WAR AND PEACE IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

POLICY RESEARCH SEMINAR REPORT
CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA
DATE OF PUBLICATION: OCTOBER 2016
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About the Organiser

The Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa, was established in 1968. The organisation has wide-ranging experience in conflict interventions in Southern Africa and is working on a pan-continental basis to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa’s regional organisations. Its policy research focuses on peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa; region-building and regional integration on the continent; relations between Africa and the European Union (EU); achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Africa; and South Africa’s bilateral and multilateral foreign policy.

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Executive Summary

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a two-day policy research seminar in Cape Town, from 19 to 20 March 2016, on the theme “War and Peace in the Great Lakes Region”.

The meeting brought together about 30 prominent African and Western policymakers, scholars, and civil society activists to assess the major obstacles to peace and security in the Great Lakes, and considered seven broad themes: Security and Governance in the Great Lakes Region; the cases of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); Burundi; Rwanda; and Uganda; as well as the role of the United Nations; and that of the European Union, in the Great Lakes.

1. Security and Governance in the Great Lakes Region

The complexity of the regional conflicts that have engulfed the Great Lakes region have resulted in over three million civilian deaths in the DRC; about 800,000 during Rwanda’s 1994 genocide; an estimated 200,000 in Burundi between 1993 and 2005; and involved eight regional states and assorted militias. The intricate nature of the conflicts in the Great Lakes is related to issues concerning ethnicity, citizenship, the ambiguous roles played by regional and external actors, mineral and economic exploitation, and youth unemployment. The continued governance and security challenges in the region are also compounded by strong synergies between national and regional conflict dynamics, while governance remains at the heart of the political crises and insecurities in the Great Lakes. The dynamics of regional politics have traditionally been driven mainly by the desire to take control of state power as a means of gaining access to economic opportunities and resources. Thus, the values and principles of sound democratic governance have not been embraced by the region’s political elite. This is mainly because principles of constitutionalism and multi-party democracy on which transitional frameworks were founded were also not adapted to the political traditions of the region.

The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) was supposed to serve as a forum for promoting shared values and norms on democratic governance and security in the region, but has no legal binding powers and close ties with the African Union (AU) system, and is also not recognised as one of Africa’s major regional economic communities (RECs). Although RECs are mandated to develop norms and principles that provide a platform for more participatory and improved governance, the membership of regional organisations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the case of the DRC, or the East African Community (EAC) in the cases of Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, has not had the expected effect of catalysing democratic governance – mainly due to the absence of shared political values. In January 2016, three countries in the Great Lakes – Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda – were elected as new members of the 15-member AU Peace and Security Council (PSC). This could negatively affect any meaningful efforts at resolving conflicts in the Great Lakes within the AU. The ICGLR also remains weak, and has very limited internal capacity for undertaking conflict resolution activities in the region. Few resources have gone towards the actual implementation of quick-impact peacebuilding projects such as disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR); security sector reform (SSR); and rebuilding states in the region. The donor community must also learn to adopt a less selective approach to responding to the governance deficiencies of the countries in the Great Lakes. While they have acted swiftly in criticising the government in Burundi, some have been reluctant to speak out against governance abuses in Uganda and Rwanda.
2. The Democratic Republic of the Congo

At the core of the Democratic Republic of the Congo's current political crisis, is a country that is troubled by a regime that reinforces a predatory political and economic system. The DRC’s 70 million citizens have, since 1965, starting with the Western-backed Mobutu Sese Seko, been governed by discriminatory practices and the manipulation of group identities for political purposes, amid widespread corruption and fraudulent electoral processes. The insecurity in the DRC that began during the period 1996 to 2003 has seen the persistence of gross human rights violations committed by both militia groups and government soldiers. The conflict in the country has been driven by two intertwined factors: weak state legitimacy, and interference by neighbours, particularly Rwanda and Uganda. While, Rwanda supported the Banyamulenge ethnic group in South Kivu in the Congo, and fought the Interahamwe insurgents and ex-FAR (Armed Forces of Rwanda) group in eastern Congo, Uganda has battled rebel Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF/NALU) elements in the DRC. Both countries have, however, also been accused of looting the Congo’s mineral resources.

The United Nations has spent $4 billion on the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) since 2006, and $17 billion in peacekeeping operations between 1960 and 2016. The world body has, however, been unable to resolve the Congo’s crisis. Although parliamentary and presidential elections are scheduled for November 2016, the government in Kinshasa has noted that it does not have the estimated $500 million that would be required to organise the polls. In June 2015, president Joseph Kabila, proposed a national dialogue among the ruling majority coalition, the political opposition, and civil society to discuss the electoral calendar, voter registration, and the financing of the elections. In addition, anyone who did not register for the 2011 elections was said by the government to be ineligible to vote in the 2016 elections, effectively disenfranchising between seven to eight million Congolese. Some see these moves as a ploy by Kabila to extend his presidential tenure. By October 2016, anti-government demonstrations were being harshly crushed, with dozens of fatalities, even as the government announced a two-year postponement of elections.

3. Burundi

At the time of the implementation of the Arusha peace accord by 2005, Burundi – with a population of 11.2 million – was widely seen as a peacebuilding success story in Africa. Between 2004 and 2007, the country integrated its old army with members of former armed groups into a national army. However, while the army was fairly well integrated, the police and intelligence services were not. This partial security reform process has resulted in Burundi’s security sector services being involved in human rights abuses and widespread violence committed with impunity. President Pierre Nkurunziza’s decision to run for an unconstitutional third term in the July 2015 polls, which he won, triggered continued violence in the country. This resulted in over 240,000 Burundian refugees fleeing across the border to neighbouring Uganda, Rwanda, and the DRC, and the death of more than 400 people.

Although the AU’s Peace and Security Council approved the deployment of 5,000 peacekeepers to Burundi to restore peace in December 2015, Nkurunziza rejected the proposal, as well as an invitation to take part in negotiations with the opposition, which the government accused of fuelling violence in the country. In April 2016, the UN Security Council also approved a resolution for a UN police force to be deployed to Burundi after reports of horrific scenes of violence against women being gang-raped by Burundian government security forces in their homes and the unearthing of secret graves in the countryside. In furtherance of a regional intervention approach, Tanzanian foreign minister, Augustine Mahiga, urged South Africa to contribute to mediation efforts in Burundi, given Tshwane’s (Pretoria) previous engagement in mediation efforts between 1999 and 2005.
4. Rwanda

Despite progress in the area of socio-economic development, civil society in Rwanda continues to be silenced through government intimidation which has led to nearly all the leading human rights activists leaving the country. Western donors as well as African states such as South Africa thus need to speak out clearly in support of the basic rights of Rwanda’s 12 million citizens. In December 2015, the country’s national electoral commission announced that 98.3 per cent of Rwandans had voted in favour of the amendment to the constitution allowing president Paul Kagame to run in presidential polls in August 2017 for another seven-year term (as well as two five-year terms from 2024). He could thus stay in power until 2034. Rwanda should, however, not need to choose between economic and democratic rights. The repression of opposition leaders and human rights activists has continued, and the media has also been muzzled.

5. Uganda

President Yoweri Museveni’s 30-year rule in Uganda, with a population of 39 million, has seen Kampala play a major role in the Great Lakes region. Museveni has also used anti-terrorism rhetoric and policies at home to deflect attention from his domestic failings, and clamped down harshly on dissent, particularly through harassing sections of the media. This militaristic tendency has not only shaped the domestic identity of his regime, but also informed Uganda’s role in the Great Lakes.

Museveni has thus never fully been trusted by members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) such as Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan – which also have their own parochial agendas in South Sudan – to play a neutral role in the search for peace in the country following the outbreak of civil war in December 2013. Although, the Ugandan leader has also chaired and hosted talks on behalf of the EAC and sought to mediate the political crisis in Burundi, many critics pointed to Museveni’s own governance deficiencies as denying him the credibility to lead this process. In addition to the militarisation of society and the police, as well as continuing government corruption, Museveni’s rule has also stoked divisions among Uganda’s diverse ethnic groups and regions. Kampala’s continued role in the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) further reflects the dominance of the military in the country’s politics.

6. The United Nations

The United Nations has had a significant presence in the Great Lakes region over the last decade. However, the world body’s peacekeeping presence has been challenged by governments in Burundi (which ensured the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers by 2006) and the DRC. At the request of the government in Bujumbura, the world body also closed the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB) in December 2014, and the UN Electoral Observation Mission in Burundi (MENUB) drew to a close in December 2015. Similarly, the DRC government challenged the UN’s peacekeeping presence in the country, with president Kabila asking the UN to withdraw its peacekeepers in 2010. In March 2015, Kabila again requested an immediate reduction of 6,000 UN troops (out of 22,000 personnel), though the UN Security Council had approved a troop cut of only 2,000 troops. It is therefore imperative for the world body to scale up the role of its Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region, Algeria’s Said Djinnit, and to strengthen the engagement of his office in the region. The UN should also work more closely with regional organisations such as the EAC, IGAD, SADC, and the AU to push for the full implementation of the Peace, Security, and Cooperation (PSC) Framework of 2013 for the DRC and the wider Great Lakes region.
7. The European Union

The four Great Lakes countries – Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC – have received the most European development assistance in Africa over the last two decades. With regard to funding socio-economic programmes, the European Union supports a variety of development, governance, humanitarian, and security projects in the region. The Congo was among the EU’s top recipients of aid between 2008 and 2013, amounting to €584 million. Furthermore, Brussels plans to increase assistance to the region through the European Development Fund (EDF) in 2014–2020. Assistance to the DRC is planned to increase from €584 million in 2008–2013 to €620 million; to Rwanda from €379 million to €460 million; to Burundi from €188 million to €432 million; and to Uganda from €465 million to €587 million.

Since January 2016, donors have either committed or contributed over $323.8 million to the DRC. A 2013 report by the European Court of Auditors, however, found that while the EU’s projects in the DRC were generally targeting relevant issues of electoral processes, security sector reform, and the rule of law, fewer than half of them could be counted as a success, and even fewer were likely to be sustainable in the long term. It is therefore imperative that future international engagement in the region should be considered by the AU and regional organisations, with the EU, the UN, and other players – including continental powers such as South Africa and Nigeria – playing more supportive roles.

Policy recommendations

The following 10 key policy recommendations emerged from the policy research seminar:

1. Since post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts in the Great Lakes have become stalled due to the unresolved issues in the region’s political economy, it is imperative that governments urgently address the major issue of youth unemployment – more than 30 percent of the region’s population are aged between 10 and 24.

2. The international community must adopt a less selective approach to responding to the governance deficiencies of the countries in the region, acting swiftly to criticise the government in Burundi but being reluctant to condemn governments in Uganda and Rwanda due to strategic interests in both countries.

3. Addressing sexual violence in the DRC must become a key priority. Making progress in security sector reform which has been largely uncoordinated by external actors amid a lack of political will on the part of the government of Joseph Kabila, would also be critical to efforts to tackling gender-based violence.

4. Burundi needs effective leadership and a government that is accountable to its own people. A mass movement must therefore be fostered to promote an inclusive negotiation process. Beyond Burundi, mass advocacy movements should also be built among the 127 million citizens of the Great Lakes.

5. Carefully targeted international sanctions against the Rwandan government for its actions in the DRC have had some effect in changing its behaviour. Such sanctions should also be applied to Rwanda’s domestic human rights situation.
6. There is an urgent need for governments in the Great Lakes region to recommit to peace accords and tackling regional insecurity related to issues of identity and citizenship.

7. There is also an urgent need for political parties and conflict actors in the Great Lakes to revisit peace accords that were signed more than a decade and a half ago with a view to adapting as well as implementing principles of constitutionalism and multi-party democracy which were enshrined in these accords.

8. Though some have suggested that UN peacekeepers should withdraw from the DRC to create room for endogenous solutions to the country’s long-running conflict, other voices have cautioned against a premature withdrawal of the UN, citing the example of Burundi in 2006 where such a withdrawal removed the international community’s capacity for tackling instability.

9. It is time to rethink the role of the UN in the DRC in the areas of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Its bureaucracy has become dysfunctional which has negatively affected the efficiency of UN peacekeeping missions. The UN Security Council must therefore do more to align mandates, roles, and resources closer to the realities on the ground.

10. The EU and other international actors need to undertake more outreach to Tanzania, South Africa, the EAC and other regional actors in their peacebuilding efforts in the Great Lakes.
Introduction

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, held a two-day policy research seminar at the Townhouse Hotel in Cape Town, South Africa, from 19 to 20 March 2016 on “War and Peace in the Great Lakes Region”.

This policy research seminar focused on previous work undertaken by CCR on the Great Lakes region, and built on the May 2015 policy advisory group seminar on “Security and Governance in the Great Lakes Region”. The Centre has also published two seminar reports, two policy briefs, as well as five books and four book chapters related to the region.1 Additionally, CCR has, since 2013, organised seven capacity-building workshops in the region focused on gender, militaries, and human rights.

The Great Lakes region, with a population of 127 million people, is at the heart of regional integration efforts in Africa, with its four states – Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda, and Uganda – claiming membership in five of the eight key African regional economic communities (RECs): the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the East African Community (EAC), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). The Great Lakes, however, faces serious challenges relating to democratic governance. Burundi and the DRC both have fragile political systems. The conflict in the Congo has involved eight regional states, assorted militias, and external actors, and has the potential to impact negatively on the security complexes of not just Central Africa, but also Eastern and Southern Africa.2 The region is grappling with continued social crises such as the abuse of women tied to patriarchal views of gender; the criminalisation of homosexuality in Uganda; the clamp-down on media and human rights organisations in Rwanda; and environmental pressures such as land-degradation putting pressure on already difficult land rights disputes in Burundi.

Presidential elections were held in Burundi in July 2015 and in Uganda in February 2016. The DRC’s election, scheduled for November 2016, was postponed for two years, while polls are scheduled for Rwanda in August 2017. In each of these cases, the issue of “third term-ism” has led to renewed threats of civil conflict. Uganda’s president, Yoweri Museveni, who has been in power since January 1986, paved the way for unlimited rule when presidential term limits were scrapped in July 2005. Rwanda voted in a December 2015 referendum to remove term limits, which will almost certainly extend president Paul Kagame’s rule in 2017, while Joseph Kabila was accused of glissage (“slippage”) even before he postponed the November 2016 presidential vote for two years. The decision of Burundi’s president, Pierre Nkurunziza, to run for a third term in April 2015 led to the boycotting by the opposition of the July

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2015 polls and to instability in which about 400 people have been killed and about 230,000 have sought refuge in Tanzania, Rwanda, the DRC, Uganda and Zambia. 3

A major cause of the region’s problems is that it has often been the victim of Realpolitik – powerful national and international actors have pursued their own parochial interests with little concern for the interests and perspectives of the region’s 127 million citizens, and often played a negative role in the Great Lakes. This includes organisations involved in the “industry of conflict”. Businesses that profit from the economic access that conflicts provide, as well as some governments and aid agencies, often have little incentive in seeing these conflicts resolved. External actors such as the United States (US), France, and Belgium historically supported the 31-year dictatorship of Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko, while France was implicated in supporting Hutu génocidaires before and during the 1994 Rwandan genocide, in which an estimated 800,000 people were killed. 4 A May 2015 report detailed sexual offences committed by United Nations (UN) peacekeepers in the DRC. 5 The European Union (EU) has been involved in funding a variety of security, governance, and development programmes in the Great Lakes region at a cost of €2.2 billion between 2008 and 2013. 6
Seminar Objectives and Themes

The Cape Town seminar brought together prominent African and Western policymakers, scholars, and civil society activists to assess the major obstacles to peace and security in the Great Lakes region. From these discussions, the meeting considered the following five key questions:

1. What are the main security challenges in the Great Lakes region, and how can they be resolved?
2. What have been the main security and governance challenges in Burundi, the DRC, and Rwanda, and how can domestic, regional, and external actors manage these challenges more effectively?
3. What impact will the refusal of leaders in the Great Lakes region to abide by constitutional mandates have on the political and economic stability, as well as security issues, in the region?
4. How effective have the peacebuilding roles of the UN and the EU been in the Great Lakes region?
5. What actions can key domestic, regional, and external actors take to promote sustainable democratic governance and economic development in the Great Lakes region?

The March 2016 policy meeting also developed concrete recommendations on how national actors in the Great Lakes can draw lessons from their own state-building and post-conflict reconstruction experiences to craft effective solutions to overcome obstacles to peace in the region. Deliberations at the seminar focused on seven broad themes: Security and Governance in the Great Lakes Region; the cases of the DRC; Burundi; Rwanda; and Uganda; as well as the role of the United Nations; and that of the European Union, in the Great Lakes region.
1. Security and Governance in the Great Lakes Region

A major challenge in the Great Lakes region is to secure durable peace for its 127 million citizens. Challenges of security and democratic governance must thus be urgently addressed.

The causes of the conflicts in the region are complex and interconnected. Ethnic identity, citizenship, external actors, mineral and economic exploitation, and persistent insecurity are some of the major causes of the conflicts in the region, which have resulted in over three million civilian deaths in the DRC. Limited economic opportunities have left many youth in the region—more than 30 percent of the regional population are aged between 10 and 24—feeling as if they do not have a stake in their countries’ future. Seven other African states (Angola, Burundi, Chad, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe) fought in the Congo’s wars, and several more were involved less directly (such as Congo-Brazzaville, Libya, South Africa, Sudan, and Tanzania), which had a destabilising impact on the security complexes of Central, Eastern, and Southern Africa. Post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts in the Great Lakes have also stalled due to unresolved issues in the political economy and a lack of donor funding. The economy in Burundi, for example, remains underdeveloped, while the authoritarian patterns that created initial conflicts in the region have also reappeared, as evidenced in the weak culture of constitutionalism and the desire by leaders to prolong their stay in power in the DRC, Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda. Effective civil society movements should therefore be built among the region’s citizens.

The issue of governance is at the heart of the political crisis and insecurity in the Great Lakes region. The peace agreements that were signed in the region a decade and a half ago sought to address the sources of insecurity associated with poor governance, such as the mismanagement of the region’s rich diversity, political marginalisation, and socio-economic exclusion. In this regard, the constitutions that emerged from power-sharing accords in the DRC and Burundi embodied a commitment to promote political pluralism and participation, to address issues of ethnic exclusion, and to resolve questions of citizenship in all four countries, including Rwanda and Uganda. However, the governance dimensions of these peace accords failed to address the causes of insecurity and to deal with issues of identity. It is now evident that the optimism about the prospects for peace in the Great Lakes in the mid-2000s was misplaced. This is because the principles of constitutionalism and multi-party democracy on which transitional frameworks were founded were not adapted to the political traditions of the region, which remain untransformed today. The level of political maturity among regional elites is low, and politics has traditionally been driven mainly by the desire to take control of state power as a means of gaining access to economic opportunities and resources. The values and principles of democratic governance have also not been embraced by the region’s political elite. This has given rise to political parties with no clear agendas, weak parliaments, and a fractured civil society, particularly in the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi.

The continued governance and security challenges in the Great Lakes are compounded by strong synergies between national and regional conflict dynamics, and the absence of any significant effort on the part of the
region’s leaders to forge common norms and values for improved governance and prosperous societies. There has also been an undue concentration of political power in, and competition for, presidential power in the region at the expense of the development of other institutions of governance. There is therefore an urgent need to build strong political parties and to strengthen the role of local and parliamentary governance in the Great Lakes. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) was supposed to serve as a forum for promoting shared values and norms on democratic governance and security in the region, but its performance has been disappointing. In the same vein, membership of regional organisations such as SADC in the case of the DRC, or the EAC in the cases of Rwanda and Burundi, has not had the expected effect of catalysing democratic governance in these countries, mainly due to the absence of shared political values. However, SADC’s peacemaking role in the region should be acknowledged. This has taken the form of mediation and, in March 2013, the deployment of the UN–sanctioned Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) – involving South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi – to defeat the March 23 (M23) rebellion in the eastern Congo.

The contributions of the African Union (AU) and the United Nations to the quest for peace and security in the Great Lakes have also been limited. The AU, due largely to its predominant character as a forum of African heads of state, has not provided sufficient leadership in the implementation of peace agreements in the region. The composition of the 15-member AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) following the January 2016 elections of new members – including Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda – could also negatively affect conflict resolution efforts in the Great Lakes. In particular, changes in the leadership of the AU Commission could negatively impact the ability of the organisation to provide guidance in resolving the crisis in Burundi. Although UN peacekeeping operations in the DRC over the past 16 years have cost $17 billion, 70 to 80 percent of this amount has actually been spent on salaries and other operating costs of the UN mission itself.10

Some observers therefore believe that it may be in the interest of the Congo for the UN to be withdrawn from the country in order to create space for endogenous solutions to the conflict. However, other voices cautioned against the premature withdrawal of the UN from the DRC, citing the example of Burundi, where the UN’s withdrawal in December 2014 contributed to the escalation of violence in the context of weak internal capacity for conflict resolution, with weak regional organisations like the ICGLR and the EAC. Very few resources have gone towards implementing quick-impact peacebuilding projects such as disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR); security sector reform (SSR); and rebuilding the Congolese state. The argument that the international community needs to act cautiously in its dealings with Burundi for fear that it would withdraw its troops from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) must also be qualified. Burundi may not really have strong leverage in this regard because bringing back its 5,432 peacekeepers from Somalia could pose a security threat to the government in Bujumbura. However, heightened concerns over the threat of terrorism from Somalia make Western countries vulnerable to Burundi’s threats.

The donor community must also adopt a less selective approach to responding to the governance deficiencies of the countries in the Great Lakes region, where it has acted swiftly in criticising Burundi but shown reluctance to speak out against governance abuses in Uganda and Rwanda due to strategic interests in both countries. Despite these daunting challenges, there has been some progress in the past decade towards the goal of achieving durable peace in the Great Lakes. The Peace, Security, and Cooperation (PSC) Framework for the DRC and the Great Lakes region was signed in February 2013 in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa by

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10 Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa, p. 15.
Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, South Africa, Tanzania, the Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan, and Zambia. Under this framework, the DRC’s neighbours pledged not to interfere militarily in the Congo, and to work together to neutralise armed groups such as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) in the country. The framework was supported by regional institutions such as ICGLR, which hosted the discussions that gave rise to the 3,000-strong SADC force that routed the M23 rebel group by November 2013. Though some critics have called for the dissolution of the ICGLR, the AU regards the body as still having an important role to play in the region. The conference was key to the resolution of the stalemate that continued after the signing of the Lusaka ceasefire agreement in 1999.

The states that border the DRC, including Rwanda and Uganda, had security concerns over withdrawing their troops from the Congo. Only the promise of both a UN inter-position force to maintain security and a long-term platform – the ICGLR – for the discussion of governance and socio-economic issues in the region convinced them to withdraw by 2002, though both Kigali and Kampala continued to intervene sporadically and to loot the Congo’s resources, according to UN reports.

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2. The Democratic Republic of the Congo

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is governed by a regime that reinforces patrimonialism and a predatory economic system. The country is also governed by discriminatory practices of the manipulation of group identities for political purposes, with widespread corruption and fraudulent electoral processes at the core of the DRC's current political crisis.

The Congo’s violent conflicts are a culmination of several factors that include political, economic, security, environmental, ethno-cultural, and religious issues. The country’s protracted conflicts are also embedded in a history of autocracy (centred on the Western-backed Mobutu Sese Seko, who was in power between 1965 and 1997), and the current government of Joseph Kabila’s unwillingness to build governance practices of national socio-political and economic cohesion for its 70 million citizens. The conflict in the DRC is driven by two intertwined factors: weak state legitimacy, and interference by its neighbours, particularly Rwanda and Uganda. The Congo has nine neighbours, seven of which have emerged from their own civil wars.13

The DRC has institutionalised “predatocracy”, with allies within and outside the country from which the government receives legitimacy despite the looting of its national resources. Regional alliances of neighbouring countries involving countries such as Angola, Burundi, Eritrea, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe have been involved in the Congo’s conflicts. Rwanda supported the Banyamulenge ethnic group in South Kivu, which turned to Kigali for support after being deprived of Congolese citizenship in 1996 by the Laurent Kabila regime. Rwanda was also fighting the Interahamwe insurgents and ex-FAR (Armed Forces of Rwanda) group in eastern Congo, who fled Rwanda and were responsible for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, in which about 800,000 people perished. Some of the largest and most dangerous militias in the Kivus – including Burundi’s National Forces of Liberation (FNL), and Uganda’s Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF/NALU) – are tied to conflicts in neighbouring states. The insurgence of “warrior refugees” further increased tensions, negatively affecting the region by overthrowing regimes in Uganda, Rwanda, and the DRC between 1986 and 1997. The DRC continues to face unconstitutional challenges in the absence of strong state institutions.

The Congolese state also does not enjoy widespread legitimacy among its citizens. Elections have become a zero-sum game that has exacerbated the conflict. International actors such as the United Nations had managed the conflict in the DRC, but not resolved it. The world body has spent $4 billion over three and half years in the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) – known until 2010 as the UN Organisation Mission in the DRC (MONUC) – since 2013, and $17 billion in peacekeeping operations between 1960 and 2016. The world body has also been ineffective in resolving the DRC conflict, and has demonstrated “responsibility without authority”. It is therefore time to rethink its role in the Congo in the areas of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Local elections, initially planned for October 2015, have been

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13 The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s neighbours that were involved in civil wars are: Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Congo-Brazzaville, Rwanda, Sudan, and Uganda.
delayed. The country’s Constitutional Court ruled in favour of a request by the national electoral commission (Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante, CENI) to delay the elections so that governors could first be elected in the country’s 26 newly created provinces. Parliamentary and presidential elections were scheduled for November 2016, but the government in Kinshasa argued that it did not have the over $500 million that would be required to organise the polls and postponed them for two years. In addition, anyone who did not register for the 2011 elections was said by the government to be ineligible to vote in the elections, effectively disenfranchising between seven and eight million Congolese.

In June 2015, president Joseph Kabila suggested a national dialogue among the ruling majority coalition, the political opposition, and civil society to discuss the electoral calendar, the registration of voters, and the financing of the election. Some in the opposition such as the Union for the Congolese Nation (UNC), warned in August 2015 that taking part in the dialogue would legitimise postponing the presidential elections, though others, such as Etienne Tshisekedi’s Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) confirmed that it would take part in the dialogue in August 2015, only to pull out of consultations two months later. In November 2015 the UDPS reconsidered its decision and urged Kabila to start the dialogue with the support of an international facilitator. However, many opposition parties and external actors still believed that these changes were being used by Kabila as a way of extending his tenure. Clashes have occurred in Kinshasa, with the first major anti-Kabila protests occurring in January 2015. A reported 40 people were killed in clashes with government forces during this demonstration, and a second protest in Kinshasa turned into a riot when 3,000 anti-Kabila protestors were attacked by youths in September 2015. Further demonstrations in September 2016 resulted in a dozen fatalities. Regionally, the Congo has suffered destabilising interventions by its neighbours, particularly in the country’s eastern provinces (North and South Kivu). The persistent insecurity in the DRC that began with the 1996–2003 conflict has continued to be regionalised. Many indigenous militias such as the Mai-Mai “self-defence” forces have also arisen in the eastern Congo, often originally in response to abuses by foreign-backed armed groups. These forces are still carrying out attacks in the DRC, with the ADF, killing 13 government soldiers during September/October 2015. Remnants of Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) continue to operate in Bas-Uélé and Haut-Uélé; while the Ituri Patriotic Resistance Front (FRPI) has continued attacks on government soldiers and civilians. These armed groups are also responsible for a large number of human rights abuses such as beatings and rapes, with the FRPI consistently accused of committing the most abuses.

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17 Report of the UN Secretary-General, S/2015/741, 28 September 2015.
18 Report of the UN Secretary-General, S/2015/1031, 24 December 2015.
21 See, for example, Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo from Leopold to Kabila.
22 Report of the UN Secretary-General, S/2015/741, 28 September 2015.
23 Report of the UN Secretary-General, S/2015/486, 26 June 2015.
24 See Reports of the UN Secretary-General, S/2015/486, 26 June 2015; and S/2015/741, 28 September 2015.
government soldiers have also been accused of violating human rights. Between March and May 2015, 60 per cent of the 810 human rights violations registered were reportedly perpetrated by several armed groups (such as the FRPI, ADF, and the FDLR), while 40 per cent were allegedly committed by state agents such as the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and the national police.25

3. Burundi

Burundi, with a population of 11.2 million, emerged from a centralised and elite-driven regime that widened the gap between the core, urbanised city dwellers and the rural periphery. Huge disparities in socio-economic equality bred discontent.

Weak governmental processes and the absence of strong institutions have created a further opportunity for criminalisation and violence. The ethnic-fuelled revolt largely began when tens of thousands of Tutsi refugees fled from Rwanda to Burundi during the Rwandan “revolution” of 1959–1961, which altered the fabric of Hutu-Tutsi relations.26 At the root of the ethnic divide are Tutsi perceptions of Hutu politicians in Burundi as potential enemies. At the time of the implementation of the Arusha peace accord by 2005, the country was widely seen as a peacebuilding success story in Africa. The government successfully integrated the old army and members of former armed groups into a national army. Burundi, however, only had a partial security sector reform process between 2004 and 2007. While the army was fairly well integrated, the police and intelligence services were not. The police force has been rife with corruption and been one of the major sources of insecurity in the country. The security services have also been involved in human rights abuses that have resulted in widespread impunity. The ruling National Council for the Defence of Democracy–Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) party has never properly transformed itself from a military organisation into a democratic political party. The current crisis has been the most serious since the end of the Arusha accord. Power struggles have persisted between the Hutu-dominated ruling CNDD-FDD and Burundi’s National Forces of Liberation. From 2010 to 2011, the government managed to expel the FNL from rural Bujumbura. The Tutsi-led Burundi Movement for Solidarity and Democracy (MSD) also emerged in 2010, introducing a new ethnic dimension to Burundi’s crisis. This became the central point for a government crackdown.

Civil society in Burundi has argued that political negotiations should not be about the distribution of posts, but should be primarily about building sustainable institutions for the effective participation of citizens in the democratic process. Corruption has continued within the government, even amid poor implementation of the 2000 Arusha accord. Burundi requires effective leadership that is accountable to its own people. A mass movement must be fostered to promote an inclusive negotiation process. A narrative, however, exists among several foreign governments that there is no alternative to some of the autocratic leadership styles displayed in the region. The crisis in Burundi has centred around president Pierre Nkurunziza’s decision to run for an unconstitutional third term in the July 2015 presidential elections, which he won. The polls were initially scheduled for May 2015 but postponed after domestic and external pressure as well as an attempted coup by the former Director-General of the National Information Service (Service National de Renseignements, SNR), General Godefroid Niyombare, in the same month. Niyombare had been dismissed from the government in February 2015 after he submitted a report to Nkurunziza urging him not to run for a third term.27 This announcement gave rise to the most violent political and security crisis since the end of the country’s civil war in 2003 and resulted in over 240,000 Burundian refugees fleeing across the border to neighbouring Uganda.

27 Report of the UN Secretary-General, S/2015/510, 7 July 2015.
Rwanda, and the DRC, and the death of more than 400 people. Nkurunziza contended that an ambiguity in Article 96 of Burundi’s 2005 constitution - which specifies that the president is to be elected by direct universal suffrage for a five-year term, renewable once – allowed him to stand for a third term. He argued that he had not been directly elected in the 2005 election, since Article 302 of the constitution stipulated that the first post-transition president be elected by the National Assembly and Senate. The Arusha agreement of 2000 was intended to bring an end to the long-standing conflict in the country, and also stated unambiguously that the president could not serve more than two terms. The accord established power-sharing in the post-conflict government in an attempt to defuse ethnic tensions. The ruling CNDD-FDD is also divided between Nkurunziza’s tight inner circle – consisting primarily of ex-fighters and “securocrats” – and those who view the president as a political liability. In addition to Niyombare’s leaked letter, a March 2015 letter from 17 party leaders had urged him to step down from power, and the president’s support – especially in the countryside – decreased, as 62 per cent of people nationwide reportedly opposed his third presidential term.

External actors such as the AU, the UN, and the US were quick to label the Burundian election as flawed and not credible, due to government harassment of the opposition and civil society members; the closing down of media outlets; and the intimidation of voters. The 15-member AU Peace and Security Council approved the deployment of 5,000 peacekeepers to Burundi to restore peace in December 2015, but Nkurunziza rejected this plan, as well as an invitation to take part in negotiations with the opposition, which the government accused of fuelling violence in the country. In April 2016, the UN Security Council approved a resolution for a UN police force to be deployed to Burundi after reports of horrific scenes of violence against women being gang-raped by Burundian government security forces in their homes and of secret graves being discovered in the country. The Nkurunziza government, however, refused to allow the UN police force to enter Burundi. An attempted coup in May 2015 was unable to gain the backing of the entire military, and Nkurunziza – who was attending an EAC summit in the Tanzanian capital of Dar es Salaam at the time – returned after only a day to

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28 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 28 August 2000, Article 7(3).
foil the putsch. AU heads of state also rejected the proposed intervention force at their summit in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa in February 2016, calling instead for high-level mediation and increased human rights monitors. External political and economic sanctions were imposed on Burundi, and the country faces diplomatic isolation. Regional involvement by South Africa was requested by Nkurunziza’s special envoy, Pascal Nyabenda, speaker of the Burundian parliament. South Africa’s proposed mediation role in Burundi is seen as important due to its former mediation efforts from 1999, which contributed greatly towards ending the civil war in Burundi by 2005. Tanzanian foreign minister, Augustine Mahiga, has thus urged Tshwane (Pretoria) to contribute to mediation efforts in Burundi.

36 See, for example, “Burundi Revenge Begins; Coup Plotters ‘Severely Beaten’, Radio Chief Flees Amidst Crackdown – Polls Delay Likely”, Mail and Guardian (South Africa), 17 May 2015.
4. Rwanda

Since the 1994 genocide, Rwanda has been touted as an example of successful development and an “island of stability” in a troubled region. However, its gains in areas such as the provision of public services for its 12 million citizens mask the fact that its stability is largely based on fear.

Independent media in the country have been stifled, with the two most popular independent newspapers, Umuseso and Umuvugizi, being suspended in April 2010 for allegedly “inciting public disorder”. The leadership of these newspapers were also sued and exiled. The leadership of these newspapers were also sued and exiled. Independent media have further been stifled, such as the British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) Kinyarwanda service, which was suspended and then banned in October 2014 for airing its documentary Rwanda’s Untold Story, which the Kagame government claimed constituted “genocide denial”. Civil society in Rwanda continues to be silenced through a combination of government intimidation and infiltration, which has led to nearly all the leading human rights activists leaving the country. Political opposition is also scarce, as officially recognised political parties tend to be part of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) coalition – such as the Party for Progress and Concord (PPC) – or often support the government politically (such as the Social Democratic Party). Parties that do attempt to mount genuine opposition are targeted for repression, as were three new parties that sought to contest the 2010 presidential elections: the Unified Democratic Forces (FDU)-Inkingi, headed by Victoire Ingabire; the Social Party (PS)-Imberakuri, headed by Bernard Ntaganda; and the Democratic Green Party of Rwanda (DGPR), headed by Frank Habineza. All faced repression, with André Kagwa Rwisereka of the Democratic Green Party being killed in July 2010; and Victoire Ingabire and Joseph Ntawagundi of the Democratic Green Party, and Bernard Ntaganda of the PS-Imberakuri, being beaten and periodically jailed. None of the parties ultimately ran candidates in the 2010 polls.

A referendum held in December 2015 approved draft constitutional amendments to allow president Paul Kagame to run in August 2017 for another seven-year term (as well as two five-year terms from 2024). The country’s national electoral commission announced that 98.3 per cent of Rwandans had voted in favour of the amendment to the constitution. In January 2016, Kagame announced that he would contest the forthcoming elections. The 2003 Rwandan constitution had, however, provided clear guidelines on term limits, stating that a president could only be elected to two seven-year terms. Critics have noted that Kagame could now rule until 2034. The ruling party – the Rwanda Patriotic Front – is a very structured organisation. Though Kagame secured an overwhelming victory in the December 2015 referendum, many voters are believed to have acted out of fear of the government.

Sanctions could, play an important role in countries in which human rights are violated. Such measures have often been taken against Kagame’s actions in the DRC rather than against human rights violations in Rwanda. Oppression of opposition leaders has continued in Rwanda. For example, in June 2010, one of the co-founders

of the Rwandan National Congress (RNC) and former army chief of staff, General Kayumba Nyamwasa, narrowly escaped an assassination attempt in Johannesburg. Another Rwandan exiled in South Africa, Patrick Karegeya, Rwanda’s former intelligence chief, was killed in Johannesburg in January 2016. Rwandans should not need to choose between economic and democratic rights. Western donors as well as African states such as South Africa need to speak out clearly in support of the basic rights of Rwanda’s citizens. International personalities like former United States president, Bill Clinton, and former British prime minister, Tony Blair, have also adopted paternalistic positions in support of autocratic regimes like Rwanda by vociferously and uncritically supporting Kagame’s leadership.
5. Uganda

President Yoweri Museveni’s 30-year rule in Uganda, with a population of 39 million, has been mixed. His National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M) has been credited with restoring stability, the rule of law, and human rights in Uganda after 1986.

In the early days of his rule, Museveni was also able to rebuild Uganda’s economy and infrastructure, while creating an enabling environment for civil society to flourish. However, according to critics, Museveni and the NRM have since become an obstacle to peace and progress both in Uganda and in the wider Great Lakes region. Similarly, his autocratic rule is based on a system of patronage that is dominated by the military. The Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) continues to play a major role in society. It has special representation in the Ugandan parliament, and coordinates a nation-wide agricultural development programme, Operation Wealth Creation, which was launched by Museveni in July 2013. Uganda’s continued role in the AU Mission in Somalia also reflects the dominance of the military in the country’s politics and governance. In addition to the militarisation of society and the police, as well as government corruption, Museveni’s rule has also stoked divisions among Uganda’s diverse ethnic groups and regions. These developments have contributed to the president’s legitimacy and that of his NRM party being questioned. Museveni’s rule may have come to resemble the autocracy of Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko in the way that it identifies itself closely with the state. Museveni, as did Mobutu, has also sought to use African tradition to legitimise his rule, and is thus comparable to the Zairian autocrat in the way he manipulates foreign donors to garner support for his rule.

Museveni has also played a major role in the region, and Uganda’s foreign policy has largely been driven by his personal decisions. Thus, Kampala has played the role of both “arsonist” and “fire-fighter” in the region. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) required Uganda to pay reparations to the DRC in a decision in 2005, and the 2002 final report of the United Nations panel of experts on the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Congo accused both Kampala and Kigali of looting the DRC’s resources. The alliance between Uganda and Rwanda fell apart in the 1998–2003 phase of the war, leading to three military clashes in Kisangani in 1999 and 2000 in which scores of Congolese were killed, as well as resulting in violence between their local proxies in the DRC. In December 1999, Museveni attempted to play the role of peacemaker by bringing together several rebel factions in the DRC – the Congolese Rally for Democracy–Goma (RCD-G), the Congolese Rally for Democracy–Kisangani (RDC-K), and the Movement for the Liberation of Change (MLC) – in a bid to resolve their differences. Similarly, Museveni, while chair of the ICGLR between January 2012 and January 2014, hosted talks in which M23 fighters eventually laid down their arms. Since July 2015, the Ugandan leader has also chaired and hosted talks on behalf of the EAC between Burundi’s government and groups that had opposed president Nkurinziza’s third presidential term.

The February 2016 presidential election in Uganda should be viewed in the context of Museveni’s increasingly autocratic rule. Eight opponents unsuccessfully ran against Museveni in the polls. Amama Mbabazi, who was a trusted ally of Museveni’s for 40 years, was removed as prime minister in September 2014, allegedly due to his use

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of the position to mobilise support for his own political ambitions. Although Museveni won the election, the credibility of the polls was questioned by domestic observers as well as Commonwealth and EU observers. In a society in which dissent is sometimes criminalised, elections have degenerated into a ritual that serves only to legitimise autocratic practices. The intimidation and harassment of Museveni’s opponents, notably the opposition leader, Kizza Besigye, in the lead-up to and after the 2016 polls, confirmed these perceptions. Prospects for change in Uganda thus appear bleak. The regime’s heavy-handed approach to dealing with dissent forecloses the possibility of peaceful protests against Museveni’s government. With the president also demonstrating contempt for, and refusing to negotiate with, other political actors, peaceful change has been made more difficult. The role of regional and external actors in forestalling an imminent outbreak of violence in Uganda is thus critical. In particular, powerful Western donors such as the US and Britain in their engagement with Museveni’s government, should prioritise the promotion of democratic values in Uganda instead of simply following their parochial national interests.

Museveni has also used anti-terrorism rhetoric and policies to deflect attention from his domestic failings, and clamped down harshly on dissent, particularly through harassing sections of the media. His framing of the LRA rebellion in northern Uganda as an act of terrorism garnered him political support and military aid from the US government. Although the war in northern Uganda has ended, the region remains marginalised, aggrieved, and volatile. Museveni’s approach to governance reflects his predisposition to militarism. He came to power in 1986 through the barrel of the gun rather than through the ballot box. This militaristic tendency has not only shaped the domestic identity of his regime, but also informed Uganda’s role in the Great Lakes. Museveni views the region as a security threat to his regime, and engages with it as such. This has earned him a reputation among critics as a regional bully who cannot be trusted to play a constructive role in addressing the challenges of the region. Museveni has thus never fully been trusted by members of IGAD such as Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan (which have their own narrow agendas as well) to play a neutral role in the search for peace in South Sudan following the outbreak of civil war in that country in December 2013. Similarly, although he was initially appointed by the EAC to mediate in the political crisis in Burundi, many critics pointed to Museveni’s own governance deficiencies as denying him the credibility to lead this process.
6. The United Nations

The United Nations has had a significant presence in the Great Lakes region for two decades, but is facing limits on its ability to influence the situation due to a combination of organisational constraints on action, resistance from regional governments such as the DRC and Burundi, and the need for external actors to play a supportive role while allowing regional and continental actors to lead peacemaking efforts.

The UN was able to play a significant role in the transitional processes in the DRC and Burundi between 1999 and 2005 for two key reasons. First, there was a commitment on the part of key UN member states such as South Africa, the US, and China, which remained diplomatically engaged in, and were willing to provide resources for, transitional processes in the two countries. Second, there was no sovereign authority or any single actor that dominated the political space in the two countries. This made it possible for the UN and other external actors to assume an active and largely uncontested role in guiding both transitions. In the case of the DRC, for example, the International Committee Accompanying the Transition (Comité International d'Accompagnement de la Transition, CIAT), exercised significant authority and played a major role in ensuring a relatively smooth transition in the country.

However, the governments of the DRC and Burundi have been increasingly hostile to the UN, especially after the end of the transitions in both countries. A defining feature of the leadership of both Congolese leader, Joseph Kabila, and Burundian president, Pierre Nkurunziza, has been their strong desire to exercise their sovereignty in relation to external actors such as the UN. The response of the UN and the donor community to the hostility of the government in Kinshasa compared to that of the government in Bujumbura has been vastly different. Western donors have been less interested in engaging with Burundi. This complicated the political crisis that accompanied Pierre Nkurunziza’s successful bid for a third presidential term in 2015. The failure of the UN and the donor community to challenge Nkurunziza’s excesses in the early years of his presidency arguably emboldened him to defy international criticism and to seek a third term in office. The role of China and Russia – in their capacity as veto-wielding permanent members of the UN Security Council – in shielding Nkurunziza from international sanctions, also needs to be highlighted. Another major challenge for the UN is that after withdrawing its 5,650 peacekeepers from Burundi in December 2010, the UN had only a small peacebuilding office in the country.

Contrary to the position it adopted in Burundi, the UN maintained an active presence in the DRC following its elections in November 2011. In the post-transitional period, the UN has been confronted with a major dilemma in the Congo. It has aspired to stabilise the country and strengthen the authority of the Congolese state while simultaneously having to deal with the abuses of an increasingly hostile and repressive government. Over the years, this tension has been reflected in the inability of the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC – MONUSCO – to play a significant role in critical peacebuilding activities such as security sector reform and the protection of civilians, even as it has provided limited military support to the Congolese government in its fight against armed groups in the volatile east of the country.

Although the 3,000-strong SADC-led force was successful in defeating the M23 by November 2013, it has not been willing to protect civilians from other armed groups, while elements of the Congolese army that have
been fighting alongside UN forces have sometimes been accused of committing human rights abuses. Despite the signing of the February 2013 Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the Great Lakes region, not much has been done by the world body to leverage other provisions of the framework to promote political reforms in Kinshasa. Against this backdrop, the UN faces a fundamental existential crisis in the DRC as president Kabila extends his term in office from 2016 to 2018. The world body could find it difficult to continue operating in the country.

The UN must also deal with opposition to its presence from regional governments, as occurred in the DRC in January 2010 when president Kabila signalled that he would formally ask the UN to withdraw its peacekeepers from the country. This decision was halted only after negotiations to reconstitute the UN Organisation Mission in the DRC into MONUSCO. Similarly, in March 2015, Kabila requested an immediate reduction of 6,000 UN troops (out of 22,000 personnel) and a clear commitment to ending the UN peacekeeping operation, though the UN Security Council had approved a troop cut of only 2,000 troops. The UN has also faced resistance in Burundi even before the onset of the current crisis. At the request of the Burundian government, the world body closed the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB) in December 2014, and the UN Electoral Observation Mission in Burundi (MENUB) also drew to a close in December 2015. For all its weaknesses, the 16-year UN mission in the DRC may have prevented the disintegration of this strategic country at the heart of Africa. It may, therefore, be best for the UN to work closely with regional organisations such as the EAC and IGAD in its peacekeeping efforts, in order to increase its influence in the Great Lakes region. Working with SADC and the AU, the UN could push for the accelerated and full implementation of the provisions of the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework of 2013. It is also imperative for the world body to scale up the role of its Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region, Algeria’s Said Djinnit, and to strengthen the engagement of his office in the region.

The mixed performance of the UN mission in the DRC is also symptomatic of the dysfunctional state of its bureaucracy, which has negatively affected the efficiency of UN peacekeeping operations generally. The inefficiency in the UN’s administration is also reflected in the absence of effective mechanisms within the organisation to hold peacekeepers accountable for crimes committed while serving on missions around the world. There is thus an urgent need to reform the UN’s administrative system. More important, the success of future UN peacekeeping missions depends to a large extent on how the mandate of these missions is articulated by the UN Security Council. Peace arrangements are not self-implementing. Peacekeeping missions tasked with implementing peace agreements must thus be underpinned by realistic mandates. In the case of the DRC, the growing complexity of mandates given to MONUSCO included many tasks that the mission was unable to fulfil. This meant in practice that the UN mission itself, rather than the UN Security Council, had to determine the mission’s priorities. The Security Council must therefore do more to align mandates, roles, and resources with political and military realities on the ground.

The 20,000-strong United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC was mandated to support elections in the Congo, even though the required resources from both the UN and Kinshasa would be at least

44 The UN has since adopted a policy of conditionality in its operations in the DRC that forbids the mission to work with commanders in the Congolese army who have been found guilty of human rights abuses.
comparable to the investment in the Congo’s first elections in 2006, which cost about $500 million. Since UN member states are required to pay their share of the peacekeeping budget, peacekeepers are often much better resourced than other UN agencies that operate alongside peacekeeping missions such as those that concentrate on post-conflict reconstruction efforts, for which contributions by member states are voluntary. The world body must thus be sensitive to the interests of large contributors, the withdrawal of which could threaten ongoing and future operations. For example, an August 2010 UN report accused the Rwandan military and Kigali-backed rebel groups of human rights violations in the eastern Congo during the 1996–2003 conflict. At the time the report was released in October 2010, Rwanda was the eighth largest contributor to UN peacekeeping operations around the world, and threatened to withdraw all of its personnel from these missions if the report was made public without revision. The document (including the accusations against Rwanda and its proxies) was released only after being leaked to the press, and after the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, had personally travelled to Kigali to discuss it with Paul Kagame and allowed Rwanda to include a reply in the final release.

49 “Ban’s Discussions with Rwandan Leader on UN Rights Report to Continue”, UN News Centre, 9 September 2010.
7. The European Union

The Great Lakes region has served as a laboratory for the European Union to seek new legitimacy as an aid donor and to experiment with its evolving Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Unhealthy competition among European member states in seeking to influence the political agenda of the Great Lakes region has included the legacy of France’s involvement in the Rwandan genocide of 1994.

The end of the Cold War increased pressure to end French dominance in the Great Lakes. The four Great Lakes countries – Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC – have received the most European development assistance over the last two decades. The Congo was among the EU’s top recipients of aid between 2008 and 2013, amounting to €584 million. Since January 2016, donors have either committed or contributed over $323.8 million to the DRC. Of this amount, the EU has provided $58.8 million.

The EU took a tough line over the elections in Burundi in July 2015. Its observer mission also criticised the polls in Uganda in February 2016 and insisted on an inclusive political dialogue as a condition for observing future polls in the DRC. Carefully targeted international sanctions against the Rwandan government for its actions in the DRC have had some effect in changing its behaviour. Such sanctions could also be applied to Rwanda’s domestic human rights situation. The European Union’s engagement with the Great Lakes region has largely been through funding of programmes, except for four instances of direct military assistance – Operation Artemis in 2003; the EU Security Sector Reform Mission (EUSEC) and the EU Police Mission (EUPOL), both in 2005; as well as the EU Force (EUFOR) mission in 2006. All were implemented in the Congo. In June 2003, France led the 1,000-strong EU Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) to conduct Operation Artemis, mandated to protect 20,000 civilians, with Britain and Sweden as the other main contributors, while Germany and Belgium provided non-combat troops. Paris started planning the mission a month before the European Council had approved it in June 2003.

In support of the Congo’s 2006 elections, Brussels authorised the EUPOL mission in Kinshasa, in February 2005, with the aim of developing an integrated police force to assist in the run-up to the presidential and parliamentary elections. The mission operated for two years, from 2005 to 2007. Also, in June 2005, Brussels authorised EUSEC. Its 50 officers sought to assist the reintegration efforts of former rebel forces. In December 2005, the UN authorised the 2,000-strong EUFOR. The mission arrived late, 14 days before the first round of presidential elections in July 2006. EUFOR only started deploying eight months after the approved UN mandate was passed. The €100 million mission also lasted for just four months – from July to November 2006. The EU experienced serious challenges during its missions in the DRC. Both EUSEC and EUPOL were under-staffed.

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and under-resourced. EUFOR, especially, was seen as slow and overly bureaucratic, and the insistence of EU member states on pre-approved exit dates was unhelpful in such a complicated conflict.

With regard to funding socio-economic programmes, the EU supports a variety of development, governance, humanitarian, and security projects in the region. Additionally, Brussels has been drawing down its involvement in important areas such as security sector reform, ending its police mission in the DRC in October 2014, and phasing out its mission to reform the Congolese army in June 2015. The EU, however, plans to increase assistance to the region through the European Development Fund (EDF) in 2014–2020. Assistance to the DRC is planned to rise from €569 million in 2008–2013 to €620 million; to Rwanda from €379 million to €460 million; to Burundi from €188 million to €432 million; and to Uganda from €465 million to €587 million. A 2013 report by the European Court of Auditors, however, found that while the EU’s projects in the DRC were generally targeting relevant issues of electoral processes, security sector reform, and rule of law, fewer than half of them could be counted as successes, and even fewer were likely to be sustainable in the long term. Future international action in the region should be led by the AU and regional organisations, with the EU, the UN, and other players – including continental powers such as South Africa and Nigeria – playing supportive roles. Building regional diplomatic capacity should be a priority, particularly that of the ICGLR, as well as promoting the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework agreed in Addis Ababa in February 2013.
Policy Recommendations

The following 10 key policy recommendations emerged from the policy research seminar:

1. Since post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts in the Great Lakes have become stalled due to the unresolved issues in the region’s political economy, it is imperative that governments urgently address the major issue of youth unemployment – more than 30 percent of the region’s population are aged between 10 and 24.

2. The international community must adopt a less selective approach to responding to the governance deficiencies of the countries in the region, acting swiftly to criticise the government in Burundi but being reluctant to condemn governments in Uganda and Rwanda due to strategic interests in both countries.

3. Addressing sexual violence in the DRC must become a key priority. Making progress in security sector reform which has been largely uncoordinated by external actors amid a lack of political will on the part of the government of Joseph Kabila, would also be critical to efforts to tackling gender-based violence.

4. Burundi needs effective leadership and a government that is accountable to its own people. A mass movement must therefore be fostered to promote an inclusive negotiation process. Beyond Burundi, mass advocacy movements should also be built among the 127 million citizens of the Great Lakes.

5. Carefully targeted international sanctions against the Rwandan government for its actions in the DRC have had some effect in changing its behaviour. Such sanctions should also be applied to Rwanda’s domestic human rights situation.

6. There is an urgent need for governments in the Great Lakes region to recommit to peace accords and tackling regional insecurity related to issues of identity and citizenship.

7. There is also an urgent need for political parties and conflict actors in the Great Lakes to revisit peace accords that were signed more than a decade and a half ago with a view to adapting as well as implementing principles of constitutionalism and multi-party democracy which were enshrined in these accords.

8. Though some have suggested that UN peacekeepers should withdraw from the DRC to create room for endogenous solutions to the country’s long-running conflict, other voices have cautioned against a premature withdrawal of the UN, citing the example of Burundi in 2006 where such a withdrawal removed the international community’s capacity for tackling instability.
9. It is time to rethink the role of the UN in the DRC in the areas of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Its bureaucracy has become dysfunctional which has negatively affected the efficiency of UN peacekeeping missions. The UN Security Council must therefore do more to align mandates, roles, and resources closer to the realities on the ground.

10. The EU and other international actors need to undertake more outreach to Tanzania, South Africa, the EAC and other regional actors in their peacebuilding efforts in the Great Lakes.

Participants of the policy research seminar “War and Peace in the Great Lakes Region”, Cape Town, South Africa.
Annex I

Agenda

Day One: Friday, 18 March 2016

16:00 – 17:30 Welcome Cocktail and Registration

17:30 – 19:00 Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) Public Dialogue: “War and Peace in the Great Lakes Region”

Chair: Ambassador Welile Nhlapo, Former Special Representative of South Africa to the Great Lakes Region; and Former National Security Advisor to the South African President, Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa

Speakers: Ambassador Alan Doss, Former Special Representative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

Ambassador Roger Meece, Former Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General to the Democratic Republic of the Congo

19h30 Welcome Dinner

Day Two: Saturday, 19 March 2016

09:00 – 09:45 Welcome and Opening Remarks

Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa

09:45 – 11:15 Session I: Security and Governance in the Great Lakes Region

Chair: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Speaker: Professor Gilbert Khadiagala, Head of the Department of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand (Wits), Johannesburg, South Africa

II:15 – II:30  Coffee Break

II:30 – 13:00  Session II: The Democratic Republic of the Congo

Chair:  Dr Kudrat Virk, Senior Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Speaker:  Professor Mbaya Justin Kankwenda, Chief Executive Officer, Congolese Institute for Development Research and Strategic Studies (ICREDES), Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo

Discussant: Ambassador Alan Doss, Former Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General to the Democratic Republic of the Congo

13:00 – 14:15  Group Photo followed by Lunch

14:15 – 15:45  Session III: Burundi

Chair:  Dr David Monyae, Co-Director, Confucius Institute, University of Johannesburg, South Africa

Speaker:  Dr Yolande Bouka, Research Associate, Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis Division, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Tshwane, South Africa

Discussant: Ambassador Welile Nhlapo, Former Special Representative of South Africa to the Great Lakes Region; and Former National Security Advisor to the South African President, Tshwane

15:45 – 16:00  Coffee Break

16:00 – 17:30  Session IV: Rwanda

Chair:  Ms Magdeline Madibela, Former Head, Gender Unit, Southern African Development Community (SADC), Gaborone, Botswana

Speaker:  Ms Carina Tertsakian, Senior Researcher, Human Rights Watch (HRW), London, England

Discussant: Professor Gilbert Khadiagala, Head of the Department of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand (Wits), Johannesburg

19:00  Dinner
Day Three: Sunday, 20 March 2016

09:30 – 11:00 Session V: Uganda

Chair: Mr Paul Mulindwa, Senior Project Officer, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Speaker: Dr Paul Omach, Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda

Discussant: Dr Pamela Khanakwa, Lecturer, Department of History, Makerere University

11:00 – 11:15 Coffee Break

11:15 – 12:45 Session VI: The United Nations and the Great Lakes Region

Chair: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Speaker: Dr Emily Paddon Rhoads, Post-Doctoral Researcher, European University Institute (EUI), Florence, Italy

Discussant: Ambassador Roger Meece, Former Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General to the Democratic Republic of the Congo

12:45 – 13:45 Lunch

13:45 – 15:15 Session VII: The European Union (EU) and the Great Lakes Region

Chair: Mr Siphosezwe Masango, Chair, Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation, Parliament of South Africa, Cape Town

Speaker: Dr Marie Gibert, Associate Lecturer, Department of Geography, Environment, and Development Studies, Birkbeck College, University of London, England

Discussant: Mr Douglas Carpenter, Head, Great Lakes Region, European Union External Action Service (EEAS), Brussels, Belgium

15:15 – 15:45 Coffee Break and Completing Evaluation Forms
15:45 – 16:45 Session VIII: Rapporteurs’ Report And The Way Forward

Chair: Professor Brian Williams, Visiting Professor in Peace, Mediation, and Conflict Transformation, University of Lusaka, Zambia

Rapporteurs: Ms Dawn Nagar, Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Dr Fritz Nganje, Consultant, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town; and Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, South African Research (SARChI) Chair of African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, University of Johannesburg
Annex II

List of Participants

1. Dr Adekeye Adebajo  
   Executive Director  
   Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR)  
   Cape Town, South Africa

2. Dr Yolande Bouka  
   Research Associate  
   Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis Division  
   Institute for Security Studies (ISS)  
   Tshwane, South Africa

3. Ms Cyrilla Bwakira  
   Member  
   Women and Girls Movement for Peace and Security in Burundi (MFFPS)

4. Mr Douglas Carpenter  
   Head  
   Great Lakes Region  
   European Union External Action Service (EEAS)  
   Brussels, Belgium

5. Mr Tumba Dieudonné  
   Ph.D. Candidate  
   University of South Africa (UNISA)  
   Tshwane, South Africa

6. Ambassador Alan Doss  
   Executive Director  
   Kofi Annan Foundation  
   Geneva, Switzerland

7. Dr Marie V. Gibert  
   Associate Lecturer  
   Department of Geography, Environment, and Development Studies  
   Birkbeck College  
   University of London  
   England

8. Ambassador J. Anthony Holmes  
   Former Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA)  
   United States Africa Command (AFRICOM)

9. Professor Mbaya Justin Kankwenda  
   Chief Executive Officer  
   Congolese Institute for Development Research and Strategic Studies (ICREDES)  
   Kinshasa  
   Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

10. Ambassador Lazarous Kapambwe  
    Advisor  
    Economic Affairs  
    Office of the Chairperson  
    African Union (AU) Commission  
    Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

11. Professor Gilbert Khadiagala  
    Head  
    Department of International Relations  
    University of the Witwatersrand (Wits)  
    Johannesburg

12. Dr Pamela Khanakwa  
    Lecturer  
    Department of History  
    Makerere University  
    Kampala, Uganda

13. Ms Magdeline Madibela  
    Former Head  
    Gender Unit  
    South African Development Community (SADC)  
    Gaborone, Botswana
14. Ms Betty Maharaj  
Acting Deputy Director  
Office of the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region  
Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)  
Tshwane

15. Mr Siphosezwe Masango  
Chair  
Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation  
Parliament of South Africa  
Cape Town

16. Ms Kim McClure  
Deputy Public Affairs Officer  
United States Consulate-General  
Cape Town

17. Ambassador Roger Meece  
Former Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General to the Democratic Republic of the Congo  
New York, United States (US)

18. Dr David Monyae  
Co-Director  
University of Johannesburg Confucius Institute (UJCI)  
Johannesburg

19. Mr Paul Mulindwa  
Senior Project Officer  
Centre for Conflict Resolution  
Cape Town

20. Mr Daniel Munene  
Coordinator  
Education Development Unit (EDU)  
University of Cape Town (UCT)  
Cape Town

21. Ms Dawn Nagar  
Researcher  
Centre for Conflict Resolution  
Cape Town

22. Mr Sagaren Naidoo  
Director  
Department of Defence  
Tshwane

23. Dr Fritz Nganje  
Research Consultant  
Centre for Conflict Resolution  
Cape Town

24. Ambassador Welile Nhlapo  
Former Special Representative of South Africa to the Great Lakes Region  
Tshwane

25. Dr Paul Omach  
Associate Professor  
Department of Political Science and Public Administration  
Makerere University  
Kampala

26. Dr Emily Paddon Rhoads  
Post-Doctoral Researcher  
European University Institute (EUI)  
Florence, Italy

27. Ms Carina Tertsakian  
Senior Researcher  
Human Rights Watch (HRW)  
London

28. Dr Kudrat Virk  
Senior Researcher  
Centre for Conflict Resolution  
Cape Town
29. **Professor Brian Williams**  
Visiting Professor  
Peace, Mediation, and Conflict Transformation  
University of Lusaka  
Zambia

**Observers**

1. **Ms Martha de Jager**  
   Librarian  
   Centre for Conflict Resolution  
   Cape Town

2. **Ms Magnifique Nkurunziza**  
   Library Trainee  
   Centre for Conflict Resolution  
   Cape Town

3. **Mr Stephen Willenburg**  
   Senior Manager: Finance  
   Centre for Conflict Resolution  
   Cape Town

4. **Mr Francis Tazoacha**  
   Senior Project Officer  
   Centre for Conflict Resolution  
   Cape Town

**Conference Team**

1. **Ms Jill Kronenberg**  
   Personal/Research Assistant to the Executive Director  
   Centre for Conflict Resolution  
   Cape Town

2. **Ms Elizabeth Myburgh**  
   Research Officer  
   Centre for Conflict Resolution  
   Cape Town

3. **Ms Lauren October**  
   Administrative Officer  
   Centre for Conflict Resolution  
   Cape Town
## Annex III

### List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADF/NALU</td>
<td>Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (Uganda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>Africa Command (United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNUB</td>
<td>UN Office in Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCR</td>
<td>Centre for Conflict Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIAT</td>
<td>International Committee to Accompany the Transition (Comité International d’Accompagnement de la Transition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENI</td>
<td>national electoral commission (Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCMA</td>
<td>Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (United States Africa Command)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGPR</td>
<td>Democratic Green Party of Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIRCO</td>
<td>Department of International Relations and Cooperation (South Africa)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>The East African Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>The Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>The European Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDU</td>
<td>The Education Development Unit (University of Cape Town)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European Union External Action Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>EU Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUI</td>
<td>European University Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>EU Police Mission</td>
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<td>EUSEC</td>
<td>EU Security Sector Reform Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ex-FAR</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDU-Inkingi</td>
<td>Unified Democratic Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIB</td>
<td>Force Intervention Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>FNL</td>
<td>Burundi’s National Forces of Liberation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRPI</td>
<td>Ituri Patriotic Resistance Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICGLR</td>
<td>International Conference on the Great Lakes Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICREDÉS</td>
<td>Congolese Institute for Development Research and Strategic Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEMF</td>
<td>EU Interim Emergency Multinational Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>the Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISS</td>
<td>Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army (Uganda)</td>
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<tr>
<td>M23</td>
<td>M23 Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>MENUB</td>
<td>UN Electoral Observation Mission in Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFFPS</td>
<td>Women and Girls Movement for Peace and Security in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLC</td>
<td>Movement for the Liberation of Change (DRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>UN Organisation Mission in the DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSD</td>
<td>Movement for Solidarity and Democracy (Burundi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRA/M</td>
<td>National Resistance Army/Movement (Uganda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPC</td>
<td>Party for Progress and Concord (Rwanda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council (African Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS–Imberakuri</td>
<td>Social Party-Imberakuri (Uganda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCD-G</td>
<td>Congolese Rally for Democracy–Goma (DRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDC-K</td>
<td>Congolese Rally for Democracy–Kisangani (DRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECs</td>
<td>regional economic communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNC</td>
<td>Rwandan National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARChI</td>
<td>South African Research Chair of African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNR</td>
<td>National information Service of Burundi (Service National de Renseignements)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>security sector reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDPSC</td>
<td>Union for Democracy and Social Progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UJCI</td>
<td>University of Johannesburg Confucius Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>Union for the Congolese Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNISA</td>
<td>University of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Uganda People’s Defence Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wits</td>
<td>University of the Witwatersrand</td>
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Other Publications in this series
(Available at www.ccr.org.za)

VOLUME 1
THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA’S SECURITY
THE UNITED NATIONS, REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND FUTURE SECURITY THREATS IN AFRICA
The inter-related and vexing issues of political instability in Africa and international security within the framework of United Nations (UN) reform were the focus of this policy seminar, held from 21 to 23 May 2004 in Claremont, Cape Town.

VOLUME 2
SOUTH AFRICA IN AFRICA
THE POST-APARTEID DECADE
The role that South Africa has played on the African continent and the challenges that persist in South Africa’s domestic transformation 10 years into democracy were assessed at this meeting in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, from 29 July to 1 August 2004.

VOLUME 3
THE AU/NEPAD AND AFRICA’S EVOLVING GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
The state of governance and security in Africa under the African Union (AU) and The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) were analysed and assessed at this policy advisory group meeting in Misty Hills, Johannesburg, on 11 and 12 December 2004.

VOLUME 4
A MORE SECURE CONTINENT
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE UN HIGH-LEVEL PANEL REPORT, A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY
African perspectives on the United Nations (UN) High-Level Panel report on Threats, Challenges and Change were considered at this policy advisory group meeting in Somerset West, Cape Town, on 23 and 24 April 2005.

VOLUME 5
WHITHER SADC?
SOUTHERN AFRICA’S POST-APARTEID SECURITY AGENDA
The role and capacity of the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) were focused on at this meeting in Oudekraal, Cape Town, on 18 and 19 June 2005.

VOLUME 6
HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN SECURITY
AN AGENDA FOR AFRICA
The links between human security and the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa, and the potential role of African leadership and the African Union (AU) in addressing this crisis were analysed at this policy advisory group meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 9 and 10 September 2005.

VOLUME 7
BUILDING AN AFRICAN UNION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES (RECS), NEPAD AND CIVIL SOCIETY
This seminar in Cape Town, held from 20 to 22 August 2005, made policy recommendations on how African Union (AU) institutions, including The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), could achieve their aims and objectives.

VOLUME 8
THE PEACEBUILDING ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
This meeting, held in Maseru, Lesotho, on 14 and 15 October 2005, explores civil society’s role in relation to southern Africa, democratic governance, its nexus with government, and draws on comparative experiences in peacebuilding.
VOLUME 9
WOMEN AND PEACEBUILDING IN AFRICA

This meeting, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 October 2005, reviewed the progress of the implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peacebuilding in Africa in the five years since its adoption by the United Nations (UN) in 2000.

VOLUME 10
HIV/AIDS AND MILITARIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

This two-day policy advisory group seminar in Windhoek, Namibia, on 9 and 10 February 2006 examined issues of HIV/AIDS and militaries in southern Africa.

VOLUME 11
AIDS AND SOCIETY IN SOUTH AFRICA
BUILDING A COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE

This policy and research seminar, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 March 2006, developed and disseminated new knowledge on the impact of HIV/AIDS in South Africa in the three key areas of: democratic practice; sustainable development; and peace and security.

VOLUME 12
HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN SECURITY IN SOUTH AFRICA

This two-day policy seminar on 26 and 27 June 2006 took place in Cape Town and examined the scope and response to HIV/AIDS in South Africa and southern Africa from a human security perspective.

VOLUME 13
SOUTH SUDAN WITHIN A NEW SUDAN

This policy advisory group seminar on 20 and 21 April 2006 in Franschhoek, Western Cape, assessed the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/A).

VOLUME 14
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE UN PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION

This meeting, in Maputo, Mozambique, on 3 and 4 August 2006 analysed the relevance for Africa of the creation, in December 2005, of the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission, and examined how countries emerging from conflict could benefit from its establishment.

VOLUME 15
THE PEACEBUILDING ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN CENTRAL AFRICA

This sub-regional seminar, held from 10 to 12 April 2006 in Douala, Cameroon, provided an opportunity for civil society actors, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the United Nations (UN) and other relevant players to analyse and understand the causes and consequences of conflict in central Africa.

VOLUME 16
UNITED NATIONS MEDIATION EXPERIENCE IN AFRICA

This seminar held in Cape Town on 16 and 17 October 2006 sought to draw out key lessons from mediation and conflict resolution experiences in Africa, and to identify gaps in mediation support while exploring how best to fill them. It was the first regional consultation on the United Nations (UN) newly-established Mediation Support Unit (MSU).
VOLUME 17
WEST AFRICA’S EVOLVING SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
LOOKING BACK TO THE FUTURE
The conflict management challenges facing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the areas of governance, development, and security reform and post-conflict peacebuilding formed the basis of this policy seminar in Accra, Ghana, on 30 and 31 October 2006.

VOLUME 18
THE UNITED NATIONS AND AFRICA
PEACE, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN SECURITY
This policy advisory group meeting, held in Maputo, Mozambique, from 14 to 16 December 2006, set out to assess the role of the principal organs and the specialised agencies of the United Nations (UN) in Africa.

VOLUME 19
AFRICA’S RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
This policy seminar, held in Somerset West, South Africa, on 23 and 24 April 2007, interrogated issues around humanitarian intervention in Africa and the responsibility of regional governments and the international community in the face of humanitarian crises.

VOLUME 20
WOMEN IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES IN AFRICA
The objective of the seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 6 and 7 November 2006, was to discuss and identify concrete ways of engendering reconstruction and peace processes in African societies emerging from conflict.

VOLUME 21
AFRICA’S EVOLVING HUMAN RIGHTS ARCHITECTURE
The experiences and lessons from a number of human rights actors and institutions on the African continent were reviewed and analysed at this policy advisory group meeting held on 28 and 29 June 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa.

VOLUME 22
PEACE VERSUS JUSTICE?
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS AND WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS IN AFRICA
The primary goal of this policy meeting, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 May 2007, was to address the relative strengths and weaknesses of “prosecution versus amnesty” for past human rights abuses in countries transitioning from conflict to peace.

VOLUME 23
CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICTS IN AFRICA
This report, based on a policy advisory group seminar held on 12 and 13 April 2007 in Johannesburg, South Africa, examines the role of various African Union (AU) organs in monitoring the rights of children in conflict and post-conflict situations.

VOLUME 24
BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
This report is based on a seminar, held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on 29 and 30 May 2007, that sought to enhance the efforts of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to advance security governance and development initiatives in the sub-region.

VOLUME 25
AFRICA’S EVOLVING HUMAN RIGHTS ARCHITECTURE
The experiences and lessons from a number of human rights actors and institutions on the African continent were reviewed and analysed at this policy advisory group meeting held on 28 and 29 June 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa.
This seminar, held from 31 October to 1 November 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa, examined the relationship between Africa and Europe in the 21st Century, exploring the unfolding economic relationship (trade, aid and debt), peacekeeping and military cooperation, and migration.

This seminar, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 September 2007, assessed Africa’s engagement with China in the last 50 years, in light of the dramatic changes in a relationship that was historically based largely on ideological and political solidarity.

This policy advisory group meeting was held from 13 to 15 December 2007 in Stellenbosch, South Africa, and focused on six African, Asian and European case studies. These highlighted inter-related issues of concern regarding populations threatened by genocide, war crimes, ‘ethnic cleansing’, or crimes against humanity.

This meeting, held from 11 to 13 September 2008 in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, South Africa, explored critically the nature of the relationship between Africa and Europe in the political, economic, security and social spheres.

This policy research report addresses prospects for an effective response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic within the context of African peacekeeping and regional peace and security. It is based on three regional advisory group seminars that took place in Windhoek, Namibia (February 2006), Cairo, Egypt (September 2007), and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (November 2007).

This policy seminar held in Tshwane ( Pretoria), South Africa on 13 and 14 July 2009 – four months before the fourth meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) – examined systematically how Africa’s 53 states define and articulate their geo-strategic interests and policies for engaging China within FOCAC.
VOLUME 33
PEACEBUILDING IN POST-COLD WAR AFRICA
PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS
This policy research seminar held in Gaborone, Botswana from 25 to 28 August 2009 took a fresh look at the peacebuilding challenges confronting Africa and the responses of the main regional and global institutions mandated to build peace on the continent.

VOLUME 34
STABILISING SUDAN
DOMESTIC, SUB-REGIONAL, AND EXTRA-REGIONAL CHALLENGES
This policy advisory group seminar held in the Western Cape, South Africa from 23 to 24 August 2010 analysed and made concrete recommendations on the challenges facing Sudan as it approached an historic transition – the vote on self-determination for South Sudan scheduled for January 2011.

VOLUME 35
BUILDING PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
This policy seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 25 to 26 February 2010, assessed Southern Africa’s peacebuilding prospects by focusing largely on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its institutional, security, and governance challenges.

VOLUME 36
POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (DRC)
This policy advisory group seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 19 to 20 April 2010 sought to enhance the effectiveness of the Congolese government, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), civil society, the United Nations (UN), and the international community in building peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

VOLUME 37
STATE RECONSTRUCTION IN ZIMBABWE
This policy advisory group seminar held in Siavonga, Zambia, from 9 to 10 June 2011, assessed the complex interlocking challenges facing the rebuilding of Zimbabwe in relation to the economy, employment, health, education, land, security, and the role of external actors.

VOLUME 38
SOUTH AFRICA, AFRICA, AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 13 to 14 December 2011, focused on South Africa’s role on the UN Security Council; the relationship between the African Union (AU) and the Council; the politics of the Council; and its interventions in Africa.

VOLUME 39
THE EAGLE AND THE SPRINGBOK
STRENGTHENING THE NIGERIA/SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONSHIP
This policy advisory group seminar held in Lagos, Nigeria, from 9 to 10 June 2012, sought to help to ‘reset’ the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa by addressing their bilateral relations, multilateral roles, and economic and trade links.

VOLUME 40
SOUTH AFRICA IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
This policy seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 19 to 20 November 2012, considered South Africa’s region-building efforts in Southern Africa, paying particular attention to issues of peace and security, development, democratic governance, migration, food security, and the roles played by the European Union (EU) and China.
VOLUME 41
THE AFRICAN UNION AT TEN
PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS
This international colloquium held in Berlin, Germany, from 30 to 31 August 2012, reviewed the first ten years of the African Union (AU), assessed its peace and security efforts, compared it with the European Union (EU), examined the AU’s strategies to achieve socioeconomic development, and analysed its global role.

VOLUME 42
AFRICA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE UNITED NATIONS’ SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 12 to 13 December 2012, considered Africa and South Africa’s performance on the United Nations (UN) Security Council, the politics and reform of the Security Council, the impact of the African Group at the UN, and the performance of the UN Peacebuilding Commission.

VOLUME 43
GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY CHALLENGES IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTHERN AFRICA
This report considers the key governance and security challenges facing Southern Africa, with a focus on the 15-member Southern African Development Community (SADC) sub-regions progress towards democracy, and its peacekeeping, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding efforts.

VOLUME 44
ACHIEVING THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (MDGS) IN AFRICA
This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 13 and 14 May 2013, considered the progress that Africa has made towards achieving the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and sought to support African actors and institutions in shaping the post-2015 development agenda.

VOLUME 45
THE AFRICAN, CARIBBEAN, AND PACIFIC (ACP) GROUP AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU)
This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 29 to 30 October 2012, considered the nature of the relationship between the ACP Group and the EU, and the potential for their further strategic engagement, as the final five-year review of the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 between the two sides approached in 2015.

VOLUME 46
TOWARDS A NEW PAX AFRICANA
MAKING, KEEPING, AND BUILDING PEACE IN POST-COLD WAR AFRICA
This policy research seminar held in Stellenbosch, South Africa, from 28 to 30 August 2013, considered the progress being made by the African Union (AU) and Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs) in managing conflicts and operationalising the continent’s peace and security architecture, and the roles of key external actors in these efforts.

VOLUME 47
POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY AFTER TWO DECADES
This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 28 to 30 July 2013, reviewed post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy after two decades, and explored the potential leadership role that the country can play in promoting peace and security, as well as regional integration and development in Africa.

VOLUME 48
SOUTH AFRICA, AFRICA, AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS (IIAs)
This policy advisory group seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 17 to 18 February 2014 assessed the principles underpinning international investment agreements, including bilateral investment treaties (BITs), and the implications of these instruments for socio-economic development efforts in South Africa and the rest of the continent.
VOLUME 49
REGION-BUILDING AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA
This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 28 to 30 April 2014 considered the challenges and potential of Africa's regional economic communities (RECs) in promoting region-building and regional integration on the continent, including through a comparative assessment of experiences in Europe, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.

VOLUME 50
SOUTH AFRICA AND THE BRICS: PROGRESS, PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS
This policy advisory group seminar held in Tshwane, South Africa, from 30 to 31 August 2014 assessed the potential for increasing the impact of the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) Grouping on global politics, and to develop concrete recommendations in support of South Africa’s continuing engagement with the bloc.

VOLUME 51
SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION
This policy advisory group seminar held in Franschhoek, Western Cape, from 9 to 10 May 2015 assessed the obstacles to peace, security and governance in the Great Lakes region. The report assessed the political situation in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the roles of Rwanda and Uganda in the region, as well as those of regional and external actors.

VOLUME 52
REGION-BUILDING AND PEACEBUILDING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
This policy advisory group seminar held in Gaborone, Botswana, from 19 to 20 September 2015 assessed key issues relating to region-building and peacebuilding in Southern Africa, while analysing South Africa’s leadership role in the sub-region.

VOLUME 53
THE AFRICAN UNION: REGIONAL AND GLOBAL CHALLENGES
This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 27 to 29 April 2016 revisited the performance and prospects of the African Union (AU) in the areas of governance, security, socio-economic challenges, as well as assessing the AU Commission and its relations with African sub-regional organisations and external actors.
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This policy research seminar was held in Cape Town, from 19 to 20 March 2016 and convened about 30 prominent African and Western policymakers, scholars, and civil society activists to assess the major obstacles to peace and security in the Great Lakes region. From these discussions, the meeting considered five key questions: What are the main security challenges in the Great Lakes region, and how can they be resolved? What have been the main security and governance challenges in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Rwanda, and how can domestic, regional, and external actors manage these challenges more effectively? What impact will the refusal of leaders in the Great Lakes region to abide by constitutional mandates have on the political and economic stability, as well as security issues, in the region? How effective have the peacebuilding roles of the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) been in the Great Lakes region? and; What actions can key domestic, regional, and external actors take to promote sustainable democratic governance and economic development in the Great Lakes region? Finally, the March 2016 policy meeting developed ten concrete recommendations at the seminar focused on seven broad themes: Security and Governance in the Great Lakes Region; the cases of the DRC; Burundi; Rwanda; and Uganda; as well as the role of the United Nations; and that of the European Union, in the Great Lakes region.