbabwe - a lengthy negotiation at Lancaster House by people being prepared to forswear violence for the ballot box.

We seek precisely the same thing in South Africa and I think that it can be brought about. It has to be done by no violence on any side in return for
genuine negotiations to get a settlement which ends apartheid and enables all people in South Africa to take part in the government.

There has not been any renunciation of violence yet. As you know, Mr Mandela has not yet been released and when he is released, obviously he has to be free to speak his mind and obviously people have to be free to say what they wish to say other than, of course, incitement to violence. I imagine the law there is against that as it is in the United Kingdom.

So if you look at the context, you will see that it is the context that brought about peace in Zimbabwe, but it is two-sided. It is genuine negotiation which affects all, in return for suspension of violence, trying to get through to a result which is satisfactory for all people of all races.

Mr Mills (BBC, Harare):

Are you disappointed that you were unable to persuade President Mugabe to come into the 'negotiations camp', if I can call it that, as opposed to sanctions?

And did you discuss with him the possibility of Britain selling him Harrier jets or fighter aircraft?

Prime Minister:

We did not have a long discussion on defence in any way. We just touched upon it very, very gently, because we were actually discussing other things, which I have indicated.

No, not especially disappointed. I know President Mugabe. I have in fact - if I might put it this way - fought off sanctions at three Commonwealth conferences, one in Nassau, one smaller one in London and one in Vancouver, and I think fought them off successfully... It is not my way.

We spend a lot of money on relieving poverty and starvation in Africa, a great deal of money, because we dislike it wherever it occurs. If sanctions worked, they would only work by bringing about poverty and starvation and anyone who inherited South Africa would inherit a wrecked economy and the prospects for all people there would be infinitely worse than they will be if we save that economy and come - as I believe we shall - to a negotiated settlement.

Do not forget, it will be a negotiated settlement for Namibia because the elections are [to be held] first [prior] to a convention which will decide the constitution.
My way will be very much better. You will have an excellent economy inherited by a new South African government. The sanctions way is the way of poverty, starvation and destroying the hopes of the very people - all of them - whom you wish to help.

So I fought this off three times. The fact is that those who fought me and wanted to impose sanctions have not gone ahead and done so.

Question:

... What specific effects do you think sanctions would have on the Front-Line States and on the majority of the population in South Africa?

Prime Minister:

I have indicated what I thought would happen in South Africa if they were effective. I think one of the reasons why people have not in fact imposed them from other states in Africa has been that they know full well it would have a very, very bad effect on their own people, because the economies are intimately bound up in many ways one with another.

We have been trying to give very considerable help so that some of the Front-Line states may have an alternative route to the sea and, indeed, we are doing a good deal, as you know, for the Limpopo line.

I think since 1980, we have given, through SADCC, pounds sterling 1 billion, so we have been trying very hard to get alternative lines, but otherwise, yes, it would be very damaging and I am the first to understand why they have not imposed sanctions. But really, may I say I think that there is so much hope now that I think it would be absurd to start to impose them at a time when South Africa has also been helpful in negotiating for the independence of Namibia. To start to impose sanctions when things are coming much further in the direction in which we wish them to go, I think it would be absurd.

I think the next major step is the release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of political organisations and then, I think that that unlocks the door to all kinds of negotiations and I think that there is a good chance that those will come about.

Jon Snow (ITN):

Prime Minister, you have talked repeatedly about wanting to see the Lancaster House methods applied in Namibia. Does the intention that you should go to Namibia on Saturday indicate that you want to play a leading role in ensuring free and fair elections inside Namibia?
Prime Minister:

If I am going anywhere, I make an announcement about it. I have no announcement to make. Namibia is quite different from Zimbabwe.

When Zimbabwe was Southern Rhodesia, the Commonwealth Conference at Lusaka in 1979 delegated wholly to Britain the responsibility for bringing Southern Rhodesia to lawful independence and we agreed that we would have a conference and we kept very closely in touch, not only with the Front-Line States, but with many other states in Africa. For example, Samora Machel was most helpful, and we kept in regular touch with him.

The history in Namibia is just very different. That is governed by the Resolution 435. There are various people who think they would like to alter that resolution - there is no question of altering it. That resolution has been passed to be observed meticulously and the observation of it means free and fair - scrupulously fair - elections and those elections will first be to a body which will determine the future constitution, so that is the method of determining the constitution.

So far as Lancaster House was concerned, we determined the constitution there and then had elections to a constitution that had already been agreed by the three main party leaders.

So it is a rather different system, but it is absolutely vital that Resolution 435 is strictly observed and that is our purpose in sending some of our army there under the United Nations auspices, to help see that it is observed.

Question (inaudible)

Prime Minister:

We are providing assistance to the army in Mozambique and training them so that they may deal with Renamo in their country. It is not for us to go into another country and deal with it.

We are friendly with Mozambique, but we have never had responsibility for Mozambique, so we are doing, I think, a very constructive thing in providing training and we shall try to step up that training, and I think it is doing extremely well.

We have no responsibility for the internal matters in Mozambique. We are helping as much as we possibly can.
Question:

What will Britain do to ensure that South Africa does not continue to support Renamo?

Prime Minister:

I think that most people - possibly not most in this room - but many, many people accept that the South African Government is not supporting, officially or unofficially, Renamo in any way. That is what they have told me when I have tackled them. Most recently, I tackled Mr. Pik Botha about it when he came through London. The South African Government is not supporting Renamo in any way.

I believe the South African Government would like to see peace in Mozambique, so that the country can develop its resources, and she is not supporting Renamo in any way.

Question ('The Guardian' of Nigeria):

During your recent meeting with the South African Foreign Minister, did you get the impression that the South African régime is now prepared to negotiate with the authentic black leaders on our terms?

Prime Minister:

I think that they wish to bring apartheid to an end. I think they know that it will obviously have to be brought to an end by negotiation with several representatives of black Africa.

I have urged them that I think that it is possible that negotiation might come about within the foreseeable future, to work out details of what such a negotiation would consist of, who would be there - that, too, also has to be a matter of consultation - and have some kind of ideas ready so that after Mr. Mandela is released, which I hope will not be too long, there would not be a vacuum but they would already have plans to carry forward.

Question:

Once you said that Mr. Gorbachev was a man you could do business with. What do you think of him now and what kind of business do you expect to do with him here in Southern Africa?

Prime Minister:

I have not altered my view. It was a correct initial impression. It has been proved correct on further acquaintance, not only by myself but with
many other leaders in the Western World – they have echoed the sentiment again and again. The initial view – a man I could do business with, a man of boldness, courage and vision – was right.

I think that the settlement would not have been reached in Angola without the active cooperation of the Soviet Union, and I believe that perestroika is working externally in that way. And I believe that the Soviet Union is seeking to solve some of the other world problems too by negotiation. And I think that the Soviet Union in many ways is preferring that route to any support – or any previous support – of organisations which have included violence on their agenda.
With Namibia's independence appearing more and more probable in 1989, financial and business interests are taking a fresh look at the prospects for investment and trade possibilities in the country.

To the average businessman, Namibia is known more for its economic resources than for the dire plight of its people over the last 104 years or so. Its diverse resource base, which includes rich mineral deposits, one of the world's richest sea fishing grounds, beef and karakul pelts (Persian lamb furs) has always attracted a wide range of financial and commercial interests. These resources, which make Namibia the fourth-largest mineral producer in Africa and the seventeenth in the world, give the country a fairly important place in the global operations of several transnational corporations (TNCs).

Many in these circles believe that, if peace and settlement are finally achieved in the next two months as it now seems, the immediate prospects for the recovery of the Namibian economy look reasonably good.

During the last 10 years, Namibia's economy has been depressed to the point of near collapse due to the following factors:

- a sharp decline in the prices of minerals resulting from the recent recession in the world markets;
- more than two decades of a war, which has seriously affected the daily life of nearly two thirds of the population and forced Pretoria to conscript into its army some 50 000 of the able-bodied Namibians, including thousands of white artisans who were previously employed in industries, especially the vital mining sector;
- a decade of ruthless overexploitation of the country's fishery resources;
- prolonged drought; and
- mismanagement and corruption.

Mining has been the main pillar of the economy of Namibia, accounting for a third of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 85% or more of all the goods exported from the country. The tax receipts from this source make up about half of the estimated government revenue. In all, a variety of more than 50 minerals is found in Namibia. The major ones are uranium, diamond and
base metals, such as copper, lead and zinc.

The Namibian mining industry is dominated by three major TNCs, namely, the Consolidated Diamond Mine (CDM) which is part of the South African-based De Beers group (itself a subsidiary of the Anglo American Corp conglomerate), the Rössing Corp, controlled by the UK-based Rio Tinto Zinc Corp and the Tsumeb Corp, controlled by the UK's Consolidated Goldfields through its South African subsidiary, Goldfields of South Africa. A smaller but significant part in the production of Namibia's base metals, uranium and other minerals is played by two South African parastatal companies – the Iron & Steel Corp of South Africa (ISCOR) and the Industrial Development Corp of South Africa (IDC). Another important South African company involved in the exploitation of Namibia's minerals is the Afrikaner-owned mining house, General Mining & Finance Corp of South Africa (GMFC). IDC and GMFC together own 26.8% of shares in the Rössing Corp, with substantial control over the mine because of the special type of shares which they own. These shares allow them controlling voting rights on the overall company policy.

There is not a single mining company operating in Namibia that is wholly or partially owned by Namibians.

This has meant that Namibia's minerals are effectively monopolized by Western and South African corporations; and with such a stranglehold on the country's key economic sector, these corporations have oriented the Namibian economy toward exports of unprocessed raw materials thus creating a situation whereby much of the wealth from the mining industry – up to 35% of the country's gross national product (GDP) – flows to foreign bank accounts of the transnational and South African corporations in the form of expropriation of profits, dividends, remittances and capital transfer. In other words, the mineral wealth of Namibia has so far not benefited the Namibians mainly because the corporate emphasis on production for exports has led to large disparities between national income and GDP, that is, huge profits for the foreign companies and extreme poverty for the black workers and peasants.

The renewed interest in the Namibia economy is for the moment focused on Swapo economic development policy because it is almost universally conceded that the movement will win the proposed UN-supervised independence elections, if they are free and fair. Swapo has thus been flooded with requests for interviews by media people and queries by government officials from many countries. The interviews and official discussions invariably have Swapo's economic policy as the central issue of interest.

This great interest has thus occasioned the release of this brief policy document on Swapo's thinking of Namibia's future economic reconstruction and development. The views expressed are synoptic, while the field of
Namibia's national economic reconstruction and development is vast. The purpose of the document is to give a glimpse of the movement's policy direction and not to offer an exhaustive presentation of its reconstruction program and development plan.

Swapo leadership does not hide its belief in the moral superiority of social ownership and control of the economic. Egalitarianism forms the basis of its vision of a just social order. But the movement is realistic enough to know that for the immediate future, independent Namibia will not have sufficient finance or technical and managerial expertise to maintain reasonable rates of economic outputs.

Already, about half of Namibian's own internal capital stock is in the form of public or state assets. These include the ownership of railroads, harbours and associated road services, post and telecommunications, water, electricity, some minority shareholdings in at least three mining companies, and some of the land and finance institutions. Thus to begin with, there is already a big demand for expertise for the future young state of Namibia to efficiently and effectively manage these public enterprises.

But this difficulty, having been admitted, Namibia, under a Swapo government, will not allow the status quo to continue whereby the structure of the economy is tailored to the needs and demands of foreign and local private capital. Change will have to be brought about. The present unjust state of affairs, characterized by a complete supremacy of foreign capital, on one hand, and the total subordination of capital formation under the colonial state and local private ownership, on the other, will have to go. Swapo's economic policy at independence is that there will be state, cooperative, joint venture and private participation in the national economy. The state will seek to have ownership of a more significant part of the country's resources than is the case now. No wholesale nationalization of the mines, land and other productive sectors is, however, envisaged for the foreseeable future.

Instead, the independent state of Namibia will stand ready to negotiate new and appropriate agreements with both the existing foreign companies and new investors who are interested in participating in Namibia's mineral development on an equal footing and for mutual benefits. The central plank of Swapo's policy on economic restructuring and development is to achieve a necessary measure of national control over the country's resources and to bring about a balance between just economic returns to the Namibian people, on one hand, and reasonable profits for foreign and local private investors, on the other. This is essential in order to eliminate the existing large disparities between Namibia's national income and GDP and the 25:1 ratio of white to black incomes.
The Mining Sector

The revenue and foreign exchange earnings from Namibia's mining sector will have to become the most important source for rebuilding and restructuring the country's national economy. To this end, investors will be required to plough back into the country's economy a significant part of their profits. Areas of the economy where such financial plough back will be necessary are further mineral explorations and development, especially with regard to the recently discovered mineral reserves like the massive coal deposits in the south eastern part of the country or the area between Aranos and the Botswana border, the Kudu natural gas field 120 km north of the Orange River and the gold fields in the areas of Karibib and Usakos in central Namibia.

Swapo's mineral development strategy will also aim at the integration of this key sector with the rest of the economy. This will include the development of mineral-based processing industries to provide things like fertilizers and simple agricultural implements, manufacturing of construction materials and the establishment of refineries for Namibia's metals and local diamond sorting, valuation and cutting to provide more jobs and higher returns for the country.

A Swapo government will also pursue just fiscal provisions in respect of the country's mineral industry. This will include a curb on the corrupt practice of "transfer pricing" and the introduction of a new tax regime to ensure adequate payment of license fees, state lease and other taxes by the mining companies operating in the country. At present, the TNCs are taxed considerably less than in other African countries. In the future, they will be required to pay tax rates that are commensurate with their actual earnings.

Swapo has not made this policy position a secret. On the contrary, it has stated the position on many occasions, as it told the companies operating in Namibia that after independence, the country will still offer them a reasonably good opportunity for investment.

Therefore, if the renewed corporate interest, discussed below, in Namibia's economic prospects is an indication of the likely response by the transnational and local businesses to Swapo's economic policy, then it is safe to say that many of them are ready for a new deal.

Land Reform Policy

With respect to land, Swapo is committed to a policy of reform in order to redress the imbalance of past policies of land allocation on a racial basis. The objective of the new policy will be to transfer some of the land from the few with too much of it to the majority landless.
At present, almost 60% of the land is owned by the whites. There are about 6,000 cattle and karakul ranches owned by some 5,000 white commercial farmers. According to South African official figures, as many as 48% of all these farms are owned by foreign absentee landlords. They will be obvious candidates for land redistribution. There are, furthermore, white individuals who own up to three farms. These farmers, too, will be obliged to give up some of the land to those who do not have it.

But as in the case of mining, there will be no full-scale nationalization of the land. Instead, there will be state farms, cooperatives, peasant family farming and private commercial farming. This strategy of mixed ownership or use of the land will seek to remote broad participation of the Namibian people in the country’s agricultural production and in the sharing of its surplus value. The second objective is to maintain increased agricultural production, with a significant measure of a balance between stock ranching and crop production in order for the country to be able to feed the population and thus to end the present contrived dependence on imports of foodstuffs from South Africa.

To this end, areas such as those of north-eastern, northern and north-central Namibia—covering what are presently known as the Ovambo, Kavango and Caprivi regions and the Tsumeb/Grootfontein/Otavi triangle—will be designated high-priority zones for crop production and intensive irrigation projects. These zones can produce enough food supply for the whole country. Enough cereals, fruits and vegetables etc., can provide the necessary support services to the agricultural sector in these and other zones in the form of credit, marketing, expert extension services for peasant farmers, infrastructure and adequate producer prices.

To realize these policy goals, it will be necessary to transfer considerable financial resources from the mining sector to the development of agriculture.

As part of its policy to achieve agricultural self-sufficiency and rural economic development, a Swapo government will promote the establishment of agro-industries which will include grain mills, fertilizer plants, timber mills, edible oil refineries, beverage distilleries, bag making, food processing, packaging and canning factories as well as the production of simple agricultural implements like hoes, axes, watering cans and ox-drawn ploughs.

In addition, a Swapo government will seek to put an end to the export of unprocessed karakul pelts which are now auctioned in London and processed for wholesalers in Europe and North America.

A Swapo government will seek joint ventures with interested investors to establish a local processing and manufacturing fashion industry to export
the pelts as finished products. This will provide more jobs and value-added income for the country.

An end will also be put to the present practice whereby Namibia's live cattle are shipped in their tens of thousands to South Africa for slaughtering and processing. This will now have to be done at home to eliminate the unnecessary transport costs to promote the development of local slaughter-houses and meat processing factories thereby creating employment opportunities for Namibians.

Swapo has been talking [sic] to the white commercial farmers and businessmen in commerce and service industry that notwithstanding the above-outlined policy, independent Namibia will still offer them far better opportunities for comfortable and secure economic undertaking than these foreign countries (South Africa and West Germany), which they tend to consider as their second homes. The movement has repeatedly appealed to these people to regard Namibia as, indeed, their homeland, to keep their assets in the country and to be ready to render their services to their country.

Swapo is committed to fair and just compensation in those instances where state acquisition of assets from private hands is considered necessary for the rebuilding and restructuring of Namibia's national economy.

These reassurances by Swapo, coupled with the fact that light can now be seen at the end of what must have appeared to many to be a dark tunnel of Namibia's struggle for independence, seems to slowly revive business confidence in Namibia's economic prospects.

For example, the local property market is already experiencing a buoyancy and the building industry is set for a big boom with local property developers reinvesting millions of rands in the building of shop and office complexes. The real estate speculators are ready to cash in as the demand for accommodation is expected to rise considerably at independence.

Foreign investors have also their eyes, once again, glued on Namibia's vast and rich mineral and other natural resources. This is true in regard to mineral and petroleum explorations as well as fisheries.

The financial and business interests now confess that independence will be a "much-needed boost for Namibia's depressed economy".

Jan Jurgens, who is currently in charge of Namibia's sea resources as the director of sea fisheries, admitted recently in Windhoek that "independence is the best thing that could happen to the fishing industry".
Pro-independence white lobbies in Namibia also smell economic boom in the air. Chairman of the Namibia Peace Plan-435-Contact and Study Group, Bryan O'Linn, for instance, stated recently in Windhoek that the postindependence outlook for the economy is, indeed, favourable. "International investment and expertise will be available to support the economy. A mixed economy will probably be maintained in which the best qualities of private enterprise will be blended with those of socialism," he said.

Overseas investors are also lining up to partake in the exploration and development of Namibia's resources. Two US companies, for example, have just signed an agreement on the transfer of a 260 000 sq km Etosha Pan concession in northern Namibia. Etosha Pan is an area where massive and promising explorations for oil and gas were going on in the 1970s by a locally registered company, called Etosha Petroleum, which is a subsidiary of Brilund Ltd. Both are controlled by William Schatten of Atlanta, Georgia, US.

The Etosha concession includes oil, gas and mineral development rights. But for nearly a decade, the explorations were abandoned because Etosha fell in the area where Swapo fighters were conducting some of their most intense guerilla operations. Actually, the company ceased operations after suffering a casualty among its staff in 1978.

Now that the prospects for peace are looking good, Brilund's dormant interest in the concession has been grabbed away by another US company, WJZ Oil, which is identified as a Delaware-based corporation with offices in New Vernon, New Jersey, US and one of the several companies controlled by private investor William J. Zylka's family. WJZ has already formed a locally registered company, known as WJZ Namibia, to restart explorations in the Pan.

Although financial details of the transfer have not been disclosed, it is understood that WJZ Oil will pay Brilund a minimum royalty of R500 000 a year, plus a 7% overriding royalty on the sales of gas and oil discovered from the concession area.

There is also an active interest in Namibia's gold deposits. The UK's Consolidated Gold Fields (CGF) has just restructured its Namibian mining and exploration interests, through its South African affiliate, Gold Fields of South Africa (GFSA), through the establishment of a new and locally registered company, Gold Fields Namibia (GFN), with an initial capital of $51.4 million.

GFSA has not said why it has decided to list its Namibian interests as a separate company on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Some business analysts believe that the possible motive behind GFSA's move is to protect its interest from possible nationalization by the future government of
Independent Namibia, if it remains operating as a South African company in Namibia.

Others think that the move is part of the current trend among the transnationals with operations in South Africa to try to spread their investment risks by registering some of their assets in countries which are not affected by the anti-apartheid sanctions pressure.

In addition, analysts say such a separate stock exchange listing will allow GFSA to raise outside finance for its Namibian subsidiary without those who will be giving loans having to worry about the spectre of sanctions.

GFN's interests in Namibia are substantial. They consist not only of the newly found gold fields, but also of its now wholly-owned Tsumeb Corp, which was formerly controlled by Newmont Mining Corp, Gold Fields' US associate. Tsumeb runs three copper-lead and silver mines as well as a copper and lead smelter. Last year, it produced 37 653 tons of blister copper, 40 634 tons of lead, 95 406 kg of silver and 172 kg of gold.

Its sales revenue was $89 million, which generated a pretax profit of $10.5 million.

This year, for the nine months up to September, the company reported pretax profits of $19.5 million on a turnover of $96.7 million.

Copper sales are forecast this year to reach 40 000 tons, lead 50 000 tons and silver 107 000 kg. Sales are expected to be worth $138 million, generating a pretax profit of $35.7 million.

For the third quarter, GFN showed increased production. The company milled 540 000 tons of ore and produced 11 571 tons of copper in concentrates, 4 768 tons of lead and 20 tons of silver, both also in concentrate.

The company also holds prospecting grants over more than one million hectares in central and north-western Namibia and is concentrating its prospecting effort on the search for gold and copper. It has also delineated uranium, salt and soda salt deposits. It is, therefore, no wonder that Gold Fields has rushed to set up a Namibia registered company in anticipation of independence.

CDM [Consolidated Diamond Mines] which, following the adoption of Resolution 435 in 1978, established its headquarters in Windhoek, Namibia's capital, is also now working on plans to establish a local facility for diamonds sorting, valuation and possibly cutting in anticipation of a new Swapo government policy, aimed at the creation of a local processing industry.
Policy on Fisheries

Independence will bring a much needed boost to Namibia's sagging and over-exploited fishing industry, a massive resource whose benefits have long been denied to the Namibian people and has instead been depleted mainly by South African fishing companies through overfishing. Allocation of high catching quotas to the South African fishing fleet and lax controls by the South African government over other fishing fleets have also greatly contributed to the devastation of Namibia's fish resources. This will have to end.

An independent Namibia will have a jurisdiction over the richest hake resource in the world, estimated at about R2 billion a year.

Sovereign and independent Namibia would declare a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone off its coast; and as a member of the South East Atlantic Fisheries (IC-SEAF), the country would be entitled to raise levies on concessions issued to other countries for fishing in its territorial water.

As with mining and agriculture, the policy of Swapo on fisheries envisages a mixture of a state fishery sector in the form of a national fishing company, joint-venture operations with experience and technologically better equipped foreign enterprises, local private ownership as well as workers' cooperatives with their own fishing vessels and canning or processing plants.

State allocation of quotas and controls over all the catching operations will be strict to enable Namibia's fish stock to recover from a decade of ruthless overexploitation and to ensure that the fisheries will once again become an important revenue-creating and export-earning sector that it used to be.

Namibia's Contrived Dependence on South Africa

There is a self-serving overgeneralization by South Africa and its friends that Namibia's economy is hopelessly dependent on that of South Africa; and that whatever the political and ideological colour of the government that will emerge from UN-supervised elections in Namibia, that government will have to toe the Pretoria line, if Namibia is to survive economically. This is essentially a false argument.

Although it is true that about two-thirds of all the investment in the Namibian mining industry is now owned by South African-based TNCs, these corporations are themselves haunted by the threat of sanctions against South Africa and are already embarked on their own investment risk-spreading policies. As mentioned earlier, they are busy establishing
separate and locally incorporated companies, outside South Africa. And since independent Namibia would not wish to share South Africa's sanctions burden, a Swapo government will ask the South African-based transnationals with operations in Namibia to seriously consider this policy option in pursuit of their own corporate interests, as different from those of the apartheid state. This means that the operations of these corporations will not offer Pretoria the kind of economic stranglehold that it would wish to have over Namibia.

Also a close examination of the mining equipment in Namibia shows that they are largely supplied by manufacturers in Europe and North America. As such, Namibia does not need to import them via South Africa. It can obtain them direct from the manufacturers.

Furthermore, unlike much of the south-central African countries, Namibia does not need access to South African rail routes or ports to transport its goods to the international markets, the claim for sovereignty over Walvis Bay by South Africa notwithstanding. The present use of South African routes and ports is contrived, rather than being natural, and it is unnecessarily expensive. For example, the transport of tens of thousands of live cattle to South Africa by railroad for slaughter and processing at South African abattoirs and plants is designed to give the South African Meat Board a complete monopoly of Namibia's beef export. Namibian commercial ranchers have in fact suffered serious losses through this policy. They pay for the long and unnecessary transportation of live cattle to slaughterhouses in South Africa. They suffer losses also when the South African Meat Board slashes, as it often does, the quota for live cattle imports from Namibia in order to keep up prices for South African farmers in a glutted home market.

Instead of benefiting from this imperial/client relationship between South Africa and Namibia, the latter has had to forego the development of its own slaughtering, cold storage and processing industry and is denied direct access to the lucrative European, Middle Eastern, Asian and other world markets.

Since much of Namibia's output of fishmeal and oil, some tinned fish and virtually all beef cattle are sent to South Africa to satisfy that country's own demand at prices which are usually far lower than the world market levels, Namibian food producers are quite often denied higher earnings from their exports because they are prevented from exporting directly from overseas markets.

Furthermore, Namibia has enough land to produce the crop side of the food supply. South Africa has consciously and deliberately discouraged Namibian farmers from going into the commercial production of cereals, fruits and vegetables in order to keep the country as a captive market for South
Africa's own food surplus. Thus, in short, contrary to the repeated claim that Namibia is heavily dependent on South Africa, the country is actually in a good position to establish its own independent trade routes to the Atlantic, even if Walvis Bay is under South African illegal occupation. Other small harbours along Namibia's 300-km coastal line can be developed in a reasonably short time, and this will be done. Namibian producers will in fact be freed from South African imperial control to diversify their trade composition and trade partners, and as such, to establish alternative markets where they could obtain better prices and trade terms, such as the possible EC preferential beef quota for Namibia under the Lomé Convention and through other multilateral facilities like the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), the Preferential Trade Area (PTA), the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), the Generalized System of Preferences, etc. The country will also, for the first time, have the freedom to produce for domestic and regional markets.

The South African-dominated Southern African Customs Union (SACU) does not constitute a beneficial relationship to Namibia. Rather, it permits a free flow of South African manufactured goods and finished products to Namibia, thereby undermining the emergence and growth of local manufacturing firms. Under SACU, Namibia in fact pays indirect tax to South Africa. This payment is usually included in pretax GDP or factor cost, which is paid to South Africa in the import bill and then returned in less proportion to Namibia as an external transfer payment.

Again, Namibia's membership in SACU is not a natural link between the two countries. Independent Namibia can easily decide to remain or not be a member of SACU; and if it opts out, there will be nothing approaching economic disaster. On the contrary, Namibia will be freed from the present unjust or horse and rider economic relationship.

Swapo does not, however, underestimate the enormity of the task ahead, and the considerable magnitude of the financial, technological and managerial requirements that must be met to rebuild and restructure Namibia's national economy, with a view to achieving growth with equity and economic independence from South Africa. Therefore, a Swapo government will make concerted efforts to obtain the necessary financial, technological, training and managerial assistance from both bilateral and multilateral sources in order to implement the above outlined economic restructuring and development plan for Namibia.
Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 435 (1978) and 430 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia

Introduction


2. The Security Council resumed its consideration of the question of Namibia at its 2755th meeting on 28 October 1987 and continued its discussion of the item at its 2756th to 2759th meetings, on 29 and 30 October 1987. At its 2759th meeting on 30 October 1987, the Security Council adopted Resolution 601 (1987), the text of which reads as follows:

The Security Council,

Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General of the United Nations of 31 March 1987¹ and 27 October 1987,²

Having heard the statement by the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia,³

Having also considered the statement by Mr Theo-Ben Gurirab, Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the South West Africa People's Organisation,³

Recalling General Assembly Resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and 2143 (XXI) of 27 October 1966 as well as Resolution S-14/1 of 20 September 1986,

² Ibid., Supplement for October, November and December 1987, document S/19234.
³ Ibid., Forty-second Year, 2755th meeting.

1. **Strongly condemns** racist South Africa for its continued illegal occupation of Namibia and its stubborn refusal to comply with the resolutions and decisions of the Security Council, in particular Resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978);

2. **Reaffirms** the legal and direct responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia;

3. **Affirms** that all outstanding issues relevant to the implementation of its Resolution 435 (1978) have now been resolved as stated in the Secretary-General's reports of 31 March and 27 October 1987;

4. **Welcomes** the expressed readiness of the South West Africa People's Organization to sign and observe a cease-fire agreement with South Africa, in order to pave the way for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978);

5. **Decides** to authorize the Secretary-General to proceed to arrange a cease-fire between South Africa and the South West Africa People's Organization in order to undertake the administrative and other practical steps necessary for the emplacement of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group;

6. **Urges** States Members of the United Nations to render all the necessary practical assistance to the Secretary-General and his staff in the implementation of the present resolution;

7. **Requests** the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress in the implementation of the present resolution and to submit his report as soon as possible;

8. **Decides** to remain seized of the matter.

3. In a communication dated 11 November 1987 (S/19290), Mr Sam Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), assured me of the fullest co-operation of SWAPO in respect of the mandate entrusted to me by Security Council Resolution 501 (1987). He reiterated the readiness of SWAPO to proceed immediately to sign and observe a cease-fire agreement with South Africa in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations plan, as endorsed by the Council in its Resolution 435 (1978).

4. I held consultations with HE Mr José Eduardo dos Santos, President of Angola, in Luanda on 18 February 1988, to review developments in southwestern Africa. He expressed support for my efforts to facilitate a peaceful settlement and said that Angola would continue to support the action of the United Nations to bring about peace in the region. To this end, he informed me that Angola was prepared to take new practical steps towards the attainment of that objective, including the initiation of peace talks with the Government of South Africa.
5. I also met with the President of SWAPO in Luanda on 18 February 1988, to discuss the implementation of Security Council Resolution 601 (1987). I informed him that I had not received a definitive response from South Africa in regard to the cease-fire called for in Security Council Resolution 601 (1987). He informed me that SWAPO was prepared to demonstrate flexibility in order to facilitate a settlement. In this connection, he stated that, while all constructive efforts to break the current impasse were welcome, no solution to the Namibian problem was acceptable outside the framework of Resolution 435 (1978).

6. In subsequent discussions with the Permanent Representative of South Africa on paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 601 (1987), I was informed that the Government of South Africa was not at war with any of the parties in Namibia. The Permanent Representative reiterated the position of the Government of South Africa that agreement must be reached on the withdrawal of all Cuban troops from Angola prior to the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978).

7. Delegations of Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, through the mediation of the Government of the United States of America, met in London, Cairo, New York and Geneva between 3 May and 5 August 1988. Their discussions were aimed at achieving a regional settlement of the conflict in south-western Africa. In New York they reached agreement, ad referendum to their Governments, on a basic document entitled 'Principles for a peaceful settlement in south-western Africa' (see annex). This document, which was initialled by the delegations of Angola, Cuba and South Africa on 13 July 1988, was approved by their respective Governments the following week and released publicly by mutual agreement on 20 July 1988.

8. Following further discussions from 2 to 5 August 1988 in Geneva, the delegations of Angola, Cuba and South Africa agreed on a sequence of steps necessary to prepare the way for the independence of Namibia in accordance with Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) and to achieve peace in south-western Africa. They agreed to recommend to me the date of 1 November 1988 for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) to begin. Further, the parties approved, ad referendum to their respective Governments, the text of a tripartite agreement that embodied, in binding treaty form, the principles negotiated in New York and published on 20 July 1988. On their side, Angola and Cuba reiterated their decision to subscribe to a bilateral accord which would include a timetable acceptable to all parties for the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The parties approved a comprehensive series of practical steps that would enhance mutual confidence, reduce the risk of military confrontation and create the conditions in the region necessary to conclude the negotiations. With the approval of these measures, a de facto cessation of hostilities came into effect. These agreements were embodied in the Geneva Protocol of 8 August 1988, which was approved by the Governments of Angola, Cuba and South

9. On 8 August 1988, the Foreign Minister of South Africa confirmed to me, in terms of the provisions of paragraph 5 of the Geneva Protocol, the South African Government's commitment to adopt the necessary measures of restraint in order to maintain the existing de facto cessation of hostilities.

10. On 12 August 1988, the President of SWAPO informed me (S/20129) that SWAPO had agreed to comply with the commencement of the cessation of all hostile acts, in accordance with the Geneva agreement. He also stated that SWAPO would be ready to continue to abide by that agreement until the formal cease-fire under Resolution 435 (1978). He stated that the cessation of SWAPO's combat actions against the South African forces in Namibia would only hold provided that South Africa also showed the necessary political will to do the same.

11. The parties to the talks on the situation in south-western Africa kept me informed of the progress of their negotiations. In my exchanges of views with them, I welcomed the agreements reached and urged them to redouble their efforts to facilitate a settlement. All confirmed their recommendation of the date of 1 November 1988 for the beginning of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), in accordance with the Geneva Protocol.

12. A meeting of the Heads of State of the Front-line States was held in Luanda on 8 August 1988. In a communiqué issued after the meeting, the Heads of State expressed their satisfaction and gave their total support for the results outlined in the joint statement issued at Geneva on 8 August 1988. They called upon the parties concerned to avoid any action that might jeopardise the negotiations. After having noted the positive evolution of the negotiations, with particular emphasis on the quadripartite meeting held at Geneva, the Heads of State requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to take measures aimed at the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978).

13. On 30 August 1988, I received a communication from the Permanent Representative of South Africa, stating that, in keeping with the spirit of the discussions between South Africa, Angola and Cuba, with United States mediation, which were aimed at securing a peaceful solution to the situation in south-western Africa, South Africa had, on 30 August 1988, completed the withdrawal of its troops from Angolan territory, in accordance with an undertaking given during the course of the discussions at Geneva.
14. Earlier, on 8 August 1988, I had received a communication from the Foreign Minister of South Africa, in which he informed me that, since the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978) was one of the important objectives of the Geneva Protocol, the South African Government considered it imperative that I should become involved at that stage. Accordingly, he informed me that the South African State President was inviting me to visit South Africa with a view to discussing preparations for the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978) and related matters, such as the decisive importance of impartiality on the part of the Secretary-General and the Security Council of the United Nations. He anticipated that my visit would expedite the steps envisaged in the Geneva Protocol.

15. On 17 August 1988, I met with Mr Derek Auret, Special Envoy of the South African Foreign Minister. He informed me that he had been asked by the Foreign Minister to stress the importance the Government of South Africa attached to the invitation it had extended to me and to urge me to accept it as a matter of priority. He emphasised that the President of South Africa believed that my visit would facilitate the peace process in south-western Africa and would stimulate and move forward the process for a settlement.

16. With regard to the question of impartiality raised in the Foreign Minister's letter, I emphasised to his Special Envoy that agreement had been reached on that issue in previous discussions with South Africa and that this had been reflected in my report to the Security Council (S/15943, para. 17) after my visit to South Africa in August 1988. Following further exchanges of views on the Foreign Minister's letter, it was agreed that discussions would not be re-opened on matters regarding which agreements had already been reached. It was also understood that any discussions envisaged with the Government of South Africa would be held within the framework of relevant decisions of the Security Council and the mandate entrusted to me as Secretary-General. I asked the Special Envoy to convey to the Foreign Minister my acceptance of the invitation by his President, subject to agreement on a mutually convenient date for my visit.

17. I subsequently confirmed to the Government of South Africa that I would be available to visit South Africa from 21 to 23 September 1988. I also accepted an invitation from the President of Angola to visit Luanda on 23 and 24 September 1988 to hold discussions with him on the situation in south-western Africa.

18. I was accompanied on my visit to South Africa and Angola by Mr Martti Ahtisaari, my Special Representative for Namibia; Mr Abdulrahim A. Farah, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Questions, Regional Cooperation, Decolonisation and Trusteeship; and Mr Marrack Goulding, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs.
19. In Pretoria, on 22 September 1988 I met with Foreign Minister Botha, General Magnus Malan, Minister of Defence, and Mr L.A. Pienaar, Adminis-
trator-General of Namibia. My discussions with the Foreign Minister
focused on practical arrangements for the implementation of Security
Council Resolution 435 (1978). I held discussions later the same day with
representatives of the internal parties of Namibia, who had come to
Pretoria to exchange views with me on the United Nations plan for Namibia.
The next day, 23 September 1988, I met with the State President and held
extensive discussions with him, both on the question of Namibia and on the
general situation in the region.

20. The State President reiterated to me South Africa's commitment to the
Geneva Protocol of 5 August 1988, by which the parties to the Protocol,
including South Africa, had agreed on a sequence of steps necessary to
prepare the way for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435
(1978) and to achieve peace in south-western Africa. In this connection,
he reaffirmed the recommendation that the implementation of Security
Council Resolution 435 (1978) should begin on 1 November 1988. He stated
that implementation could start as soon as agreement was reached on the
total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, as called for in the Geneva
Protocol, and that South Africa would continue its efforts within the con-
text of the talks on south-western Africa, in order to expedite agreement.

21. In response, I informed the State President that I was encouraged by
the progress made at the talks on the situation in south-western Africa and
urged all concerned, including South Africa, to make a renewed and deter-
mined effort at the next round to facilitate a settlement.

22. I informed the State President that I had set in motion the administrative
machinery for the emplacement of UNTAG in Namibia. In this connection, I
urged the Government of South Africa to extend its co-operation to the
United Nations, particularly in respect of facilities and services which
would be required by UNTAG in Namibia during the transitional period.
Following these exchanges of views with the State President, I reached
agreement with the Government of South Africa on the dispatch of a United
Nations technical team to visit Namibia and South Africa as a matter of
urgency, in order to up-date plans concerning administrative and logistic
requirements, as well as budgetary provisions, for UNTAG. The technical
mission was to review the situation on the ground in Namibia, hold dis-
cussions with its South African counterparts and collect, at first hand, ne-
necessary technical information and data. The technical mission duly
visited Namibia and South Africa between 2 and 23 October 1988.

23. In my discussions in Pretoria, it was also agreed to finalise for signature
the draft agreement on the status of UNTAG, in order to establish the legal
status of UNTAG and its personnel in Namibia. This has now been done in
principle. I also reviewed with the State President developme-
ning the military component of UNTAG which had taken place since my last visit to South Africa in August 1983. I explained that further consultations would be necessary, especially as regards the logistic elements of the military component, before its composition could be finalised.

24. I further confirmed to the State President that agreement had been reached on the system of proportional representation for the election envisaged in Security Council Resolution 435 (1978). I also confirmed that the text of the Principles concerning the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution of an independent Namibia (S/15287) constituted an integral part of the United Nations plan (see para. 35 below).

25. During these discussions, I reiterated to the South African authorities that South Africa remained the interlocutor of the United Nations in regard to the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) and that, in the implementation of the United Nations plan, the Administrator-General of the Territory must assume the full functions entrusted to him in the settlement proposal (S/126J6) as the counterpart of my Special Representative.

26. The question of impartiality was raised again in my discussions in Pretoria, both by the South African authorities and by representatives of the internal parties of Namibia. I reaffirmed that agreement had been reached with the Government of South Africa on that issue and that it had been confirmed as such in my report to the Security Council after my visit to South Africa in August 1983 (S/15943, para. 17). I again gave assurances to all concerned of the complete impartiality of the United Nations in the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978). I emphasised that I expected the same from all South African officials in the discharge of their responsibilities in Namibia during the transitional period. So far as the United Nations was concerned, I stressed that all the parties in Namibia would be treated equally on the commencement of implementation of the United Nations plan. I confirmed to the State President that the United Nations would place all the political parties of Namibia on an equal footing during the transitional period leading to independence.

27. I confirmed with the South African authorities the informal understandings reached in 1982 by the Front-Line States and Nigeria, SWAPO and the Western Contact Group on the question of impartiality in respect of the responsibilities of the Government of South Africa and the United Nations during the transitional period (see paras. 35 and 36 below).

28. On the completion of my visit to South Africa, I proceeded to Luanda on 23 September 1988 and held discussions on the same day with President José Eduardo dos Santos on the situation in south-western Africa. He informed me of the progress made at the talks on the situation in south-western
Africa and assured me that the Government of Angola would continue with its efforts in the negotiations in order to facilitate a settlement. Among other things, he confirmed to me that South Africa had completed the withdrawal of its troops from Angola on 30 August 1988. In this connection, he emphasised that the objectives of Security Council Resolution 602 (1987) had been fulfilled. My visit to Luanda also provided me with the opportunity of exchanging views with the President of SWAPO and of informing him of the outcome of my visit to Pretoria.

29. At the 2827th meeting of the Security Council, held on 29 September 1988, the President of the Security Council made a statement on behalf of the members of the Council concerning the question of Namibia (S/20208). The members of the Council stated that they supported the action I had taken in regard to the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) and encouraged me to continue my efforts to that end. They took particular note of developments in previous weeks by some of the parties to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in south-western Africa. The nature of the efforts was reflected in the joint statement of 8 August 1988 by the Governments of Angola, Cuba, South Africa and the United States. The members of the Council urged the parties to display the necessary political will to translate the commitments they had made into reality in order to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Namibian question and peace and stability in the region. In particular, they strongly urged South Africa to comply forthwith with the Security Council's resolutions and decisions, particularly Resolution 435 (1978), and to co-operate with the Secretary-General in its immediate, full and definitive implementations. To that end, they urged States Members of the United Nations to render all necessary assistance to the Secretary-General and his staff in the administrative and other practical steps necessary for the emplacement of UNTAG.

30. Following the signing of the Geneva Protocol on 5 August 1988, delegations of Angola, Cuba and South Africa, through the mediation of the Government of the United States, held five meetings at Brazzaville, between 24 August and 13 December 1988, to continue negotiations towards a peaceful solution of the conflict in south-western Africa. I was represented at Brazzaville by my Special Representative for Namibia. On 13 December 1988, the Governments of Angola, Cuba and South Africa signed the Brazzaville Protocol (S/20325) by which the parties agreed to recommend to me that 1 April 1989 be established as the date for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978).

31. As agreed in the Brazzaville Protocol, the parties met on 22 December 1988 in New York at United Nations Headquarters for signature of the tripartite agreement prepared in Geneva in August (S/20346) and for signature by Angola and Cuba of a bilateral agreement relating to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola (S/20345). In anticipation of the latter, the Security Council had, on 20 December 1988, unanimously decided, by its
Resolution 626 (1988), to establish under its authority the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM), for a period of 31 months, to verify implementation of the bilateral agreement. In its Resolution 628 (1989) the Council welcomed the signature of the tripartite and bilateral agreements and expressed its full support for those agreements.

32. Following the signing of the tripartite and bilateral agreements on 22 December 1988, I met on the same day with the Foreign Minister and with the Defence Minister of South Africa to exchange views on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978). They confirmed South Africa’s agreement to recommend to me that 1 April 1989 be the date for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) and stated that the Government of South Africa was ready to extend all necessary co-operation with regard to the responsibilities entrusted to me for the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia.

II

33. At its 2842nd meeting on 16 January 1989, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 629 (1989), the text of which reads as follows:

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its relevant resolutions, in particular, Resolutions 431 (1978) of 27 July 1978 and 435 (1978) of 29 September 1978,

Taking note of its Resolution 628 (1989) of 16 January 1989,

Noting that the parties to the Protocol of Brazzaville, contained in document S/20325 of 14 December 1988, agreed to recommend to the Secretary-General that 1 April 1989 be established as the date for the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978),

Recognising the progress in the south-western African peace process,

Expressing concern at the increase in the police and paramilitary forces and the establishment of the South West Africa Territory Force since 1978, and stressing the need to ensure conditions under which the Namibian people will be able to participate in free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations,

Noting also that these developments make appropriate a re-examination of the requirements for the United Nations Transition Assistance Group effectively to fulfil its mandate which include, inter alia, keeping borders under surveillance, preventing infiltration, preventing intimidation and ensuring the safe return of refugees and their free participation in the electoral process,
Recalling the approval by the Security Council of the Secretary-General's statement on 28 September 1978 to the Security Council (S/12869),

Emphasizing its determination to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations, in accordance with its Resolution 435 (1978) of 29 September 1978,

Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia,

1. Decides that 1 April 1989 shall be the date on which implementation of Resolution 435 (1978) will begin;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to proceed to arrange a formal cease-fire between the South West Africa People's Organization and South Africa;

3. Calls upon South Africa to reduce immediately and substantially the existing police forces in Namibia with a view to achieving reasonable balance between these forces and the United Nations Transition Assistance Group so as to ensure effective monitoring by the latter;

4. Reaffirms the responsibility of all concerned to co-operate to ensure the impartial implementation of the settlement plan in accordance with Resolution 435 (1978);

5. Requests the Secretary-General to prepare at the earliest possible date a report to the Council on the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978), taking into account all relevant developments since the adoption of that resolution;

6. Requests also the Secretary-General, in preparing his report, to re-examine requirements necessary for the United Nations Transition Assistance Group in order to identify wherever possible tangible cost-saving measures without prejudice to his ability fully to carry out its mandate as established in 1978, namely, to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations;

7. Calls upon Members of the United Nations to consider, in coordination with the Secretary-General, how they might provide economic and financial assistance to the Namibian people, both during the transitional period and after independence.
This part of the present report is submitted in pursuance of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the above resolution.

34. In its resolution 435 (1978), adopted on 29 September 1978, the Security Council had approved the Secretary-General's report of 29 August 1978 (S/12827), together with his explanatory statement of 28 September 1978 (S/12869). That report, with the explanatory statement, detailed arrangements for the implementation of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation which had been put forward on 10 April 1978 by the five Western members of the Security Council (the "Western Contact Group") (S/12636). The settlement proposal and the Secretary-General's report on its implementation had been exhaustively negotiated with all the parties concerned.

35. The United Nations plan for Namibia includes agreements and understandings reached by the parties since the adoption of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) and confirmed as such to the Secretary-General. These agreements and understandings remain binding on the parties. In this connection, I wish to draw attention to the following:

(a) The agreement reached in 1982 that UNTAG, with the co-operation of host Governments and in the context of implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), would monitor SWAPO bases in Angola and Zambia (S/15776);

(b) Informal understandings reached in 1982 on the question of impartiality (see also para. 36 below);

(c) The text of the Principles concerning the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution of an independent Namibia which was transmitted to the Secretary-General on 12 July 1982 (S/15287);


36. With regard to subparagraph (b) above, the informal understandings, also known as the impartiality package, include undertakings by the Western Contact Group, the Front-Line States and Nigeria and SWAPO, with respect to activities within the United Nations system once the Security Council meets to authorise the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978). The informal understandings also detail corresponding obligations on the part of the Government of South Africa in order to ensure free and fair elections in Namibia. At a meeting on 24 September 1982 the representatives of the Front-Line States and Nigeria, SWAPO and the Western Contact Group jointly confirmed to me the agreements they had reached in respect of the impartiality package and presented me with a check-list of their
informal understandings. All the parties at the meeting confirmed to me their agreement to the informal understandings contained in their check-list. In separate discussions with the Western Contact Group, the Government of South Africa also confirmed its agreement to those understandings which relate to its responsibilities under the settlement plan.

37. Members of the Council will recall that, in the second paragraph of the explanatory statement of 28 September 1978, the Secretary-General recognized that the cost of UNTAG would be a particularly heavy burden for Members to bear and stated that he would of course try to ensure that the mandate was carried out in the most economic manner possible. This has been an imperative guideline for the Secretariat in its detailed planning for the implementation of the settlement proposal for Namibia.

38. As approved in Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), the civilian component of UNTAG will consist of two elements. Its non-police element will have the function of assisting the Special Representative in implementing paragraphs 5 to 7 of the settlement proposal and the relevant sections of the annex thereto (S/12636). In this connection, the settlement proposal makes provision for each stage of the electoral process and in regard to all measures affecting the political process at all levels of administration. It states that every adult Namibian, without discrimination or fear of intimidation from any source, will be eligible to vote, campaign and stand for election to the Constituent Assembly. It makes provision for secret ballot and for full freedom of speech, assembly, movement and the press. It requires that the electoral machinery ensure that all political parties and interested persons, without regard to their political views, shall have a full and fair opportunity to organise and participate in the electoral process. It requires the repeal of all remaining discriminatory or restrictive measures which might abridge the objective of free and fair elections and the release of all political prisoners or detainees so that they can fully and freely participate in the electoral process, without fear of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment. The proposal also provides for the peaceful return of all Namibians in exile so that they, too, may fully and freely participate in the electoral process without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment. It stipulates that all Namibians be given a full and voluntary choice whether to return. It requires that my Special Representative take steps to guarantee against the possibility of intimidation or interference with the electoral process from whatever quarter. Compliance with all the criteria indicated in the settlement proposal is a guiding principle for me and will be scrupulously ensured by my Special Representative and his staff.

39. Taking these factors into account, no further savings could be found in respect of the plans for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and his staff and for the administrative personnel of UNTAG, beyond those which have resulted from consolidations deriving from a review of
1978 plans undertaken some years ago. As regards the electoral element in
the civilian component of UNTAG, the precise number of electoral super-
visors required will depend on the detailed arrangements for the election
which, in accordance with the settlement proposal, will be worked out by my
Special Representative and the Administrator-General, in the context of
their respective functions, once the implementation of the United Nations
plan has begun (S/17658). In these circumstances, I propose to maintain
the present provision for about 800 electoral supervisors.

40. As regards UNTAG's civilian police monitors, the concept was first des-
cribed in paragraph 9 of the settlement proposal (S/12636). Therein, it is
provided that "primary responsibility for maintaining law and order in
Namibia during the transition period shall rest with the existing police
forces. The Administrator-General, to the satisfaction of the United
Nations Special Representative, shall ensure the good conduct of the police
forces and shall take the necessary action to ensure their suitability for
continued employment during the transition period. The Special Represen-
tative shall make arrangements when appropriate for United Nations person-
nel to accompany the police forces in the discharge of their duties. The
police forces would be limited to the carrying of small arms in the normal
performance of their duties". Paragraph 10 of the settlement proposal also
provides that the "Special Representative will take steps to guarantee
against the possibility of intimidation or interference with the electoral
process from whatever quarter". The tasks of UNTAG's police monitors are
also described in paragraphs 29 and 30 of the Secretary-General's report of
29 August 1978 (S/12827) and in his explanatory statement of 28 September
1978 (S/12869). Therein, the Special Representative's responsibilities in
this area were summarised as follows:

(a) To satisfy himself that the Administrator-General ensures the good
conduct of the police force;

(b) To satisfy himself that the Administrator-General takes the necessary
action to ensure the suitability of the police for continued employ-
ment during the transition period;

(c) To make arrangements when appropriate for United Nations personnel to
accompany the police forces in the discharge of their duties.

41. The Secretary-General has been assured that monitoring by UNTAG of the
existing police forces will be fully facilitated. The organizational and
deployment format of UNTAG police monitors will follow that of the existing
police forces. They will come under the authority of the Special Represen-
tative of the Secretary-General from his headquarters at Windhoek and will
operate through a number of district headquarters situated throughout the
Territory. Each district will have several sub-stations or posts at
strategic locations. The number of district and sub-stations will be
approximately 30. This number will be kept under constant review. The stations from which UNTAG police monitors will operate will be so located as to enable them to visit all existing police stations in the Territory. UNTAG police monitors will be highly mobile and will also exercise a general overview in regard to the maintenance of law and order in the Territory, in accordance with the mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

42. In the Secretary-General's report of 29 August 1978 it was indicated that approximately 360 police monitors, who would be professional policemen seconded by Governments, would be required. The then existing police forces numbered close to 3 000. In his explanatory statement of 28 September 1978 the Secretary-General said that concern had been expressed as to whether the number of United Nations personnel to monitor the police was appropriate to the tasks they were expected to perform. He announced that he would keep the question under continuous review. The concern of the Council has now also been expressed in Resolution 629 (1989) regarding, inter alia, the increase in police and paramilitary forces in Namibia since 1978 and the need to prevent intimidation. The technical survey mission which visited Namibia in October 1988 was informed that the total number of police in the Territory, including counter-insurgency forces, had risen to approximately 8 300. Of these, the counter-insurgency unit, known as Koévoet, was said to number approximately 3 000 personnel. Monitoring the disbandment of counter-insurgency units, including Koévoet, will be the concern of the military component of UNTAG, which will ensure such disbandment as part of the military tasks described above, in accordance with the settlement proposal. Even after such disbandment, however, the existing police force will be substantially greater than that present in the Territory in 1978, to which the former proposed figure of 360 related, although they continue for the most part to operate from the same locations. I was informed by the South African Foreign Minister on 22 December 1988 that South Africa intends to reduce the size of the existing police force to 7 100. I was thereafter informed by South Africa of a further reduction to 6 000. I shall continue to keep under constant review the adequacy of the number of police monitors in regard to their tasks. However, in the first place and in the circumstances described above, I have concluded that 360 police monitors will be insufficient. I therefore propose an increase in their number to 500.

43. Under the existing plan, the military component would account for more than 75 per cent of the cost of UNTAG. Its tasks derive from paragraph 8 of the settlement proposal and are set out in more detail in the annex thereto (S/12636). These tasks were further elaborated in the Secretary-General's report of 29 August 1978 (S/12827), which was approved in Resolution 435 (1978), and in the subsequent detailed operational planning by the Secretariat. They can be summarised as follows:
(a) To monitor the cessation of hostile acts by all parties;

(b) To monitor the restriction of South African Defence Force (SADF) troops to base and their subsequent reduction to the agreed strength of 1 500 men, who will be restricted to certain agreed locations;

(c) To monitor such SADF military personnel as continue to perform civilian functions during the transitional period;

(d) To monitor the dismantling of the command structures of citizen forces, commando units and ethnic forces (now known as "full-time forces" and including the South West Africa Territory Force (SWATF)), the withdrawal of all SADF personnel attached to those forces, and the confinement of all the arms and ammunition of such forces to agreed locations;

(e) To monitor the restriction of SWAPO troops to base in Angola and Zambia;

(f) To keep the borders under surveillance and prevent infiltration;

(g) To ensure that all military installations along the northern border are deactivated or placed under United Nations supervision and to provide security for vital installations in the northern border area.

In addition, the military component is to assist and support the civilian component of UNTAG in the discharge of its tasks, as may be required. This will include the protection of entry and reception centres for returning Namibians.

44. In 1978 the Security Council accepted the Secretary-General's judgement that up to 7 500 military personnel would be needed to perform these tasks, consisting of 7 infantry battalions, totalling approximately 5 000, plus 200 military observers and, in addition, command, communications, engineer, logistic and air support elements totalling approximately 2 300, all ranks. In his explanatory statement of 28 September 1978 (S/12869) the Secretary-General made it clear that this was an estimate based upon reliable professional judgement, in the light of the tasks to be performed and of previous United Nations experience, as well as of the rules and regulations governing the deployment of United Nations personnel. The military component of UNTAG would be built up gradually and would be introduced by stages. The total of 7 500 military personnel would be the authorised upper limit and the actual size of the military component at any given time would depend upon the development of the general situation, which the Secretary-General would keep under constant review.
45. The deployment plans prepared between 1978 and 1982 provided for the gradual build-up of the military component of UNTAG in stages, up to 6 infantry battalions, 200 military observers and approximately 2,300 logistic personnel. The seventh battalion was to be held in reserve in its home country. It remains the opinion of my military advisers that deployment at this level would be required if the military component was to be capable of carrying out in full all the military tasks listed in paragraph 43 above. The question therefore becomes one of whether the relevant developments, referred to in Resolution 629 (1989), make it possible to delete or reduce any of these tasks, thus permitting the deployment of a smaller military component. Only in this way would it be possible to devise the tangible cost-saving measures which the Secretary-General is requested to identify in paragraph 6 of Resolution 629 (1989).

46. It is clear that many of the tasks enumerated in paragraph 43 above will still be required. These include the monitoring of the dismantling of the citizen forces, commando units and ethnic forces, including SWATF, monitoring SADF forces in Namibia, as well as SWAPO forces in neighbouring countries, and the supervision and security of installations in the northern border area (i.e., items (b), (c), (d), (e), and (g) in paragraph 43). These tasks are clearly defined, in the sense that the numbers and locations of the personnel and sites to be monitored or secured are known. It is thus possible to make a reasonably exact estimate of the numbers of United Nations military personnel who will be required. Most of these tasks can be performed by military observers, although armed troops will be required for some of them, notably the guarding of installations in the north and the safe custody of the arms of the citizen forces, commando units and ethnic forces, including SWATF, after these have been deposited in agreed locations.

47. I should like to take this opportunity to clarify paragraph 25 of the Secretary-General’s report of 29 August 1978 (S/12827) where it is stated that “the military component, including the monitors, will be provided with weapons of a defensive character”. Many of the functions assigned to the “monitors” in the UNTAG operational plan are in fact those performed by unarmed military observers in other United Nations peace-keeping operations. In accordance, therefore, with standard peace-keeping practice, the military observers deployed with UNTAG will not carry weapons.

48. The other tasks enumerated in paragraph 43 above are the monitoring of the cessation of all hostile acts, border surveillance and the prevention of infiltration. By definition, they require the military component of UNTAG to be very extensively deployed at strategic points along the length of the borders and to maintain a highly mobile reserve to react to any hostile acts which might take place during the transition period. Much of the requirement for infantry in the present plan for UNTAG is attributable to these tasks.
49. On 20 December 1988 I received a visit from the permanent representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council. They informed me that they strongly supported the efforts of the Secretary-General and his staff to help to facilitate the independence of Namibia. They believed that the two agreements to be signed on 22 December at United Nations Headquarters would lead to Namibian independence on 1 April 1990. In this respect, the five permanent members believed it was necessary to re-examine the plan for UNTAG, taking into account positive developments in the southwestern Africa peace process, as reflected in the above-mentioned agreements. They were convinced that UNTAG could carry out its primary function - to ensure free and fair elections - in a substantially more economical manner. The permanent members therefore hoped that I would begin a thorough review of existing UNTAG plans, particularly with respect to the size of the military component to be deployed, in order to achieve the maximum reduction in costs. This review, they stated, would be completely consistent with the letter and the spirit of Resolution 435 (1978) and reports which I myself had made to the Council concerning the point that the actual size of UNTAG should reflect the prevailing political situation in the area. In subsequent contacts with representatives of the permanent members, it was pointed out by them that, under the special scale of assessments for peace-keeping operations, they would be responsible for 57 per cent of the costs of UNTAG and that the establishment of an operation larger than they thought necessary would both put in question the financing of that operation and jeopardise the prospects for other peace-keeping operations in the future.

50. On 21 December 1988 I received a visit from the permanent representatives of a number of non-aligned countries, led by the Permanent Representative of Zimbabwe in his capacity as representative of the Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, and including the non-aligned members of the Security Council, the Front-Line States and Nigeria and SWAPO. The Permanent Representative of Zimbabwe stated that, in the view of the non-aligned countries, the Secretary-General needed effective means to supervise and control elections in Namibia in accordance with Resolution 435 (1978); the situation in Namibia had become more complex since 1978, notably because of the consolidation of the South African military, police and administrative presence; this led the non-aligned countries to conclude that, if anything, there was a need for an increase in the military component of UNTAG; but it was not their wish to renegotiate the existing settlement plan. In this connection, the Permanent Representative of Zimbabwe expressed grave reservations about moves to tamper with the military component of UNTAG, because such a move would violate Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) and would compromise the Secretary-General's ability to conduct free and fair elections in Namibia. In a communication addressed to me on 23 December 1988, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, reiterated to me the concerns of the non-aligned countries in regard to the reduction of the military component of UNTAG as
a cost-saving measure. A ministerial delegation of the Front-Line States, comprising the foreign ministers of Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia, also expressed their concerns to me when I met with them on 6 January 1989.

51. Throughout my contacts with the permanent members and with the non-aligned countries, I consistently stressed that Resolution 435 (1978) had approved a certain level of resources to enable the Secretary-General to carry out the military tasks assigned to UNTAG in the 1978 settlement proposal. If it was the Security Council's wish that fewer resources should now be made available for UNTAG, the Council should indicate which of the tasks in the settlement proposal were no longer required. I urged the need for consultations between the members of the Council for this purpose.

52. Resolution 629 (1989) represented a compromise which was achieved with some difficulty and which did not fully resolve the differences between the proponents of the two points of view described above nor clearly eliminate any of the tasks assigned to UNTAG. The differences revolve round the question of how much confidence is to be placed in the readiness of the various parties to the proposed settlement in south-western Africa to honour the commitments, formal and informal, which they have entered into vis-à-vis each other and vis-à-vis the United Nations. As Secretary-General, I have to assume, in this as in other cases, that all the parties will honour the commitments which they have solemnly entered into; indeed, no operation of this kind can succeed without the full co-operation of all the parties. In the present circumstances the Secretary-General is obliged to advise the Council that, after so much progress has been achieved and when the independence of Namibia is at last in sight, it would be a tragedy if this question of confidence and the resulting differences within the Council were to cause further delay thus seriously jeopardising the emplacement of UNTAG by 1 April 1989, the date on which the Council has already decided that the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978) should begin.

53. Since Resolution 629 (1989) was adopted, I have pursued consultations with all the parties concerned. Their views have been taken into account in the preparation of this report. But as members of the Security Council are aware, it has not been possible to reconcile the opposing viewpoints described above. At the same time, all concerned are determined that implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia should begin on 1 April 1989. I have therefore thought it right to submit to the Council a concept of operations which will not be wholly satisfactory to either side, nor to me, but which offers the best available prospect of fulfilling my mandate of ensuring the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations, while at the same time enjoying the necessary financial support of the members of the Organisation. Such a concept of operations is set out in the next paragraph. In putting it together I have taken into account the following:
(a) The paramount need for UNTAG to be capable, and to be seen to be capable, of ensuring the full implementation of Resolution 435 (1978), including, above all, the creation of conditions which will permit free and fair elections;

(b) The repeated assurances which I have received from the neighbouring countries, including South Africa, that, in accordance with paragraph 12 of the settlement proposal (S/12636), they will ensure to the best of their abilities that the provisions of the transitional arrangements, and the outcome of the election, are respected and that they will afford the necessary facilities to my Special Representative and all United Nations personnel to carry out their assigned functions and to facilitate such measures as may be desirable for ensuring tranquility in the border area;

(c) The views expressed by some members of the Council that recent progress in the south-western Africa peace process has reduced the need for the tasks of border surveillance and the prevention of infiltration;

(d) The feasibility which has now emerged of consolidating UNTAG's operations by grouping geographically tasks assigned to the military component of UNTAG and assigning a variety of tasks to each unit, whether infantry or military observers, including assisting in ensuring the safe return of refugees;

(e) The feasibility of assigning to military observers some tasks which had previously been reserved for the infantry, without impairing the operational efficiency of the Force;

(f) Increasing the ratio of operational troops to headquarters and administrative staffs, by increasing the size of the infantry battalions;

54. Taking these factors into account, the concept of operations which I recommend to the Security Council is as follows:

(a) The Force Commander would concentrate on the tasks of monitoring the disbandment of the citizen forces, commando units and ethnic forces, including SWATF, monitoring SADF forces in Namibia, as well as SWAPO forces in neighbouring countries and supervising and securing installations in the northern border area (i.e. the tasks listed in subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e) and (g) of paragraph 43 above);

(b) The authorised upper limit for the military component of UNTAG would remain at 7,500;
(c) Three enlarged infantry battalions, each averaging 850 all ranks, would be deployed initially, with the other battalions being held in reserve. This would provide as many operational troops as five battalions of the size envisaged in the earlier deployment plan, but with the overall numbers being reduced because of the regrouping of the operational troops, and the consequent elimination of some headquarters and administrative elements;

(d) To permit the transfer of certain tasks from infantry to military observers, the military observer element deployed initially would be increased from 200 to 300 officers;

(e) The logistic elements deployed initially would total about 1,700 all ranks and would be appropriate for a force of three enlarged infantry battalions and 300 military observers, taking into account also the need for the military logistic elements to support the civilian component;

(f) Budgetary provisions would at this stage be presented to the General Assembly on the basis of a military component of 4,650 consisting of 3 enlarged infantry battalions, 300 military observers, about 1,700 logistic troops and headquarters staff of about 100, all ranks;

(g) If it should become apparent during the course of the transitional period that a military component of this size was insufficient to assist my Special Representative in carrying out his mandate of ensuring the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations and that there was a real need for additional military personnel, the Secretary-General would so inform the Security Council and, subject to there being no objection from the Council, would deploy as many of the reserve battalions, with appropriate logistic elements, as he judged to be necessary. I would seek urgent financial provision from the General Assembly for this additional deployment. I trust that, under such circumstances, I could count on the support of all members of the Council, particularly its permanent members, to help to meet the logistic commitments involved in an urgent deployment of this kind, including assistance with airlift to the mission area as a voluntary contribution.

55. If the Security Council decides to approve the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978) on the above basis, the estimated cost of the civilian and military components of UNTAG will be approximately $416 million, excluding the cost of the operation of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for the return of Namibians currently in exile, for which I intend to launch a separate appeal. This is inevitably a preliminary figure based on information currently available and on the
experience of United Nations peace-keeping operations; it may be subject to
revision once UNTAG has been launched. It is based on the assumptions that:

(a) Member States providing infantry battalions and logistic units or
police offers for UNTAG will be reimbursed on the same basis as those
which contribute troops to the United Nations Disengagement Observer
Force (UNDOF) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL).

(b) Member States will not be reimbursed for troop costs or other costs
during the period that battalions or other units are held in reserve
in their home countries;

(c) Military observers and electoral supervisors assigned to UNTAG will be
made available by the Member States concerned on the same basis as
observers provided to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organi-
sation (UNTSO).

56. It is also necessary to emphasize that the estimate in the preceding
paragraph is based on the assumption that UNTAG will purchase goods and
services from local sources of supply in southern Africa whenever these are
more economical than sources of supply elsewhere. Any other assumption
will call into question the feasibility of the operation in the time-scale
already decided by the Council, as well as increasing its cost.

57. It is recommended that the costs of UNTAG should be considered as expenses
of the Organisation to be borne by the Member States in accordance with
Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter. It is my intention also to
recommend to the General Assembly that the assessments to be levied on
Member States be credited to a special account which would be established
for this purpose.

58. If the Security Council decides to proceed on the basis recommended above,
I will do everything possible to have UNTAG in place and operational by 1
April 1989. My ability to achieve this will, however, depend crucially on
the availability of the major financial resources which will be needed
immediately to meet the expenses of the set-up phase of UNTAG. It will be
essential, therefore, for the General Assembly to take very early action to
appropriate the necessary funds for the financing of UNTAG and for Member
States thereafter to pay their assessments without delay. The latest
experience gained in connection with the payment of assessed contributions
for an operation which was recently established by the Council has shown
that, at the end of the assessment period, the rate of payment was less
than 56 per cent of the amount apportioned. In light of these consider-
ations, I shall appeal to Member States to make advances, on a voluntary
basis, to meet the initial expenses of UNTAG pending formal action by the
General Assembly. These advances will be repaid as soon as it has been determined that sufficient assessed contributions have been collected. I shall also appeal to Member States to make voluntary contributions, both in cash and in kind, to UNTAG.

59. A large number of Governments have already expressed their interest in providing military personnel for UNTAG, whether infantry battalions or military observers or logistic units. As soon as the Council has decided to proceed as recommended in this report, I shall finalise my proposals for the composition of the military component and, after consulting the parties, I will seek the Council’s agreement to my proposals. Members of the Council will recall that the appointment of the Force Commander, Lieutenant-General Prem Chand (India), has already been approved by the Council (S/13862, para. 5).

60. As regards the cease-fire envisaged in Resolution 435 (1978), both South Africa and SWAPO agreed to a de facto cessation of hostilities, with effect from 10 August 1988, as provided for in the Geneva Protocol of 5 August 1988. It was foreseen in Resolution 435 (1978) that the cease-fire between South Africa and SWAPO would take effect on the date of the beginning of implementation of the settlement plan. I accordingly intend to send identical letters, at the appropriate time, to South Africa and SWAPO proposing a specific date and hour for the formal cease-fire to begin. In those letters I will also request both parties to inform me in writing, by a specific date, of their agreement to abide by the formal cease-fire. Meanwhile I appeal to all the parties to exercise maximum restraint and to refrain from any actions which might jeopardise the present de facto cessation of hostilities or implementation of the settlement plan.

61. In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that, as members of the Council are aware, Resolution 435 (1978) entrusts to the Secretary-General a wide range of responsibilities in connection with the supervision and control of free and fair elections in Namibia. My official and I will be required to act with complete impartiality in carrying out these tasks. The same will be expected from the Administrator-General and all other officials in the Territory. The successful implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) will depend upon the co-operation of all parties concerned as well as of the international community as a whole. As far as my own responsibilities are concerned, I trust that I can count on all Member States, and on my colleagues in the United Nations system, for their co-operation in enabling the United Nations family as a whole to meet its responsibilities to the people of Namibia in accordance with the United Nations plan.
Annex

PRINCIPLES FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN SOUTH-WESTERN AFRICA

The Governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba and the Republic of South Africa have reached agreement on a set of essential principles to establish the basis for peace in the south-western region of Africa. They recognize that each of these principles is indispensable to a comprehensive settlement.


B. The Governments of the People's Republic of Angola and of the Republic of South Africa shall, in conformity with the dispositions of Resolution 435 (1978) of the Security Council of the United Nations, cooperate with the Secretary-General with a view towards ensuring the independence of Namibia through free and fair elections, abstaining from any action that could prevent the execution of said resolution.

C. Redeployment towards the north and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of the People's Republic of Angola on the basis of an agreement between the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba and the decision of both States to solicit the on-site verification of that withdrawal by the Security Council of the United Nations.

D. Respect for the sovereignty, sovereign equality and independence of States and for territorial integrity and inviolability of borders.

E. Non-interference in the internal affairs of States.

F. Abstention from the threat and utilisation of force against the territorial integrity and independence of States.

G. The acceptance of the responsibility of States not to allow their territory to be used for acts of war, aggression, or violence against other States.

H. Reaffirmation of the right of the peoples of the south-western region of Africa to self-determination, independence, and equality of rights.
I. Verification and monitoring of compliance with the obligations resulting from the agreements that may be established.

J. Commitment to comply in good faith with the obligations undertaken in the agreements that may be established and to resolve the differences via negotiations.

K. Recognition of the role of the Permanent Members of the Security Council of the United Nations as guarantors for the implementation of agreements that may be established.

L. The right of each State to peace, development and social progress.

M. African and international co-operation for the settlement of the problems of the development of the south-western region of Africa.


Letter dated 23 January 1989 from the Permanent Representative of Zimbabwe to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to forward the enclosed press statement issued by the African Group at the United Nations on 20 January 1989, with a request that it be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under the item entitled "Question of Namibia", and of the Security Council.

(Signed) I.S.G. Mudenge
Ambassador/Permanent Representative

Annex


The African Group at the United Nations has learnt with grave concern of reports to the effect that some members of the Security Council are trying to pressure the United Nations Secretariat to propose severe reductions of the budget for the preparations leading to the independence of Namibia.

According to this information, these members want the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) military personnel to be reduced from 7 500 to 4 000. This is not only contrary to the letter and spirit of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), which set an upper limit of 7 500 military personnel, but also would be going counter to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 629 (1989). The latter resolution requests the
Secretary-General to propose cost-saving measures, wherever possible, but without prejudicing the ability of UNTAG to carry out its mandate.

It is important to point out to the international community that the racist Pretoria régime already has over 100 000 soldiers in Namibia and other para-military and ethnic forces, not to mention a police force of over 13 000.

After decades of being brutalized by the racist régime's instruments of coercion, a meagre United Nations force of 7 500 is barely adequate to restore the confidence of the long-suffering Namibian people, let alone the 4 000 being proposed to cover a territory of about 824 269 square kilometres. At a time when the Namibian people are anxiously awaiting free and fair elections, the reduction of UNTAG military personnel will deprive them of the right freely to choose their representatives.

The African Group at the United Nations rejects the proposed reduction and calls upon the international community to raise its voice against the cuts.
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