



Institute for Security Studies

SITUATION REPORT

SOMALIA:

FIGHTING THE ODDS IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE AFTER THE TRANSITION

Despite renewed hope in the future of Somalia, post-transition efforts towards peace and stability in this country face numerous challenges. This situation report notes that progress will be defined by the dynamics surrounding the strengths or weaknesses of the new Somali Federal Government (SFG), the rapidly adapting al-Qaeda-linked Islamist al-Shabaab and the success or failure of international support in the pursuit of peace. The emerging perception among sections of the Somali population as well as the international community of a weak and weakening Somali central government constitutes one of the most challenging developments, with far-reaching implications for the collective push for peace in the country. This situation report proposes that efforts should be aimed at strengthening the government, since its performance is central to any realistic progress in the country.

Despite the improvement in the security situation in parts of Somalia since the end of the transition period in 2012, the country is still far from achieving its goal of sustainable peace.

The transition process was unable to bring about lasting peace because it was not meant to be a peacebuilding process. Rather, it was intended to end years of weak successive transition governments and feeble political leadership in a challenging situation. As a result, the transition process has succeeded in giving the country a new crop of leaders and helped to build towards peace, but it has not delivered peace.

Consequently, the realities that the post-transition government faces are as old and entrenched as the genesis of the crisis itself. Peace efforts in the immediate post-transition period face complicated political and security dynamics. Progress in dealing with these dynamics will be defined by three key factors: first, the strength or weakness of the new Somali Federal Government (SFG), whose emergence on the political scene was met with a great deal of anticipation but whose popularity is gradually waning; second, a rapidly adapting al-Qaeda-linked Islamist al-Shabaab, whose resolve to overturn the progress made in the country cannot be underestimated; and third, the success or failure of international support in the pursuit of peace in Somalia.

In an attempt to understand how these dynamics are playing out in the search for peace in Somalia, this report examines the three key factors. It is based on field visits to Nairobi and Mogadishu during which extensive interviews were conducted with members of the international community, SFG officials, members of the diplomatic community and experts engaged in various aspects of ongoing peacebuilding efforts.

The report consists of five major sections. Section one traces the achievements of the transition process in Somalia and key unfinished business in the country. Section two discusses the new SFG in terms of its current political matrix and the challenges in dealing with unresolved issues. The third section discusses the role of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the impact of the government's weaknesses on the mission.

This is followed by a discussion of recent changes in al-Shabaab and the group's perceived weaknesses. The fourth section discusses the role and contribution of the international community before the final section sets out recommendations on the way forward.

DEFINING SOMALIA'S UNFINISHED BUSINESS

The transition process in Somalia delivered diverse successes. The most important was the extent to which both local and international actors succeeded in nominating and integrating 135 traditional elders (or *Duubab*) into the process in a country where opposition to international intervention is widespread and clan division is rife.

These leaders, in turn, nominated the 825 members of the National Constituent Assembly, who were responsible for nominating the 275 members of parliament and the provisional adoption of the Federal Constitution. The nominated members of parliament then elected a speaker of parliament with two deputies as well as a president, thus marking the end of the transition. The president later appointed a prime minister, who formed a cabinet to make up the new SFG, one that was greeted with overwhelming support from important sections of the Somali population.¹

The process was principally aimed at putting in place political leaders capable of heading the stabilisation and peace process. The process of moving from the transitional government to the SFG thus was not a peace process in itself. The end of the transition implied neither an end to the conflict nor the onset of a post-conflict situation. Therefore, despite the notable successes of the process, it has left the country with three key unresolved matters.

The first is those issues that were never addressed, such as the failure to reach out to important stakeholders outside the current political arrangement who are nonetheless important for national reconciliation.

The second is those issues that were being addressed at the end of the transition but that had not yet been fully resolved. These include the fight against al-Shabaab, rebuilding and capacitating the Somali National Army (SNA), and building state institutions.

The third set of unresolved issues includes those that were intentionally left in the grey area because of their contentious nature and the fact that they needed to be decided collectively by all Somalis, or because any attempt to decisively address them stood the risk of derailing the consensus for peace in the run-up to the end of the transition in August 2012. These issues include the final adoption of the Somali constitution, which must be subjected to a referendum; whether Sharia is a source of law or *the* source of law; citizenship; and demarcation of the federal states' borders. The subsequent sections discuss

the efforts towards reaching these milestones and the challenges bedeviling the various actors.

PROBLEMS OF A WEAK NEW GOVERNMENT

There is no doubt that the current Somali government enjoys significant support, especially when compared with previous leadership arrangements in the more than two decades of instability the country has faced. However, the government is also under pressure to deliver immediate results in order to establish its relevance in the daily lives of its citizens. Upon coming to power, therefore, the new leadership wasted no time in identifying six priority areas. These are:

- Establishing functioning institutions
- Spearheading economic recovery
- Promoting sustainable peace
- Providing services to citizens
- Undertaking robust international relations
- Working towards reconciliation, political dialogue and national unity

Within these broad pillars, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was emphatic about his government's overriding focus on enhancing security as the foundation for all other efforts to restore peace in the country. The new regime has made some important strides in pursuing these goals. Domestically, there has been some political and judicial reform and efforts have been made to lay the necessary foundations for reconstructing the country's institutional base. The Office of the Prime Minister, with the support of the international community, is currently working on a stabilisation plan aimed at implementing interventions to mitigate conflict. Priority target groups and areas include:

[D]isengaged fighters and youth at risk, revival of [the] Somali traditional and religious justice system, stabilization through peace-building and peace dividends, stabilization through establishment of local councils and administrations and improve[ing] livelihoods and economic opportunities through job creation.²

Even though this stabilisation plan is still in the initial conception stages, the readiness of the SFG to drive the development of its programmatic components is encouraging.

The government has also succeeded in repositioning Somalia as a member of the international community. The government has received the endorsement of a number of Western countries, particularly the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK). The Somali president has embarked on various high-profile trips to Addis Ababa, Ankara,



A new cement factory in Mogadishu

Brussels, Cairo, Doha, Kampala, London, Nairobi, Riyadh and Washington; in line with the government's commitment to adopting a robust international relations policy.

However, the absence of key human resources and its associated weakening of state institutions, internal divisions among the many clans, insecurity as a result of al-Shabaab, and the high expectations of Somalis are already beginning to undermine the efforts of the new government, thereby defining its weaknesses.

Caught between international push and domestic pull

While pursuing international recognition in order to mobilise resources and support for its domestic programmes, the government is struggling to meet the expectations of its domestic constituents. In other words, it is trapped in a contest between the domestic pull to perform to the high expectations of its people and the international push for recognition and support. Some actors therefore accuse the president of being less visible in the areas outside Mogadishu. A section of Somalis accuse President Mohamud of being too busy travelling to different Western capitals, at the expense of delivering on the expectations of the country's citizens.

This has been a potential trap for the new government from the beginning, given of Somalia's long absence from the international scene and its correlating lack of strong foreign policy machinery to advance the new government's foreign policy goals. The government's international visibility is winning donor confidence and repositioning the country in the comity of nations, as well as encouraging many Somali business people to invest in the country. However, the government is caught up juggling influential external actors, on the one hand, and trying to meet the expectations of citizens, on the other.

When it comes to decision-making and the implementation of important projects in the country, the indispensable role of various UN bodies has strengthened the long-held view of the dominance of the 'Gigiri Republic'³ in the affairs of Somalia. While this situation may not be a

big problem in many other countries, the Somali context is different because of spoilers such as al-Shabaab, who peddle the perception that the new leaders are the puppets of the West.

Mistakes of a newcomer president

Another issue that explains the initial slowdown in government activity since President Mohamud took over is what can be termed the mistakes of a newcomer president. In his efforts to break with the past and establish his leadership, President Mohamud replaced a number of officials, including individuals who were key in making crucial gains towards the end of the transition, particularly in the security sector. This 'tabula rasa' approach has had negative consequences. It has effectively (albeit unintentionally) cut short the momentum for improved performance and wiped out the institutional memory that had been amassed during the third transition arrangement. Some elements of the international community, even though they are supportive of President Mohamud, feel that the post-transition period would have benefitted greatly from the institutional memory of the last transitional government had it been innovatively kept and not completely wiped out by President Mohamud's immediate post-election choices.⁴

One sector where this slowdown has manifested quite perceptibly is in the area of security. The new crop of appointees has had to adapt to the various demands of their jobs, and this probably means that they have not been as tough on al-Shabaab as their predecessors. The president is accused of populating the security sector with ineffective people at a time when the country cannot afford to lose momentum on consolidating the gains it has made against al-Shabaab. In such a fragile context, the slowdown of tough action against al-Shabaab and the failure to capture new areas disturb many stakeholders.⁵ The slowdown has been interpreted in some quarters as early signs of a wavering political will to contain the threat posed by al-Shabaab.

Realistically, however, the options of the new government in terms of keeping elements of the transition

arrangement were limited, given the accusations of inefficiency and corruption that were levelled against those officials. In hindsight, the president needed to do some selective balancing in the interest of continuity. To blame the slowdown of the fight against al-Shabaab wholly on the new government also raises questions, as it is apparent that the fighting potential of AMISOM is also overstretched in the face of the rapidly adapting nature of the Islamist group.

One of the major challenges associated with the overall slowdown of government activity in the country is that the current crop of leaders, despite the massive popularity they enjoyed initially, are beginning to struggle to maintain public support. A section of the Somali population accuses the government of doing little to reach out to other stakeholders and not adequately containing emerging challenges around the country.

Shadows of dysfunctional institutions

Instituting political leadership in a context of dysfunctional institutions, as was done in the transition process, has been challenging for post-transition Somalia. All indicators point to the fact that the change in leadership has not been enough to renew either the political system or the country's institutional base. Consequently, weak institutions still threaten the existing administrative apparatus. According to the 2013 Report of the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, for instance, one challenge is the redirection of government revenue disbursed by the central bank, with 'about 80 per cent of withdrawals' not being used to conduct government business.⁶ Apart from pointing to large-scale corruption in the system, this occurrence is facilitated by the lack of robust institutional oversight and accountability.

In the midst of all these structural challenges, international financial support to the SFG has been insufficient due to the absence of adequate financial accountability measures. Donors prefer to provide funding to the SFG through multilateral institutions such as the European Union (EU) or the UN, thereby creating, in some cases, confused agendas and limited direct support to government.⁷ As a consequence, the SFG faces resource constraints that have caused a slowdown in the realisation of its six priority areas.

Conflicting approaches to federalism

The implementation of a federal system was envisaged as one of the key ways in which to positively address the divisive influence of clans in Somalia. The greatest advantage of this approach rests in the fact that the major clan demographics are geographically clustered. Federalism, at least in theory, is an intelligent response to the country's need to have a governance system where more power is concentrated at the base and not within a central authority.

In practice, however, the adoption of federalism appears to institutionalise the country's fundamental divisions. Additionally, there is yet to be a national dialogue among the different stakeholders about who should drive the implementation agenda and how. Questions as to which form of federalism is to be implemented, outstanding border demarcations, the role of Sharia in the country, the status of Mogadishu as the capital city and the absence of an Upper House are generating tensions in diverse ways.

While the SFG insists on taking a leading role in the process of federal state making, the regional administrations would prefer the central government to play a limited role. The SFG's approach can basically be summed up as a 'centralised decentralisation approach' (top-down) vis-à-vis the 'decentralised decentralisation' (bottom-up) strategy preferred by the regional administrations. Coupled with the associated perception that Mogadishu is trying to control everything from the centre, federalism is being undermined as a key factor in the pursuit of peace in Somalia.

In the case of the formation of a federal state in the Juba region,⁸ tensions emerged between the SFG and the regional administration in Kismayo led by Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Sheikh Madobe). The disagreements that underpinned the tension centred on who was to drive or facilitate the process. Given that the creation of the federal state was neither driven from Mogadishu nor centred on the involvement of the SFG, but rather depended on the local Kismayo administration led principally by Madobe, the SFG deemed the largely locally driven process unilateral and unconstitutional, raising a great deal of tension in the region. The issue was resolved only through the involvement of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in August 2013.

Apart from illustrating the competing approaches, the Jubaland case also highlights the nature of the challenges to be addressed in the implementation of federalism in the country. Defining an appropriate formula for power and economic resource-sharing within the emerging body politic and ultimately between the emerging states and the central government is an important issue that threatens the smooth implementation of federalism.

In light of all these factors, many Somalis feel the government is still struggling to find its feet. In a proverbial analogy, an interviewee described the overwhelming struggles of the new government as 'a hunter who went in search of a deer and instead landed a rhino and is challenged in hauling the game home'.⁹ Confounded by personality clashes and age-old tensions, the government finds itself in a position that makes policy implementation and political choices very difficult. The challenges bedevilling the new government are, however, to some extent a reflection of the fact that the country is still in the midst of a transition. An interviewee noted that:

A transition has begun in the country. The previous transition was one from anarchy. Somalia is now in a transition to peace and stabilisation and its inherent challenges ought to be acknowledged.¹⁰

A CHALLENGED AMISOM AND THE BLUE-HATTING DEBATE

The successes achieved in the security arena are largely attributable to the military strength and successes of AMISOM. The resolve of its component troop-contributing countries (TCCs) to make the mission an African success story within the ambit of the popular mantra 'African solutions to African problems' is encouraging. However, the changing nature of the security situation and the weaknesses of the new leadership are having an impact on AMISOM in a number of ways.

First, a weak government in Mogadishu means that AMISOM will not be able to effectively hand over anytime soon to a local Somali force capable of consolidating the gains made so far. This situation has repercussions for the mission's running costs and its ability to implement an exit strategy, which is the expected end of any successful mission. According to the UN's Capstone Doctrine,

[D]etermining whether a multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping mission deployed in the aftermath of a violent internal conflict has successfully completed its mandate is far more challenging given the number of complex variables involved. Experience has shown that a domestic peace is truly sustainable when the warring parties are able to move their struggles from the battlefield into an institutional framework where disputes can be settled peacefully.¹¹

In the case of Somalia, the major goal that should inform AMISOM's withdrawal strategy is building the capacity of the government to the level where it can effectively replace the international presence in safeguarding Somalis' security, running the country and exercising appreciable control over the use of force. Protracted weaknesses in the government thereby imply prolonging the peacekeeping operation.

Second, going forward, donors' continued support for AMISOM will determine whether it can help the SFG to develop its capacity to provide security. At the moment AMISOM is already overstretched: it is challenged in terms of both intelligence gathering and equipment support, particularly force enablers.

As a result it is concentrating on maintaining control over liberated areas rather than on expanding its area of control. The initial AMISOM aim, as evidenced by the liberated parts of the country, seems to have involved liberating areas controlled by al-Shabaab and then handing these over to the SNA. However, this no longer appears to be happening, as the SNA is neither large nor strong enough to hold and protect the areas currently under the control of AMISOM.

In fact, the SNA is still in the initial stages of formation and is not adequately capacitated or equipped yet – a situation that will take time to remedy. Some experts estimate that the reconstitution of the SNA will take at least five years, pointing to the enormity of the task ahead for AMISOM, local Somali stakeholders and the international community.

AMISOM already suffers from structural limitations due to the nature of its initial mandate, which provides for the mission to support the transitional federal institutions rather than helping to build peace. As it stands, the mission's mandate has been placed in the hands of the SFG, effectively making it an authorised extension of the



The AMISOM headquarters in Mogadishu

government's security forces, with implications for its neutrality in the search for peace in Somalia.

AMISOM is currently confronting various challenges. One major challenge relates to the perceived influence of and geopolitical roles played by TCCs such as Kenya. The complexities surrounding perceptions of the interplay between their interests in the creation of a buffer zone in the Juba region, which led to their support for Madobe and his Ras Kamboni militia credited with liberating Kismayo from al-Shabaab, are having an impact on political processes in Kismayo. First, Kenya's initial support for Madobe fed into al-Shabaab's propaganda machinery, which claims that foreign forces are in the country to protect their own interests, and second, the tensions that emerged between the SFG and Madobe had wide-reaching implications for the relationship between Kenya and the SFG, because of Kenya's support for Madobe in taking control of the Juba region.

Challenges associated with funding AMISOM are also impeding the mission's ability to deliver. The current AMISOM funding structure is largely dependent on the EU, particularly in terms of troop allowances. Through its Peace Support Facility, the EU has been providing \$444 million a year since the start of the mission in 2007.¹² Despite AMISOM's need for additional resources in order to extend its sphere of influence, there are no guarantees that the EU will increase or even sustain current funding levels. Even though funding support from the UN, through the UN Support Office to AMISOM (UNSOA), has increased over time, it is still far from meeting the mission's requirements.¹³

The AU does not appear to be doing much about finding alternative sources of funding, even for its own internal activities. A report presented by an AU High-Level Panel on Alternative Sources of Funding under the chairmanship of former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo met with opposition from some members of the AU. Among others, the report had put forward proposals for the introduction of a \$2 hospitality levy on hotel accommodation in Africa and a \$10 tax on air tickets purchased by travellers to and from Africa, in order to raise funds for the AU. However, some AU members, including Zambia, Zimbabwe and Egypt, objected to the proposal. Apart from this, there appears to be few efforts by the AU to raise funds either internally or through alternative means.

Practically, however, if funding fatigue persists in relation to AMISOM, there will certainly be problems with sustaining the mission's capacity to deliver: first in terms of maintaining liberated areas, and second in extending its influence to other areas currently under the control of al-Shabaab. This will mean that, despite the good intentions of the various TCCs, their long-term contribution to peace could be undermined by a lack of adequate resources.

The numerous challenges AMISOM confronts have spawned the possibility of its blue-hatting. The realisation in some quarters on the African continent that such a move

could help to share the burden of finding peace in Somalia has further driven this discussion. However, attempts to re-hat the mission as a UN one will have to be mindful of the complexity of the situation, particularly in terms of security and the inability of the SNA to play a leading role in providing security for both state institutions and the country.

Challenges associated with funding AMISOM are also impeding the mission's ability to deliver

The existing challenges associated with the command and control structures of AMISOM are also important, as is the fact that the national interests of countries such as Kenya still heavily influence their operations on the ground. There will be issues around the inclusion of Somalia's neighbours in a UN-led force.

Given the challenges facing the current government and the SNA's apparent inability to become fully functional in the near future, additional support and equipment for AMISOM is crucial, as is mandating AMISOM to train and equip the SNA. Despite the challenges associated with this option, sustainable security in Somalia depends on developing the SNA's capacity. Without that, there is a real risk of blue-hatting introducing a situation similar to that of the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), where the international community's involvement ended up being long term. A more logical approach should involve a review of the 2012 Concept of Operations of AMISOM (CONOPS), including a full assessment of critical needs on the ground, and the provision of additional resources. It should also outline a time frame within which key tasks should be delivered.

AL-SHABAAB'S PERCEIVED WEAKNESSES

Despite the fact that al-Shabaab has suffered massive military losses in Mogadishu and Kismayo, it is fast evolving into a more complex and deadly African jihadi group, and adapting to the tough resistance from AMISOM. Its rapid evolution is a result of the pressure on its leader, Moktar Ali Zubeyr (Ahmed Abdi Godane), to counter the increasingly prevalent view that the group has been weakened by AMISOM, his desire to position al-Shabaab as a credible African partner of the global al-Qaeda franchise in sub-Saharan Africa, and the fact that al-Shabaab currently finds

itself on the back foot due to pressure from a relatively better-equipped AMISOM.

Godane has set in place massive internal cleansing strategies that have eliminated influential moderate elements and some key foreign elements from the command and control structures of the group. Severe internal strife and infighting between Godane's faction and dissenting leaders such as Sheikh Hassan Aweys, Ibrahim Afghani, Sheikh Mukhtar Robow, Moallim Burhan and Abu Mansour Al-Almriki (Omar Hammami) dominated the first half of 2013. As a result of these internal wranglings, the late Mansour, who used to be one of al-Shabaab's foreign commanders, propagandists and recruiters, lambasted the group for failing to represent jihadism because of Godane's authoritarian leadership style, his brutal responses to internal dissent and the perceived targeting of foreign fighters. Other leaders such as the late Afghani, who was Godane's deputy, also criticised Godane for targeting foreign al-Shabaab members, imprisoning them in secret detention centres and even killing them.

Further evidence of the internal divisions is the fleeing and subsequent arrest of Aweys and the killing of Afghani for resisting arrest in June 2013. Robow, who used to be an influential figure in local recruitment and sometimes acted as al-Shabaab's spokesperson, deserted the group under similar circumstances. There have since been indications that Robow is closely monitoring the government's handling of Aweys, as that will inform his plans to sever ties with al-Shabaab.¹⁴

If these internal weaknesses and AMISOM's resistance were to persist, one would expect the cumulative effect to break the back of the Islamist group and ultimately undermine its influence in the insecurity matrix of Somalia and the entire Horn of Africa. However, there are important indications that al-Shabaab is instead fast adapting to the situation and evolving into a more complex and deadly group. The elimination of some elements within the group has fundamentally altered its power structures by concentrating power in Godane's hands. This lack of opposition to Godane's decisions could deliver better results in terms of command and control.

By eliminating the likes of Aweys and Robow, the group is gradually replacing some of the more moderate and older elements with a younger, more jihadi-minded cadre. The older elements have recently become far less relevant to the fulfilment of the global jihad objective and the strategic alliance between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda. Foreign fighters and diaspora Somalis were important components of the more moderate group. Now they are gradually being replaced with a younger cadre of Somali-born Somalis, despite fresh attempts to recruit more fighters from the diaspora.¹⁵ The use of a younger generation of Somalis raises crucial questions about the group's spheres of influence and the hardening attitude of local young people,



The AMISOM headquarters hit by al-Shabaab in 2009

a worrying situation that points to the enormity of the task ahead. More than two decades of war have created a generation of Somalis who have never known peace.¹⁶ One area where this new dynamic is playing out is in Godane's preference for the use of the *amneyats*, a special operations division under his direct leadership. In cases where the *amneyats* have been deployed in Mogadishu, their reconnaissance, assassination and suicide units have cleverly co-ordinated their activities to wreak havoc against targets such as the Supreme Court and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) compound.

This choice of tactics has effectively served as the capstone to al-Shabaab's evolution into a guerrilla group ready to exploit the vulnerabilities of its foes through asymmetric warfare. The shift has seen a rise in hit-and-run operations, minimal direct confrontation with AMISOM, fewer men used and few resources expended in operations. The 2013 UN Monitoring Group report on Somalia quotes a pro-al-Shabaab communicator summing up this form of operation as '[T]he enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; He (*sic*) retreats, we pursue.'

With the form the *amneyats* are taking and their positioning within al-Shabaab, it does appear that even if international efforts were to succeed in dismantling its fighting forces, chances are good that the cells under the leadership of Godane will continue operating. This implies that the ongoing military operation against the group might be set for a long fight, as it points to major shifts in the nature of the battle against al-Shabaab in Somalia and effectively redefines its operation capabilities in relation to other actors.

Against this backdrop, al-Shabaab ceases to be circumscribed by its capacity in terms of conventional assessment, but becomes defined by its actual capacity by virtue of the new phase of guerrilla warfare in which it is engaged. As such it does not need more than its current estimated force strength of 5 000 to be able to sabotage peace efforts in Somalia and beyond. Additionally, its

actual strength should be assessed relative to the actors resisting its operations. In other words, al-Shabaab may be weak in comparison with the capacity it had in the past as well as in relation to AMISOM's agility; but it is not weak in comparison with the weak Somali government and the huge internal vulnerabilities in the region.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES IN SOMALIA

The UN Security Council's adoption of Resolution 2093 on 6 March 2013 signified a political turn-around as far as the UN's presence in Somalia was concerned. Among other important decisions, the resolution said the new UN mission should 'be headquartered in Mogadishu and should deploy further across Somalia as security conditions allow'.¹⁷ It has provided the basis for the UN's presence in Mogadishu, which is a direct response to the Somali government's request for a single 'door to knock on'¹⁸ and the need to effectively co-ordinate international support for the SFG.¹⁹

In the immediate post-transition period under the new government, the international community's support and involvement has been evident in three key areas. It has firstly become apparent in the area of security support: despite limited resources AMISOM continues to support the SNA in maintaining and expanding security beyond Mogadishu. In addition, the international community continues to provide logistical and training support to the SNA in order to enhance its capacity to secure the country. Over the years, several actors, including the EU, have embarked on training activities aimed at capacitating the SNA. Since launching the Military Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia) in April 2010, for instance, the EU has trained about 3 600 soldiers at the level of non-commissioned officers (NCOs), junior officers and specialists, among others.²⁰

Secondly, the international community has contributed immensely in helping the SFG to conceptualise programmes and projects within the six broad pillars of the government's policies. International funds allocated to the political sphere have increased with the revitalisation of the state-building process after the inauguration of President Mohamud's government. This support has materialised after bilateral agreements with certain countries – specifically Gulf States such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia – or through multilateral agreements with the UN and the EU. However, the outcomes of this support are still limited at this stage.

One of the major indications of international support and commitment to reconstruction in post-transition Somalia is the New Deal compact launched on 16 September 2013 in Brussels. The New Deal compact is aimed at supporting Somalia's emergence from fragility and has donor pledges

of \$2,2 billion to finance projects encouraging inclusive politics, security reform, improved justice, economic growth, revenue collection and service provision.

Finally, the international community has been providing humanitarian relief since the 1990s through funding refugee camps and social service delivery programmes such as education centres and health-care centres. However, despite gradual improvement, the humanitarian situation is still critical and the country remains in need of aid and additional resources.

Individual actors such as Turkey, who are not necessarily operating under the umbrella of the international community, are also playing an important role in Somalia in terms of humanitarian assistance and development aid. In 2012, the Turkish International Co-operation and Development Agency (TIKA), alongside the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), funded a variety of infrastructure projects, including the restoration of government buildings and the settlement of thousands of internally displaced persons.

Despite making a commendable contribution, international involvement in the pursuit of peace in Somalia has primarily been driven by the agendas of international actors. This has sometimes confounded local actors, and can lead to inadequate co-ordination among the many international actors currently on the ground.

CONCLUSION

Overall, despite the progress made and the sense of optimism surrounding Somalia's future, a great deal of effort needs to centre on building a strong SFG. This will not only sustain the population's hopes and confidence, but will also provide a useful partner for international efforts in the country. However, this can only be achieved if international actors not only engage with the government, but also capacitate it to act on its own. Such an approach will help build the necessary local capacity for the government to stand on its own. The emerging perception among sections of the Somali population and the international community of a weak and weakening Somali central government is, therefore, one of the most challenging developments in post-transition Somalia, and one that has far-reaching implications for the collective push for peace in the country.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The al-Shabaab threat remains one of the most formidable factors undermining peace in post-transition Somalia. Despite AMISOM's military successes against the group, there are indications that it is rapidly adapting and adopting more sophisticated asymmetrical warfare tactics. This evolution represents the next phase of the conflict, which cannot be won only by military means.

The SFG should consider, as a matter of urgency, opening dialogue with the leaders of the group and making concessions that will end its armed operations. Additionally, a peace process bringing together relevant stakeholders from all regions in the country should be initiated as a non-military option in the search for peace.

- Building strong Somali state institutions is a prerequisite for achieving a functioning government and replacing the international military presence in the country. State institution-building should therefore be central to the priorities of the SFG. Particularly, ongoing international support for capacitating and equipping the SNA should focus on refining the command and control structures, reforming the security sector, and achieving an integrated army where the cadres' loyalties are not aligned to any identity bloc.
- An elaborate diaspora recruitment programme (DRP) should be instituted with the aim of identifying, motivating and recruiting a competent crop of qualified and dedicated citizens for the Somali civil service. This will help strengthen the institutions by providing the necessary human resources.
- Rather than contribute to peace, the implementation of federalism has the tendency of fomenting tension if not well managed. The SFG should consider opening a national dialogue on federalism. Within this, a Somali Federal Commission on Constitution Implementation (SFCCI) should be established with the mandate to facilitate national dialogue on federalism and other outstanding issues. Part of its role should involve generating national consensus on the nature of and approach to federalism. An affiliate Independent Federal Boundaries Commission (IFBC) should be established to clearly delineate the boundaries of the various states in the federation.
- For AMISOM to fully deliver on its intended goals in the quest for peace in Somalia, an increase in international support for its operations in terms of funding and equipment is necessary, despite discussions on the blue-hatting of the mission. The relationship between AMISOM and the UN has seen limited co-ordination and information sharing. With the recent setting up of the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) an opportunity has emerged for both institutions to improve the situation through the institutionalisation of information sharing so as to achieve a common and coherent strategy that can benefit Somalia. Building consensus on neutrality among regional forces to bring about coherence and strategic unity in AMISOM is also required for supporting the credibility of regional players.
- The international community should agree on a common policy on Somalia to provide a framework for engagement and partner collaboration. This will prevent competition among and duplication by the

many international actors, help with prudent resource management and improve collective impact on the ground.

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NOTES

- 1 See an extensive discussion of the process in Andrews Atta-Asamoah, *Long walk to restoration: lessons from Somalia's transition process*, ISS, 9 July 2013, http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/SitRep2013_9July-Asamoah.pdf (accessed 13 July 2013).
- 2 EUNIDA (The European Network of Implementing Development Agencies), *Support to Somali Federal Government*, Inception Report, 28 June 2013.
- 3 For many Somalis critical of the government, the 'Gigiri Republic' represents the UN office in Nairobi and its considerable influence in decision-making in a sovereign Somalia.
- 4 Non-attributable interview with a security source, Mogadishu, Somalia, 17 July 2013.
- 5 Non-attributable interview with a Somali parliamentarian, Nairobi, Kenya, 20 July 2013.
- 6 UN Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2060 (2012): Somalia, S/2013/413, 2013.
- 7 Non-attributable interview with an international member, Mogadishu, Somalia, 18 July 2013.
- 8 The Juba region is made up of Lower Juba, Middle Juba and Gedo. The newly formed federal state in that region was initially referred to as 'Jubaland'. Following the Addis Ababa process of the IGAD, the federal state has been accepted as an interim arrangement.
- 9 Non-attributable interview with a Somali parliamentarian, Nairobi, Kenya, 19 July 2013.
- 10 Ibid.
- 11 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines, Peacekeeping Best Practices Section Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training Department of Peacekeeping Operations, New York, 2008, 87.
- 12 Matt Freear & Cedric De Coning, Lessons from the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) for peace operations in Mali, *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development* 2(2:23) (2013), 11.

- 13 Some of the challenges around this are centred on the accountability lines and bureaucratic processes surrounding the UN's accounting expectations.
- 14 Non-attributable interview, Mogadishu, Somalia, 18 July 2013.
- 15 In a video released in August 2013 titled 'The path to paradise: from the Twin Cities to the land of migration', there are clear indications that al-Shabaab is trying to immortalise some of its foreign fighters in order to appeal to a new crop of fighters in the country. See <http://jihadology.net/2013/08/07/al-kataib-media-presents-a-new-video-message-from-harakatal-shabab-al-mujahidin-the-path-to-paradise-from-the-twin-cities-to-the-land-of-the-twomigrations/> (accessed 20 August 2013).
- 16 For a detailed analysis, see Andrews Atta-Asamoah, The damage done by war in Somalia, ISS Today, 22 May 2009, <http://www.issafrika.org/iss-today/the-damage-done-by-war-insomalia> (accessed 20 August 2013).
- 17 UNSC Resolution 2093, par. 23, 2013, <http://unpos.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Ao7g9mfjLTM%3D&tabid=9705&language=en-US> (accessed 19 August 2013)
- 18 Letter from the UN Secretary-General addressed to the President of the UN Security Council, S/2013/239, 19 April 2013, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_239.pdf, (accessed 20 August 2013).
- 19 See the 6957th and 6958th meetings of the UN Security Council, Security Council establishes United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, to be operational by 3 June for initial period of 12 months, United Nations, 2 May 2013, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10944.doc.htm> (accessed 20 August 2013).
- 20 See details in EU External Action, EU military mission to contribute to the building up and strengthening of the Somali National Armed Forces, October 2013, http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutmsomalia/pdf/02052013_factsheet_eutm-somalia_en.pdf, (accessed 30 October 2013).

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