



INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES
ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY

PEACE & SECURITY REPORT

Vol. 1

July 2019

GUINEA BISSAU CONFLICT INSIGHT



ABOUT THE REPORT

The purpose of this report is to provide analysis and recommendations to assist the African Union (AU), Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Member States and Development Partners in decision making and in the implementation of peace and security-related instruments.

CONTENTS

SITUATION ANALYSIS	2
CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT	4
ACTORS	7
DYNAMICS OF THE CONFLICT	9
RESPONSES	12
SCENARIOS	13
STRATEGIC OPTIONS	14
REFERENCES	15
GUINEA BISSAU CONFLICT TIMELINE (1974 - 2018)	16

CONTRIBUTORS

Dr. Mesfin Gebremichael (Editor in Chief)

Ms. Elshaddai Mesfin (Author)

Ms. Alem Kidane

Ms. Tigist Kebede Feyissa

Ms. Tsion Belay

EDITING, DESIGN & LAYOUT

Michelle Mendi Muita (Editor)

Abel B Ayalew (Design & Layout)

© 2018 Institute for Peace and Security Studies | Addis Ababa University.
All rights reserved.

SITUATION ANALYSIS




Figure 1: Country profile and demographics (2018)

ⁱ Sources: Human Development Index(HDI), 2018, available at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/GNB.pdf

Guinea Bissau is a country located on the coast of West Africa along the Atlantic Ocean. It consists of a mainland on the continent - where the majority of the population lives - and close to 80 archipelagos on the ocean, of which only 20 are habited. The country's population is approximately 2 million people comprised of several ethnic groups. These include the Fula (30%), the Mandinka-speaking people in the north and northeast of the country (13%); the Balanta in the north and south (30%); the Papel (7%) that live in the southern coastal area; and the Manjaco (14%) that are spread across the country.ⁱ

Guinea Bissau's economy, like many African economies in the region, is highly dependent on the export of primary products. The country's gross domestic product (GDP) is anchored on the sole export of cashew nuts, which represent 93% of its official export earnings. However, the country intends to diversify the economy and join the rank of middle-income countries through the 2015-2020 development strategy, known as "Terra Ranca", by moving towards industrialization and exploiting natural resources such as bauxite and phosphates.ⁱⁱ Based on the country's history, which has involved a series of political and socio-economic challenges, the commitment of the citizens as well as regional and international partners

ⁱ World Population Review. (2019). Guinea-Bissau Population 2019. Retrieved from <http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/Guinea-Bissau-population/>

ⁱⁱ Bappah, H. Y. (2017). *Why Peace Fails in Guinea Bissau? A Political Economy Analysis of the ECOWAS-brokered Conakry Accord*. Dakar: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Peace and Security Centre of Competence Sub-Saharan Africa available at <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/fes-pscc/14166.pdf>

is essential to achieving economic growth. However, persistent challenges ranging from civil war and political instability to weak governance have hindered this intended progress.

The 1998-1999 Guinea Bissau Civil War adversely affected the country's economic development, causing the country's agricultural production and GDP to fall by 17% and 28% respectively.ⁱⁱⁱ Although efforts were made to re-launch the economy, the GDP remained at 3% GDP until 2009.^{iv} The government's inability to finance and provide basic services in health, justice and social services to the citizenry prolonged its heavy dependence on foreign aid from international partners such the European Union (EU) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

The political instability that has plagued the country since its independence from Portugal in 1974 has also adversely affected the government's ability to deliver democratic dividends to its people. Notably, since independence, Guinea Bissau has never experienced an elected government finishing its term. Military coup d'états, assassinations and mutinies - often results of the internal power struggles between the elites of the country's dominant party, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) - have contributed to the political destabilization and uncertainty. The infighting within the party and

ⁱⁱⁱ Ibid.

^{iv} Ibid.

government is highlighted by the civil war of 1998-1999 when government forces of then president João Bernardo Vieira battled against the rebel forces of his Chief of Staff, Brigadier-General Ansumane Mané.

The war erupted following President Vieira's sacking of Mané in May 1998.^v As a result, Mané led a coup in June 1998 that gave him control of the main districts of the capital. On 1 November 1999, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) brokered the Abuja Peace Accord, thereby countering the involvement of neighbouring states Guinea and Senegal, who sent troops - 500 and 1,300 troops respectively – in his support of the restoration of the constitutional order. Following the conclusion of the peace agreement and the deployment of ECOWAS's mission - Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) - aimed at restoring the legitimate government, Senegalese and Guinean troops were withdrawn and elections were scheduled to be held later in the year despite their delay.^{vi}

Arguably, the underlying cause of these frequent political crises in Guinea Bissau is the semi-presidential system adopted with the 1993 constitution following almost two decades of one-party rule since independence. After the constitution was amended in 1993 to allow for multi-party democracy, the principles of this change - particularly the principle of separation of powers - was not internalized by governing bodies due to the Constitution's lack of demarcation between the powers, roles and responsibilities between the President and the Prime Minister. As a result, eight coup d'états have been recorded since the 1980s, the most recent of which (2012) plunged the country into a still unresolved stalemate despite coordinated efforts from the ECOWAS and the United Nations' Integrated Peace Building Office in Guinea Bissau (UNIOGBIS).^{vii}

In the midst of political instability, the country is further affected by the scourge of corruption. Guinea Bissau currently ranks as 171 in the Global Corruption Index.^{viii} Worse still, corruption in the country is inextricably linked to drug trafficking networks with the country's army cited as a major benefactor.^{ix} In fact, Guinea Bissau remains one of the few countries whose army's remuneration is still informal and whose means of income has been undocumented since its independence in 1974.^x The weaknesses of the state institutions and structures identified above contribute to governance deficiencies, protracted conflicts and instability that have heightened the feeling of insecurity among citizens.

^v An independent inquiry by the National Assembly would later on reveal that the President was aware of the alleged weapons trafficking but was "unable, or unwilling, to intervene".

^{vi} *Jeune Afrique*. (2018, November 2). *Guinée-Bissau : selon Domingos Simões Pereira, du PAIGC, « le président Vaz ne veut pas des élections législatives »*. Retrieved from <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/656353/politique/guinee-bissau-selon-domingos-simoes-pereira-du-paigc-le-president-vaz-ne-veut-pas-des-elections-legislatives/> It should be noted that the elections were initially planned to take place on November 18, 2018 but have been postponed due to delays in voter registration. The government plans to have them held between the end of 2018 and the beginning of 2019.

^{vii} United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea Bissau (UNIOGBIS) and Institute for Security Studies (ISS). (2018). *Guinea Bissau: Review the Framework Law on Political Parties*. Dakar: ISS Africa.

^{viii} Trading Economics. (2019). *Guinea Bissau Corruption Rank*. Retrieved from <https://tradingeconomics.com/guinea-bissau/corruption-rank>

^{ix} Bappah, H. Y. (2017). *Why Peace Fails in Guinea Bissau? A Political Economy Analysis of the ECOWAS-brokered Conakry Accord*. Dakar: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Peace and Security Centre of Competence Sub-Saharan Africa available at <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/fes-pscc/14166.pdf>

^x (2018). *Report of the Secretary General on Developments in Guinea Bissau and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea Bissau*. New York: United Nations (UN).

CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT

The constitutional crisis in Guinea Bissau is the primary cause of the country's on-going stalemate. The hallmark of the 1993 constitution was a provision that introduced a multiparty, semi-presidential system as a key element of the reforms to move the country from a one-party system. However, the constitution did not clearly delineate the roles, powers and responsibilities between the president and the prime minister under the semi-presidential system it adopted. The executive branch of government comprises the President who is the Head of State (Art. 62) and the Prime Minister who acts as the Head of Government (Art.97 § 2). The President is elected by direct vote through universal suffrage and it is the President of the Republic, in accordance with the electoral results, who nominates the Prime Minister after consulting with political parties represented in the National Popular Assembly (NPA) (Art.98 § 1).^{xi}

To form the government, the Prime Minister proposes ministers and secretaries of state for presidential nomination and approval (Art.98 § 2). The government is then led by the Prime Minister. In essence, although the President names the cabinet, the Prime Minister is responsible to parliament and may be forced to resign should it lose the confidence of the legislature. Also important to note is that although the semi-presidential system is similar to the parliamentary system, the former has a significant difference with the head of state having roles that transcend ceremonial duties. Herein lies the problem. Both the President and Prime Minister are powerful and to a large extent, the personalities occupying the office determine to whom members of the cabinet and bureaucratic hierarchy hold allegiance to. Indeed, although both actors may be from the same party, the competition for power and access to resources create waves of instability in the government.

As a result of this lack of delineation of clear roles and responsibilities, laws in the NPA are often passed to neutralize the power and influence of either of the two individuals or preserve the status quo. Furthermore, the President may instigate the dissolution of the Cabinet to push for the election of a new Prime Minister as witnessed in August 2015.^{xii} The Supreme Court, thus far, has been unable to reconcile these differences given the fact that its independence is not ensured. Its council is not presided over by judges on the basis of merit. Rather, judges are political appointees of the President.

^{xi} Republic of Guinea Bissau. (1996). *Constitution of the Republic of Guinea Bissau Adopted in 1984, Amended in 1991, 1993 and 1996*. Retrieved from <https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/gw/gw001.en.pdf>

^{xii} *The President fired the cabinet following his fallout with his ministers.*

Thus, their voting on decisions is not predicated on ensuring constitutionalism but determined by political allegiances.^{xiii}

Military intervention in politics

As a country whose national politics has been overtaken if not dominated by the PAIGC since independence, Guinea Bissau is no exception to the recurrent intervention of the military in its politics. In fact, for long, the PAIGC and its armed wing that fought for independence, Forças Armadas da Guinea-Bissau (FAGB), hailed themselves as the legitimate rulers of the country. On the basis of the PAIGC being the "leading political force of society and state",^{xiv} the FAGB ensures that the political climate is one that conforms and protects its political interests even if the party in power is the PAIGC itself. Such was the claim no difference stood between the two actors until the 1991 Multi Party principle. This forced a clear distinction between the PAIGC as a political party and the FAGB as the national army. Furthermore, it ushered in a new divide within the PAIGC. The PAIGC was predominantly composed of Guinea Bissau's liberation fighters who pursued political careers, in contrast to the FAGB. With the introduced reforms of the 1990s, the PAIGC was divided between the old wing and a new reformed civilian component that separated itself from the PAIGC - the Party for Social Renewal (PRS). The latter would establish itself as the main opposition party in Guinea Bissau's politics challenging the FAGB, and composed of civilians who did not partake in the independence struggle but were part of the small elite group.

As the national army's political relevance declined, it seized opportunities to maintain its relevance, including the staging of coup d'états and the constant meddling in the politics of the country-with the 1998-1999 civil war and the 2012 coup d'état being notable examples. In both cases, certain military factions forged allegiances with certain factions of the political parties, notably the FAGB, and intervened beyond their scope to ensure that their interests and influence were protected in the country's political landscape.

^{xiii} (2018). *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers*. New York: United Nations General Assembly.

^{xiv} Patrick Chabal. (2002). *A History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa*. Retrieved from https://books.google.com.et/books?id=qZjbTgMqkn4C&pg=PA268&tp-g=PA268&dq=PAIGC+being+the+%E2%80%9Cleaving+political+force+of+society+and+state%E2%80%9D,&source=bl&ots=wEwpMgPdFY&sig=ACjU3U1CrQK-FYpqlyNOuYYC-9LzWQ0pQg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKewiu_9zL8ZXjA-hULDuwKHb30BbUQ6AEwAHoECAAQAQ#v=onepage&q=PAIGC%20being%20the%20E2%80%9Cleaving%20political%20force%20of%20society%20and%20state%E2%80%9D%2C&f=false

For example, during the civil war, the firing of Brigadier General Ansumane Mané from his post was only a small part of the bigger picture. The military elite felt excluded from the political scene as the then President Vieira consolidated power around a small inner circle of trusted individuals from which it was not part of.^{xv} Its consequent involvement in the 2012 coup d'état follows the same rationale.

Weak state institutions

The inherent weaknesses in state institutions have contributed to the repeated crises the country is experiencing. The state has failed to deliver on its responsibility to provide basic social services as well as its role to ensure and promote justice and the rule of law. The absence of state presence is more apparent at the sub-national level. The UN Secretary General's Special Rapporteur's on the independence of judges and lawyers on Guinea-Bissau report noted that state structures are absent at the local level, consequently failing in the provision of basic social services. Instead, as the report noted, members of the government, dominant political parties as well as the military, direct their efforts at finding means of consolidating their power base in the capital city in a bid to accumulate political leverage.^{xvi} This has further distanced these political actors from the citizenry to whom they have failed to provide basic public services to. According to the World Food Programme (WFP), over 70% (and growing) of the country's population is living under the poverty line and thus exposed to chronic food insecurity that is worsened by the on-going political crises.^{xvii}

State institutions that should ensure justice and promote the rule of law are also lacking in performance. The report of the UN's Special Rapporteur noted that the judiciary's lack of independence and inability to tackle impunity was "sad and terrible".^{xviii} Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the country's laws are written in Portuguese even though only 14% of the population speaks the language. Essentially, the law is inaccessible to a majority of the population as it is difficult for them to read, understand and even mainstream discussions on their rights and duties. Furthermore, the absence of funds to deliver justice or ensure due process has forced tribunals to be held either in degraded or rented

buildings, or worse, not at all.^{xix}

Consequently, sections of the population tend to resort to their own sense of justice or to traditional means of ensuring justice away from the rule of law; a situation that contributes to growing impunity in the country. In fact, the country has seen a spike of killings in different communities by young citizens, desperate to see justice served.^{xx} Away from government control and the population unable to stop them from doing so, young people organized in gangs attempt to gain a sense of justice through human and/or livestock kidnappings or revenge killings. In contestations, elders practicing traditional justice mechanisms have emerged to fill the vacuum and limit the violence from spreading. Yet, they themselves are limited to ensuring justice only when it comes to petty crimes and not with regards to homicides or drug trafficking charges.^{xxi} They lack the legitimate authority or prefer to keep a distance to avoid being victims of those seeking revenge. The levels of impunity and injustice have spread to the extent that citizens have developed a growing sense of insecurity.

The common sense of injustice and impunity felt by the population alongside the absence of basic social services have reinforced the perception that the rule of law is absent by choice and not because of lack of enforcing mechanisms. This is the result of a government and its relevant institutions that chooses to focus on/prioritize the politics of the centre for reasons of power and resource accumulation as opposed to their mandate of serving their citizens.

Narco state, corruption and criminal drug networks

In addition to the above, the role both the government and military elites play in corruption and criminal drug networks contributes to the recurrent political instability. With a low ranking in the development index, Guinea Bissau is a country with a high rate of corruption with its government and military elites indicted. For example, prominent political figures have been at the centre of controversies concerning the embezzlement of state funds and accused of embezzling close to 9.1 million euros of aid funds donated by Angola and of improper utilization of close to US\$20 million of taxes collected on cashew trade.^{xxii}

^{xv} International Crisis Group (ICG). (2012). *Beyond Turf Wars: Managing the Post-Coup Transition in Guinea Bissau*. Dakar: International Crisis Group (ICG).

^{xvi} (2018). *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers*. New York: United Nations General Assembly.

^{xvii} World Food Program. (2018). *Guinea Bissau*. Retrieved from <https://www1.wfp.org/countries/guinea-bissau>

^{xviii} (2018). *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers*. New York: United Nations General Assembly.

^{xix} *Ibid.*

^{xx} Voz di Paz. (2010). *Roots of Conflicts in Guinea Bissau: The voice of the people*. Bissau: Voz di Paz / Interpeace.

^{xxi} *Ibid.*

^{xxii} Bappah, H. Y. (2017). *Why Peace Fails in Guinea Bissau? A Political Economy Analysis of the ECOWAS-brokered Conakry Accord*. Dakar: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Peace and Security Centre of Competence Sub-Saharan Africa.

In addition to rampant corruption, Guinea Bissau is an important player in the West Africa drug trafficking network. The country acts as a transit hub of drug trafficking from Latin America (in particular Columbia, Brazil and Venezuela) to Europe (mainly Portugal and Spain due their coastal lines). The location of its remote archipelagos and the absence of government control have made it ideal for drug cartel networks to dump their drugs as well as have them moved to their desired destinations in Europe.^{xxiii} Between 2005 and today, it has been estimated that an average of 30 tons of cocaine, estimated at \$250.3 million (13% of Guinea Bissau's GDP), is trafficked annually through the country.^{xxiv}

This lucrative yet illicit business has participants drawn from the highest echelon of government and military circles to young people from the rural areas that are desperate to make a living. Expectedly, the involvement of government officials and the military enables the trade as they routinely turn a blind eye when drugs are being moved, ease the release of drug traffickers, or conceal the prosecutions of arrested dealers. A notable example is the concealment and disappearance of close to 2.5 tons of cocaine from the country. High-ranking military officials had authorized the landing of a plane carrying the said amount of cocaine in a military base in Cufar in the southern part of the country. In another incident, the army blocked the judicial investigation of a drug cargo that entered the country through its international airport on 12 July 2008, having ensured its safe passage from the airport to its destined European markets.^{xxv} The active involvement of military and high-ranking government officials in the illicit trade was further confirmed when Jose Americo Bubo Na Tchuto, the former head of Guinea Bissau's navy, pleaded guilty in an American court in 2014 for importing narcotics into the country.^{xxvi} The youth, motivated by the flashy lifestyles of known drug traffickers, consider this venture a viable means of income. Youth involvement in the drug trade has further increased violence and criminality especially in the rural areas, where they often fight to control territories or to settle a score over a feud. Worse still, the number of young people addicted to drugs in the country is rapidly increasing.^{xxvii}

The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), alarmed by the rate of the drug network expansion in Guinea Bissau, declared it a "narco state" and on 25 June 2008, the UN Security Council urged the government in Bissau to stop the trafficking and to "strengthen its international and regional cooperation to fight the narcotics trade and organized crime plaguing the country".^{xxviii}

In light of the above, the underlying reason behind the waves of political crises in Guinea Bissau is the competition to control the political space and accumulated wealth. Following independence, there was a wide perception among the population and political actors that security and wealth are guaranteed should one be closer to power bases in the city. So much so, that since 1974 the major political actors of the country remain the same: the military and the FAGB. Each has competed against each other to ensure its dominant place in the political and economic realm. The power struggle between the Prime Minister and the President, the result of the constitutional crisis, is a competition to control the political landscape of the country while protecting the interests of the army and veterans of the independence struggle. The frequent interventions by the military in the country's politics and its close ties to the narcotics industry is a testament of its determined will to ensure its entitlement to the country's politics and wealth.

xxiii Ramet, V. (2012, August). *Civil-military relations in Guinea Bissau: An unresolved issue*. Brussels: European Union.

xxiv Joshua, B. (2012,). *The World's Fastest Growing Cocaine Trafficking Hub Is In This Impoverished African State*. *Business Insider*.

xxv *Ibid*.

xxvi Reuters. (2014, June 4). *Exclusive: Guinea-Bissau's ex-navy chief pleads guilty in U.S. drug case*. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bissau-drugs-guilty/exclusive-guinea-bissau-ex-navy-chief-pleads-guilty-in-u-s-drug-case-idUSKB-N0EE2FO20140603>

xxvii Voz di Paz. (2010). *Roots of Conflicts in Guinea Bissau: The voice of the people*. Bissau: Voz di Paz / Interpeace.

xxviii United Nations Security Council. (2008, June 25). *Security Council Press Statement on Guinea-Bissau*. Retrieved from <https://uniogbis.unmissions.org/en/june-25-2008-security-council-press-statement-guinea-bissau>

ACTORS

KEY

- Links/ Close Relationship
- ~ Discord/ Conflict
- = Alliance
- - - Informal/ Intermittent
- | Broken/ Disconnected Link




Figure 2: Actors Mapping

The African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC)

The PAIGC is one of the primary actors in the conflict of Guinea Bissau. As the oldest party in the country, it has emerged as an important player in the country's politics. Established in 1956 as the liberation front that undertook the struggle for independence against Portugal, it has long considered itself the vanguard of the country. In fact, it remained the de jure single party from 1974 to 1991, when the introduction of the 1991 constitutional revision changed the face of the party.

The PAIGC struggled to fully transform itself into a civilian movement, thus creating a rift within itself. Composed by a majority of veteran independence fighters, its line of thought was highly similar to that of the army. In fact, both were believed for a long time to have been the same. Nevertheless, with the introduction of the multi-party system a new composition of the party emerged. Younger civilian members, who were not war veterans but abided by the party's principles softly pushed for a separation of the military and the civilians. Unsuccessful, those who called for the reform separated from the PAIGC to form the PRS and established themselves an ardent opposition force in the country's politics. Accordingly, when the PAIGC would win elections, the military would exert their influence to ensure that the appointees were war veterans or those

in line with their interests. The coup of 2012 is a clear reflection of such an approach. The veteran/non-veteran divide did not hinder the party's predominance in the country's political sphere. Since the 1990s, the PAIGC has won the majority of the elections conducted in the country.

Forças Armadas da Guinéa-Bissau (FAGB)

The FAGB is the former armed wing of the PAIGC and today's predominant constituent of the country's national army whose electoral base is the majority of the rural population. In fact, the FAGB has always strived to ensure that its interests, and most importantly the interests of the predominant Balante group, are not overlooked. It believes it is the group's vanguard and legitimate representation, and fights to ensure that its rights are respected and enshrined in the constitution by the "white collars"^{xxix}.

In order to maintain the status quo, the FAGB conducted swift coup d'états, and even assassination attempts when the President or the Prime Minister, elected from their own party, were perceived as potential reformers. The 2012 coup d'état during the presidential elections that would have seen President Gomes win is one such example. The President was also visibly advancing

^{xxix} In this context, "white collars" are the officials in charge of the revision of the constitution.

support to ensure the conduct of DDR measures to the Guinea Bissau army. The military elite within the FAGB deemed this to be intrusive on its networks within the military and instigated the coup d'état that would depose President Gomes and install a transitional period under a new Prime Minister.

These tense and competitive relationships between the PAIGC with a civilian government trying to push forward for reforms, and a military clinging to power, remains at the core of the country's on-going conflict dynamics.

Partido da Renovação Social (PRS)

The Partido da Renovação Social, or Party for Social Renewal (PRS), is another dominant political party in the Guinea Bissau political landscape. Kumba Yalá (who died in 2014), a former PAIGC member, established the party in 1992 following the introduction of the multi-party system. With a strong Balante electorate and its own networks in the military elite, the party is composed of several former PAIGC members and stands for a full-fledged civilian government with a liberal ideology focused on serving the country's farming population. The PRS has emerged as a strong contender against the PAIGC, especially as the latter has been involved in several political scandals including self-inflicted coup d'états, corruption allegations as well as the close ties it has with the military. The popularity of the PRS increased when 15 dissidents, who were removed from their parliamentary seats for giving a vote of no confidence to the President in August 2015, formed a coalition with the party. With the increased popularity of the PRS, it can become an important contender in the NPA or a viable coalition option for other political parties as a credible alternative to the PAIGC.

CONFLICT DYNAMICS

The underlying triggers for the on-going crisis are the 2012 military coup d'état and the dissolution of the cabinet in 2015. As noted previously, Guinea Bissau follows the semi-presidential system, holding presidential elections every five years and legislative elections every four years. The 2012 presidential elections held on 18 March 2012 featured Carlos Domingos Gomes Júnior representing the PAIGC, Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo who ran as an independent (although from the PAIGC himself), Kumba Yala representing the PRS, and several other most prominent candidates. Mr. Gomes Júnior, a wealthy businessman with strong influence in the elite networks of the PAIGC as well as an ability to consolidate a strong base of supporters, was the forerunner.^{xxx} However, a coup d'état was successfully staged before President Gomes could consolidate his victory. It was alleged that Gomes had intended to carry out reforms of the military and introduce SSR measures, a move viewed as threatening to remove the military from its position of influence in the country's political landscape. There was also an assumption that Gomes would use the reforms to install his own network of military elites within the army.

Furthermore, the FAGB – an integral part of the PAIGC – considered President Gomes an illegitimate representative of the party^{xxxi}. This was in part because Gomes did not share the common view that the PAIGC derived its legitimacy from the role the FAGB played in gaining the country's independence. The coup d'état was efficiently executed, the President imprisoned, and Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo appointed as transitional president to lead the country until 2014 when presidential elections were scheduled to be held. Despite international condemnation of the coup by the UN and the EU, the army felt the move was justified.^{xxxii}

On May 2014, following a long and protracted process, the planned presidential and legislative elections finally took place. The PAIGC won both elections with former finance minister José Mário Vaz elected president by a large margin, and PAIGC leader Domingos Simões Pereira appointed prime minister. Yet, the stability was short lived, as the President dismissed Pereira and dissolved the government in August 2015 after falling out with him. Both the NPA and PAIGC rejected this move, leading to political divisions that plunged Guinea

Bissau back into a political crisis over the course of 2015, with a turnover of four prime ministers in a little over a year.

The situation quickly deteriorated. On 15 January 2015, a political stalemate emanated following the decision by the Permanent Commission of the National Assembly to remove the parliamentary mandate of 15 members of parliament (all from the PAIGC, and who would later form a coalition with the PRS) for abstaining from voting on the government's programme. The concerted efforts to form a coalition government and cabinet to ensure the daily operations of the state repeatedly failed. Five months later, on 26 May, the President issued a decree appointing a new Prime Minister. The appointment triggered another political and security standoff during which the dismissed Prime Minister and cabinet ministers refused to vacate government offices. The move sparked protests by PAIGC supporters with approximately 100 protesters reportedly gathering in front of the presidential palace following the announcement, throwing rocks and burning tires.

Early steps to resolve the political impasse involved the Inter-parliamentary Committee of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). The organization completed a six-day visit to Guinea Bissau on 2 June 2015 to assist all concerned national stakeholders to reach a solution. Following tedious negotiations led by ECOWAS and pressure from the international community and local peacebuilders, on 10 September 2016 political rivals agreed to the Conakry Road Map for Peace (Conakry Peace Accord). The Accord, a six-point plan to end the political crisis, was drafted with the help of ECOWAS. It included a preliminary agreement to form a consensus government with a Prime Minister that had the "President's trust", followed by the pursuance of electoral elections, constitutional reforms on the roles and responsibilities of the Prime Minister and President, and most importantly SSR reforms for the FAGB.^{xxxiii}

Unfortunately, progress with the implementation of the Conakry Accord has been slow, thereby stalling progress with regard to attaining stability and peace in Guinea Bissau. Although the agreement is yet to be implemented in full, there are important developments that signal that the country may be moving in the right direction. For example, following the failure to nominate a Prime Minister that had the "President's trust", on February 2018 ECOWAS issued a series of sanctions on

^{xxx} International Crisis Group (ICG). (2012). *Beyond Turf Wars: Managing the Post-Coup Transition in Guinea Bissau*. Dakar: International Crisis Group (ICG).

^{xxxi} International Crisis Group. (2017). *Beyond Turf Wars: Managing the Post-Coup Transition in Guinea-Bissau, report 190/Africa*. Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/beyond-turf-wars-managing-post-coup-transition-guinea-bissau>

^{xxxii} *Ibid.*

^{xxxiii} *Conakry Agreement On The Implementation Of The Ecowas Roadmap For The Resolution Of The Political Crisis In Guinea Bissau*. (2016, October 14). Conakry.

19 high-ranking military officials.^{xxxiv} This pressured the PAIGC, PRS, NPA as well as local peacebuilders such as the women's network group and the Catholic Church to push for the nomination of a Prime Minister in accordance with the agreement.

This brought forth several positive developments. First, a Prime Minister - Artides Gomes of the PAIGC - was appointed by consensus on 16 April 2018 to hold office until the next elections scheduled for the end of 2018. Following the appointment of Artides Gomes as Prime Minister, the National Assembly that had previously remained closed, opened for legislative business. One of the key responsibilities of the new Prime Minister was to ensure that the Conakry Agreement was implemented in full and that elections were held on time. In this regard, the new government also set 18 November 2018 as the day for legislative elections while May 2019 was anticipated for the presidential elections. The announcement was accompanied by a government pledge to contribute \$1.8 million toward preparing the process. Finally, a draft stability pact was reached on June 2018 between political stakeholders. It aims to be a binding document with a set of principles to be followed by all stakeholders in the run-up and after the planned elections to avoid a reversal of the political impasse.^{xxxv}

Additionally, the security and defence forces seem to have refrained from getting involved in the political crisis, thanks to the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea Bissau (ECOMIB). The regional organization deployed its first troops totalling 629 (677 including non-military personnel) from Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Senegal on 17 May 2012^{xxxvi} to ensure the security of citizens and government officials, implementation of SSR measures for the FAGB, and the provision of healthcare assistance to citizens until constitutional order was restored. ECOWAS also worked towards negotiating and building a consensus around transition agreements between concerned political stakeholders until the next round of elections.

However, there are threats to stability in Guinea Bissau, emanating from funding limitations to ECOMIB and their threats to withdraw as a consequence of the unwillingness of the country's political actors to abide

^{xxxiv} PSC. (2018). *the 760th meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council on the situation in the Republic of Guinea Bissau*. Addis Ababa: PSC.

^{xxxv} (2018). *Report of the Secretary General on Developments in Guinea Bissau and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea Bissau*. New York: United Nations (UN).

^{xxxvi} Herpolsheimer, J., & P.W. Döring, K. (2016, 12). *New Regionalisms and Violent Conflicts in Africa: The Politics of the AU ECOWAS in Mali and Guinea Bissau*. Working paper series des SFB 1199 an der Universität Leipzig, pp. 1-24. available at https://research.uni-leipzig.de/~sfb1199/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/WP5_B07_D%3%B6ring-Herpolsheimer_final.pdf.

by the terms of the 2016 peace agreement. If ECOMIB withdraws from the country, the resultant power vacuum is more likely than not to be filled by the FAGB security forces, thus bringing back the military as a potential spoiler of the on-going political stalemate. Fortunately, the threat to withdraw has been overcome following political and financial support from the international community, including the UN and EU, resulting in the extension of the mission's mandate.^{xxxvii}

Despite the lifting of sanctions by ECOWAS on 31 July 2018, there are still in-country delays that may set back the progress the country has made. For example, the NPA is yet to pass amendments to the Constitution to address the fundamental issues that contributed to the political impasse. Particularly, the provisions that relate to the delineation of the roles, responsibilities and powers of the President and Prime Minister have not been tabled and made a priority.^{xxxviii}

The role of non-governmental organizations within the dynamics of the political impasse has been noteworthy, particularly the instrumental role of traditional leaders, the Group of Women Facilitators and the Catholic Church. Traditional leaders and the Catholic Church were not only key in convincing political actors to sign and uphold the peace agreement, they also played critical roles in upholding the morale of the population while filling the voids in the justice system.^{xxxix} The Group of Women Facilitators, who championed the rights of women, promoted inclusiveness and the opening up channels of communications at the highest levels, ensured that women were also able to add their influence to the signing of the Conakry Peace Accord.^{xl}

After several delays, legislative elections were held on 10 March 2019. The elections were hailed as smooth and once again confirmed the political predominance of PAIGC. In spite of winning 47 seats out of 102 and 46.1% of the popular vote, the PAIGC failed to meet an absolute majority in parliament. This opened the path for a hung parliament and prompted parties to form two opposing coalitions. The ruling coalition consists of PAIGC (47 seats), APU-PDGB (5 seats), UM (1 seat) and PND (1 seat), while the opposition coalition involves PRS (21

^{xxxvii} <https://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/projects/mission-Guinea-Bissau-ecomib-ecomib-i-ii>.

^{xxxviii} UNIOGBIS, Institute for Security Studies. (2018). *Provide Guinea-Bissau with a new constitution to strengthen the rule of law and stability*. Retrieved from <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief-guineabissau-1-eng.pdf>

^{xxxix} Bappah, H. Y. (2017). *Why Peace Fails in Guinea Bissau? A Political Economy Analysis of the ECOWAS-brokered Conakry Accord*. Dakar: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Peace and Security Centre of Competence Sub-Saharan Africa.

^{xl} Abdenur, A. E. (2018, April). *Gender and Mediation in Guinea Bissau: The Group of Women Facilitators*. Igarape Policy Brief, pp. 1-15.

seats) and MADEM (27 seats). In this current legislative configuration, PAIGC relies on three small parties (APU-PDGB, UM and PND) to ensure its influence in parliament is maintained. PRS and MADEM on their side, rely on one another to challenge the PAIGC and its allies. As a result, there is a growing risk of collapse in this current parliament as the interests of parties either in the ruling coalition or in the opposition coalition could negatively evolve depending on whether various circumstances are viewed as being favourable to them or not.

Another threat as illustrated on 22 May and 25 May 2019 is the eruption of public protests, led by PAIGC and its allies, demanding that President José Mario Vaz appoint their leader, Domingos Simoes Pereira, as the new Prime Minister. PAIGC and its allies were threatening to overthrow President José Mario Vaz if he does not fulfil their demands. Finally, President Jose Mario Vaz and PAIGC found an agreement. As a result, Aristides Gomes was appointed as prime minister on June 22, 2019 instead of Domingos Simoes Pereira to end the political deadlock started since March 2019.^{xli}

^{xli} DW News. (2019, June 22). Guinea-Bissau president names new prime minister "in name of peace". Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/en/guinea-bissau-president-names-new-prime-minister-in-name-of-peace/a-49314563>

RESPONSES

The reaction of the international community to the 2012 coup was uniform and decisive^{xlii}. The African Union (AU) suspended Guinea Bissau's membership; the UN imposed sanctions on the coup leaders and key supporters, while ECOWAS imposed its own sanctions on key government and military high-ranking officials. While the AU and UN played an oversight role to ECOWAS in line with the subsidiarity principle by focusing on sanctions, ECOWAS played the most active role as the mediator of the peace process trying in to reel in those responsible for the coup to consider the alternative of progressive reforms to the constitution.

AU

The AU has expressed increasing concern in the political impasse that has engulfed Guinea Bissau and has played a frontline role in efforts to resolving the issues that led to it. The AU showed continental leadership and coordination from expressing zero-tolerance for the coups and the Peace and Security Council (PSC) established regular interaction with the government and political stakeholders in the country as well as provided constant support to ECOWAS' peace-making efforts. Following the condemnation of the coups and the suspension of the country from the continental organization, the PSC visited the country twice in 2018 to assess the situation on the ground as well as to monitor the progress made in resolving the political deadlock. Particularly, the visit undertaken in July 2018 was primarily to recommend and insist that the government respect the timelines set for both the presidential and parliamentary elections as well as commit itself to resolve the impasse in accordance with the Conakry Agreement. The AU also held SSR and DDR workshops with military officials from 22-24 November 2016 geared towards ensuring the full implementation of those initiatives in line with the peace agreement. Finally, the AU was able to coordinate the pledge of more than 1 billion euros by the EU and other international donors as part of a 10-year development plan aimed at giving the country a new start after prolonged political instability. These efforts are evidence of the AU's commitment to ensuring peace and security on the continent.

ECOWAS

Alongside the AU, ECOWAS played important roles in Guinea Bissau including that of a long-standing mediator. ECOWAS played a pivotal role towards the establishment of dialogue platforms and consequently peace between the various political actors. The

^{xlii} Abdenu, A. E. (2018, April). *Gender and Mediation in Guinea Bissau: The Group of Women Facilitators. Igarape Policy Brief*, pp. 1-15

organization supported and guaranteed the transition period through diplomatic and financial support including the deployment of ECOMIB in the aftermath of the 2012 coup d'état. ECOWAS was integral to the successful negotiations between the then military junta and the PAIGC that resulted in the release of the presidential elections runner-up Junior Gomes and the preservation of the Parliament. To complement these efforts, ECOWAS deployed the ECOMIG Mission comprised of 629 police officers and military personnel to ensure the peaceful transition as well as the much-needed DDR efforts for the country's military. Notably, ECOWAS financed the transitional period until the elections were held in 2014.

The organization has sustained its presence and interactions within the country. Since the breakout of the 2015 political crisis, ECOWAS has been engaged in mediation efforts to bring the disputing political actors to negotiate a peaceful settlement. In February 2018, the organization issued sanctions against 19 prominent personalities of the conflict, a situation that helped in ushering in a Prime Minister that has the "President's Trust" until the anticipated but postponed November 2018 elections. Also noteworthy is the renewal of the mandate of the organization's ECOMIG forces that are to stay in Guinea Bissau until the presidential elections. The ECOMIG forces play a crucial role in ensuring that the army continues to refrain from intervening in the politics of the country.

UN

The UN's role in Guinea Bissau was targeted towards providing support to ECOWAS's mediation efforts. In this regard, the UN mobilized international partners to adopt a common approach and position i.e. through international sanctions as well as international condemnation during the coups and the prolongation of the political deadlock, thus further providing legitimate ground for ECOWAS's mediation process.

UN support to ECOWAS was further consolidated with the former's deployment of its Integrated Peacebuilding Office for Guinea Bissau (UNIOGBIS) established by UN Resolution 2404 (2018) whose mandate has been extended until February 2019. Through this office, the UN coordinated international humanitarian aid, coordinated efforts with the UNDP office and local organizations focused on educating the populace on their rights and duties as well as mainstreaming the rule of law with the intent to develop the country's weak judiciary system and limiting impunity.

SCENARIOS

Best-case scenario

The best-case scenario remains the timely and full implementation of the Conakry Road Map for Peace. This includes the legislature making the necessary amendments to the constitution to ensure that the powers, roles and responsibilities of both the Prime Minister and President are well defined and delineated following the timely conduct of planned legislative and presidential elections. Having a clear mandate for these offices will prevent the clash of personalities and powers that exacerbated the political impasse over the years. A clear and unambiguous definition of powers, roles and responsibilities of both offices will promote stability in the government and enable them to concentrate more on implementing the ambitious development agenda of Terra Ranka, as well as addressing the challenges of social services and justice for its citizens.

The new configuration in parliament could foster collaboration between the different coalitions. The small parties could play a key role in that regard, as opposed to their current role as stand ins to ensure an absolute majority for the ruling party. A more collaborative role requires that PAIGC avoid any kind of pressure or attempt to control interactions with opposition parties in the political arena.

Limiting the role of the army to military duties only will augur well for the country as their historic intervention in the political arena has contributed to an impasse over the years. This scenario implies a particular focus on DDR in order to prevent the military from intervening in the domestic politics of the country. ECOWAS should maintain the sanctions imposed in February 2018 on high-ranking military officials until tangible progress has been observed as such sanctions have been a catalyst to enhancing and accelerating peace processes in Guinea Bissau since 2012. The sanctions would remain in place until the full implementation of the peace agreement.

The best-case scenario would also see sustained and coordinated support from international actors such as the AU, UN and the EU. The political, technical and financial support towards Guinea Bissau would be crucial in strengthening the country's institutions. This would particularly be true in the provision of legal services that would significantly limit the pervasive nature of recurrent injustices and impunity. It is vital that such support be coordinated to reflect a single clear position on the solutions to the political impasse. This would not only ensure the continuance of the needed political and financial support but also exert pressure on military and political elites to see peace as the only viable option. In the long run, this would dismantle the political economy they have been benefiting from at the expense of the population and establish the state for all and not for the few.

Worst case scenario

The worst case scenario for Guinea Bissau would be a collapse of the parliament that could potentially bring about violence between different parties and their respective supporters. In fact, in a fragmented parliament with no absolute majority, the current interests that link the parties within the ruling and opposition coalitions could evolve negatively. Each party would struggle to secure its own interests through the mobilization of its supporters. That would seriously lead to a new cycle of violence that would hamper the emerging democratic and peaceful trends in Guinea Bissau as well as strengthen military involvement in politics. Furthermore, the protests led by PAIGC and its allies demanding President José Mario Vaz to appoint their leader as Prime Minister, could lead to generalized riots that would open a path for the military to intervene and capture power through a coup d'état.

Although the army appears to be refraining from intervening in the politics of the country since August 2015, any future political instability may influence them to overcome their current passive response. Should the army get involved in the politics of the country, there are likely to be negative outcomes affecting the progress already recorded. Yet again, this would only be probable should ECOMIB withdraw from the country, or international and regional actors fail to have a coordinated approach and negligent stand on the sanctions on the country and its elites.

With a goal of ensuring law and order but most importantly protecting its own interests, the army would leverage its past experiences in staging coups to bring in a transitional government that will protect its interests. The army will thus not intervene because of the intent of preserving the status quo, but rather because the weak un-reformed semi-presidential system allows it to do so. In fact, the army would rather choose to take hold of the government instead of letting it plunge into another political deadlock. Sanctions imposed on selected high-ranking officials will likely remain, with more coming through (such as loan embargos); although the strain would still be felt more by the citizens than the political personalities.

Such a scenario perpetuates the state of weak institutions of Guinea Bissau. In fact, with the army in charge, it is highly unlikely that the constitutional amendments will go through the NPA. Even worse, the provision of social services and justice would not be a priority, rather the cycle of competition between the political and military elites would dominate.

Most likely scenario

Although the recent elections saw PAIGC winning the majority of the seats, its inability to meet the absolute majority to effectively control the parliament brought about a fragmented institution in terms of political power. Hence, coalitions were set both by the ruling party and the opposition parties. In that regard, the most likely scenario would be the emergence of collaborative interactions within the parliament and subsequently the reinforcement of the emerging democratic trends since 2015. In that configuration, the military would be kept at bay and would not have enough strength to involve itself in politics.

Achieving such a result deeply relies on the constitutional revisions recommended by the Conakry Peace Accord. But the fear of a military insurgency in consideration of the key role played by the current constitutional configuration in conflicts in Guinea Bissau, would constrain the authorities to deal smoothly with the process of constitutional revision. Moreover, the different coalitions would focus on the reinforcement of their coalition to counter each other and to maintain a balance of power. Hence, the status quo would continue to exist.

STRATEGIC OPTIONS

Government

Given the state of sustained injustice, it is imperative that the government establishes processes to promote delivery of justice to the population by reinforcing the formal judiciary system, and through the enhancement of traditional methods of disputes settlement in light with the article 33 of the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance and the articles 33 and 34 of the constitution of Guinea Bissau.

An infrastructure for peace designed with the potential to redress conflict and improve access to justice, especially using alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, should be prioritized collaboratively with ECOWAS as per the article 58 (2.) of ECOWAS revised treaty of 1993.

Providing citizens with accessible and just avenues to assert their rights and/or resolve disputes peacefully provides a viable alternative to self-justice that has contributed to the pervasive sense of insecurity in the country.

Politically, there is need to initiate transparent intra-party negotiations for reforms within the PAIGC and the military elite. This means that the move from a liberation front to a civilian group has to be started.

An amendment of the constitution would be crucial to clearly define lines between executive, legislative and judicial power as per the article 1 (a) of the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance^{xliii} and the Peace Agreement of Conakry.

The limitation of the role of militaries in conformity with the article 19 of ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance combine to a solid process of SSR would help to professionalise security institutions and prevent their involvement in politics.

AU and RECs

The AU and RECs should continue their coordinated and complementary approach in resolving the crisis in Guinea Bissau while reeling in international support including from actors such as the European Union (EU) in light with the articles 3e, 3f and 3g of the AU Constitutive Act.

The AU should continue to play a supportive and complementary role in support of ECOWAS. In line with the subsidiarity principle^{xliv}, the AU should continue with providing ECOWAS the political legitimacy to continue its leading role in resolving the crisis.

The AU must continue to act swiftly and decisively as it did in condemning the coup d'état and suspending the Guinea Bissau's membership in accordance with Article 4 of the AU Constitutive Act. Such immediate approaches in implementing the principles embodied in the Constitutive Act as well as within the APSA should be further pursued, especially with regard to ensuring that the Conakry Agreement is fully complied with.

Accordingly, the AU should set a deadline for compliance with the Conakry Peace Accords with the threat of sanctions on key political parties while maintaining its supportive role for the ECOWAS brokered peace deal.

ECOWAS should continue exerting pressure on political stakeholders for the timely and full implementation of the remaining steps of the Conakry Peace Accord. Strategically, ECOWAS should re-instate sanctions on the high-ranking military officials to refrain the army from interfering yet again in the country's political scene and stakeholders reach agreements on the implementation of the peace plan. This should be complemented with taking up the role of implementing the SSR measures proposed in the peace agreement. This will allow ECOWAS to carefully plan an exit strategy for ECOMIB to ensure that a vacuum is not left after fulfilling its mandate with regard to transparent security provision.

ECOWAS, in light with the article 3 (e) should proactively intervene to undermine tensions between President José Mario Vaz and the PAIGC to avoid a setback to violence in Guinea Bissau and a likely subsequent coup d'état.

^{xliii} Supplementary to the ECOWAS Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security adopted on December 10, 1999 in Lomé (Togo).

^{xliv} African Union Peace and Security Protocol (AUPSCP), article 8 (5.), Durban, 9 July 2002.

REFERENCES

- (2018). Report of the Secretary General on Developments in Guinea Bissau and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea Bissau. New York: United Nations (UN).
- (2018). Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers. New York : United Nations General Assembly.
- Abdenur, A. E. (2018, April). Gender and Mediation in Guinea Bissau: The Group of Women Facilitators. Igarape Policy Brief , pp. 1-15.
- AFP. (2018, 09 21). Voter registration begins ahead of Guinea Bissau elections. Retrieved from Africa News: <http://www.africanews.com/2018/09/21/voter-registration-begins-ahead-of-Guinea-Bissau-elections/>
- Bappah, H. Y. (2017). Why Peace Fails in Guinea Bissau? A Political Economy Analysis of the ECOWAS-brokered Conakry Accord. Dakar: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Peace and Security Centre of Competence Sub-Saharan Africa.
- Conakry Agreement On The Implementation Of The Ecowas Roadmap For The Resolution Of The Political Crisis In Guinea Bissau. (2016, October 14). Conakry.
- Herpolsheimer, J., & P.W. Döring, K. (2016, 12). New Regionalisms and Violent Conflicts in Africa: The Politics of the AU ECOWAS in Mali and Guinea Bissau. Working paper series des SFB 1199 an der Universität Leipzig, pp. 1-24.
- International Crisis Group (ICG). (2012). Beyond Turf Wars: Managing the Post-Coup Transition in Guinea Bissau. Dakar: International Crisis Group (ICG).
- Joshua, B. (2012, 10 17). The World's Fastest Growing Cocaine Trafficking Hub Is In This Impoverished African State. Business Insider.
- PSC . (2018). The 760th meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council on the situation in the Republic of Guinea Bissau. Addis Ababa: PSC.
- Ramet, V. (2012, August). Civil-military relations in Guinea Bissau: An unresolved issue. Brussels: European Union.
- United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office In Guinea Bissau (UNIOGIS) And Institute For Security Studies (ISS). (2018). Guinea Bissau: Review the Framework Law on Political Parties. Dakar : ISS Africa.
- Voz di Paz. (2010). Roots of Conflicts in Guinea Bissau: The voice of the people. Bissau: Voz di Paz / Interpeace.
- World Food Programme. (2018, July). WFP Guinea Bissau Country Brief . Retrieved from World Food Program: https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000074401/download/?_ga=2.99503646.1622487982.1538566208-533459879.1538566208.

GUINEA BISSAU CONFLICT TIMELINE (1974 - 2018)

-
- 1974** – Guinea-Bissau gains independence from Portugal with Luis Cabral as the president.
-
- 1980** – A Military coup led by Joao Bernardo Vieira ousted President Luis Cabral.
-
- 1991** – New Constitution adopted establishing the semi-presidential system.
-
- 1994** – First free elections undertaken with Vieira emerging as President of Guinea-Bissau.
-
- 1998** – General Ansumane Mané was sacked by President Vieira following accusation of weapon smuggling to Senegalese rebels. This leads to mutinies within the army.
-
- 1999** – A coup led by General Ansumane Mané topples Vieira's presidency and the military junta places former speaker of parliament, Malam Bacai Sanha as interim President.
-
- 2000** – Presidential elections held with Kumba Yala emerge victorious. General Mané dies in an alleged attempted coup.
-
- 2001 May** – The IMF and World Bank suspend aid due to millions missing from development funds.
-
- 2001 December** – Prime Minister Faustino Imbali is relieved from office for "failing to meet expectations". Government announces a thwarted coup attempt by the army.
-
- 2002** - President Yala states plans to dissolve parliament and call for early elections.
-
- 2003** – Another Military coup ousts President Yala with a civilian administration led by interim President Henrique Rosa and interim Prime Minister Antonio Artur Rosa being sworn in.
-
- 2004 March** – The African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) win the elections.
-
- 2004 October** – The head of the armed forces is killed by mutinous soldiers who had demands including payment of outstanding wages.
-
- 2005 May** – Former deposed President, Kumba Yala, briefly occupies the presidential building and declares himself the rightful Head of State.
-
- 2005 July** – Former military President Joao Bernardo Vieira who returned from exile in Portugal wins a run-off vote in presidential elections.
-
- 2006 March-April** – Battle ensues between soldiers in Guinea Bissau and Senegalese rebels along the southern border.
-
- 2006 October** – In order to prevent human-traffickers from smuggling migrants, including Asians, to Europe Guinea-Bissau asks for international aid.
-
- 2007 June** – The UN and IMF issue warning to combat Latin American drug cartels and save Guinea Bissau from ongoing drug trafficking chaos.
-
- 2007 December** – A law which guarantees amnesty for violence committed during the periods of political unrest (1980 and 2004) is passed by parliament.
-
- 2008** – President Vieira dissolves parliament and survives a gun attack in what appears to be a failed coup by mutinous soldiers.
-
- 2009 March** – General Tagme Na Waie, the army's chief of staff dies in a bomb attack and hours later, President Vieira is killed by defected soldiers.
-

2009 July – Malam Bacai Sanha wins presidential election in a run-off.

2010 April – Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior is detained by mutinous soldiers and he is replaced by the chief of the armed forces. The leader of the mutiny, General Antonio Indjai is later made army chief.

2010 August – Due to lack of respect for the rule of law, the EU announces it is ending its mission to reform Guinea Bissau's security forces.

2010 October – Alleged drugs kingpin Jose Americo Bubo Na Tchuto is reinstated as head of the navy amid concerns by the US.

2011 February – Part of the EU's aid to Guinea Bissau suspended due to worry over poor governance and the rule of law record.

2011 July-August – Protests erupts following the resignation of Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior because of rising food prices.

2011 December – Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior announced that a coup attempt has been foiled. Navy chief Na Tchuto is arrested on suspicion of masterminding the coup.

2012 January – President Malam Bacai Sanha dies whilst receiving treatment in Paris. Raimundo Pereira, National Assembly head becomes interim president.

2012 April-May – Military coup topples the government. Interim President Pereira and presidential candidate and ex-PM Carlos Gomes, are arrested. Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo leads the formation of a transitional government. UN imposes travel bans on the coup leaders and key supporters.

2012 July – The UN Security Council demands a return to constitutional rule amid concerns that drug trafficking has increased since the coup.

2012 October – Seven people are killed in a raid on an army barrack and the transitional government describes this as a coup attempt.

2013 April – ex-navy chief Jose Americo Bubo Na Tchuto is arrested and charged with drug trafficking by US operatives.

2013 December – Portuguese airline TAP suspends air link to Guinea Bissau amid row with Portugal over refugees from Syria, who allegedly arrived by plane from Guinea-Bissau with false documents.

2014 May – Jose Mario Vaz wins presidential election run-off.

2014 September – President Vaz sacks armed forces chief, Antonio Indjai, accused of plotting to traffic cocaine and sell weapons to Colombian rebels by the US.

2015 January 15 – Permanent Commission of the National Assembly removes the Parliamentary mandate of 15 Members of Parliament (all from the PAIGC who would join the PRS) for abstaining from voting on the Government's programme.

2015 May – In order to help reinvigorate Guinea-Bissau's economy after years of instability, international donors pledge more than \$1.1bn in aid.

2015 August – Prime Minister Domingos Simoes Pereira is sacked by President Jose Mario Vaz as a result of disputes between the two which sparks a political crisis.

2016 August – A power struggle between President Vaz and opponents in the ruling PAIGC leads to Umaro Sissoco Embalo becoming the fifth prime minister in little over a year.

2016 September 10 – Signing of the Conakry Agreement on the Implementation of the ECOWAS Roadmap for the Resolution of the Political Crisis in Guinea Bissau.

2017 December – West African leaders have threatened "collective and individual sanctions" on politicians in Guinea-Bissau unless it resolves its ongoing political crisis.

-
- 2018 February 4** – ECOWAS issues sanctions on 19 high ranking military and government officials for failure to comply with the Conakry Peace Accords.
-
- 2018 February 27** – The President of National Election Commission, Mr. Sambú announced a revised timeline dating the Legislative elections for 18 November 2018 and Presidential elections for May 2019.
-
- 2018 February 28** – the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2404 (2018) extending the mandate of UNIOGBIS for another year, from 1 March 2018 to 28 February 2019.
-
- 2018 March 9** – the Government and the United Nations signed onto a \$7.7 million joint project, to be managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) through a basket fund established for donor contributions, to support the national authorities in organizing the legislative elections. At the signing ceremony, the Government confirmed its contribution of \$1 million, and later announced a further \$800,000 to supplement its initial contribution.
-
- 2018 April 14** – ECOWAS Extraordinary Summit enables the reaching of an agreement to end the crisis in Guinea Bissau.
-
- 2018 April 16** – Artides Gomez of the PAIGC is appointed as Prime Minister with the President's Trust until the upcoming 2018 election and forms a new government of consensus.
-
- 2018 April 19** – First National Assembly Plenary session conducted since its closure on December 2015.
-
- 2018 April 25** – President Vaz issued a decree appointing 26 members of the new Government, which comprised representatives of the political parties with seats in the National Assembly, the group of 15 parliamentarians that had been expelled from PAIGC and members of the Office of the President.
-
- 2018 July 28** – the Government issued a press release setting 23 August to 23 September as the period for voter registration and indicating that voter registration cards would be printed by the Technical Support Office for the Electoral Process in Bissau and the regional offices of the National Electoral Commission. This would later be delayed to have voter registration started by 21 September 2018.
-
- 2018 July 31** – ECOWAS urged Guinea-Bissauan political stakeholders and civil society to continue to demonstrate their commitment to adhering to the timeline of 18 November 2018 for the holding of legislative elections; pledges a financial contribution of \$2 million by the West African Economic and Monetary Union for the electoral preparations. The Authority welcomed the progress made since the ECOWAS summit of 14 April and also decided to lift the targeted sanctions imposed against 19 stakeholders on 4 February.
-
- 2018 September 21** – Voter Registration under way for Presidential elections on November 18,2018. Deadline set for 20 October 2018
-
- 2018 October** – Voter Registration deadline extended to 20 November 2018. Protests in the capital city Bissau following accusations of irregularities.
-
- 2018 November** – Postponement of elections announced with dates yet to be set.
-
- 2018 December 20** – Presidential Decree announced the new dates for legislative and presidential elections. Presidential elections are set for January 2019 and legislative elections for March 2019.
-
- 2019 March** - Legislative elections took place, PAIGC won the elections with 47 seats out of 102 but failed to meet an absolute majority.
-
- 2019 March-July** - Political deadlock opposing President Mario Vaz to his own party, PAIGC over the nomination of Domingos Simoes Pereira (President Mario Vaz's estranged deputy).
-
- 2019 July** - The appointment of Aristides Gomes as Prime Minister of Guinea Bissau ends the political deadlock in Guinea Bissau.
-



INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES
ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY

IPSS PEACE & SECURITY REPORT

Addis Ababa University
P. O. Box: 1176
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

T +251 (1) 11 245 660
E info@ipss-addis.org
W www.ipss-addis.org

www.facebook.com/ipss.addis
www.twitter.com/ipss_addis
www.instagram.com/ipss_addis