



The AU reform agenda: What areas of reform are most transformational and of the highest return for the continent?

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Executive Summary

Figuratively, a reformer needs a telescope for long-horizon vision and a microscope for the basics. The AU needs long-term foresight that focuses on the superstructure, the end state and envisaged vision of the reform; but more importantly, it requires a strong foundational substructure.

The AU reform agenda began with an overall strategic vision as provided within Agenda 2063. The reform agenda was introduced in recognition of the fact that Agenda 2063 cannot be implemented without a reform of the AU. The reform agenda also began with the basic principle of identifying the areas of reform (initially four but later extended to five priorities),¹ which are: focusing on continental priorities, realigning AU institutions for delivery; connecting the AU to its citizens; effective and efficient management of the business of the AU; and sustainable financing of the AU.²

This policy brief argues that to be transformational (impact and extent of the delivery), the AU reform agenda needs to position poverty eradication and constitutional democratization as the new frontiers for the re-conceptualization of Pan-Africanism. With the focus on poverty eradication and democratization, challenges, including conflicts and corruption, will be addressed at their root causes. The policy brief further argues that such a transformation is unlikely without self-financing, which is necessary not only for the radical reform of the AU Commission towards making it an effective delivery machine for implementation, but also for the total overhaul of the AU-RECs relationship that will ensure faster integration. With an effective and efficient AU Commission, the relevance of the AU in its totality will be stronger, and in a much better position to deliver and address continental threats. More robust, strategic and well-thought-out collaboration between the AU and RECs is a prerequisite to creating a larger scale of economy that will help Africa escape from a state of permanent deprivation.

Key Points

- ❖ The essence of this policy brief is that reform is political and complex; even more so because the AU is a multilateral institution. Unlike other multilateral regional governance institutions, the AU is not merely the summation of individual states. Legally and substantively, through the coming together of its distinct Member States, the AU represents an expression of overlapping Pan-African and regional interests, common concerns and shared aspirations. These interests do not readily aggregate the preferences of each Member State. Instead, the AU looks for an overlapping consensus as stated in various instruments, such as its Consultative Act.
- ❖ In reform, perspective matters. Experience shows that it is important to appreciate that reform is progressive and requires accepting half loaves as better than none at all. Without such recognition, hopelessness would set in if the reform was to stumble.
- ❖ The AU reform agenda is an opportunity to ensure that the AU is relevant, independent, efficient and effective. There were several attempts in the past to reform the AU. The shared element of these reform attempts is that no detailed diagnosis has been carried out to find out why these initiatives failed and how their ailments could have been cured. For this round of reform to succeed, a detailed diagnosis and course of action needs to be conducted.
- ❖ No matter how many or what efforts are made at continental or regional levels, Africa will not change without a transformation of the nature of the states and that of the AU Commission. A reformed AU is expected to emerge from the current weak, inefficient and ineffective AU organs. Such a transformation needs to begin with an overhaul of the engine of the AU system, which is the AU Commission.
- ❖ The transformation of AU-RECs relations needs to start with building a partnership that is effective, comprehensive, institutionalized and sustainable. The principles of mutual respect of mandate, subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage should guide the partnership. For such a partnership, centralization is neither effective nor useful. While planning and oversight could be centralized, implementation should be decentralized and undertaken by RECs and Member States.
- ❖ Presently, little horizontal learning and harmonization has transpired among RECs. The reform can take on the task of facilitating horizontal harmonization and learning among RECs as well as vertical harmonization as one of the core integrative tasks to create a large-scale economy and transformative reform.

Introduction

In 2018, President Paul Kagame, in his acceptance speech as the newly elected Chairperson of the AU, said:

We are running out of time, and we must act now to save Africa from permanent deprivation. Scale is essential. We must create a single continental market, integrate our infrastructure, and infuse our economies with technology. We have to be functional, and we have to stay together. The financial and institutional reform of the African Union derives all of its urgency from these realities. Fortunately, Africa has assets and strengths to build on, starting with this organization [AU], and its tangible commitment to unity.³

The ultimate aim of this quote is to highlight the urgent need for AU reforms as well as what the focus should entail. With regards to the latter, there are three key messages. First, is the urgency to save Africa from permanent deprivation with all its momentous implications on politics, peace and security; the second relates to the relevance and functionality of the AU and the need for organizational reform, while the third concerns creating the Pan-African scale of economy through integration.

The central thesis of this policy brief is that the reform agenda needs to begin by getting the basic thinking right, where reform should focus on the areas with the potential to deliver high(er) returns to the resources utilized. Already, the AU reform agenda has begun with an overall strategic vision as provided by Agenda 2063.⁴ To create the institutional mechanism for reforms, this vision focuses on the following key priorities: focusing on continental priorities; realigning AU institutions for delivery; connecting the AU to its citizens; effective and efficient management of the business of the AU; and sustainable financing


of the AU.⁵ The key question in this regard is then: What areas of reform are most transformational and of the highest return towards this ultimate aim of saving Africa from permanent deprivation? What kind of reform is required for such a scale of economy? What kind of organizational reform would ensure the relevance and functionality of the AU?

The first scene setter for transformation is political consensus and instilling a political sense of urgency in the Member States and in the African public at large. Only when reform outpaces crises, then is there hope for Africa to get out the vicious cycle of poverty and violence. Without urgency, Africa cannot achieve the escape velocity necessary to get out of permanent deprivation.


Urgency: Saving Africa from permanent deprivation

The challenges to global migration governance can be divided into the following broad categories: Africa is facing severe peace and security challenges as illustrated by the relatively high number of UN peace missions concentrated on the continent. Military interventions, including these peace missions, are sometimes necessary to promote and maintain peace and stability to achieve economic development. However, such military interventions do not address the structural causes of conflict. The main structural causes of conflict in Africa include socio-economic deprivation and governance deficit. Poverty, a consequence of inadequate opportunities for socio-economic development, is the fundamental accelerator of conflict and instability in Africa. 37% of the African population lives in poverty.⁶ With the current growth rate, only 30% of that population will be lifted out of poverty by 2030, and in a best-case scenario, the population living in poverty will reduce to 7%. Currently, the African political landscape is predatory as a result of its failure to bring about large-scale economic transformation. Ultimately, socio-economic development and

good governance constitute the most humane and cost-effective tools to preventing conflict.⁷



Indeed, while conflict deepens poverty, poverty exacerbates conflict with development objectives either destroyed and/or hindered. For AU reform to set Africa on a path to overcoming the cycle of conflict, poverty and deprivation of socio-economic opportunities, the nature, scale, depth and pace of change needs to be more strategically determined as well as accelerated. Such transformation is only achievable if the AU reform agenda transforms African predatory states into agents of human security.



Transformation of the nature of African states: from predatory states into agents of human security

In addition to the urgency for economic transformation, another high return reform area is the transformation of the nature (capability and behaviour) of African states. States are the central actors in the transformation of Africa, without which security and economic development are hard to find.

Generally speaking, in the current nature of states, governments are often strong in the wrong functions or weaker than they should be in the right areas of service delivery. At the same time, these states are weak in the right functions, mainly in ensuring the human security of their populations. Many African states are effective mainly in the maintenance of the security of the government, ruling political party interests and influential pro-government individuals or groups. Many African states allocate enormous resources to specialized military and paramilitary forces, high technology surveillance equipment and pro-government lobbying. This approach, at the expense of African states, results in weak non-viable states being unable to carry out state core functions that could endow them with the legitimacy they desire. African states have become increasingly fragile, displaying the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of their various organs with limited control of the means of violence and their territories.

A number of changes at the national level in the past few years require the attention of the AU and its reform agenda. Most of these changes are within what we call 'dominant developmental parties' and could have serious, long-term positive and/or negative consequences for the future of constitutional democracy in the continent. Changes of leadership within ruling parties, such as the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, ZANU-PF of Zimbabwe, the Ethiopian Peoples' Voluntary Democratic Front of Ethiopia, and Botswana Democratic


Party (BDF) of Botswana came about without any electoral processes. They are rather outcomes of intra-party struggles, influenced, shaped and in some cases demanded by popular and populist movements. Changes have also happened in MPLA of Angola even if by-election. Similar demands for change may occur in other countries such as Nigeria, Algeria, South Sudan, Sudan, etc.

While these changes are received euphorically by many, it is far from clear if they will last and bring significant departures from the past. Rapid changes in cabinets have forced some to consider if the Italian style of unpredictable coalition politics is occurring in Africa. Such government changes may create political volatility as they are happening without the required strong and democratic institutions, thereby risking the instability of the states. These long-drawn-out internal struggles may undermine the ability of governments to engage in the fast-paced delivery necessary to enable Africa to escape permanent poverty. To fulfil the unique and irreplaceable role of the state, governments need to build the capacity for delivery and to distribute services and goods with inclusivity that will bestow them legitimacy, enhance the provisions of security, and more importantly, mobilize resources.

States do not operate in a vacuum; they are determined and often reflective of political and social mobilization. In countries where poverty is rampant and extreme, and institutional checks and balances absent, predictability and accountability are rare. Political forces serve as a tool for resource capture, and resource capture can often help achieve political power. Currently, in many African countries, political parties are solely interested in achieving and maintaining power by any means necessary. This unhealthy type of political mobilization leads to undemocratic internal governance of political parties. At some stage, the focus of the AU reforms should be to instil constitutional democratic values in sub-national entities such political parties and social and economic organizations. One means of reaching these entities is through national democratic

institutions working on elections, integrity, human rights, justice, etc.

FIVE PILLARS OF VIABLE AND CAPABLE STATE



Relevance and functionality: The unfinished business of AU reform⁸

It is important to note that the AU, formerly the OAU, has undergone several reform programmes that delivered very little. All previous efforts were aimed at addressing the AU's three cardinal challenges: the inability to fund its programmes; Member States' unwillingness to cede adequate portions of their sovereignty to AU mandates; and a lack of effective and efficient AU and RECs institutions. These three failings render the AU less relevant to the common African, highly dependent on donors, inefficient and ineffective due to a limited mandate, legal constraints and lack of merit-based recruitment. Many documents have been produced after elaborate consultations, the recent ones being Agenda 2063 (2014), Alternative Sources of Funding (2013), NEPAD (2011), the Audit Report (2008), and much earlier versions such as the Abuja Treaty (1991) and the Lagos Plan of Action (1980⁹). Since 2005, there have been successive attempts to reform the AU Commission and its managerial performance and financial accountability. In peace and security, the African Standby Force (ASF), where significant resources have been invested, remains

inoperative one decade after its establishment. Similarly, ACRIC (envisaged as a short-term reform of the ASF), failed to take off after facing the same challenges that constrained the ASF.

Historically, the AU/OAU has passed through four eventful periods.¹⁰ First, the Period of Pan-African solidarity that mainly fomented the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggles of Africa; Second, the Period of confusion and division, in which the Cold War created ideological struggles between supporters of the capitalist West and the communist bloc, leading to conspiratorial and undemocratic political mobilizations, dictatorial styles of governance, bloody political and military coups, revolutions and civil wars. The end of the Cold War offered African leaders an opportunity to seek African solutions to a variety of African problems. To meet these challenges, the institutional transformation of the OAU into the AU occurred with a declaration made at the OAU Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Governments in September 1999 in Sirte, Libya.¹¹ Indicative of the purpose, the title and theme of the Summit was “Strengthening OAU Capacity to enable it to meet the Challenges of the New Millennium.” This Summit amended the OAU Charter in order to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the OAU.¹² This Extraordinary Summit (and later the AU Constitutive Act) shifted the mission and vision of the OAU from an organization of anti-colonial and anti-apartheid solidarity, ushering in the third Period of interventionist and integrationist AU. In this regard, the AU Constitutive Act bestowed the AU with robust, substantive mandates¹³ such as the right of intervention in Member States of the AU, and an institutional make-over that gave rise to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).¹⁴ These provisions have been important steps in resolving the tensions between sovereignty and responsibility.¹⁵ If indeed transformational, the reform led by President Kagame will launch Africa out of permanent poverty and predatory governance and bring forth a new period of poverty eradication and constitutional

democratization as the new frontiers of Pan-Africanism. In this regard, AU self-financing, overhauling the AU Commission and AU-RECs relations would create significant momentum, a multiplier effect and a high rate of return.

Keeping momentum on the self-financing of the AU

AU self-financing should be the first area of focus for three basic reasons. First, self-financing has a multiplier effect; it can enhance confidence, foster ownership and ensure priorities are Pan-African and not determined by donors. Second, with self-financing, mutual horizontal accountability between the Member States and the AU, as well as vertical accountability from the AU to the Member States, will increase. Third, it will also render flexibility in funding peace and security depending on the availability of funds from partners. The reform should keep the momentum already created and push the current Member States (currently 23) that have taken measures at the national level to implement the 0.2% levy on eligible imports. High-level visits to Member States that are yet to adopt the AU levy and the issuance of public progress reports to the media may further galvanize public support for self-financing.

Overhauling the engine of the AU: Reform of AU Commission

The third critical reform area with a potentially high return is the transformation of AU organs, specifically the AU Commission (AUC) which putatively operates as a dynamic forum for coordinating the policies of Member States.¹⁶ In other words, the Commission is the engine that allows for the fulfilment of the AU objectives as set out in its Constitutive Act.¹⁷ The Commission serves as the secretariat responsible for conducting the day-to-day affairs of the AU and implementing the policies and decisions of the

policy-making bodies including the AU Assembly.¹⁸ Within this context, Member States constitute the parts that ensure the effective functioning of the Union. Overall, the AUC is responsible for representing and defending the interests of the Union.¹⁹ A significant portion of the human and financial resources of the AU is invested in the AU Commission.²⁰

Nonetheless, the AUC is critically encumbered by shortcomings which include: low collection rates of assessed contributions from the Member States; low budget execution rate (less than 60% of total); cumbersome recruitment process; limited incentive and retention system; lack of accountability for non-performance and absence of promotion for higher performance; and extreme centralization of power in the execution of programmes and associated budgets.

In 2016, the AU Commission collected less than 38% of the total pledges made by the Member States and donors. More worrying is the low overall execution rate of the total budget (less than 33%; 32% for the operational budget and 35% for the programme budget).²¹ A consequence of this was the AU's inability to pay salaries in 2015/2016.²² For this reason, the budget execution for payment of salaries is lower than 35% due to the delay in staff recruitment from an unnecessarily protracted process. High turnover of staff due to poor retention strategies also contributes to the low levels of absorption of the budget. Some of the laws should be amended. Cumberstone recruitment and human resource development procedures inhibit timely hiring and promotion of competent staff members. In the attempt to avoid this lengthy procedure, the AUC has almost twice as many short-term staff in contrast to permanent staff members.²³

Similarly, firing staff members is extremely difficult even when staff members are involved in administrative and financial offences. Contributing to the low absorption of the budget, the AU Financial Rules and Regulations (FRR) are not sufficiently flexible to allow reallocation of significant portions of the budget during the year.

The power to make decisions on programmes and associated budget expenditures are highly centralized. For instance, a task as simple as a mission requires approval from three and more officials.

In solving the above shortcomings, the leadership and management of the Commission is, therefore, a key factor in the success of the AU. Hence, the reform of the AUC should focus both on the laws governing the AUC, and the election of its leadership and appointment of managers. Meritocracy needs to guide the recruitment and promotion of staff members.

Scale of economy: Transform the AU-RECs relationship

Integration, as one of the visions of the AU, needs to be at the centre of the reform agenda. Integration is a function of trust among states, particularly in the scale of economy, infrastructural development and political determination. Through their proximity, local expertise, beneficiation and relative legitimacy, RECs could enable the AU to seize integrative opportunities. The place of RECs in African integration is critical and continues to grow both in capacity and legitimacy. RECs could serve the AU as the vehicles for integration. With increasing demands for an expanded peace and security role, RECs need to develop the required capacity for such an enormous undertaking. RECs that provide their peace and security would ultimately be more beneficial to the AU and the economic development agenda. Increasingly, interventions will require local expertise and popular legitimacy, in addition to military, financial and other capabilities.

However, RECs face the same challenges as the AU. The reform agenda of the AU needs to initiate reform in the RECs. RECs could provide a mechanism for 'secularizing' the reform agenda and its implementation in the region and in the respective Member States. Some RECs think the modalities for consultations on Agenda 2063

have been more inclusive compared to earlier initiatives.²⁴

The current relationship between the RECs and the AUC is poorly conceptualized, competitive, superficial, fragmented and ad hoc.²⁵ As a result, the relationship is fraught with tension. It prevents the optimal use of RECs in the integration of Africa and the reform of the AU. A stronger and more principled AU-RECs partnership can bring more legitimacy, expertise and potential effectiveness due to the specialist and comparative advantages.

Attempts have been made to reform the relationship; however, none of these efforts properly defined the legal standing or the rights and duties of RECs and the AU to each other. In this regard, a pioneer strategy to link RECs with the AU and APSA invented the current formal AU-RECs relationship. For this reason, the 2008 MoU between the AU and RECs determined the nature of the collaboration as mainly focusing on APSA. To the detriment of the other priority areas, such as governance and integration, the MoU put peace and security at the top of the relationship. The AU further decided to establish Representational Offices in RECs in 2004 and was implemented only in 2012.²⁶ The impact of these offices in the overall relations between the AU and RECs is yet to be officially assessed.²⁷ RECs have expressed strong interest in an overhaul of the relationship between the AU and RECs and a desire to develop a new instrument based on the existing instruments to cover all aspects of the relationship rather than to be limited to the APSA. In recent years, there have been efforts to explore how to put the institutional linkages and accountabilities of the RECs Liaison Offices under the Chairperson of AUC.²⁸ So far, despite these fragmented legal instruments, ad-hoc mechanisms continue to govern AU-RECs relations.

From a formal to a functional partnership

Africa is increasingly assuming more prominent and important roles in global affairs which require a rethinking of the partnerships the continental body has with other institutions, countries and other actors. Some of the reasons behind the growth in Africa's reckoning in global affairs include renewed competition from global strategic powers for economic and military alliances, and market megatrends in Africa that will significantly attract interest from multinational companies.

The current reforms are being undertaken when global strategic rivalry in Africa is high. New and old global and regional powers are now back in Africa for economic and military competition. China has spread its influence all over Africa including to the AU and RECs; the EU is struggling with how to sort out its partnership to catch up with other partners; the USA just woke up and is attempting to unseat and deter China's expansion in Africa; and NATO aims to mend relations with the AU after political differences emanating from its military intervention in Libya.

In recognition of this increase in partnerships, the AU has developed what is called "the Banjul Formula" that differentiates partnerships based on categories, continents, countries or organizations, and which also requires partnership summits to rotate between Africa and its partner locations.²⁹ Accordingly, the AU has a Sub-Committee on Multilateral Cooperation (under the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) composed of all ambassadors of AU Member States) that oversees all partnerships. This Committee leads the partnership negotiations, while the Bureau of the Chairperson provides all the Secretariat support to the partnerships with the AU. The AUC resources are assigned to "serve as levers and guarantors of the initiation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of these partnerships,

in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the decision-making organs of the continental organization.”³⁰ Consequently, the AUC established Africa’s Strategic Partnerships Division under the Bureau of the Chairperson.³¹ The proliferation of partnerships poses increasing challenges in management and ensuring policy coherence and direction. Many reports advance myriads of recommendations on partnership, but they are not synthesized into one self-contained strategic policy. In the spirit of mutual accountability, and mainly for its own sake, the AU, on its side, also needs to deliver concrete actions commensurate with the support from its partners. AU reform needs to take note of this and develop a unified Pan-African voice on these developments to promote common African interest and mitigate their negative impact on the interest of Africa. In order to offer a clear mandate and act in a timely manner, the AUC may need to consider upgrading Africa’s Partnerships Division to the level of a department. This is not only urgent but also of potential long-term consequence for Africa.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Poverty must be targeted as the number one threat to regional stability. Hence, socio-economic development is an underlying factor in the promotion, maintenance and sustenance of peace and security in Africa. The state/society capabilities (the predictive, preventive, responsive and adaptive capacities of countries) are certainly a function of resilience in the face of vulnerabilities to internal and external factors and shocks. These capabilities, in turn, are the functions of a socio-economic developmental status. Thus, sustainable peace and security require an accelerated fight against poverty to enable Africa’s escape from permanent deprivation. Africa’s progress in this regard is only possible with: a broad-based sense of urgency in the fight against poverty; the

transformation of the nature of the African state, the self-financing of the AU, the total overhaul of the AU Commission and the relationship between AU-RECs.

1. The AU reform agenda, in a way, should constitute an attempt to redefine Pan-Africanism for the 21st century Africa. Emphasizing the redefinition of Pan-African solidarity, poverty eradication and constitutional democratization should constitute the new frontiers of Pan-African progress. The AU reform agenda will hopefully deliver both economic development and security by overhauling existing AU institutions.
2. The AU reform agenda needs to place national level engagement at the level of Member States as a critical factor for success. Hence the need to rethink the old AU approach of engagement with Member States. Usually, the AU brings Member States to venues of meetings and summits, mostly in Addis Ababa. The participants of these AU meetings (usually the same professionals, diplomats and politicians) rarely bring the decisions and documents to the national level in a manner the public is sufficiently consulted on and updated. This has to change. With the full support of governments, the AU should go to the capitals of Member States and conduct National Consultative Conferences on the AU reform agenda. Potentially a paradigm shift, the AU could put its various initiatives to be discussed with stakeholders at a national level in each Member State. Some of the resistance to the reform agenda emanating from governments could be addressed in these consultations.
3. Similar to the self-financing, a transformed AU Commission has a valuable role to play in bringing a quantum leap of reform to the AU. The AU’s transformation needs to begin with overhauling the engine of the AU system,

which is the AU Commission. The reforms must focus on transforming the AU Commission into an effective thought leader and delivery machine. This may require radical internal reforms of the AU Commission including:

- a) Bestowing upon it a stronger mandate and leadership;
- b) Providing the AU Commission with more technical, human and financial resources;
- c) Reforming of recruitment processes based on meritocracy and to a limited degree and representation;
- d) Conferring the AUC the expenditure powers on various levels and cutting red-tape in the approval process; and
- e) Ending norm-setting and utilizing all resources for norm-implementation.

4. The AU reform agenda should transform the relationship between AU-RECs as well as between the AU Commission and RECs secretariats. It should aim at making the RECs 'real' building blocks by empowering them with coordination, harmonization and reporting roles in the implementation of AU policies.
5. The AU needs to overhaul its partnerships with external actors. Moreover, the ultimate aim of such a partnership needs to be self-reliance through building the capability of the AU and RECs to provide peace and development for and by itself. It needs to avoid 'capacity-substitution' and dependence on aid. With regard to partnerships in security, these need to be based on Chapter VIII of the UN Charter that provides a mandate for the regional mechanisms of peace and security based on the principle of complementarity and subsidiarity. More importantly, it is now urgent that all partnerships be anchored in priority-based, concrete projects with deliverables and not lofty promises.

About the Author

Dr. Mehari Taddele Maru is a graduate of Harvard University and Oxford University, and a former fellow of prestigious academic programmes (Edward George Mason, Max Planck, Shell, Partnership for Peace) at Harvard and Oxford Universities, the Max Planck Institute and the NATO Defense College. Dr. Mehari holds a Doctorate of Legal Sciences (PhD) from J.L. Giessen University, Germany, an MPA from Harvard, USA, and an MSc from the University of Oxford, UK, as well as an LLB from Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia.

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Dr. Mehari was a Programme Coordinator and Legal Expert at the African Union Commission. Both at the AU and IGAD, he drafted blue-print policy documents on migration, peace and security, governance, and humanitarian effectiveness. Published by a globally respected legal and academic publisher, his book, entitled 'The Kampala Convention and Its Contributions to International Law', examines the African Union Convention on the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (known as the Kampala Convention). Read more details at <http://meharitaddele.info> or follow him on Twitter at @DrMehari

End Notes

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- ⁷ IGAD, Communique of the Second IGAD General Assembly Meeting, Kampala, 26 March 2014.
- ⁸ Mehari Taddele Maru, 2012, 'Rethinking and Reforming the African Union Commission Elections', *African Security Review*, 21.4, December 2012, P 64-78.
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- ¹¹ African Union Summit, Transition from the OAU to the African Union (noting that the purpose of the Extraordinary Session entitled "Strengthening OAU Capacity to Enable It To Meet the Challenges of the New Millennium" was to amend the OAU Charter to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the OAU), available at http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/background/oau_to_au.htm (accessed 07 October 2017).
- ¹² African Union Summit, Transition from the OAU to the African Union, available at http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/background/oau_to_au.htm (accessed 07 October 2017).
- ¹³ Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act stipulates "the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity" and Article 4 (j) which confirms "the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security." These formulations are put as a 'right' not 'obligation'. Nonetheless, they are conceived rather as duty of the AU and Member States when grave circumstances prevail in another Member State.
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- ²¹ Report of the Meeting of the PRC Advisory Sub-Committee on Administrative, Budgetary and Financial Matters, 26 October 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Sub-Cttee/2016/suppl/Rev.1.

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- ²² Report of the Meeting of the PRC Advisory Sub-Committee on Administrative, Budgetary and Financial Matters, 26 October 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Sub-Cttee/2016/suppl/Rev.1, Pp 5-6.
- ²³ Report of the Meeting of the PRC Advisory Sub-Committee on Administrative, Budgetary and Financial Matters, 26 October 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Sub-Cttee/2016/suppl/Rev.1.
- ²⁴ Mehari Taddele Maru and Shara El-Fassi, 2015. The regional economic communities and implementation of the African Governance Architecture (AGA). ECDPM Discussion Paper 181, Maastricht: ECDPM.
- ²⁵ Ibid.
- ²⁶ Key informant 18, AU Commission, 27 April 2015, AU Liaison Officer to RECs, RECs Secretariat, Djibouti.
- ²⁷ Commission of the African Union: 2004-2007 Strategic Plan.
- ²⁸ Key informant 23, AU Commission, 25 April 2015, Sheraton Hotel, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
- ²⁹ See Report on the Evaluation of the Global Review of Africa's Strategic Partnerships with other parts of the World, Executive Council, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, January 2012, EX.CL/785(XXIII) IVRev, Pp 9-11.
- ³⁰ Ibid. Pp 11-12;
- ³¹ Ibid.